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Abstract 
Unlike other financial services (e. g., services provided by a bank or a primary 
insurance company), reinsurers seldom deal with the consumers directly. This indirect 
relationship with the consumer results in the view that it is not necessary to regulate 
pure reinsurers to the same degree as primary insurers, because they deal only with 
other companies or individuals in the insurance business who are already subject to 
regulatory control. It is true that a reinsurer bears its own risk; however, if a reinsurer 
becomes insolvent or has not provided sufficient reserves to cover liability of 
payments, the stability of the primary insurer might be threatened and hence the 
interests of the insured parties. 
In the last decade or so, reinsurance markets have been dominated by a 
number of trends, which include an increase of the potential risk of liability of "long- 
tail" catastrophe (e. g., earthquake, hurricane and flood) and significant uncollectible 
reinsurance recoverables due to legal disputes relating to contract liability. These 
factors have affected solvency margins of primary insurers. At the same time, there 
has been a rapidly growing concern respecting "finite risk" reinsurance and 
securitisation of insurance risk, which can be tailored more specifically to the needs of 
the insurers. 
With regard to emerging markets, reinsurance regulation currently tends to be 
based on local protectionism. This has impeded the diversification of insurance risk 
and has resulted in a shortage of capital capacity to cover further risks. In addition, 
trade barriers as to reinsurance have been gradually dismantled by the efforts 
undertaken by many international negotiations and organisations (e. g., WTO and 
OECD) in recent years. On the other hand, with insurance regulation being gradually 
built, internationally on a set of pro-competitive principles designed to ensure a 
competitive, solvent and fair market, the reinsurance market is becoming more 
competitive. 
In order to establish a sound and viable regulatory regime, emerging countries 
are seeking to implement regulatory reform based on several leading regulatory 
models which have been proved effective in developed countries (e. g., the UK and 
USA models). It is evident, however, that the attempts merely to copy the "ready- 
made" law of industrialised countries will fail unless awareness of particular social, 
economic and legal differences are taken into account. 
The primary theme of this volume is that the traditional point of view that 
private reinsurers and reinsurance markets are not in need of governmental regulation 
is flawed. To the contrary, the reinsurers, reinsurance intermediaries and related 
reinsurance arrangements should be appropriately regulated to protect the solvency of 
primary insurers. Through comparative analysis of different sets of international 
regulatory principles and of experienced developed country models, this volume will 
develop and address these general regulatory issues. In order to provide and to enact a 
sound and viable regulatory system in emerging markets, however, such regulations 
should be adopted to suit the particular country circumstances and should not be 
imposed or copied en masse from existing models. In support of this proposition, the 
example of the Taiwanese reinsurance market will be used as a case study. 
Unless otherwise indicated, this volume speaks as of September 2001 
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Introduction 
Reinsurance' is mainly designed to transfer insurer's risk to reinsurerS2. In addition to 
this main purpose, other ancillary functions include improving insurers' capacitY3 of 
obtaining business, stablising insurers' profitS4, strengthening their financial 
' To achieve a satisfactory legal definition of reinsurance is more problematic, particularly in the 
definition of "subject matter" of reinsurance. It has been scrutinised that " The English authorities do 
not provide a satisfactory definition of reinsurance, and the evolution of reinsurance in its various 
forms has made it difficult to achieve a comprehensive definition. " See MacGILLIVRAY ON 
INSURANCE LAW 888 (Nicolas Legh-Jones et al. eds., 9th ed., 1997). There are several aspects to 
achieve a narrow legal definition of reinsurance. It has been proposed in the following working 
hypothesis. " (1) A reinsurance contract is a transaction involving the transfer of risk which is governed 
by the legal principle of uberrima fides. (2) The transferor (the reinsured) transfers risk to one or more 
transferees (the reinsurer/s) in consideration for the payment of money (the reinsurance premium). (3) 
The risk that the reinsured transfers may arise either (a) under a contract or contracts of insurance, or a 
contract or contracts of reinsurance, which contracts the reinsured has entered into before the making 
of the reinsurance contract; or (b) following the making of the reinsurance contract, under future 
contracts of insurance or reinsurance, which are in the contemplation of the parties at the time the 
reinsurance contract is made. (4) The reinsurance contract under which the risk is transferred is 
separate and distinct from the insurance or reinsurance contract or contracts under which the reinsured 
has assumed the risk. (5) The reinsurer may assume 100 per cent, which the reinsured has assumed, or 
will in the future assume, under a contract or contracts of insurance or reinsurance. (6) The nature and 
extent of the obligation of the reinsurer to pay money to the reinsured is defined solely by the terms of 
the particular reinsurance contract. (7) There will frequently be elements of reinsurance which do not 
constitute an acceptance of the reinsured's "insurable interests" in the underlying subject matter. " P. T. 
O'NEILL, & J. W. WOLONEECKI, THE LAW OF REINSURANCE IN ENGLAND AND 
BERMUDA 24-25. (1998). 
2 Reinsurance has been simply described as " insuring insurance". "It is (1) the business of insuring an 
insurance company or underwriter against suffering too great a loss from their insurance operations; 
and (2) allowing an insurance company or underwriter to lay off or pass on part of their liability to 
anther insurer on a given insurance which they accepted. " See ROBERT KILN & STEPHEN KILN, 
REINSURANCE IN PRACTICE I (4th ed. 2001). An insurer, however, can suffer a great loss under 
the protection of reinsurance only through laying off or transferring its risk to reinsurers,. Accordingly, 
the main function of reinsurance is to lay off (or transfer) risk to reinsurers. See generally P. T. 
O'NEILL, & J. W. WOLONIECKI supra note 1, at 3. See also KEITH RILEY, THE NUTS AND 
BOLTS OF REINSURANCE 2-3 (1997); R. PHILIPPE BELLEROSE, & KENNETH V. LOUW, 
REINSURANCE FOR THE BEGINNER 1-5 (1998); LEALIE LUCAS, JOHN McLEAN, & PETER 
GREEN, REINSURANCE MANAGEMENT 1-2. (1996); R. L. CARTER, LEALIE LUCAS, & 
NIGEL RALPH, REINSURANCE 3 (4th ed., 2000). Reinsurance also is thought of as "insurance for 
an insurance company" MICHAEL W. ELLIOTT, BERNARD L. WEBB, HOWARD N. 
ANDERSON, & PERTER R. KENSICKI, PRINCIPLES OF REINSURANCE Volume II (July 
1995). 
3 In the insurance industry, the insurance company insures the whole risk itself and transfers or lays off 
some of the amount it has accepted to other insurers or reinsurers. Through this arrangement, insurers 
can obtain business when they cannot afford to keep the whole of the insured value for its own account 
or meet the solvency margins. Such risks are numerous: aircraft, ship and satellites are some of the best 
examples. See generally R. PHILIPPE BELLEROSE, & KENNETH V. LOUW, supra note 2, at 1-2. 
4- Insurance losses sometimes fluctuate widely because of demographic, economic, social, and natural 
forces as well as simple chance. Smoothing the peaks and valleys of a primary insurer's random 
variation in loss experience helps ensure steady profits. " MICHAEL W. ELLIOTT, BERNARD L. 
WEBB, HOWARD N. ANDERSON,, & PERTER R. KENSICKI, supra note 2, at 3. For example, 
when an unexpected accumulation of losses or of single catastrophic losses occurs during the certain 
period, reinsurers will absorb these losses to smooth the peaks and valleys of insurers profits through 
the reinsurance contract. See R. PHILIPPE BELLEROSE, & KENNETH V. LOUW, supra note 2, at 
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solvency 5, and providing technical service 6. 
The object of reinsurance is to spread risk domestically or e%, cn 
7 intemationall Y. Particularly in some developing countries, foreign reinsurers with 
greater experience can support a new, growing insurer not only to increase this 
insurer's capacity, but also to improve its technical experiences (e. g., underwriting 
and pricing of products)8. Unlike other financial services (e. g., those supplied by 
banks, and primary insurance companies), reinsurers seldom deal with the consumers 
directly. "This less direct link to the consumer leads to the view that pure reinsurers 
do not need to be regulated to the same degree as insurers because they deal only with 
other companies in the insurance business who are themselves not neophytes and are 
already subject to regulatory control. 9" 
Reinsurers bear their own risk, however, if reinsurers become insolvent or 
3. (1998). See also P. T. O'NEILL, & J. W. WOLONEECKI supra note 1, at 4. KEITH RILEY, supra 
note 2, at 2-3. 
5 The example which explains how reinsurance can improve the solvency margin of insurers is as 
following: 
An insurer has capital and free reserves of $4 million. The annual premium is $ 20 million. 
The solvency ratio without reinsurance would be 20% (4 million/20 n-fillion=20%) If it has reinsurance 
which allows annual premium cession of 4 million, the net retained premium will be $16 million 
($20million less a cession of $4 million). The ration of solvency margin would increase to 25% (4 
million/16 million=25%). 
See R. PHILIPPE BELLEROSE, & KENNETH V. LOUW, supra note 2, at 4-5. See also P. T. 
O'NEILL, & J. W. WOLONIECKI, supra note 1, at 4. (1998). LEALIE LUCAS, JOHN McLEAN, & 
PETER GREEN, supra note 2, at 1-2. 
6 Insurers can obtain the knowledge from large reinsurance companies and some reinsurance brokers 
which have an international experience of insurance business, particular in some developing countries. 
The technical service which reinsurers or reinsurance brokers provide can be divided into three parts 
which are as following: 
(1) Risk underwriting-For example, nuclear insurance that requires a particular underwriting 
experience is often beyond the insurer's expertise. 
(2) Claims handling-In particular for the claims due to legal liability (e. g., professional liability, 
product liability) or the specialist classes (e. g., pollution), insurers lack skills and experience on 
these claims. 
(3) Technical research-Reinsurers often publish the results of research on technical matters to 
improve insurers' experiences. 
See LEALIE LUCAS, JOHN McLEAN, & PETER GREEN, supra note 2, at 7-8. Besides the 
technical service mentioned above, the service range also includes setting accounting procedure and the 
training of staff. Cf. R. L. CARTER, LEALIE LUCAS, & NIGEL RALPH, supra note 2, at 12. 
7 For example, if a catastrophe (e. g., earthquake, flood, and hurricane) occurs in one country and causes 
huge losses beyond the capacity of this country, it is necessary to transfer the catastrophe risk to a 
number of foreign reinsurers who can share the risk before the earthquake occurs. Reinsurance can be 
thought as a "worldwide risk sharing" tool. MICHAEL W. ELLIOTT, BERNARD L. WEBB, 
HOWARD N. ANDERSON,, & PERTER R. KENSICKI, supra note 2, at 12. 
8 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, SUPERVISION OF 
INSURANCE SUPERVISION OF INSURANCE OPERATIONS-A MANUAL TRAINEE STAFF 
OF INSURANCE SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES, Module 3, at 14 (1996). 
9 P. T. O'NEILL, & J. W. WOLONEECKI, supra note 1, at 660. 
1) 
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have not provided sufficient resources to cover liability of payments, the stability of 
the primary insurers would be threatened and hence the interests of the Insured 
parties. In the last decade or so, the global reinsurance market has been dominated by 
several significant trends, including the crisis in US liability insurancelo and 
exceptional losses from natural catastrophe (e. g., earthquake, hurricane and flood)". 
These changes have impaired the financial condition of many reinsurers 12 and have 
resulted in an increase of legal disputes between reinsurers and primary insurers' 3. 
These adverse impacts have consequently affected adversely the solvency margins of 
"ceding" insurance companies. Mstorical evidence shows that several significant 
insolvency cases have resulted in uncollectible reinsurance for primary insurers 
during the 1980s 14 . This illustrates the importance of reinsurance collection' 
5 in the 
context of solvency of primary insurers 16 and the necessity for supervision of 
10 During 1980s, the loss ratios in the US liability insurance rose dramatically due to higher claims 
relating to asbestos and environmental impairment loss. The trend in US court rulings to grant 
increasingly higher compensation to injured parties exacerbated the existing problems. These major 
changes consequently caused insurers to unexpectedly increase their loss reserve, and "the legal 
uncertainties in the writing of new business led to severe capacity shortage in the US insurance market 
and in the reinsurance market especially. " See Swiss Re, The Global Reinsurance Market In The Midst 
Of Consolidation, 9 SIGMA 1,12 (September/ 1998). 
11 In the last ten years, the property insurance industry in the USA market has paid out over $60 billion 
in losses due to increasingly severe catastrophes such as hurricane Andrew (1992, $16 billion), the 
Northridge earthquake (1994, $12.5 billion), hurricane Opal (1995, $2.1 billion), and hurricane Fran 
(1996, $1.6 billion). See Michael S. Canter, Joseph B. Cole and Richard L. Sandor, Insurance 
Derivatives: A New Asset Class for the Capital Markets and a New Hedging Tool for the Insurance 
Industry, Hedge Financial Products Inc. (last visited 10 March, 2002) available at 
<http: //www. cnare. com/rescenter/s2k-reports/s2k-insderivatives. htm>. 
12 See R. C. L. Bakker and H. J. M. Teeuwen, The MIS Survey on Reinsurance Supervision: An 
Overview of the Finding, 23 THE GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND INSURANCE NO. 89, at 613 
(Oct/1998). See also Swiss Re, supra note 10, at p. 14. 
13 In the insolvency cases of Mission and Integrity in 1984 to 1988, the US House of Representatives 
Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Staff Memorandum on the 
Subcommittee's investigations of the failures, states, both insurers used complex arrangements 
involving hundreds of reinsurers around the world to transfer most of the risk on the extremely 
unprofitable business they were underwriting. When huge losses started to accrue, Mission and 
Integrity were required to pay the entire amounts because their reinsurers refused to pay. The reinsurers 
have alleged fraud and misrepresentation as justification for not paying, but the ultimate result was to 
force Mission and Integrity into bankruptcy because of their inability to collect reinsurance proceeds. " 
See JOHN MILLIGAN-WHYTE, G. L. SMITH, & STEPHEN LEWIS, Transnational Aspects Of 
Insurance And Reinsurance Insolvencies: An Introductory Overview Of Selected Issues From 
Bermudian, American, And English Perspectives, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY, US - 
CANADIAN BUSINESS LITIGATION ISSUES: A COMPARATIVE VIEW 327, at 344-345(The 
American Law Institute, C475 ALI-ABA 327,16 Nov. 1989). 
14 See MICHAEL W. ELLIOTT, BERNARD L. WEBB, HOWARD N. ANDERSON,, & PERTER 
R. KENSICKI, PRINCIPLES OF REINSURANCE Volume 11193 (July 1995). 
15 In brief, the issue of reinsurance collection falls into two categories: one is that reinsurers do not 
have the ability to pay because of insolvency of reinsurers; the other is that reinsurers will not pay due 
to legal dispute arising from the reinsurance contracts. See LEALIE LUCAS, JOHN McLEAN, & 
PETER GREEN, supra note 2, at 4. 
16 Some articles indicate that the reinsurance collection is one of the causes of insolvencies. "There are 
3 
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reinsurance activities. Under such a scenario, for the purpose of consolidating the 
solvency margin of insurers in the reinsurance operations, it is essential for insurers 
and their regulators to concentrate on the evaluating reinsurers' solvency. 
At the same time, there is an innovative reinsurance product that was known 
as "financial reinsurance" during 1980s and is now frequently expressed in the term- 
"finite risk reinsurance" 17 . As the use of this arrangement especially could optimize 
the reinsurer's balance sheet and could contradict the "true and fair view" insurance 
accounting principle in some cases, it is gaining increasing attention from supervisors 
and tax authorities. The initial function of reinsurance is to transfer liability for 
potential future losses arising from actual insurance underwriting risks' 8 along with 
the premium corresponding to such risk. Finite risk reinsurance, however, mainly 
transfers finite risk19 that could affect the reality of future profits (e. g., investment and 
interest profits) of insurance companies from future loss payments through 
deterioration of the insurers' loss reserves. This controversial type of reinsurance 
contract today plays an important role in the issue of reinsurance regulations and 
several key factors common to insolvent companies. LInefficiencies in middle and upper management; 
2. Poor planning; 3. Rapid over-expansion and diversification; 4. Under-capitalisation; 5. Poor 
investment policies; 6. Inadequate pricing; 7. Under reserving; 8. Failure on the part of management to 
monitor managing general agents; and 9. Inability of ceding companies to collect reinsurance 
recoverables. " See FRANCINE L. SEMAYA & JOHN S. PAK, Reinsurance Litigation: Current 
Issues and Strategies-Current Trends in the Regulation of Reinsurance Insolvencies, in 
REINSURANCE LITIGATION 1995,51, at 54-55. (Reinsuarnce Ligation and Arbitration, 
Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook Series, 717 PLI/Comm 5 1, Practising Law Institute, 
May 1995). According to the AM Best's report, reinsurance collection is also a primary cause of 
insolvency. This report describes 8 primary causes of insolvencies. 1. Deficient loss 
reserves (Inadequate pricing); 2. Rapid growth; 3. Alleged Fraud; 4. Overstated assets; 5. Significant 
change in Business; 6. Reinsurance Failure; 7. Catastrophe losses; and 8. Impaired affiliate. See 
A. M. BEST, Insolvency: Will Historic Trends Return in A. M. BEST SPECIAL REPORT February 
1999, at 1-5 (Martin P. Sheffield, et al. eds., Feb., 1999). 
17 "Finite risk and financial reinsurance are synonymous because a very limited amount of risk, 
underwriting risk, is transferred along with the financial concern. " ROSS PHIFER, REINSURANCE 
FUNDAMENTALS -TREATY AND FACULTATIVE, 99 (1996). The expression "finite risk" is now 
frequently used as an equivalent for or alternative to "financial reinsurance". See P. T. O'NEELL, & J. 
W. WOLONIECKI, supra note 1, at 660. "While underwriting risk played only a subordinate role in 
(pure) financial reinsurance contracts up to the beginning of the nineties, it has meanwhile become an 
integral component of finite risk reinsurance. " See also Swiss Re, Alternative Risk Transfer via Finite 
Risk Reinsurance: An Effective Contribution To The Stability Of The Insurance Industry, 5 SIGMA 1, 
11 (1997). 
18 "Underwriting risk is against the resulting economic damage from a defined peril, which may range 
from smoke damage to hurricane wind, from slander to malpractice. " ROSS PHIFER, id at 99. 
19 There are several types of finite risk. For example, investment return risk is the uncertainty as to the 
ultimate investment return which a reinsurer will earn, other than by reason of the timing risk, on net 
moneys accruing under a reinsurance contract. See THE INSTITUTE OF CHARTERED 
ACCOUNTANTS IN ENGLAND AND WALES, ACCOUNTING FOR NON-LiFE FINANCIAL 
REINSURANCE: A DISCUSSION PAPER 6 (1992). 
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. 
In addition to finite risk reinsurance, the securitisation of insurance risk has 
raised considerable concerns for investors, insurance undertakings, regulators, and 
accountants since the major landmark insurance- linked securities carrying a "rating" 
on the underlying catastrophe risk-USAA (United Services Automobile Associations 
as a primary insurer) and Residential Reinsurance (as a reinsurer) was launched in 
June 1997 21 . In general, a "special purpose vehicle" is created not only to provide 
reinsurance coverage for the ceding insurers but also to issue insurance-linked 
securities to the investors. A trust is also created for collecting funds from the 
investors while the ceding insurer pays a premium to the SPV in exchange for 
reinsurance coverage. The ultimate return can be based on the actual loss of the 
ceding insurer, the performance of the related index, the occurrence or non-occurrence 
of the specific event, or the physical parameters of the natural hazard 22 . 
As a result of the dramatic increase in these securitisation transactions, 
regulators have been challenged significantly to develop an appropriate regulatory 
approach to supervise these activities. 
With regard to emerging markets, reinsurance regulation tends to be based 
largely on local protectionism. This has impeded the diversification of insurance risks 
and has resulted in a shortage of "capacity" in these markets. Yet, globally, the trade 
barriers on reinsurance have been gradually dismantled by the efforts undertaken in 
various international negotiations and in various international organisations in recent 
years. Further, globally, insurance regulation is being gradually built on a set of pro- 
competitive principles designed to ensure a competitive, solvent and fair market; and 
in fact, the reinsurance market seems globally to be more competitive than before. 
Thus, particularly in emerging markets, it is becoming essential to establish a 
20 For example, the insurance Committee in the OECD discusses major recent policy issues in solvency 
regulations which include financial reinsurance. See OECD, INSURANCE IN FINANCIAL, 
INVESTMENT, TAXATION AND COMPETITION, at 3, (last visited 12 April 1998) available at 
http: //www. oecd-or. -, /search97cRi/s97 cgi 
21 By gaining "double B" ratings from the main rating agencies, this transaction successfully 
represented that insurance-linked securities had become the significant part of investment grade 
securities and had opened up the market to diversify the investors' portfolio. See GARRY BOOTH & 
CHARLES ALLARD, INSURANCE RISK SECURITIES- A GUIDE FOR ISSUERS AND 
INVESTORS 17 (1999). See also Michael S. Canter, Joseph B. Cole, and Richard L. Sandor,, supra 
note 11. 
22 See Eduardo Canabarro, Markus Finkemeier, Richard R. Anderson & Fouad Bendimerad, Analyzilig 
Insurance-linked Securities, FINANCING RISK & REINSURANCE, September 1999, at 5(1999). 
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comprehensive and viable regulatory system to provide a "safe and sound" flooring to 
this increasingly liberalised and competitive environment. 
In order to establish a sound and viable regulatory regime, emerging countries 
have sought to draw from several leading regulatory models, which have been proved 
effective in developed countries (e. g., in the UK and USA). It is evident, however, 
that the attempts to copy literally and uncritically the "ready-made" law of 
industrialised countries will fail unless awareness of social, economic and legal 
differences has been taken into account23. In terms of reinsurance regulation in 
emerging markets, adaptation of developed models and international regulatory 
principles should take into account the particular market characteristics and legal 
differences in a particular emerging market. 
The primary theme of this volume is that the traditional point of view that 
private reinsurers and reinsurance markets are not in need of governmental regulation 
is flawed; to the contrary, reinsurers and related reinsurance arrangements should be 
appropriately regulated to protect the solvency of primary insurers. Analyses of 
international regulatory principles and experienced developed country models will 
help address these general regulatory issues. In order to provide and to enact a sound 
and viable regulatory system in emerging markets for reinsurance, however, such 
regulations should be adapted to the particular circumstances and should not simply 
be imposed or copied wholly all from the existing models. 
In support of this proposition, the example of the Taiwanese reinsurance 
market will be used as a "case study". In the case of Taiwan, which has common 
characteristics with many other emerging markets, there is a pre-existing regulatory 
system and a particular market environment that can not be ignored. With regard to 
the Taiwanese reinsurance market, the trends and lessons arising from the recent Asia 
financial crisis and liberalisation of trade in financial services will also be addressed. 
The current emphasis on fundamental financial sector reform in Asian 
economieS24 has had a striking impact on the expansion plans of many insurers and 
reinsurers in its Asia-Pacific area. Also, influencing such plans are several major 
23 See JOSEPH J. NORTON, FINANCIAL SECTOR LAW REFORM IN EMERGING 
ECONOMIES 130-132 (2000). 
24 See THOMAS J. T. BALINO, CHARLES ENOCH, ANNE MARIE GULDE, CARL-JOHAN 
LONDGREN, MARC QUINTYN, & LESLIE TEO, ADVANCE COPY: FINANCIAL SECTOR 
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trends: e. g., deregulation occurring in a number of emerging markets, the potential 
reduction of restrictions on financial service transaction worldwide, and the 
implementation of the World Trade Organization agreement ("GATS") calling for the 
dismantling of barriers to trade in financial service by countries participating in this 
agreement 25. Due to these trends, non-life reinsurance demand has continued to rise 
and real growth in "cession volume" is even higher than that in direct premiums 26 in 
recent years. All this makes the Asia-Pacific market increasingly importan t in global 
reinsurance market. In 1997, Asia-Pacific's share of global ceded business in non-life 
reinsurance market reached 12.1%27. With regard to the reinsurance market in Taiwan, 
which plays an important role in this region, the average rate of risk retention in the 
last decade is about 50%28 . The transfer (ceding) of risk abroad is now a common 
industry market practice in Taiwan. Yet, as a matter of fact, the regulation of 
reinsurance in Taiwan still appears less developed than in developed countries. It is 
accordingly essential to introduce an adequate regulatory framework for reinsurance, 
inter alia to protect solvency of insurers in Taiwan. This is needed to maintain the 
continued stable operation of the Taiwanese insurance and reinsurance market, as well 
as of the Taiwanese economy as a whole. 
For comparative purposes, this volume will explore selective developed 
models for reinsurance regulations and will analyse the related regulatory issues 
especially with regard to solvency requirement of insurers in reinsurance 
arrangements. Drawing from these models, this volume will recommend possible 
regulatory reform as to the current Taiwanese reinsurance regulation, taking into 
account its particular economic environment and legal system. From this, broader 
lessons may be learned by other emerging economies 
To facilitate the development of its primary and related themes, this volume 
will be organised into five chapters. In order to provide a theoretical basis for 
examining the main issues in the succeeding Chapters, Chapter One will analyse the 
CRISIS AND RESTRUCTING: LESSON FROM ASIA 5 International Monetary Fund (Sept. /1999). 
25 See A GUY CARPENTER, GLOBAL REINSURANCE ANALYSIS 1998-A GUY CARPENTER 
SPECIAL REPORT 32 (Sept. 1998). 
26 Over the period 1990-1997, the growth in cession volume is about 10.5%. But, the growth in direct 
premium is only about 8%. See Swiss Re, supra note 17, at 7. 
27 Swiss Re, supra note 17, at 5. 
28 For example, reinsurance premium ceded abroad accounted for 45.38% of total direct written 
premium of the industry in 1996. 
See TAIPEI INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, FACT BOOK 1996-NON-LIFE INSURANCE IN 
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purposes of reinsurance regulation and possible regulatory models currently available 
from several developed regulations. The first part of Chapter One considers the 
purposes of reinsurance regulation along with the current global trends of 
liberalisation of reinsurance and harmonisation of insurance regulation. Taking into 
account particular market characteristics, the essential purposes of reinsurance 
regulation for emerging economies will be suggested. The second part of Chapter One 
then turns to a discussion of the current available models in developed countries as 
well as the international supervisory principles issued by the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and by the International 
Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS). In search for an appropriate regulatory 
model, it is observed that emerging countries may face a critical balance between the 
security of reinsurance and the diversification of insurance risk. In addition, it is 
argued that some developed models might not be appropriate for emerging countries 
with a shortage of reinsurance. As a result, it is suggested that the regulation of 
reinsurance arrangements of primary insurers, as well as the assessment of the 
financial condition of foreign reinsurers should be enhanced. 
Based on the above discussion and analysis, the author will use the Taiwanese 
reinsurance market as a case study for identifying the potential problems in 
reinsurance regulation in Taiwan, and in emerging economies more generally. 
In order to discern an appropriate framework of reinsurance regulation, 
Chapters Two, Three and Four will consider in more details the specific problems 
with regard to reinsurers, reinsurance arrangements of insurance, reinsurance 
intermediaries and alternative risk transfer relating to finite risk reinsurance and 
securitisation of insurance risk. 
Chapter Two mainly deals with the regulation of reinsurers and the regulation 
of primary insurers' reinsurance arrangements. In terms of regulation of reinsurers, it 
is difficult to decide upon an appropriate regulatory structure to enable domestic 
insurers to benefit from the liberalisation of reinsurance without endangering the 
recoverability of reinsurance. In general, regulation of reinsurers can be categonsed 
into two regulatory approaches: direct supervision of reinsurers and indirect 
supervision of reinsurers by way of supervision of reinsurance policies of primary 
insurers. In terms of direct supervision of reinsurers, all the reinsurers who intend to 
TAIWAN R. O. C., at 14 (1997). 
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carry on reinsurance business should obtain authorisation or license from the 
insurance regulators. In such an approach, the reinsurers should meet the regulatory 
requirements in relation to corporate structure, capital requirements, financial 
solvency requirements, and the relevant obligation to submit their financial 
statements. 
On the other hand, indirect supervision of reinsurance means that the 
insurance regulators give emphasis to the reinsurance policies of the primary insurers 
rather than to the reinsurers. In the case of this indirect regulatory approach, the 
insurance regulators monitor and supervise reinsurance arrangements of primary 
insurers. For liberalization of reinsurance business to benefit emerging markets, 
regulatory reform will be crucial for maintaining the financial solvency of primary 
insurers. In essence, the financial condition of reinsurers should be the main concern 
for regulators and primary insurers. 
However, the regulators face a dilemma between the strict direct regulation of 
reinsurers and freedom of reinsurance transactions. In supervising reinsurers directly, 
regulators can efficiently monitor reinsurers and primary insurers can assess the 
quality of reinsurance more accurately. In contrast, the direct regulation of reinsurers 
may have adverse impact on the reinsurance business and may impede the 
diversification of insurance risks. As an alternative regulatory approach that can 
ensure the stability of insurance market, it appears that the indirect regulation of 
reinsurers would be more appropriate for emerging markets to adopt. However, it is 
argued that the indirect regulatory approach to regulate reinsurers also may have flaws 
in its character if the following aspects have not been considered. First, as a 
fundamental and evident precondition, reinsurers should be licensed and subject to 
meaningful prudential regulation in the respective domiciled countries; the regulatory 
approach should be based on "mutual recognition", with a similar regulatory regime 
being considered for the regulation of reinsurers. Second, such a regulatory system 
should be "harmonized" and based on prevailing internationally accepted prudential 
regulatory standards. Appropriate governmental supervision of reinsurers is important 
for reviewing the capital adequacy, solvency and professional competence of 
reinsurers. An indirect regulation model will be successful only if it is properly 
structured and takes into account the supervision of foreign reinsurers who already are 
subject (hopefully) to similar international based regulatory requirements. Third, 
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given that the harmonization of reinsurance regulation would contribute to the 
stability of global insurance markets and the evaluation of the "security" (i. e., the 
creditworthiness and financial viability) of reinsurers, the regulatory standards 
accepted by countries intending to enhance this international regulatory cooperation 
should not seek the lowest common denominator of regulatory and supervisory 
standards. 
While liberalisation of reinsurance services would benefit the diversification 
of insurance risks in emerging markets, it is crucial to ensure the security of 
reinsurance. In the second part of Chapter Two, selective issues relating to primary 
insurers' reinsurance arrangements will be discussed. The assessment of reinsurers 
will be first introduced to provide comprehensive criteria concerning the 
creditworthiness/security of reinsurance. Consequently, the implementation of 
appropriate regulation concerning the creditworthiness/security of reinsurance will be 
discussed. As the amount of reinsurance may be used to reduce the required technical 
provisions (or loss reserves) designed to meet the claims from the policyholders, the 
regulatory approaches concerning creditworthiness/security of reinsurers generally are 
considered under the framework of solvency regulation. In addition to the quality and 
appropriateness of governmental supervision, the quality and appropriateness of 
corporate governance and internal controls regarding the creditworthiness/secunty of 
reinsurance should be considered to ensure the financial solvency of primary insurers. 
Following upon these discussions, it is argued that the US approach addressing the 
creditworthiness/security of reinsurers licensed and domiciled abroad might lead to 
undue restriction on the free movement of international reinsurance transactions. On 
the other hand, it is suggested that the Mexican approach concerning the reliance of 
reinsurers on external rating agencies may be more appropriate for emerging markets 
to maintain the financial stability of primary insurers, although there are some flaws 
in this approach also. 
While international supervisory standards, which have been increasingly 
developed in recent years, propose to harmonise or to converge reinsurance regulation 
to establish a "single passport system" throughout the world 29 , the major obstacles 
facing this single license concept will be emphasized. The third part of this Chapter 
29 See 1AIS-Working Group on Reinsurance, Reinsurance and Reinsurers: Relevant Issues and 
Establishing General Supervisory Principles Standard and Practices, (2000), at 6-7. (last visited 
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identifies several weakness and major problems relating to this recommendation 30 
made by the Reinsurance Subcommittee of the IAIS. 
As the insurance regulators and ceding insurers struggle to ensure a critical 
balance between efficiency of reinsurance and security of reinsurance, the framework 
of regulation of reinsurance should be properly structured and should take account of 
particular market characteristics and legal systems. While the shortage of reinsurance 
is the main issue in emerging markets, insurance regulators should consider an 
appropriate regulatory approach concerning the security of reinsurance while 
minimising the adverse burdens caused by the regulation. In this regard, the fourth 
section of Chapter Two addresses essential aspects for appropriate reinsurance 
regulation and supervision in emerging markets. 
A reinsurance intermediary, also known as a reinsurance broker 31 , generally 
acts as a conduit in the arrangment of reinsurance contracts and as an administrator of 
the reinsurance contract, claims negotiation and collection 32 . However, these 
intermediaries do not merely engage in arranging reinsurance for the ceding insurers 
but also accept or underwrite reinsurance business on behalf of the reinsurers 33 . In 
emerging markets, these intermediaries may be expected to provide their expertise in 
relevant insurance law and regulation and to assist domestic insurers in identifying 
their exposure. Moreover, they may be involved with arranging reciprocal exchanges 
October 20 2001) available at http: //www. iaisweb. orp,. 
30 id. 
31 It has been observed that "At the present time, particularly in reinsurance treaties, brokers are 
frequently referred to as intermediaries, a name perhaps slightly more elevated than broker. " See P. T. 
O'NEILL, & J. W. WOLONIECKI, supra note 1, at 333. It also has been argued in England that "the 
term of intermediary, although it is commonly used in reinsurance, has no legal definition, and in law a 
broker is an agent. " BARLOW LYDE & GILBERT, REINSURANCE PRACTICE AND THE LAW, 
2-2 (LLP, Service Issue No. 16-1 April 2000). It should be noted, however, that the term of reinsurance 
intermediary does not merely include the reinsurance broker who generally is deemed as the agent of 
insurers, but also include the underwriting agent who acts as the agent of the reinsurers and are known 
as managing general agents (M[GAs) in the United States. As a result, this chapter will not only draw 
on the regulatory issues arising from the reinsurance brokers but will discuss issues relating to the 
underwriting agents. 
32 See John S. Diaconis, Introductory Comments and Basic Overview of Reinsurance Term, in 
REINSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE: NEW LEGAL AND BUSINESS DEVELOPMENTS IN A 
CHANGING GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 1998, at 25 (Practising Law Institute-Commercial Law and 
Practice Course Handbook Series, PLI Order No. A4-4548,778 PLI/COM[M[ 7, October 1998). 
33 R. L. CARTER, LEALIE LUCAS, & NIGEL RALPH, supra note 2, at 55. In some cases, the 
brokers hold a binding authority to assess and assume risk on the behalf of reinsurers. 
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34 
of reinsurance business 
As a result of these functions provided by reinsurance intermediaries, possible 
risks may anse if these intermediaries are not subject to proper regulation and 
supervision. Chapter Three considers the reinsurance intermediaries and their 
influence on financial solvency and stability of insurers. This consideration is made 
from a comparative analysis of leading regulatory models vis-a-vis establishing an 
appropriate regulatory infrastructure that might be applied in the insurance industry in 
developing countries such as Taiwan. Section I and 2 consider the general duty of 
reinsurance intermediaries and address the essentiality of regulation of reinsurance 
intermediaries, as well as the relevant, related regulatory issues. Section 3 then 
discusses the related experience of several leading regulatory models. The concluding 
observations in this Chapter suggest a possible regulatory infrastructure for 
maintaining financial stability of emerging insurance markets in emerging economies. 
As the increasing number of alternative risk transfer transactions raise 
considerable concern for regulators, investors, insurance undertakings and other 
financial institutions, Chapter Four will discuss two innovative instruments relating to 
reinsurance regulation- finite risk reinsurance and securitisation of insurance risk. 
With regard to finite risk reinsurance, Chapter Four illustrates the nature of 
finite risk reinsurance and the current regulatory models. Based on a comparative 
analysis, it is argued that "timing risk" alone is sufficient to constitute a reinsurance 
contract because the timing risk ansing from the uncertainty of liability payment for 
policyholders will significantly affect the capacity of the ceding insurers. In addition, 
this Chapter makes several recommendations for development of an appropriate 
regulatory approach. First, the issue relating to the "economic substance" of 
transactions should take into account the terms of contracts that may affect the loss 
payment from the reinsurers and further reinsurance premiums paid by ceding 
insurers 35 . The criteria regarding the economic substance of a reinsurance contract 
also should take into account the terms of reinsurance contracts as a whole and should 
analyse the financial outcome relating to this transaction. Second, the 
34 Id. at 56-57. 
35 For instance, experience account, the premium payable estimated by reference to a stated or implied 
interest rate, a return of profit commission, cancellation or co mmutation provisions that would r esult in 
a loss to the ceding insurers. 
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creditworthiness/security of reinsurance transactions should be emphasised because 
these transactions often involve huge amounts of reinsurance premiums and the 
payments will be distributed over several years 36 . The financial condition of reinsurer 
will have a significant impact on reinsurance recoveries. 
Furthermore, reinsurers who speciallse in the area of finite risk reinsurance are 
often located and registered in less stringent regulated jurisdiction such as Bermuda 
and the Cayman Islands. This has increased concerns for the security of reinsurance 
transactions. The regulators should be able to assess the financial viability of the 
reinsurers. 
Third, the adequacy of loss reserves should be considered even though the 
reinsurance transaction meets the risk transfer criteria. As previously discussed main 
practical advantage of finite risk reinsurance is the reduction of loss reserves after 
finite risk reinsurance cover has been provided. As finite risk reinsurance may lead to 
an inadequacy of loss reserves, it is crucial to develop methods to estimate the extra 
reserves needed and to analyse the possible effect of the terms of contracts on 
insurer's financial solvency. 
The second part of Chapter Four discusses the securitisation of insurance risks. 
The basics of securitisation, paying particular attention to the advantages and 
disadvantages of these transactions, will be identified. This will be followed by a 
discussion of selective regulatory issues concerning issuance of insurance-linked 
securities, the structure of special purpose reinsurers and reinsurance contracts. As 
several countries have developed relevant regulations in that area, the next section 
will review these models. Finally, a suggestion for the development of a legal 
infrastructure will be submitted as to the potential problems arising from insurance- 
linked securities. 
In Chapter Five, the Taiwanese insurance market will be followed by a "case 
study" for identifying the potential problems of and providing the suggestions for 
developing an appropriate regulatory system relating to reinsurance in emerging 
market. In this regard, this Chapter will introduce the current Taiwanese insurance 
regulatory regime and will address Taiwanese recent financial regulatory reform in 
36 For example, under the loss portfolio transfer agreements, the payment of reinsurance recoveries are 
structured on a financial loss and distributed along with the investment income during the covered 
period. 
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this area. With regard to particular market characteristics in Taiwan, the Taiwanese 
insurance market relies on the international reinsurance market to extend its limited 
capital capacity to underwrite insurance risks and to stabilize the development of 
domestic economy. Due to lack of reinsurers in Taiwan, the main issue relating to 
reinsurance regulation is to establish an appropriate regulatory regime to maintain the 
financial solvency of primary insurers. It should be noted, however that certain 
developed regulatory country models might not be appropriate for an emerging 
market with a shortage of reinsurance. Taking into account the particular regulatory 
environment and market characteristics, suggestions will be provided for potential 
solutions for the regulatory reform in the reinsurance sector in Taiwan. A number of 
recommendation will be developed concerning the introduction of a new framework 
for the regulation of reinsurance in Taiwan-this, in particular, will draw on the main 
lessons from countries-U. K., U. S. A., the EU, and other international organisations 
as well as the operations and development of the main international insurance 
markets. From this analysis, broader lessons will be drawn as to appropriate 
reinsurance regulation in emerging markets generally. 
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Chapter One 
Purposes and Structures of Reinsurance Regulation: A 
Comparative Study 
Most of insurance regulations have as their basis a special public interest', which is 
composed of many elements related to different aspects of the underlying insurance 
1 The insurance regulation could be justified by several theories of regulation, which include the public 
interest theory, the interest group theory, the private interest theory (economic theory), the institutional 
theory, and the political theory. Although the public interest theory has generated growing currency for 
justifying the insurance regulation in recent years, in fact, it is well recognised that the public interest 
theory has often been used to explain the existence and implementation of insurance regulation. 
Firstly, the main theme of the public theory is that regulator acts in pursuit of public rather than private 
interests. See generally C. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING 
THE REGULATORY STATE (Cambridge, Mass., 1990). 
Secondly, the interest group theory assumes that regulation is a product of relationships between 
groups and with the state. See generally B. MITCHELL, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
REGULATION 100 (New York 1980). 
Thirdly, the most important support of the economic theory of regulation, began with an article on 
the theory of economic regulation" by George Stigler in 197 1, which integrates the analysis of political 
behavior with the large body of economic analysis. "The major theoretical development of this theory 
has been an article by Peltzman in 1976 and Gary Becker in 1983. " See S. Peltzman, The Economic 
theory of Regulation after a Decade of Regulation, BROKKINGS PAPERS ON 
MICROECONOMICS, I Brookings Institution (1989), reprinted in A READER ON REGULATION 
93 (Robert Baldwin, ed. Oxford, 1998). See also S. Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of 
Regulation, 119 JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMIC, at 211-240 (August 1976), and Gary 
Backer, A Theory of competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 QUARTERLY 
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, at 371-400 (August 1983). Because of its feature that the politicians are 
presumed to be self-interested maximizers, some articles name the economic theory as private interest 
theory. See A. OGUS, REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC THEORY 3-4 (Oxford 
University Press, 1994). See also J. FRANCIS, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION: A 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Blackwell Publishers 1993); P. L. Joskow, & R. G. Noll, 
Regulation in Theory and Practice: An Overview, in STUDIES IN PUBLIC REGULATION, at 35-40 
(G. Fromm ed. 198 1). 
"Institutionalist Theorists centre on the notion that institutional structure and arrangements, as well as 
social processes, significantly shape regulation, and that there is more driving regulatory developments 
than mere aggregations of individuals' preferences. Individual actors are seen by institutional i sts as 
influenced by rules as well as organisational and social settings, rather than as pure rational choice 
maximizers(unlike private interest theory), and as having preferences that are influenced by 
institutional procedures, principles, expectations, and norms that are encountered in cultural and 
historical frame works. " R. BALDWIN & MARTIN CAVE, UNDERSTANDING REGULATION: 
THEORY, STRATEGY AND PRACTICE 27 (Oxford, 1999). See also THE NEW 
INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (W. Powell and P. Di Maggio, eds., 
Chicago 1991); B. LEVY & T. P. SPILLER, REGULATIONS, INSTITUTIONS AND 
COMMITMENT (Cambridge, 199 1). 
The main element of the public theory is that regulatory policies are shaped in "the interaction of 
political institution with in an environment that influences the abilities of these institutions, including 
the insurance industry, consumers of different kinds, regulatory bureaucrats and political elites, to use 
their political resources effectively. " All of these groups are presumed to be self-interested maximizers. 
See generallýy K. J. MEIER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION-THE CASE OF 
INSURANCE 27-32 (State University of New York Press, 1988). 
Regulatory theory has developed in so many approaches and traditional academic boundaries have 
been crossed between such disciplines as law, political science, and economics. The concept of public 
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transaction and of the organisations through which the business of insurance is 
transacted. Achieving a satisfactory and comprehensive definition of the "public 
interest" in the regulation of insurance of a country is problematic as it depends on 
each country's specific market, economic, political and legal circumstances 2. 
Nevertheless, the concept of "public interest" in the insurance regulation was 
expressed early in Gennan Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis 3 in United States since 1914, 
and in the official reasons accompanying the proposal for the Insurance Supervision 
Law in Germany in 19004. 
Reinsurance is mainly designed to transfer insurer's risk to reinsurers. The 
primary insurer has to prudently consider in each case "whether reinsurance with the 
intended reinsurer will result in claims being paid perhaps decades after the risk is 
placed . 
5" The primary insurer must be careful to disclose all material facts and to 
consider prudently the contractual terms and conditions. Any breach of contractual 
duties by a primary insurer may result in a legal dispute or, may enable reinsurers to 
repudiate liability. Even if all claims are ultimately met in full according to the terms 
and conditions, a reinsurer in financial difficulties or which is insolvent may not have 
provided sufficient resource to cover liability of payments 6. Thus, the stability of the 
primary insurers would be threatened and so would be the public interests (e. g., 
insured party, the stockholder of insurance company, and financial system. ). 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the general issues relating to the 
regulation of reinsurance as to provide a basis for the thematic analysis in the 
following chapters. To facilitate this task, this chapter is divided into three main 
interest is not the single method to justify existing regulation. This volume will not drawn on the 
arguments of regulatory theories, but will pay more attention on the control of risks caused by 
reinsurance transactions through regulations. 
2 WERNER PFENNIGSTORF, PUBLIC LAW OF INSURANCE, INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW VOL. 6 COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS AND 
INSTITUTIONS CHAPTER 7,16 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996). 
3 German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389(1914). 
4 "... [T]he public interest has an especially large stake in a prosperous and solid development of the 
insurance business, and imposes on the government a duty of special care in this field. " See Entwurf 
eines Gesetzes ueber die privaten Versicherungsunternehmungen: Stenographishe Berishte ueber die 
Verhandlungen des Reichtstages, X. Legislaturperiode. II. Session, 1. Anglageband Nr. 5 (Berlin 1900) 
at 35, translated by WERNER PFENNIGSTORF, supra note 2, at 16. 
5 P. T. O'NEILL, & J. W. WOLONIECKI THE LAW OF REINSURANCE IN ENGLAND AND 
BERMUDA 160 (1998). 
6 Peter Falush, The Development Of Reinsurance Markets In The Economies In Transition, in Insurance 
Regulation and Supervision in Economies in Transition: Second East-West Conference on Insurance 
Systems in Economies in Transition, OECD Proceedings, 265 (Organisation for Economic Co- 
operation and Development 1997). 
16 
Chapter One Purposes and Structures of Reinsurance Regulation 
sections. The first part focuses on analyzing various objectives achieved by regulation 
of reinsurance and on assessing financial risks caused by reinsurance transactions. 
The second part identifies the characteristics of reinsurance business that may 
influence the regulation of reinsurance and discusses the structure of regulation of 
reinsurance from the existing regulatory models. Learning from several existing 
regulatory systems, this work, on the third part, will identify selective regulatory 
problems in Taiwan and will provide some suggestions for possible reform. 
I. Purposes of Reinsurance Regulation 
The purpose of reinsurance regulation has been described as follows: 
"to protect the interest of insureds, claimants, ceding insurers, assuming insurers and 
the public generally. The legislature hereby declares its intents is to ensure adequate 
regulation of insurers and reinsurers and adequate protection for those to whom they 
owe obligations. ,7 
This declaration is making a point that reinsurance regulation not only deals 
with the two parties of the reinsurance contract (the reinsurer and primary insurer), 
but also intends to provide directly or indirectly adequate protection for insureds, 
claimants and the public. Following upon this scenario, the purposes of reinsurance 
regulation can be categorised into two groups: namely, to maintain solvency of 
insurers and reinsurers who are the reinsurance contracting parties and to protect other 
external parties affected by the reinsurance operations. In addition, particularly in 
developing countries, it should be noted that reinsurance regulation is also used as a 
mechanism to protect local insurance markets and to limit the freedom of operation of 
reinsurance. In the following sub-section, the implication of these purposes will be 
introduced and examined. 
A. To Maintain Financial Solvency and Solidity of Primary Insurers and 
Reinsurers 
Generally speaking, the regulation of reinsurance mainly deals with the relationship 
between the solvency of primary insurers and their reinsurance arrangements. 
Historical evidences also show that several significant insolvency cases have resulted 
' NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS (N. A. I. C. ), Reinsurance: 
Creditfor Reinsurance Model Law, in NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES 
VOL. V, 785 (1999). 
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from uncollectible reinsurance for primary insurers during the 1980s. In this context, 
insurance solvency regulation can be divided into three parts: technical provision, 
solvency margin, and control and valuation of assetS8. With regard to solvency 
regulation, to what extent reinsurance will affect the solvency of primary insurers 
depends upon the method of accounting for the technical reserves (which are designed 
to ensure that an insurer will match all its known liabilities to the policyholders). In 
general, the methods to account for technical reserves can be classified as on a "gross 
reserving basis' I and on a "net reserving basis". Even in the European Union, member 
states, who have set up several standards for harmonisation of insurance solvency 
regulation, still have not been able to agree on the same approach9. 
Some countries on the gross reserving basis do not take reinsurance into 
account unless reinsurers have deposited premium reserves and outstanding liability 
reserves with the primary insurers (e. g., in France) 1 0. In this case, regulators can 
monitor the financial condition of insurers without control over their reinsurance 
arrangements, because the financial security of reinsurance is achieved by the 
requirement of the deposit of premium reserves and outstanding liability reserves. 
Under these circumstances, it has been criticized that the stringent deposit 
requirements will deprive reinsurers of freedom of investment and interest earnings, 
and will consequently result in added costs that will be passed on to the final 
'ROBERT KILN & STEPHEN KILN, REINSURANCE IN PRACTICE 383 (4th ed. 2001). 
9 With regard to reinsurance arrangement on technical provision, EC Insurance Directives provides that 
"If the home Member State allows any technical provisions to be covered by claims against reinsurers, 
it shall fix the percentage so allowed. In such cases, it may not specify the localisation of the assets 
representing such claims". It also indicates that every member state can decide which reserving basis it 
will require. See Article 21, Third Non-Life Insurance Directives 92/49/EEC, 1992 O. J. (L. 228/1) and 
article 21 Third Life Insurance Directives, 92/96/EEC, 1992 O. J. (L. 360/1). It should be noted that the 
article 21 of third non-life insurance directive and of third life insurance directive has not been 
amended by the new Council Directive. See Council Directive 2002/12/EEC amending Council 
Directive 79/267/EEC as regards the solvency margin requirements for life assurance undertakings, OJ 
2002, L 77/11; Directive 2002/13/EEC amending Council Directive 73/239/EEC as regards the 
solvency margin requirements for non-life assurance undertakings, OJ 2002, L 77/17. 
10 "Technical reserves are determined including re-insurance cessions. For European re-insurers, no 
agreement is required. If is only required for re-insurers, whose head office is situated outside of the 
European countries" in French Insurance Law article 321.2 and article 321.5., translated by Bertrand 
Balaresque & Jean-Luc de Boissieu, Financial Supervision of Insurance Company, NATIONAL 
REPORT, in 8h World Congress on Insurance Law, at 223 (AIDA, 1990). Even though technical 
reserves are determined including reinsurance cession in France, it should be noted that the European 
Community did not impose any localisation-of-reserves requirements on non-Community reinsurers. 
See ROBERT L. CARTER & GERARD M. DICKINSON, OBSTACLES TO THE 
LIBERALIZATION OF TRADE IN INSURANCE, 74 (Thames Essays, Trade Policy research centre 
1992). 
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consumer party] 1. Additionally - with respect to multinational reinsurers - this has 
engendered not only an adverse effect upon their global financial strength caused by 
fragmentation of its capital funds but also has increased the strain on their adequate 
resources to meet urgent claims that might arise anywhere in the world 12 . 
Thus, this 
may create an advantage to larger multinational reinsurers who have the ability to 
transfer adequate capital internationally and efficiently in the international reinsurance 
3 markets 1 
Many countries on the net reserving basis permit primary insurers to cover 
their technical reserves by applicable reinsurance arrangements (e. g., in Germany, 
14 United Kingdom, Japan) 
. On this basis, reinsurance, which can be calculated to 
cover insurers' technical reserve as admissible assets, becomes an important issue 
relating to the insurance solvency regulation. This also explains that reinsurance has 
15 long been held to be a substitute for capital under the net reserving basis . Under 
such circumstances, the financial solvency of reinsurers has a direct impact on the 
I 461f ability of primary insurers to fulfill the terms of their insurance contracts. 
regulation allows the primary insurers to cover their reserves by the amount of risk 
transferred to the reinsurers who are beyond the control of solvency regulation, the 
requirement of the technical reserve is, to some degree, circumvented. " 16 If the 
reinsurer is insolvent when the time comes to pay the liability on the risk it has ceded 
from the primary insurer, then the primary insurer's reduced technical reserve may be 
inadequate as well, resulting in another insolvency or, at least, institutional financial 
17 
crisis that may impair the primary insurer's future ability to compete in the industry . 
11 The requirement of deposit will increase an reinsurer's extra operating costs, particularly if the 
regulations extend to reserve funds in excess of expected claims costs, because reinsurers have to 
acquire and to maintain additional capital to meet this requirement. The extract costs of maintaining 
capital and the loss of investment will increase the cost of reinsurance arrangements of primary insurers 
and consequently will tend to be pass on to the final consumer party. 
12 ROBERT KELN & STEPHEN KILN, supra note 8, at 389. 
13 See ROBERT L. CARTER & GERARD M. DICKINSON, supra note 10, at. 76. 
14 See generally WERNER PFENNIGSTORF, supra note 2, at 97-98. 
15 S. M. COUTTS & T. R. H. THOMAS, MODELLING THE IMPACT OF REINSURANCE ON 
FINANCIAL STRENGTH 4-5 (Institute of Actuaries, London, 24/Feb. /1997). 
16 See Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, COUCH ON INSURANCE, "Part I. The Insurance Industry 
and Insurance Relationships, Chapter 9. Reinsurance, I. Introduction", § 9: 5 (3 rd ed., 1995). 17 See id. 
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Hence regulators should be equally concerned with the financial solvency and 
8 financial soundness of the reinsurers as much as primary insurers' . 
B. To Ensure the Interests of Insured Party and the General Public 
Insurance regulation often performs two basic functions: it protects against insolvency 
and regulates market conduct. Solvency regulation is mainly designed to maintain the 
solvency of insurers and to protect policyholders against "default risk" stemming 
from financial failure. On the other hand, the purposes of market conduct regulations 
are to ensure the fairness, equity and reasonableness in insurance transactions. 
Reinsurers, as insurers, are regulated for financial supervisory purposes, but, with few 
exceptions, basically are not regulated by market conduct regulation relating to 
contract on terms, conditions and tariff. 
Financial supervision of primary insurers is concerned mainly with the 
insurers' ability to meet their contractual obligations. Apart from the interests of the 
insured party, an insurer's financial solvency is the primary concern for capital market 
investors generally. These various groups have different concerns depending on their 
own particular interests' 9. The regulation of reinsurance has the same purpose as other 
financial supervisions. Not only does this form of regulation intend to maintain 
financial soundness of primary insurers and reinsurers, but also it is intended to 
provide adequate protection for policyholders, investors and the public in general. 
On the other hand, market regulation is designed to protect the insured party, 
and is generally inappropriate in the context of the regulation of reinsurance. The 
reinsurance contracting parties are presumed to be sophisticated participants, 
knowledgeable in insurance matters and capable of protecting their intereStS20. In 
addition, the flexibility of reinsurance contracts on terms, conditions and tariff is a 
key characteristic of reinsurance transactions. For these reasons, reinsurance 
transactions have been excluded from most regulatory systems regulating the 
relationship between the insured party and the primary insurers 21 . Due to the 
complexity and diversity of reinsurance transactions, however, reinsurance terms and 
18 See Charles W. Havens III and Rita M. Theisen, The Application of United States and EEC Antitrust 
Laws to Reinsurance and Insurance Pooling Arrangement, Developments- 19 85 -Antitrust and the 
Business of Insurance, 54 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 1299,1303 (American Bar Association, 
1986). 
19 WERNER PFENNIGSTORF, supra note 2, at. 84. 
20 See Charles W. Havens III and Rita M. Theisen, supra note 18, at 1303. 
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conditions may have a direct effect on the interests of policyholders and investors in 
some cases. This has gained attention by some regulators, beginning with the case of 
Fidelity and Deposit Company v. Pink 22 in the United States since 1937. For example, 
in the United States, a reinsurance agreement must contain a provision, the "solvency 
clause", stating that "in the event of the insolvency of the primary insurer, the 
reinsurers shall pay reinsurance proceeds to the domiciliary liquidator based on the 
liability of the ceding insurers, regardless of whether the liquidator can fully pay such 
ý123 liability . Without such a clause, a U. S. primary insurer would not be able to take 
credit for the reinsurance to reduce the technical reserve in its statutory financial 
statements. The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that the reinsurance is 
payable directly to the company or its liquidator without reduction in the event of the 
insolvency of the primary insurer. 
C. To Protect the Local Insurance and Reinsurance Market 
It is widely accepted that the object of reinsurance is to spread risk domestically or 
even internationally and the necessity for reinsurance stems from the financial 
imperative for large exposures 24 , both as to single risks or catastrophic 
accumulationS25 . Therefore, reinsurance transactions are subject to less stringent 
21 See id. at 1303-1304. 
22 302 U. S. 224 reh'g denied, 302 U. S. 780 (1937). In this case, following the primary insurer's 
insolvency, "the superintendent of Insurance of New York, Pink, demanded that the reinsurer pay half 
of the primary insurer's obligations under the reinsurance contract. Before the U. S. Supreme Court, the 
reinsurer contended that the reinsurance contract was one of indemnity that required the reinsurer to 
reimburse the liquidator only with respect to that proportion of losses the liquidator actually paid to 
claimants. The liquidator contended that it should be reimbursed for the primary insurer's liability to 
claimants, regardless of the amount the insolvent company was able to pay them. Based on the 
language of the reinsurance agreement, which the Court found made payment of a claim a condition 
precedent to reinsurance recovery, the United States Supreme Court found for the reinsurer. " See 
ROBERT W. HAMMESFAHR & SCOTT W. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF REINSURANCE CLAIMS 
252 (Reactions Publishing Group, 1994). See also M. J. Laughlin, General Clause for Most Treaties, in 
REINSURANCE CONTRACT WORDING 98-99 (Robert Strain ed., 1992). 
23 See ROBERT W. HAMMESFAHR & SCOTT W. WRIGHT, supra note 22, at 252. 
24 The need for spreading risk internationally is well recognised by governments in both developed and 
developing countries and by international agencies such as the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD). See ROBERT L. CARTER & GERARD M. DICKINSON, supra note 
10, at 5. 
25 It has been addressed that the benefits of recourse to international reinsurance so are self-evident for: 
"(1)large risks where a single loss may account for a substantial proportion of (and in case of some 
small developing countries, more than) the total premium income of all domestic insurers; (2) 
catastrophe risk, notably where a country is so exposed to natural perils that a single event may destroy 
a significant part of its productive and other resources. " See R. L. CARTER, L. D. LUCAS, N. 
RALPH, REINSURANCE 861 (Reactions Publishing Group, 4th ed., 2000). 
21 
Chapter One Purposes and Structures of Reinsurance Regulation 
regulations than those applied to direct insurance transactions in most countries 26 . On 
the other hand, national interests largely have been concerned with the protection of 
the local insurance and its domestic reinsurance market. To facilitate this concern, 
particularly in developing countries, reinsurance regulation has been used as a 
mechanism to build up a local reinsurance market by protecting domestic insurers 
from foreign competition, to avoid unnecessary loss of foreign exchange through the 
purchase of reinsurance from abroad 27 , and to reduce the country's dependence on the 
supply of foreign reinsurance 28 . 
1. Building Up the Local Reinsurance Market 
The need to protect and to build up the local market is argued usually from two 
conflicting points of view. Local control would deny the efficient competition and 
assimilation of the risk concentration. It is well recognised that a compulsory state- 
owned reinsurance company would result in inflexible and inefficient reinsurance 
coverage being provided to the local insurerS29. In addition, on the basis of the law of 
30 the large numbers , these stringent protections will reduce the risk reduction 
advantages obtained from writing a geographically well-di versified reinsurance 
portfolio3l. 
On the other hand, from the viewpoint of local protectionism, the newly 
established local reinsurers should be protected from the competition of multinational 
reinsurers which enjoy the benefits of scale from their extensive worldwide operations 
2' ROBERT KILN & STEPHEN KILN, supra note 8, at 394-395. In addition, there are three reasons 
to explain why trade in reinsurance is subject to less regulation than trade in direct insurance. Firstly, 
domestic insurance market can gain access to the capital and technical expertise of the international 
insurance market because of the existence of well-developed reinsurance market. Secondly, the 
fiduciary concern of the regulatory authorities is less than for direct insurance, for insurance companies 
can be assumed to be better-informed consumers than the general public. Thirdly, the greater use of a 
reinsurance is considered to afford the balance-of -payments savings over trade in direct insurance. See 
ROBERT L. CARTER & GERARD M. DICKINSON, supra note 10, at 5. 
27 "Reinsurance placed with insurers located abroad will over time lead to an outflow of premium 
payments which will be only partly offset by claim inflows. Even if funds required to cover expected 
claims and local expense are maintained in the country, contributions to central reserves and profits 
will be remitted abroad. " Even though foreign reinsurers are established within the country, profits 
earned will through time be remitted to the parent head office. In additional, local reinsurers may also 
transfer their risks to their parent. See ROBERT L. CARTER & GERARD M. DICKINSON, supra 
note 10, at 33-34. 28 See id. at 28-29. 
2' ROBERT KILN & STEPHEN KILN, supra note 8, at 393. 
30 "If an insurance company can combine in one account a large number of similar units, independently 
exposed to loss, then there will be a tendency for the variation in the size of the total losses which it 
may incur during any one year to be smaller, relative to the amount of business transacted. " See 
ROBERT L. CARTER & GERARD M. DICKINSON, supra note 10, at 14-15. 
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and which have adequate capital and expertise to withstand competition. It is also 
argued that a high density of reinsurers operating in a market leads to wasteful and 
destructive competition32 because of the danger of intensive competition undermining 
a reinsurer's solvency and thus the security provided for primary insurerS33. 
Moreover, it is equally unacceptable that the world's reinsurance industry is 
concentrated among a hand of few giant multinational reinsurerS34 if developing 
countries fail to build up their domestic reinsurerS35. 
2. Balance of Payments and Shortages of Foreign- Currency Holdings 
The reinsurance of local risks with foreign reinsurers may affect a country's balance 
of payments and may tend to impact adversely on a country's foreign-currency 
holdings. Balance-of-payments considerations, particularly in developing countries, 
have been a major economic motive behind the establishment of reinsurance 
regulation. This, more probably, will lead over times, to an outflow of premium 
payments, which will be only partly offset by claims inflows 36 . , While countries will 
be influenced by their own international competitive position in assessing balance-of- 
payments consideration, the issue is inevitably bound up with the nature of the 
existing international monetary system and the general level of confidence in this 
system. 37, ' The actual strain on a country's balance of payment, however, will be 
reduced by several factors over the long-term. Balance of payments costs are often 
31 See id. at 74. 
32 In some cases, a large foreign insurer may enter the domestic market and adopt a strategy of offering 
unsustainable low price to acquire market share. This may lead to destructive competition that can 
reduce the financial strength of smaller local companies and may cause insolvencies. See Gerry 
Dickinson, The Changing Focus On Insurance Regulation, in 15'h International Progress Seminar on: 
Regulation in Financial Services: Implication for Services 2000 Vol. 1, at 65, The Geneva Association 
(Geneva 16-17 September 1999). See also ROBERT L. CARTER & GERARD M. DICKINSON, 
supra note 10, at 33. 
33 See ROBERT L. CARTER & GERARD M. DICKINSON, supra note 10, at 31-33. 
34 Several dominant global reinsurance group-Munich Re, Swiss Re, General Re, and Employers Re, 
wrote more than one-third of world wide reinsurance business, and the twenty-five largest reinsurers 
accounted for nearly two-thirds in 1998 and the first half of 1999, See Alan Murray, Global 
Reinsu rance- Industry Outlook, Global Credit Research, at 7, Moody's Investors Service (New York, 
1999). 
3' ROBERT KILN & STEPHEN KILN, supra note 8, at 393. 
36 "Even if funds required to cover expected claims and local expenses are maintained in the country, 
contributions to central reserves and profits will be remitted abroad. " See ROBERT L. CARTER & 
GERARD M. DICKINSON, supra note 10, at 33-34. 
37 See ROBERT L. CARTER & GERARD M. DICKINSON, supra note 10, at 84-85. 
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reduced by claim payment, investment gains 38 , reinsurance commissions 
39 
, and other 
service costs paid to local consumers. "Thus the overall balance-of-payment costs of 
reinsurance imports are substantially less than any superficial examination of the 
outflow of premium payment would suggest . 
9940 Even so, the net outflow of balance- 
of-payments may be a reasonable extra price to pay for security provided by 
international reinsurance without endangering any one company or the economy of 
any one country 41 . 
3. National Security Concerns 
With regard to the interests of national security, some countries may build up their 
domestic reinsurance industries to prevent from the threat of a high dependence upon 
reinsurance imports. In this regard, tow examples have been cited 42: the Arab region's 
commercial vulnerability to the decisions of the London marine insurance market and 
suspension of marine and aviation cover on Argentine ships, aircraft and cargo during 
the Falkland Islands conflict. It should be noted, however, that the decision of 
building up domestic reinsurers in the interests of national security is defactor mainly 
based more on political rather than economic concernS43. 
D. The Trend of Liberalisation, Harmonisation, and Consolidation on 
Reinsurance Regulatory System and Global Market 
While in the past several decades many developing countries have established state- 
owned reinsurers to meet their own reinsurance demands, their reliance on foreign 
reinsurance is still high. It has been observed that "the small size of the markets, the 
imbalance nature of the insurance portfolios and certainly the lack of sufficient 
38 Investment funds obtained from the prepayment of reinsurance premium are often retained in the 
country of operation. The earning of the investment will reduce the potential balance-of-payments cost 
of external reinsurance. 
39 The purpose of reinsurance commission is to compensate primary insurers' acquisition costs and 
additional administrative costs. 
40 See ROBERT L. CARTER & GERARD M. DICKINSON, supra note 10, at 86. It should be noted 
that in 1989,1990,1992 the huge American Insurance Industry received more from reinsurers located 
in Western Europe by way of claims payments than they paid to them in premiums. See R. L. 
CARTER, L. D. LUCAS, N. RALPH, supra note 25 at 873. 
41 See R. L. CARTER, L. D. LUCAS, N. RALPH, supra note 25 at 873. See also H. von Urbanski, 
Reinsurance: Legend and Reality, in DIE INDUSTRIE, (July 1977), reprinted in THE REVIEW, 
(26/Aug/1977). 
42 See Harold D. Skipper, Protectionism in the Provision of International Insurance Service, 
JORUNAL OF RISK AND INSURANCE, Vol. LIV, No. 1 (1987). 
43 See ROBERT L. CARTER & GERARD M. DICKINSON, supra note 10, at 36. 
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44 experience and know-how" are among the main reasons for this situation . 
Furthermore, the trend of deregulation of primary insurers and liberalisation of 
reinsurance operations, particularly in the developing countries, has had a significant 
impact on these developing domestic markets previously protected from foreign 
competition. Multinational negotiations between different countries and international 
organisations have been set up to liberalise the insurance and reinsurance transactions 
under the auspices of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development45 
(OECD) and the General Agreement of Trade in Service/World Trade Organization 
(GATS/WTO)46. Under these external multilateral negotiations, efforts have been 
47 undertaken to remove the barriers to trade in reinsurance 
At the same time, with increasing international penetration into the domestic 
insurance markets and increasing cooperation to remove trade barrier among different 
countries, the harmonisation of insurance regulation has become an important issue to 
resolve the conflicts among different jurisdictionS48 . As a matter of fact, international 
44 j. FRANqOIS OUTREVILLE, REINSURANCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES-MARKET 
STRUCTURE AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE, United Nations Office at Geneva, United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Discussion Papers No. 12 1, at 12(Geneva, Oct. / 1996). 
45 The organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) with a current membership 
of 30 countries accounting for about 90% of world insurance premiums has contributed to remove 
barrier to trade in insurance. "The aim for liberalisation is being pursued in close co-operation with the 
Committee on Capital Movements and Invisible Transactions, which is the "watch dog" for the two 
OECD Liberalisation Codes: the Code of Liberalisation of Current Invisible Operations and the Code 
of Liberalisation of Capital Movements". See OECD, Liberalisation of Insurance Markets and 
International Co-operation, (last visited 25/02/2000) available at http: //www. oecd. org//daf/financial- 
affairs/insurance/liberalisation. htm 
46 According as the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, the World 
Trade Organisation was created on I January 1995. See WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION (WTO), 
FINAL ACT EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL 
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (1994). The General Agreement on Trade in Service is specified in the 
Annex 113 of the WTO Agreement. Under GATSIWTO, two provisions have a substantial effect on the 
reinsurance activities, namely Annex on Financial Service and Understanding on Commitments in 
Financial Service. In the Annex on Financial Service, a member must not be prevented from taking 
measures for prudential reasons, including for the protection of investors, depositors, policyholders, or 
persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial service supplier, or to ensure the integrity and 
stability of the financial system. See WTO, ANNEX ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, para. 2 (a). 
47 Under Twenty Guidelines for Insurance Regulation and Supervision in the Economies in Transition, 
which was a major outcome of the second EastlWest Conference on insurance systems in economies in 
transition organised by the OECD Insurance Committee in co-operation with the Polish government 
held in 1997, OECD strongly encourages its member countries to liberalise cross-border operations 
related to reinsurance and dismantling the restriction on the access to international reinsurance market. 
See OECD, Presentation on the Second EastlWest Conference on Insurance Systems in Economies in 
Transition (15/04/1999), available at http: //www. oecd. org//sge/ccnm/pubs/cpgel 112/Pres. htm (visiting 
time: 25/02/2000). 
48Differences in regulation between countries may result in "regulatory diversity" which "can impede 
the continued international i sation of financial service by (1) magnifying the negative effects of market 
failures, (2) provoking more stringent domestic trade-related regulation, and (3) increasing t__ 
transactional costs. " See generally Harold. D. Skipper Jr., Regulatory Harmonization and Mutual 
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cooperation among different countries is having a tendency to develop more fon-nal 
structures and to provide international supervisory principles on a regional basis and 
at a worldwide level49 - Following these trends of liberalisation of trade in reinsurance 
and harmonisation of reinsurance regulation makes it difficult for a country to 
reconcile these conflicting regulatory purposes and with choosing the regulatory 
systems to achieve this end. In addition, while the purpose of reinsurance regulation 
has been gradually shifted from local protectionism to liberalisation of reinsurance 
operations, the trends toward consolidation in global reinsurance and increased 
competition are having a significant impact on the international reinsurance marketS50 - 
Related insurance/reinsurance institutions mergers not only have become increasingly 
international but also include other financial sectors e. g., Citigroup and Travellers in 
the US, Commercial Union and General Accident in the UK, and AXA and UAP in 
France 51 
. With the increasing consolidation in international reinsurance, it is 
reasonable to assume that more official attention might be paid to competition policy 
and anti -competi ti ve activities relating to mergers and arrangements among 
reinsurers 52 . 
E. Interim summation 
The purposes of reinsurance regulation are intended not only to maintain financial 
solvency and the solvency of primary insurers and reinsurers but also to provide 
adequate protection for the interests of insured party, claimants, investors and the 
general public. On the other hand, particularly in developing countries, reinsurance 
regulation has been used as a mechanism to preserve national interests concerned with 
the protection of local reinsurance and insurance markets. 
Recognition In Insurance, in INTERNATIONAL RISK AND INSURANCE: AN 
ENVIRONMENTAL-MANAGERIAL APPROACH, at Chapter 14 (Harold. D. Skipper Jr., ed., 
Boston, Irwin McGraw-Hill, 1998). 
49 Apart from European Union, there are numerous activities among different areas to develop formal 
structure and regular meetings. For example, Conf6rence International des Contr6les d'Assurances des 
ttats Africains (CICA) is formed by twelve French-speaking countries of western Africa. There also 
has been a tradition of regular meetings and close cooperation among the insurance regulators of 
South-east Asia and those of the Caribbean. See WERNER PFENNIGSTORF, supra note 2, at 40-4 1. 
50 See Alan Murray, supra note 34, at 7-8 (New York, 1999). 
51 See OECD, Competition and Related Regulation Issues in the Insurance Industry, (1998) Q March 
2000), available at http: // www. oecd. oriz/daf/clp. 
52 These trends can give rise to conflict between sector-specific regulators and the competition 
authority. See generally OECD, Competition and Related Regulation Issues in the Insurance Industry, 
(1998), available at http: H www. oecd-or. R/daf/clp. Visiting time: 11: 48,03/03/2000. 
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Due to the trend toward greater liberalisation of reinsurance operations, 
however, trade barriers are being gradually dismantled by the efforts undertaken by 
many international negotiations and organisations. Thus, the purpose of reinsurance 
regulation related to preserving national interests is becoming less emphasized today, 
the same degree as before. So such, following this trend, it is difficult for many 
regulators to reconcile or to compromise the conflicts between regulation in the 
interests of consumers, claimants, investors and regulation as a necessary barrier to 
preserve national interests including national economic, currency and security 
interest 53 
. 
On the other hand, it has been observed that "financial liberalisation makes 
attacks possible and expose underlying vulnerabilities to the vagaries of international 
capital markets: this tension between market liberalisation and system stability and 
safety and soundness needs to be better understood and appreciated by all . 
54, ' As 
insurance regulation is being gradually built on a set of pro-competitive principles 
designed to ensure competitive, solvent and fair market 55 , so also the reinsurance 
markets seem to be becoming more competitive than before. Thus, particularly in 
emerging markets, it is important to establish an adequate prudential regulatory 
system for the insurance supervisor to deal with more complicated and difficult issues 
and to prevent an improper sequencing of liberalisation. To establish a prudential 
regulatory system in the reinsurance sector, governments should enact and should 
enforce laws and regulations that provide an effective framework for competitive 
reinsurance markets 56 and should establish reasonable solvency regulations as the 
primary means of protecting the general public 57 . 
11. The Structure of Reinsurance Regulation 
53 It is also "difficult to establish a clear distinction between regulation in the interest of consumers or 
as a necessary means to preserve the national economy or currency on the one hand and discriminatory 
favouritism on the others. " See WERNER PFENNIGSTORF, supra note 2, at 41. 
54 JOSEPH J. NORTON, FINANCIAL SECTOR LAW REFORM IN EMERGING ECONOMIES 10 
(London, 2000). 
55 See Harold D. Skipper, Jr., The Impossibility of Separating Domestic Regulation In Insurance From 
International Trade Issues, in 231 ETUDES ET DOSSIERS REGULATION IN FINANCIAL 
SERVICES: IMPLICATIONS FORSERVICES, at 199 (The Geneva Association, Geneva, 1999). 
56 As markets move from restrictive to liberal regulatory approach, "competition law becomes more 
important as some firms will have motives to try to engage in anti -competitive practices. " Competition 
law is a crucial component of the framework that could promote the competitive markets. See Harold 
D. Skipper, Jr., supra note 55, at 200. 
57 See id, at 201. 
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Due to the unique characteristics of the reinsurance business, however, the regulation 
of reinsurers differs in many respects from that of primary insurers. These 
characteristics not only lead to a regulatory environment in which reinsurers are not 
regulated to the same degree as primary insurers in most countrieS58 , but also result in 
the difficulties of implementation of regulation of reinsurance particularly as to the 
international nature of reinsurance markets. The contracting parties in reinsurance 
transactions are considered to be sophisticate participants capable of expertise on the 
insurance business. Thus, in this sector, the level of regulation has been reduced or 
even completely exempted in most countries 59 . In addition, reinsurance transactions 
are based on cross-border operations in order to spread risk more effectively. Primary 
insurers often transfer their risk to the reinsurers which are supervised by different 
regulatory system. Following such a scenario, reinsurance regulation "not only would 
be difficult to enforce but if enforced vigorously could have an adverse effect on the 
availability of coverage for domestic risks and the spread of risks on an international 
ý, 60 level. 
A. The General Structure of Reinsurance Regulation 
In general, the regulation of reinsurance can be divided into two aspects; i. e. the 
supervision (1). of the reinsurance arrangements of primary insurers (indirect 
reinsurance regulation) and (2). of reinsurers and of direct insurers that accept 
reinsurance business 61 (direct reinsurance regulation). The structure of reinsurance 
regulations in each country "concerns the extent to which regulators can rely on (1) on 
the financial soundness and integrity of reinsurers, and (2) on the ceding insurer's 
liability and willingness to select reliable reinsurers. , 
62 In addition, while emerging 
markets may be influenced by their own international competitive position in 
assessing balance-of-payments considerations, the structure of reinsurance regulation 
is inevitably bound up with the protection of the local currency and economy. Thus, 
58 See R. C. L. Bakker and H. J. M. Teeuwen, The MIS Survey On Reinsurance Supervision: An 
Overview Of The Finding, 23 THE GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND INSURANCE, No. 89 
(Oct/1998). 
59 See WERNER PFENNIGSTORF, supra note 2, at 43. 
60 Id, at 43. 
61 Peter Falush, supra note 6, at 265. 
62 See WERNER PFENNIGSTORF, supra note 2, at 97. 
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the structure of reinsurance regulations depends inter alia on the particular market 
structure, regulatory environment, business usage and experience of each countrY63. 
The main concern relating to supervision of reinsurance arrangements of 
primary insurers is how to assess the reliability of reinsurers. The supervision of the 
reinsurance arrangements of primary insurers can be regulated in the folloýý, ýing 
respects. Firstly, in most countries, insurance laws and regulations require a primary 
insurer to reinsure the mandated percentage of risk in order to reduce its underwri'ting 
risk. In many cases, the risk retention is required to be a fixed minimum percentage 
by insurance supervisors 64 . 
Secondly, the reinsurance programmes and contracts 
would be reviewed and monitored by insurance supervisors on a case-by-case basis 
and would need prior approval of the regulators in their first several years. The 
supervisor frequently requires prior approval of reinsurance contracts "put into place 
at the time of licensing and must usually be informed of any changes in an insurer's 
reinsurance programmes and may or may not require prior approval of such 
, 65 changes' . 
In addition, the security of reinsurance is the main concern among 
primary insurers and insurance supervisors for the reason that unrecoverable 
reinsurance have resulted in several major insolvencies during the 1980S66. As a 
result, the choice of reinsurers in primary insurer's reinsurance programmes are 
regulated or supervised by regulators in some developed regulatory systems. In this 
case, regulations often differentiate between reinsurance transferred to reinsurers 
authorised by the domestic insurance regulators and that transferred to unauthorised 
reinsurers established in some other countries 67 . In emerging markets, 
it should be 
noted that some governments establish stated-owned reinsurance corporations to 
protect their reinsurance and insurance markets and to meet their domestic demand on 
reinsurance. In this case, regulations or statutes may require domestic primary 
insurers to reinsure a specified portion of their risk to state or nationally owned 
63 Id, at 97. 
64 According to the survey by OECD in 1996, "the risk retention (of net non-life premiums as a 
percentage of gross premiums) is required to be a minimum 10% by Swiss supervisors and in Canada 
the minimum retention ratio is 25% if reinsurers are local and 75% if foreign. " See Peter Falush, supra 
note 6, at 285. 
65 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, SUPERVISION OF 
INSURANCE OPERATIONS-A MANUAL FOR TRAINEE STAFF OF INSURANCE 
SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES, Module Three, at 14-15 (1996). 
66 See MICHAEL W. ELLIOTT, BERNARD L. WEBB, HOWARD N. ANDERSON & PETER R. 
KENSICKI, PRINCIPLES OF REINSURANCE VOL. 2, at 193 (Insurance Institute of America, 
Pennsylvania, 2nd edition, 1995). 
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reinsurance corporationS68 . Through such control, the government not only would 
influence reinsurance transactions on contract terms and the premium rates, but also 
would facilitate its protection on the national currency 69 . 
With regard to direct reinsurance regulation, many jurisdictions may require 
that reinsurers be licensed to the same degree as primary insurers. Although the 
characteristics of reinsurance operations differ from that of insurance contracts and 
result in a regulatory environment under which individual reinsurance transactions 
have been completely or partially excluded from market regulations, stringent 
solvency regulations still play a crucial role under reinsurance regulations. 
B. International Supervisory Standard Convergence and its Influence on 
Reinsurance Regulation in Emerging Markets 
On the international level, with regard to reinsurance regulation, international 
supervisory standards have been established by several international organizations 
such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors. 
According to the twenty insurance 64 guidelines" for insurance regulation and 
supervision approved by twenty-one OECD countries and seventeen countries in 
Central Eastern Europe and the New Independent States, several fundamental 
principles relating to reinsurance regulation have been established. The main purpose 
of these guidelines is not only to liberalise reinsurance transactions on cross-border 
operations 70 but also is to strengthen international co-operation relating to information 
exchange 71 in order to facilitate the monitoring of the activities of reinsurers and to 
67 See WERNER PFENNIGSTORF, supra note 2, at 98. 
68 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Supervision of Insurance Operations-A 
manual for trainee staff of insurance supervisory authorities, (1996), at Module Three p. 15-16. See 
also J. FRANqOIS OUTREVILLE, supra note 44, at 12. 
69 See WERNER PFENNIGSTORF, supra note 2, at 135. 
70 Rule no. 4: Establishment of foreign insurance companies should be based on prudential but not on 
discriminatory rules. Liberalisation of cross-border operations, at least concerning! reinsurance and 
international risks, should be encouraged. See OECD, Twenty Insurance Guidelines For Economies In 
Transactions, in OECD News Release, (Paris, 17/ApriUI997), available at 
http: //www. oecd. orp, /search97cgi/s97-cgi (visiting time: 04/01/99) 
71 Rule no. 14: Regulation should not restrict free access to international reinsurance markets. 
Compulsory cessions of risks to domestic/national reinsurers should therefore be avoided. The 
collection and monitoring of information relating to reinsurance companies should be established. 
International co-operation is particularly important to obtain accurate information and should be 
strengthened. Id. 
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promote the development of sound, modem and open insurance marketS72 . Under the 
principle of liberalisation of reinsurance operations, reinsurance regulations adversely 
affecting free access to international reinsurance market should be avoided. Thus, the 
barriers of compulsory cessions of risks to dome stic/state-owned reinsurers should be 
dismantled. On the other hand, the alternative regulatory system to safeguard the 
financial soundness of primary insurers should be established and implemented. With 
regard to the alternative regulatory system, however, these guidelines only propose 
that governments should strengthen co-operation on information exchange in order to 
facilitate the monitoring of the activities of reinsurance companies. Despite the lack of 
substantial supervisory arrangements in these guidelines, they encourage the general 
structure of mutual recognition among the member countries and have been 
influential in shaping supervisory practices in the international context. 
The IAIS established in 1992 is committed to developing standards for 
insurance supervision throughout the world 73 and to monitoring adherence to those 
standards by insurance supervisors within their jurisdictions. It has issued, and 
continues to develop, principles, standards and guidance papers for insurance 
supervisors. With respect to reinsurance regulation, the JAIS has established basic 
principles to regulate and to supervise reinsurance operation. According to the 
principles, supervisors have to ensure their ability to review reinsurance 
arrangements, to assess the degree of reliance placed on these arrangements and to 
determine the appropriateness of such reliance. Moreover, in order to determine the 
appropriateness of reliance placed on these arrangements, the following requirements 
should be established and enhanced by an insurance supervisor: 
--"The amount of the credit taken for reinsurance ceded. The amount of credit 
taken should reflect an assessment of the ultimate collectability of the reinsurance 
72 Rule No. 19 Governments should strengthen co-operation in order to exchange information on 
insurance regulation and supervision, facilitate the monitoring of the activities of foreign insurance and 
reinsurance companies and promote the development of sound, modern and open insurance markets. 
Id. 
73 6, ItS membership includes insurance regulators and supervisors from more than 100 jurisdictions, 
who resolve to; (1) co-operate to ensure improved supervision of the insurance industry on a domestic, 
as well as on an international, level in order to maintain efficient, fair, safe and stable insurance 
markets for the benefit and protection of policyholders; and (2) unite their efforts to develop practical 
standards that members may choose to apply. " See INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF 
INSURANCE SUPERVISORS (IAIS), INSURANCE PRINCIPLES, STANDARDS AND 
GUIDANCE PAPERS I (Basel, December 1999). 
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recoverables and may take into account the supervisory control over the reinsurers; 
and 
--The amount of reliance placed on the insurance supervisor of the reinsurance 
business of a company which is incorporated in another jurisdiction' 74 . 
With respect to the amount of the credit taken for reinsurance ceded, it should 
depend on the collectability of the reinsurance recoverables which can be assessed 
and may take into account the supervisory control over the reinsurers. In other words, 
an insurance supervisor should assess the collectability of the reinsurance 
recoverables to compute the amount of the applicable reinsurance, which can take the 
credit to cover the technical reserve, on the net reserve basis. In addition, the 
assessment of the collectability of the reinsurance recoverables may take into account 
the supervisory control over the reinsurers for the reason that reinsurance transactions 
often operate on a cross-border basis. 
Due to the cross-border characteristic of reinsurance transactions, reinsurers 
often operate in another jurisdiction. In order to obtain accurate information to 
establish the method for collection and monitoring of information relating to 
reinsurers, it is essential for an insurance supervisor to enhance international 
cooperation as to information exchange relating to regulation and supervision 75 . 
From the viewpoint of local protectionism, particularly in emerging markets, 
governments may impose reinsurance regulations which have restrictive effects on 
reinsurance transactions between local primary insurers and foreign reinsurers. 
Domestic insurers may be required to reinsure their risk with a domestic or state- 
owned reinsurance corporation. In many emerging markets, insurers are obliged to 
cede to the local reinsurance corporation a specified share of all business written. In 
some cases, insurers must place their reinsurance with local state-owned reinsurance 
corporation which alone is permitted to retrocede risks abroad. In addition, primary 
insurers may be required to place all or part of certain classes of insurance with a local 
or regional P00176 which is a group of domestic-e stabli shed insurers or reinsurers each 
of whom agrees to assume a predetermined share of all the insurance business written 
74 See INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE SUPERVISORS, supra note 73, at 7. 
75 See INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE SUPERVISORS, supra note 73, at 83. 
76 See ROBERT L. CARTER & GERARD M. DICKINSON, supra note 10, at 43. 
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by the members of the P00,77 . These requirements should be deemed as an 
unnecessary barriers to international trade in reinsurance service. 
On the other hand, regulations and accounting rules may have indirect effects 
on the reinsurance transactions operating on a cross-border basis. In some cases, 
primary insurer can not be permitted to take credit for the amount of reinsurance 
placed abroad with foreign reinsurers established in other country on a net reserving 
basis, unless reinsurers either deposit with their share of the unearned premium and 
outstanding claims reserves or deposit funds with the supervisory authority to obtain 
64 approved reinsurer status 78. ), . 
Reinsurance regulations which may have an indirect 
effect on the placing of risk with foreign reinsurers, however, not only often exits in 
emerging markets but also are imposed in some developed countnes (e. g., in the 
United StateS)79. It is difficult to establish a clear distinction to define such a 
regulation as either a prudent regulation in the interests of general public or a 
discriminating measure against foreign reinsurers. 
C. Developed Models of Structure of Reinsurance Regulation 
The differing regulatory approaches in the United Kingdom, within the European 
Union and in the United States to reinsurance activities are worth examining. In the 
following context, legislation and regulation in these developed models will be 
addressed respectively. 
1. European Union and United Kingdom 
a. Regulation of Reinsurers in the European Union and the United Kingdom 
The reinsurance markets in the European Union have become highly internationalised 
and less heavily regulated than the direct insurance business 
80 
. As a result, introducing 
"the right to freedom of establishment" within in the EC/EU was rather straight 
forward in the case of reinsurance operations while the first tentative EC moves 
towards "the single market" were taken 81 in the so-called reinsurance directive on the 
77 See Charles W. Havens III and Rita M. Theisen, supra note 18, at 1301. 
78 Peter Falush, supra note 6, at 266. 
79For details, see NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS (N. A. I. C. ), 
Reinsurance: Credit for Reinsurance Model Law, in NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND 
GUIDELINES VOL. V, 785-1(1999). 
80 See ROBERT MERKIN & ANGUS RODGER, EC INSURANCE LAW 4 (Longman 1997). 
81 Id, at 4. 
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freedom of establishment and service (1964)82 . The adoption of the First Insurance 
Directive 83 on freedom of establishment and freedom to provide reinsurance and 
retrocession services abolished all restrictions on establishment and provision of 
service relating to reinsurance 84. Reinsurers established in the European Union, 
therefore, have not only the right to freedom of establishment, but also the legal right 
to supply their service across national EU country borders, in both cases subject to 
85 their complying with the host's domestic rules applicable to reinsurers . When the 
EC solvency margins were first introduced in implementing the Co-insurance 
Directive of 1978 86 , however, reinsurers who only carried on reinsurance business 
were excluded from the new requirements. Consequently, it should be noted that 
reinsurance is not covered 87 by the third generation of EU Insurance Directives 88 
developed to complete the progress toward a "Single European Insurance Market". As 
a result, the regulation of reinsurers differs from those applied to insurers 
underwriting direct insurance business or direct and reinsurance busineSS89. In other 
words, professional or pure reinsurers having an authorisation restricted to 
reinsurance do not benefit from the single license system developed in the "third 
generation" of Insurance Directives. The regulation of reinsurers in the European 
Union thus has not been harmonised and varies in every EU member state. 
Before the implementation of the UK Financial Services and Markets Act 
2000 (2000 c8, FSMA 2000), the main legislative provisions which governed 
insurance companies in the United Kingdom were the Insurance Companies Act 1982 
(1982 c50, ICA1982) and the Insurance Companies Regulations 1994 (SI 1994/1516). 
82 It was published in 0. J. No. 56 of 4/4/1964 and is reproduced in Part IX, Appendix B post. See T. 
HENRY ELLIS, THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET AND INSURNACE LAW & PRACTICE 
65 (Witherby, London, 1994). 
83 COUNCIL DIRECTIVE ON THE ABOLITIONS OF FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT TO 
PROVIDE SERVICES IN RESPECT OF REINSURANCE AND RETROCESSION, 64/225/EEC, 
1964 O. J. L 56,3.4.64, p. 878(s. edn 1963-64, p. 13 1) special edition. 
84 CLIFFORD CHANCE, INSURANCE REGULATION IN EUROPEAN 12 (LLP, London, 1993). 
85 See ROBERT MERKIN & ANGUS RODGER, supra note 80, at 4. 
86 COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 78/473 of 30 May 1978 on the co-ordination of laws, regulations and 
administrative provision relating to Community co-insurance. 78/473/ EEC, OJL 151,7.6.78, P. 25. 
87 Marie-Louise Rossi, Changes in the Regulatory Environment in the UK, in Etudes et Dossiers No. 
230 REGULATION IN FINANCIAL SERVICES: IMPLICATIONS FOR SERVICES 2000, at 120( 
The Geneva Association, Geneva, 1999). 
88 Two major directives in this generation are developed to amend the directives in previous two 
generations, namely the Third Non-Life Directive (Council Directive, 92/49/EEC, 1992 ((0 J L. 
228/1))), and the Third Life Directive (Council Directive, 92/96/EEC, 1992 ((0 J L. 360/1))). 
89 See T. HENRY ELLIS & JAMF_S A. WILTSHIRE, REGULATION OF INSURANCE IN THE 
UNITED KINGDOM AND IRELAND B . 6-01 (Kluwer, Issue 5 3, August/ 1997). 
34 
D. Chapter One Purposes and Structures of Reinsurance Regulation 
The ICA has been amended by the Insurance Companies ("Third Insurance 
Directives") Regulation 1994 (SI 1994/1696) which came into force on I July 1994 
("the Third Directive Regulation")90. According to section 96(l) of the ICA 1982, an 
insurance company is defined as: "A person or body of persons (whether incorporated 
or not) carrying on insurance business. " As for a reinsurer, however, the ICA does not 
define "insurance business" as including reinsurance business. It should be noted in 
this context, however, that in Re NGR Victory Reinsurance Ltd. (1995) 1 WLR 239 
(Ch D) Lindsay J concluded that, for the purposes of the ICA, reinsurance business 
was included within the term "insurance business". After this case, it is judicially 
clear that reinsurance is to be regulated by the ICA 1982.91 
After the main provisions of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
came into force on Ist December 2001, the Insurance Companies Act 1982 and the 
Insurance Companies Regulations 1984 were repealed and replaced by the FSMA 
2002, the Financial Services Authority "Handbook of Rules and Guidance", and 
92 regulation and orders made under the FSMA 2000 
According to the Rule Interim Prudential Sourcebook for Insurance 2.1 (Rule 
IPRU ((INS)) ) issued by the FSA, every company whose business in the UK is 
restricted to reinsurance has to maintain its solvency margin in accordance with the 
Margin of Rules. Thus the requirements of solvency margins of a reinsurer are the 
same as that which applies to an insurance company who writes direct business and 
has its head office in the UK. In general, regulation of licensed reinsurers will include 
the following: 
--"Solvency Margin 
--Determination of Liability 
--Valuation of Assets 
--Matching liabilities with appropriate assets and localisation of assets 
90 See, REINSURANCE PRACTICE AND THE LAW, LLP, at 1-17 (Colin Croly & Michael 
Mendelowitz eds., Issue No. 15-1 October 2000). 
91Id, at 1- 18 (Issue No. 15-1 October 2000). 
92 See Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Consequential Amendments and Repeals) Order 2001 
(SI 2001/3649). With regard to the scope of insurance in FSA regulation, Part 11 of the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) Order 2001 (SI 2001/3544) 
specified the regulated activities. See P. L. Pruves, The Expanding (or Shrinking) Scope of "Insurance 
" in FSA Regulation, JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW, 2001, Nov. at 623-645. 
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--Annual returns 
93 
. 
Reinsurance company whose head office is in an "European Economic Area" 
(EEA) member state and which carries on reinsurance business is required to meet a 
financial solvency whereas "there is no requirement for EC and EEC direct insurers to 
demonstrate a solvency requirement in respect to their UK business as the 
responsibility for prudential supervision rests with the supervisors of the home 
member states . 
94" This is because EC reinsurers are not subject to supervision in the 
same way as other direct insurers 95 who benefit from the "single license system" 
developed in the "third generation" of EU Insurance Directives. 
Since the EC Co-insurance Directive was introduced in 1978 96 , reinsurers 
have been excluded from this requirement. As a result of the different controls 
between pure reinsurers and insurers, the UK has a tendency to regulate reinsurance 
activities in its own domestic market. Therefore, the onus of supervising a reinsurer 
from another EU member state which obtains an authorisation for a branch or agency 
in the UK is placed on the Financial Service Authority 97 . 
With respect to solvency 
requirements, pure reinsurers are required to maintain the same margins as that 
98 applied to a direct insurer having its head office in the UK . In addition, the solvency 
margin requirements apply not only to the UK business of a pure reinsurer but also to 
9 its worldwide business9 . 
An applicant, which is based in a country outside the EEA and wishes to 
transact either direct insurance or reinsurance business, needs to obtain an 
authorisation from the FSA. Generally speaking, non-EEA companies may be 
authorised to transact insurance business, if the FSA is satisfied that "(a) the applicant 
is a corporate body, entitled under the law of the place where its head office is 
93 See T. HENRY ELLIS & JAMES A. WILTSHIRE, supra note 89, at B. 6-01-B. 6-19 (Issue 72 May 
2002). 
94 Id, at B. 5.2-01. 95 Id, at B. 6-02. 
96 Council Directive of 30 May 1978 on the co-ordination of laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to Community Co-Insurance (78/473/EEC). 
97 Before 5/1/1998, the UK regulatory authority for insurance was the Department of Trade and 
Industry. "On that date, these powers were exercisable by the Treasury Insurance Directorate (TID). On 
18"'November 1998, under the arrangements for the establishment of the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA), the Treasury Insurance Directorate (TID) transferred its responsibility under the Insurance 
Companies Act 1982 and the Financial Services Act 1986 to the Financial Services Authority. " Id, at 
B-21 (Issue 72, May 2002). 
98 Id, at B. 6-01, B. 6-02 See also Interim Prudential Sourcebook for Insurance Appendices 2.1 and 2.2. 
99 Id. at B. 6-02. 
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situated to effect and carry out contracts of insurance; (b) the applicant has in the UK 
assets of such value as may be prescribed; such assets must amount to a value at least 
equal to the minimum guarantee fund appropriate to the UK margin of solvency; and 
(c) the applicant has made a deposit in accordance with IPRU (INS) Chapter 8" 1 00. 
However, the applications for authorisaton as to non-EEA direct insurance companies 
are stricter than those applicable to non-EEA pure reinsurance companies. For 
example, by virtue of Rule EPRU (INS) 8.1(1), the deposit requirement is not 
applicable in the case of a non-applicant for an authorisation restricted to reinsurance 
business only, whereas non-EEA companies who carry on direct general or long-term 
business are required to lodge a deposit of a certain prescribed amount with a 
nominated person 1 01. 
b. Regulation of reinsurance arrangements of primary insurers in the 
European Union and the United Kingdom 
Under the evolving EU insurance regulatory regime, the regulation of primary 
insurer's reinsurance arrangements is mainly covered by the requirement of "technical 
provisions" 102 which are designed to ensure insurance undertakings maintain 
sufficient acceptable assets to cover all underwriting liabilities. According to the EU's 
103 Third Insurance Directives , the debt owed by reinsurers can be treated as 
"acceptable assets" to cover technical provisions. Although the debt owed by 
reinsurers can be treated as acceptable assets under the EC Insurance Directives, this 
does not mean that the debt owed by reinsurers must automatically be accepted as 
cover under the technical provision requirements. Each member state is to lay down 
more detailed rules fixing the conditions for the use of acceptable assets: in this 
connection, a state may require valuable security or guarantees (e. g., letter of credit), 
particularly in the case of debts owed by reinsurers' 04 . In addition, if the home 
Member State allows technical provisions to be covered by claims against reinsurers, 
100 Id, at B. 3.4-02 (Issue 72 May 2002). 
101 Id, at B. 3.4-02 (Issue 72 May 2000). 
102 Each member stare shall require every insurer authorised by it 'to establish adequate technical 
provisions in respect of their entire business" (article 17, Third Non-Life Insurance Directive 
92/49/EEC, 1992 O. J. (L. 228/1) and article 18 Third Life Insurance Directives, 92/96/EEC, 1992 O. J. 
(L. 360/1)). The rules regarding control over technical provisions are reflected in the provisions of the 
Annual Accounts and Consolidated Accounts Directives (91/674/EEC, O. J. L. 374/7 1991). 
103 Article 21, Third Non-Life Insurance Directives 92/49/EEC, 1992 O. J. (L. 228/1) and article 20 
Third Life Insurance Directives, 92/96/EEC, 1992 O. J. (L. 360/1). 
37 
Chapter One Purposes and Structures of Reinsurance Regulation 
it is to fix the percentage so allowed. Regarding the localisation of assets, the home 
Member State may not specify the localisation of the assets representing such 
claims' 05. To ensure diversification and adequate spread of investments, the Third 
Insurance Directive provides a set of admissibility rules that contain the quantitative 
limitation and six "guiding principles" for the home Member State to prescribe more 
detailed rules on admissibility of assets. With regard to reinsurance arrangements, the 
home Member State is to ensure that "limitations on particular categories of assets 
must take account of the treatment of reinsurance in the calculation of technical 
69, 
provisionslo . 
Regarding financial regulation of primary insurers in the United Kingdom, a 
primary insurer is required to maintain a minimum solvency margin and an amount of 
acceptable assets in excess of the insurance liabilities. In the field of non-life 
insurance, the minimum requirements are prescribed in IPRU (INS) Chapter 2. The 
liability is to be valued in accordance with IPRU (INS) Chapter 5 and the acceptable 
assets representing these liabilities and the solvency margin requirements are to be 
valued in accordance with the provisions IPRU (INS) Chapter 4 107 . 
Under these financial requirements for primary insurers, their reinsurance 
arrangements will be affected and regulated in the following aspects: 
(1) The restriction of the reinsurance fraction on solvency margin 
requirement 
Although the solvency requirement will be reduced by the reinsurance 
fraction, there is a restriction on the reinsurance fraction to 50% in the case of non-life 
insurers' 08 . 
(2) Valuation of admissible assets 
104 See Article 21 of Third Non-Life Insurance Directives and Article 21 of Third Life Insurance 
Directives. They provide that the home Member State must restrict acceptable investments to the 
following three categories: A. Investments, B. Debts and Claims, and C. Others. 
105 See Article 17 of Third Non-Life Insurance Directives and Article 18 of Third Life Insurance 
Directives. 
106 See Article 22 of Third Non-Life Insurance Directives and Article 22 of Third Life Insurance 
Directives. 
107 The detailed requirements for calculating the amount of the solvency margin are set out in 
regulation 17 of, and Schedules 3 and 4 to, the Insurance Companies Regulations 1994. See T. HENRY 
ELLIS & JAMES A. WILTSHIRE, supra note 89, at B. 5.2-01 (Issue 72 May 2002). 
108 For a non-life insurer, the detailed requirements for calculating the amount of the solvency margin 
are set out in IPRU (INS) Appendix 2.1. 
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The EU Third Insurance Directive provides for diversification and an adequate 
spread of assets representing the technical provisions and for guiding principles for 
each member state to lay down more detailed rules fixing the conditions for the use of 
acceptable assets. In the United Kingdom, the current version of the valuation of 
assets regulations for the general insurance business is contained in IPRU (INS) 
Chapter 4109. According to Rule EPRU (INS) 4.5 (7), the value of a debt from or rights 
of recovery against a reinsurer is the amount that can reasonably be expected and to 
be recovered' 10. 
(3) Statements concerning major reinsurers and major cedants 
The accounts and related financial statements are used to demonstrate the 
compliance with the solvency requirements as to the reinsurer, the amount of its 
admissible assets and the amount of its liabilities. These are a means by which the UK 
Financial Services Authority (FSA) on behalf of H. M. Treasury is able to monitor the 
financial condition of insurers. Insurers are to prepare accounts and other statements 
in prescribed form and to file copies of these accounts with the FSA in accordance 
with EPRU (INS). The precise form and content of the accounts are set out in the 
IPRU (INS) Appendix 9.1. 
Under Rule IPRU (INS) regarding reinsurance arrangements, insurers are 
required to provide the accounting information about reinsurance business and to 
submit statements summarising the company's exposure to major reinsurers and 
major cedants, and the nature of any connection with each reinsurer and cedanti 11. 
2. United States of America-NAIC Model Law on Credit for Reinsurance 
Insurance and reinsurance undertakings in the United States have primarily been 
regulated by the federal states since 19451 12 , although there are some 
federal laws that 
either directly or indirectly apply to several important financial sector areas including 
banking, securities, employee benefits, liability risk retention, health insurance 
109 T. HENRY ELLIS & JAMES A. WILTSHIRE, supra note 89, at B. 5.4-02-53 (Issue 72, May 2002). 
110 See id. 
1" See generally Rules IPRU (INS) 9.21,9.25,9.26 and 9.28. 
112 The McCarran-Ferguson Act 1945 has two principal aspects to deal with a legal and business crisis 
created by South-Eastern Underwriters (322 U. S. 533 1944) case. It not only validates many activities 
of state regulation which would otherwise create an illegal interference with the sweeping powers of 
the Federal government under the Commerce Clause but also provides a limited federal antitrust 
immunity to the "business of insurance". See PETER M. LENCSIS, INSURANCE REGULATION 
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coverage, social security and some specific programmes that provide flood insurance 
3 in certain communities" . 
Due to the complexity and diversification of insurance and 
reinsurance regulations among the states, state insurance regulators created the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) in 1871 to address the 
need to coordinate regulation of multistate insurers' 14 . Among its tasks in 
harmonisation of insurance regulation, an important influence exerted by the NAIC is 
the adoption of "model laws and regulations", of which there are currently over 
1501 15 
- 
As a matter of fact, a substantial amount of insurance and reinsurance 
regulation is initiated at the NAIC level, with individual states adopting model 
legislation or a modified version of NAIC model acts. Although the NAIC has no 
direct regulatory authority over the states, the NAIC accreditation process under 
which it grants or withholds accreditation of individual state insurance departments 
16 has been successful in moving states toward adoption of NAIC model acts' . 
Whereas the regulatory regime relating to the distribution of direct insurance 
mainly focuses on the party that will bear risk (the primary insurer), the regulation of 
IN THE UNITED STATES: AN OVERVIEW FOR BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT 2-7 
(Quorum Books, Connecticut 1997). 
113 In the area of banking, the primary federal sources of restrictions on banking entities with respect to 
the distribution of insurance products or underwriting activities are the National Bank Act (12 U. S. C. 
sec. 24. ), the Bank Holding Company Act (12 U. S. C. sec. 1843) and the amendments to the Bank 
Holding company Act made by the Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982(12 U. S. C. Sec. 1843 (c)(8)). 
Some insurance contracts (such as variable life and annuities whose payments rely on the fluctuating 
value of investment portfolios) are so much like non-insurance investments that they are considered 
"securities" under the Securities Act 1933 (15 U. S. C. Sec. 77a et seq. ). The insurance companies that 
sell these products may be considered "issuers" of securities and "investment company" under the 
Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U. S. C. Sec. 80a- I et seq. ) 
In the field of employee benefits, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) (P 
L. 93-406; 29 U. S. C. Sec. 1001 et seq. ), provides vesting and funding requirement for private pension 
plans and generally regulates the design of pension and other benefit plans. 
During the liability crisis, the federal Product Liability Risk Retention Act of 1981 (P. L. 97-45) was 
developed to allow commercial entities to create risk retention groups and purchasing groups under 
state supervision for product liability risks. 
In addition, the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) (P. L. 99-272) requires 
many employers to provide continuation of health insurance coverages for terminating employees and 
certain family members for a specific period. 
The federal Social Security Act (42 U. S. C. Sec. 401 et seq. ) was enacted in 1935 during the Great 
Depression to provide several programmes relating to disability insurance, hospital and medical 
insurance. 
The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (P. L. 90-448 Title XIII) and the Flood Disaster Protection 
Act of 1973 (P. L. 93-234) provide for the availability of flood and mudslide coverage to certain 
property owners in all states. PETER M. LENCSIS, supra note 112, at 9-12. 
114 See NAIC, The NIAC-A Tradition o Consumer Protection, (last visited July 28 2000), available at f 
http: //www. naic. org/Imisc/aboutnaic/about/about0l. htm. 
115 PETER M. LENCSIS, supra note 112, at 16. 
116 Debra J. Hall, The Emerging Regulation of Reinsurance Intermediaries, 42 DRAKE LAW 
REVIEW 859,863 (1993). 
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reinsurance generally focuses on the party receiving coverage (the ceding insurer or 
the primary insurer) by limiting the financial accounting relating to admissible assets. 
The amount of debt owed by reinsurers cannot be deemed as admitted assets to cover 
or reduce technical provisions unless the reinsurers and reinsurance contracts meet 
117 certain statutory requirements . In addition to these requirements, ceding of some 
portions of risks in particular lines of insurance business is often required by the 
statutes in most states. In the following subsections, several significant parts of 
regulation of reinsurance in the United States will be introduced and discussed 
respectively. 
a. Regulations relating to conduct reinsurance business 
An insurer is ordinarily authorised to carry on reinsurance business with its state of 
domicile, as to the same kinds of insurance it is authorised to write direct insurance. A 
significant amount of the reinsurance business in the United States, however, is 
conducted by reinsurers who are not licensed in the state where business is conducted. 
In general, state insurance departments will grant authorisation to the reinsurer who 
8 has been regulated and monitored by other state" . Therefore, the primary 
responsibility for regulation of multistate reinsurers rests with the reinsurers' state of 
domicile' 19. 
For licensed foreign insurers, they may provide reinsurance coverage without 
any particular authorisaton in some states. In other states, the foreign reinsurers are 
allowed to carry on reinsurance without any licensing authority' 20 . In general, a 
reinsurer in the United States is said to be relatively free from regulation; however, 
their regulatory treatment, which may affect primary insurers' financial statement, 
differs depending on whether they are authorised or unauthorised in a state. Insurance 
regulation mandates that a primary insurer can only take a reinsurance credit to cover 
or to reduce its technical reserve if the transaction is made with an authorised 
reinsurer or if the reinsurance is supported by a cash deposit or other security for the 
117 See Michael P. Goldman, Michael J. Pinsel and Natalie Spadaccini Rosenberg, Legal and 
Regulatory Issues Affecting Insurance Derivatives and Securitization, in SECURITIZED 
INSURANCE RISK STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITIES FOR INSURERS AND INVESTORS, at 85 
(Michael Himick ed., Chicago 1998). 
118 See MICHAEL W. ELLIOTT, BERNARD L. WEBB, HOWARD N. ANDERSON & PETER R. 
KENSICKI, supra note 66, at 215. 
119 See id, at 216. 
120 See PETER M. LENCSIS, supra note 112, at 101. 
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reinsurer's obligations. In other words, state insurance departments indirectly regulate 
unauthorised reinsurers by employing financial requirements on a primary insurer that 
121 cedes risks to an unauthorised reinsurer 
In order to compile information on alien insurers and reinsurers, the 
Nonadmitted Insurers Information Office was formed as an adjunct to the NAIC. The 
main task of this office is to analyse the financial condition of each company and to 
provide a valuable service to state regulators who would otherwise not have adequate 
122 resources to analyse alien insurers and reinsurers 
b. Requirements relating to risk retention 
In most states, a primary insurer is prohibited from permanently accepting or retaining 
more than certain specified amounts of risk and is required to obtain reinsurance to 
cede risks in excess of these amounts, such as one-tenth of the amount of their surplus 
on any one property or liability risk 123 . The main purpose of this requirement is to 
prevent a primary insurer from exposing itself to an ultimate loss ansing out from 
insurance contracts. 
c. Regulation of reinsurance arrangements ofprimary insurers 
Regulation of reinsurance in the United States mainly focuses on the primary insurers 
and their reinsurance arrangements. According to the NAIC's Credit for Reinsurance 
Model Law', the value of reinsurance recoverable by a primary insurer from a 
reinsurer is considered as either an admitted assets or a reduction from technical 
reserve only if, and when the reinsurance is ceded to (I)an assuming insurer that is 
licensed to transact insurance or reinsurance in this state; or (2)an assuming insurer 
that is accredited as a reinsurer in this state; or (3) an assuming insurer that is 
domiciled in, or in the case of a U. S branch of an alien assuming insurer, a state that 
employs standards regarding credit of reinsurance substantially similar to those 
applicable under this statute, maintain the certain amount of surplus and submits to 
the authority of this state to examine its books and records; or (4) an assuming insurer 
that maintains a trust fund in a qualified U. S. financial institution for the payment of 
121 See MICHAEL W. ELLIOTT, BERNARD L. WEBB, HOWARD N. ANDERSON & PETER R. 
KENSICKI, supra note 66, at 215. 
122 See MICHAEL W. ELLIOTT, BERNARD L. WEBB, HOWARD N. ANDERSON & PETER R. 
KENSICKI, supra note 66, at 214-215. 
123 PETER M. LENCSIS, supra note 112, at 40. 
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the valid claims of its U. S. ceding insurers their assigns and successors in interest. 
Moreover, credit is to be allowed when the reinsurance is required by applicable law 
or regulation of that jurisdiction. In other words, credit will be allowed to ceding 
insurers that are mandated by these jurisdictions to cede to state-owned or controlled 
insurance or reinsurance companies or to participate in pools, guaranty associtaions or 
residual market mechanisms. 
d. Regulation of reinsurance policyfonns 
Market conduct regulation designed to protect the insured party is generally 
inappropriate in the context of the regulation of reinsurance. Reinsurance transactions 
have been excluded from most regulatory systems regulating the relationship between 
the insured party and primary insurers. In general, state insurance departments do not 
require the same prior approval or informational filings for the wording used in 
reinsurance contracts as they do for primary insurance policy forms. Due to the 
complexity and diversity of reinsurance transaction, however, reinsurance terms and 
conditions may have a direct impact on the interests of policyholders and investors. 
Thus, state regulations require that specifying clauses, which may protect the interests 
of policyholders and the public, are to be included in a reinsurance contract with a 
primary insurer. In general, the following three clauses are to be included: (1) the 
"insolvency clause" states that reinsurance is not relieved of its liability arising out 
from reinsurance contract should the primary insurer become insolvent; (2) the 
"service of process clause" requires that the reinsurer have a legal representative 
within the United States who accept service on behalf of the reinsurer; and (3) the 
"intermediary clause" stipulates that the intermediary is an agent of the reinsurer for 
124 the purpose of receiving and transmitting funds 
e. Regulation of reinsurance intermediary. 
In June 1990, the NAIC adopted the Reinsurance Intermediary Model Act, which 
requires a reinsurance intermediary be licensed and to comply with other specific 
requirements. Reinsurance intermediaries under this Act are divided into two types: 
reinsurance brokers and reinsurance managers' 
25 
. In addition to the 
licensing 
124 See MICHAEL W. ELLIOTT, BERNARD L. WEBB, HOWARD N. ANDERSON & PETER R. 
KENSICKI, supra note 66, at 216. 
125 A reinsurance broker means any person, other than an officer or employee of the ceding insurer, 
firm, association or corporation who solicits, negotiates or places reinsurance cession or retrocessions 
on behalf of a ceding insurer without the authority or power to bind reinsurance on behalf of such 
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requirements and the obligation imposed upon the contracting parties, the Act 
presents various model provisions addressing the obligations of ceding company 
clients or reinsurer clients and applying penalties against reinsurance intermediaries, 
insurers and reinsurers who violate the regulatory acts. 
3. A Comparative Analysis on the Structures of the Reinsurance Regulation 
In comparing the two developed models of the EU-UK and the U. S., several 
fundamental differences between them can be identified as follows: 
First, regarding the licensing requirements and authorisation of reinsurers, the 
regulation of reinsurers in the European Union has not been harmonised and varies in 
every member state. In the UK model, the requirement of solvency margin of a 
reinsurer is the same as that which applies to an insurance company who writes direct 
business and has its head office in the UK. Unlike other EU direct insurance 
companies, reinsurance company whose head office is in an EEA member state and 
which carries on reinsurance business is required to demonstrate its financial 
solvency. In addition, an applicant, which is based in a country outside the European 
Economic Area, needs to obtain an authorisation from FSA before carrying on 
reinsurance business. 
With regard to licensing requirements of reinsurers in the United States, an 
insurer is ordinarily authorised to carry on reinsurance business within its state of 
domicile, as to the same kinds of insurance as it is authorised to write direct 
insurance. As for the reinsurance business conducted by reinsurers who are not 
licensed in the state where business is conducted, state insurance departments will 
grant authorisation to the reinsurer who has been regulated and monitored by another 
state. On the contrary, in some states, the foreign reinsurers are allowed to carry on 
reinsurance without any licensing authority. In other states, they may provide for 
reinsurance coverage which is of the same kind of direct insurance as to which they 
are licensed to carry on without any specific authorisaton. As a general proposition, it 
seems that reinsurers in the United States are relatively free from regulation. It should 
be noted, however, that their regulatory treatments, which may affect primary 
insurers' financial statement, differ and depend on whether they are authorised or 
insurer. 
iA 
reinsurance manager, on the other hand, is defined as any person, firm, association or 
corporation who has authority to bind or manages all or part of the assumed reinsurance business of a 
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unauthorised in a state. In other words, state insurance departments indirectly regulate 
unauthorised reinsurers by employing financial requirements on primary insurers that 
cede risks to unauthorised reinsurers. 
Secondly, the differences between US and UK regulatory regimes exist with 
respect to the regulation relating to reinsurance arrangements of insurers Accordine, to 
the EU's Third Insurance Directive, the debt owed by reinsurers can be treated as 
acceptable assets to cover technical provisions. Each member state may require 
valuable security or guarantees, particularly in the case of debts owed by reinsurers. 
In addition, if the home Member State allows technical provisions to be covered by 
claims against reinsurers, it is to fix the percentage and ensure that limitations on 
particular categories of assets is to take account of the treatment of reinsurance in the 
calculation of technical provisions. 
Regarding financial regulation of primary insurers in the United Kingdom, 
reinsurance arrangements of primary insurers are regulated and monitored by 
regulators in the following aspects. There is a restriction on the reinsurance fraction 
respecting the solvency margin requirement. Further, the amount of value of 
reinsurance recovery against a reinsurer can reasonably be expected and recovered. 
Moreover, insurers are required to submit statements summarising the company's 
exposure to major reinsurers and major cedants, and the nature of any connection with 
each reinsurer and cedant. 
Compared with EC insurance directives and the United Kingdom model, 
regulation of reinsurance arrangements of primary insurers in the United States appear 
more complicated, detailed and stringent. 
Regarding the requirement of risk retention, if primary insurers insure any 
risks above certain specified amounts, they are required to obtain reinsurance for the 
excess portion in most states. Although both the EU and the United States recognise 
that reinsurance recoverables can be treated as admitted assets under their respective 
statutory accounting principles, the value of reinsurance recoverable in the United 
States can be recognised by the regulators only if the reinsurer is licensed in the 
regulator's state or otherwise approved as an accredited foreign or alien insurer. In the 
case of ceding to foreign reinsurers who are not accredited by a state insurance 
reinsurer (including the management of a separate division, department or underwriting office) and acts 
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department, primary insurers can not take credit of reinsurance unless the reinsurers 
have provided (1) a deposit of cash or securities with the ceding companies, or (2) an 
amount of cash or securities in trust with a domestic bank or other suitable trustee, or 
(3) an irrevocable letter of credit issued by an acceptable bank to secure the 
126 
reinsurer's obligations 
Thirdly, market regulation designed to protect the insured parties is generally 
inappropriate in the context of the regulation of reinsurance. Reinsurance transactions 
have been excluded from most regulatory regimes regulating the relationship between 
the insured party and primary insurers. Although reinsurance terms and conditions 
may have a direct effect on the interests of policyholders and investors in some cases, 
reinsurance terms and conditions are only regulated by specific regulations in the 
United States. 
D. Regulatory Issues relating to Reform on the Structure of Reinsurance 
Regulation in Emerging Markets 
An alternative regulatory system would be to safeguard the financial 
soundness of primary insurers. Under this system, supervisors are to ensure their 
ability to review reinsurance arrangements, to access the degree of reliance placed on 
these arrangements and to determine the appropriateness of such reliance. An 
insurance supervisor would assess the collectability of the reinsurance recoverables to 
compute the amount of the applicable reinsurance, which can take the credit to cover 
the technical reserve, on the net reserving basis. In addition, the assessment of the 
collectability of the reinsurance recoverables would take into account the supervisory 
control over the reinsures for the reason that reinsurance transactions often operate on 
the cross-border basis. In order to obtain accurate information to establish the method 
for collection and monitoring of information relating to reinsurers, it would be 
essential for an insurance supervisor to enhance international cooperation and 
information exchange relating to regulation and supervision. 
It would appear, notwithstanding the need to adhere to international 
liberalisation trend in a sequenced and managed manner, this alternative regulation 
system to safeguard financial stability appears best suited for emerging countries. Yet, 
many emerging countries have sought for expediency to copy the developed models 
as an agent for such reinsurer whether known as a RM, manager or other similar term. 
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operating on certain industrialised countries 127 . It is evident, however that the attempts 
to copy the "ready-made" law of industniallsed countries will fall unless awareness of 
28 particular social, economic and legal differences has been taken into account' . 
Several issues arise when considering formulating reinsurance regulation reform in 
emerging market. 
I. Conflicts between Regulation of Reinsurers and the Diversification of 
Insurance Risk 
As mentioned above, the regulation of reinsurers in the UK and US models tends to 
regulate reinsurers in their domestic jurisdictions. For example, reinsurers who wish 
to carry on reinsurance business in the UK should obtain the authorisation from the 
129 FSA . Should the same regulatory model be adopted by an emerging market, simply 
because it seems that such a developed model proved to be successful in these 
developed countries? 
On the one hand, direct regulation of reinsurers can promote the regulators' 
control on reinsurers by means of licensure, financial solvency requirements and 
market conduct control (e. g., contract wording, fraud). While the markets become 
liberalisation, the insurers may find it more difficult to assess the reinsurer's 
creditworthiness and to deal with legal dispute arising from reinsurance contracts. In 
direct supervision of reinsurers, this will provide an uniform of assessment for 
regulators and insurers and should make it become easier to settle dispute in the same 
jurisdiction. 
On the other hand, regulation of reinsurers may lead to excessive transaction 
costs, operational obstacles and increased supervisory costs. The licensure of 
reinsurers means that reinsurers should be subject to relevant investment requirements 
and capital requirements. This will increase operational obstacles for those foreign 
reinsurers. Consequently, this would establish a barrier to entry into a domestic 
market and hence to damage the diversification of insurance risk. 
126 See PETER M. LENCSIS, supra note 112, at 40. 
127 This is because these industrialised countries' models proved to be successful and the emerging 
countries need to speed up their regulation reform. See generally JOSEPH 
J. NORTON, supra note 54, 
at 130. 
128 - ** ., [E]xperience shows 
that no government can expect to develop their own model by copying a 
developed country's successful model. These developing countries should benefit from comparative 
law methodology, but they should not rely on ready-made laws which operate, substantially. in 
different economic, social and legal environments. " Id, at 130-132. 
47 
Chapter One Purposes and Structures of Reinsurance Regulation 
Unlike developed reinsurance markets, the main problem in the emerging 
markets is the lack of capacity for risk 130 and expertise. By adopting direct regulation, 
it, more probably, will cause a shortage of coverage for the risk that insurers have 
assumed. Therefore, the successful developed models in developed markets may be 
inappropriate or adoption by emerging market. 
2. Regulation of Reinsurance Arrangements and Cross-border 
Reinsurance Transactions 
Cross-border reinsurance transactions can be difficult to track and to obtain 
information relating to financial condition of reinsurers. Additionally, the cross- 
border aspect will increase uncertainty of reinsurance payment. Foreign insurers may 
not be subject to the same degree regulatory regime as domestic insurers 131 - 
In the 
United States, international reinsurers who wish to carry on reinsurance business 
132 should meet specific collateral requirements . By doing so, the ceding insurers can 
obtain the credit of reinsurance to reduce the loss reserve in their financial statements. 
The use of collateral requirements may prevent domestic insurers from difficult 
collection problems arising from foreign reinsurers 133 and may reduce the uncertainty 
of reinsurance payments. 
From the viewpoint of insolvency law, collateral requirements may create 
certain classes of preferential creditors and may act to the detriment of other classes of 
34 
other policyholders and creditors' . As mentioned above, it is difficult to define such 
collateral requirements as either a form of prudent regulation in the interests of the 
general public or a discriminatory measure against foreign reinsurers. Although the 
use of collateral requirements can reduce collection problems, defacto discrimination 
still might occur. It is inevitable that such requirements will increase the transaction 
129 See Section 11, C, 1 of this chapter. 
130 See MIS Working Group on Reinsurance, "Reinsurance and Reinsurers: Relevant Issues for 
Establishing General Supervisory Principles, Standards and Practices", IAIS, (Feb. 2000), p. 11. 
131 See IAIS Working Group on Reinsurance, Reinsurance and Reinsurers: Relevant Issues for 
Establishing General Supervisory Principles, Standards and Practices, at 27, (Feb. 2000) available at 
<www. iaisweb-org> 
132 In the case of ceding to foreign reinsurers who are not accredited by state insurance departments, 
primary insurers can not take credit of reinsurance unless the reinsurer have provided (1) a deposit of 
cash or securities with the ceding company, or (2) an amount of cash or securities in trust with a 
domestic bank or other suitable trustee, or (3) an irrevocable letter of credit issued by an acceptable 
bank to secure the reinsurer's obligations. 
133 See IAIS Working Group on Reinsurance, supra note 13 1, at 27. 
134 Id, at 27. 
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costs of reinsurance. Consequently, they may impose indirect restrictions on the 
cross-border transactions and then impede the diversification of insurance risks. 
3. Assessment of Security of Reinsurers and International Supervisory 
Standards 
It is recognised that the lack of reinsurance coverage is the main problems as to 
emerging markets' 35 . Regulators in emerging countries not only have to promote 
liberalisation of reinsurance transactions but also have to ensure the security of 
reinsurance payments. To avoid any distortion of freedom of reinsurance activities, 
regulators need to reconciliate the conflicts between prudential regulation and the 
diversification of insurance risk. 
With regard to direct regulation of reinsurers, a registration system (e. g., UK 
)136, that is less stringent, might be introduced while the licensure of reinsurers may 
damage the freedom of reinsurance activities and may increase further transaction 
costs. Under this system, reinsurers are required to demonstrate their financial 
condition and relevant regulation to which they are subject before authorisaton is 
granted. In the UK model, an applicant from another EEA member state for a 
reinsurance authoristaion would need authorisation from the FSA. For the applicant 
who is outside the EEA, the applications of authorisaton are stricter than those 
applicable to non-EEA pure reinsurance companies. For example, according to Rule 
IPRU (INS) 8.1. (1), the deposit of requirement is not applicable in the case of a non- 
applicant for an authorisation restricted to reinsurance business only. 
It should be noted, however, that several steps have to be taken before such a 
system is introduced and enacted. First, the official assessment of the financial 
condition of reinsurer should be established. Such an assessment should be based on 
generally accepted accounting standards. Second, regulators should be able to obtain 
accurate information by enhancement of cooperation between regulators throughout 
the world. Third, regulators should comply with high standard of expertise to use the 
assessment. 
In emerging market, regulators often have insufficient experience and 
expertise to assess the financial condition of reinsurers particularly as to some 
135 Id, at 11. 
136 Id, at 3 See also further discussions in Chapter Two. 
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advance reinsurance products such as finite risk reinsurance and insurance- linked 
securities. In addition, the establishment of their own assessments is a difficult task. 
For emerging markets, the use of rating agencies can be an alternative tool of 
assessment as they can provide useful criteria for primary insurers to select 
reinsurers. 1 37 
From the viewpoint of harmonisation of supervisory standards, the "mutual 
recognition" used in European Union countries seems successful. Although the 
66 single passport system" for reinsurers still has not been adopted by the EU, the 
proposal to adopt a single license system has been suggested by the CEA (Comite 
Europeen des Assurances) 138. In the long-term as to developing a single passport 
system for reinsurance activities, appropriate international supervisory standards 
should be established first to reduce legal uncertainty and transaction costs. This will 
also benefit the emerging countries in developing their own reinsurance regulations 
and in promoting fair competition and the diversification of insurance risks. 
111. Regulatory Reform on the Purposes and the Structure of 
Reinsurance Regulation in Emerging Markets: The Case of Taiwan 
In the case of Taiwan, which shares the common characteristics with other 
emerging markets, there is a pre-existing regulatory system and a particular market 
environment that can not be ignored. This observation leads to one of the main themes 
of this volume; that is, the reform of reinsurance regulation should take into account 
its specific circumstances in each country. It is in this context that the Taiwanese 
reinsurance market is used as a case study. As such, two general aspects of 
reinsurance regulation in Taiwan, namely the purposes of its reinsurance regulation 
and the structural reform on its reinsurance regulatory regime, will be addressed 
respectively. In this connection, this research is intended to identify the contour of the 
current problems relating to reinsurance regulation in Taiwan, and then to submit 
selective suggestions in this respect by comparative reference to developed models 
including the EC insurance directives, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
A. Taiwanese Reinsurance Regulatory Regime and the Potential Problems 
137 See MICHAEL W. ELLIOTT, BERNARD L. WEBB, HOWARD N. ANDERSON & PETER R. 
KENSICKI, supra note 66, at 201. 
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With regard to regulatory regime in Taiwan, the domestic Insurance Law prescribes 
the supervisory authority, the Ministry of Finance, as being responsible for 
supervising any undertakings carrying on insurance business. The Insurance Law 
governs the insurance contract and also provides the regulatory requirements for 
insurance enterprises. Among the Insurance Law, there is only one article concerning 
reinsurance arrangements of insurers. In order to prevent insurers from risk exposure, 
it requires that risk retention of insurers shall not exceed one tenth of the aggregate 
amount of the capital or foundation fund, the surplus, the special reserve and the 
retained earnings 139 . 
To ensure the control on the ceding business of insurers and to protect its 
domestic reinsurance market and balance of payment situation, the Central 
Reinsurance Corporation Act (CRCA) was enacted in 1972. This Act provides for the 
main part of the reinsurance regulatory regime in Taiwan. According to Article 6 of 
the CRCA, Central Reinsurance Corporation (CRC) 140 was established in 1968 by the 
government. The CRC is responsible for taking priority cessions from all authorised 
insurers in Taiwan although the insurers are permitted to make cessions to foreign 
141 reinsurers pursuant to several exemptions . 
In other words, all authorised insurers 
are to make priority cessions of all lines business to the CRC unless they meet the 
conditions established by the Ministry of Finance. In addition to CRCA, Rules 
Governing Ceding Business to Foreign Insurers made by the Ministry of Finance 
contain substantial provisions that authorise insurers to obtain the approval to cede to 
foreign reinsurers without compulsory cessions to CRC if foreign reinsurers can 
142 provide more favorable coverage than the CRC can In practice, the minimum 
143 
cession made on a quota share basis to the CRC is 10% and the average is 15% 
Except for compulsory cessions to the CRC, insurers in Taiwan are free to reinsure 
abroad without any restriction. As a result, the main purpose of Taiwanese 
138 Michael Pickel, Panel On Reinsurance Regulation: The Importance Of Global Regulation of 
Reinsurers Seen From The Point Of View Of A German Reinsurer, in Seventh Annual Conference of 
The IAIS, at 6 (Cape Town, 10 October 2000). 
139 Insurance Law (Taiwan ROC) (amended) 2001, art. 147. 
140 Central Reinsurance Corporation is the solo professional reinsurer in Taiwan and one of only two 
Asia reinsurers (along with Korean Re) to be listed in Standard & Poor's Top 100 Reinsurers listing. 
BARBARA HADLEY, INSURANCE IN ASIA 109 (Financial Times, 1998). 
141 Central Reinsurance Corporation Act 1972, art 2. 
142 Article 3 and 4 of Rules Governing the Ceding Business to Foreign Insurers (amended) 1981, 
M. O. F. (70), no. 15498. 
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reinsurance regulation is based currently on local protectionism rather than on 
maintaining the financial solvency of insurers. 
With regard to the reinsurance market in Taiwan, in 1998 premiums ceded to 
an internal reinsurance market were estimated to be around TWD 19,804 million 
(USD 633 million) whereas premiums ceded abroad were estimated at TVvD 30,942 
million 144 . 
The percentage of non-life direct premium income ceded abroad in 1998 
was 40.80% 145 . 
This shows that foreign reinsurers have significant influence on the 
Taiwanese reinsurance market, and the financial condition of such reinsurers might 
have a direct impact on domestic insurers. In addition to foreign reinsurers, 
reinsurance brokers also play an essential role to cede "facultative business" abroad 
146 since most "treaty business" is concluded directly with reinsurers 
In spite of the important role that the foreign reinsurers and brokers play in the 
Taiwanese reinsurance market, the domestic regulation of reinsurance is far from 
comprehensive and sound in ensuring the financial solvency of insurers. This is 
because, as mentioned above, the primary purpose of domestic reinsurance regulatory 
regime is based on local protectionism rather than on enhancing the financial solvency 
of insurers in Taiwan. The Insurance Law only contains one provision concerning risk 
retention of the insurers. Apart from that, the CRCA provides limited regulatory 
functions by using compulsory cessions. 
As a result of the inadequacy of solvency regulation concerning reinsurance in 
Taiwan, it is reasonable to assume that potential risk might arise while the reinsurance 
market increasingly becomes internationalised after the establishment of WTO/GATS 
and Taiwan's entry in this world trading regime. Under these circumstances, the 
insurers may face competitive challenges from other foreign insurers. In order to 
maximum their profit opportunities, they may change their strategy and management 
to expand their business by using reinsurance as a "substitute capital". As a result, the 
insurers might neglect the quality of the reinsurance and credit risks of the reinsurers 
if appropriate solvency regulation are not been enacted and applied. 
14' AXCO, INSURANCE MARKET REPORT ON TAIWAN-NON-LEFE 33 (AXCO Insurance 
Information Services, July 2000). 
144 Id, at 35. 
145 Id, at 34. 
146 Id, at 39. 
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The legal instruments used by the GATS 
147 
, the Annex, is an integral part of 
the GATS, is designed to be the framework agreement to provide greater specificity, 
148 covers reinsurance among other insurance services . Additionally, each GATS 
member state should not employ any measures for protectionism, although each 
149 country has its own right to take any measures for prudential reasons 
As for cross-border trade in financial services, the GATS Understanding on 
Commitments in Financial Services requires that each member state is to "permit non- 
resident supplier of financial services to supply financial services beyond those 
enumerated in the Annex on Financial Services as a principal, through an 
intermediary or as an intermediary' 50 ." The Understanding regarding cross-boarder 
covers several commercial insurance services including maritime shipping, 
commercial aviation, space launching, freight, hull cargo, and liability, goods in 
international transit, reinsurance and retrocession' 51 . As a result, foreign insurers shall 
be permitted to conduct reinsurance and retrocession in the domestic market by 
domestic regulation. 
Fostering the trend of globalisation, the GATS mandates that unnecessary 
barriers and restriction to entry domestic reinsurance market are to be abolished. For 
example, the regulation relating to compulsory cessions to CRC used as a means to 
protect domestic reinsurance market and the national currency may violate the GATS. 
Further, international supervision standards should be considered and applied into 
Taiwanese regulatory system. In recent years, international "institutions" have 
147 See generally J. Steven Jarreau, Interpreting the General Agreement on Trade in Services and the 
WTO Instruments relevant to the International Trade on Financial Services: the Lawyer's Perspective, 
25 NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COMMERCIAL 
REGULATION I (Fall 1999). Aly K. Abu-Akeel, Definition of Trade in Services Under the GATS: 
Legal Implications, 32 GEORGE WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 189 (1999); Joel P. Trachtman, Trade in Financial Services under GATS, NAFTA and 
the EC: A Regulatory Jurisdiction Analysis, 34 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL 
LAW 37 (1995). 
148 See General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organisation, Annex 113, Legal Instruments -Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 28 
(1994), 33 I. L. M. 1167 (1994)., cited by J. Steven Jarreau, supra note 147, at 36. 
149 "Notwithstanding any other provisions of the Agreement, a Member shall not be prevented from 
taking measures for prudential reasons, including for the protection of investors, depositors, policy 
holders or persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial system. Where such measures do 
not confirm with the provisions of the Agreement, they shall not be used as a means of avoiding the 
Member's commitments or obligations under the Agreement". See Section 2 (a) of the Annex on 
Financial Services. Idat 36. 
150 Idat 57-58. 
151 See Section 3 (a) and (b) of Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services, Apr, 15,1994, 
Results of the Uruguay Round-Legal Texts 477 (1994), 33 I. L. M. 1260-63 9(1994). Id, at 57. 
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developed several minimum supervisory standards in order to provide a similar level 
playing field for reinsurers and to promote a fair competitive environment. The main 
purpose of these guidelines and principles is to ensure that regulators have the ability 
to review reinsurance arrangements, to assess the degree of reliance placed on these 
arrangements and to determine the appropriateness of such reliance. In comparison to 
these international supervisory standards, it appears that the reinsurance business of 
the ceding insurers in Taiwan is largely free from prudential regulation, 
notwithstanding the compulsory cessions to a state-owned reinsurer. As a matter of 
fact, the Taiwanese reinsurance regulation can control neither the insurer's selection 
of reinsurers nor the reinsurance programmes. 
Moreover, the current reinsurance regulation in Taiwan lacks a comprehensive 
and viable tool for supervising and monitoring reinsurance activities. Due to 
inadequate regulations that delegate authority to insurance regulators, the insurance 
regulators only can rely on the financial statements provided by the ceding insurers in 
supervising the ceding business of the insurers. However, approval standards relating 
to selection of reinsurers and reinsurance arrangements have not been prescribed in 
the relevant regulations. In addition to reinsurers and insurers in the reinsurance 
market, such regulations should consider the reinsurance intermediaries which act as 
the agents of reinsurers or insurers. As a result, the regulation of reinsurance 
intermediary should be included in the reinsurance regulatory regime although the 
reinsurance intermediary in Taiwan are free from specified regulation regarding 
licensure, supervision of market conduct, and solvency regulation. 
In terms of a comprehensive and viable regulation, the Taiwanese regulators 
should be able to supervise the ceding business of the insurers and also provide a fair 
competitive regulatory environment for domestic and foreign reinsurers. While the 
needs of prudential regulation increases, the development of new regulatory regime 
should avoid "over-regulation" that may increase transaction costs and may unduly 
reduce market competition. 
B. Purposes of reinsurance regulation in Taiwan 
For the variety reasons mentioned above, It is difficult to define and to determine the 
priority of purposes of reinsurance regulations for emerging markets. On the case of 
Taiwan, the author has the following suggestions. 
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1. Maintaining the financial solvency of primary insurers in reinsurance 
arrangements 
As mentioned above, the regulation of reinsurance mainly deals with the relationship 
between solvency of primary insurers and their reinsurance arrangements. To what 
extent reinsurance will affect the solvency of primary insurers depends the method to 
calculate the technical reserve, which is designed to ensure that an insurer will match 
all its known liabilities. 
Among some countries on the gross reserving basis, regulators can monitor the 
financial condition of insurers without control on their reinsurance arrangements 
because the financial security of reinsurance is achieved by the requirement of the 
deposit of premium reserves and outstanding liability reserves. It should be noted, 
however, that the stringent deposit requirement will deprive reinsurers' freedom of 
investment, interest earnings and consequently will result in the extract cost which 
will be passed on to the final consumer party. In addition, it has increased the adverse 
effect on global reinsurance market. Thus, many countries adopt the net reserving 
basis and permit that primary insurer can cover its technical reserves by applicable 
reinsurance arrangements. 
In this connection, Taiwan also adopts the similar regulatory mechanism to 
allow that primary insurers can hold reinsurance recovery as a substitute for capital. In 
such circumstances, reinsurance recovery has a direct impact on the financial 
solvency of primary insurers in Taiwan. Furthermore, the transfer (ceding) of risk 
abroad is a common practice in Taiwan. Reinsurance capacity of non-life insurance 
industry in Taiwan relies heavily upon the supply from the international reinsurance 
market. Thus, it is essential for a regulator not only to promote primary insurers to 
spread their risk efficiently and internationally but also to enhance the regulatory 
mechanisms to ensure the security of reinsurance recovery. While other developed 
countries have established and employed several regulatory mechanisms to monitor 
reinsurance arrangements, however, regulations in Taiwan are still insufficient to 
prevent primary insurers from credit risk relating to default of reinsurers. In Chapter 
Two, this issue will be further discussed. 
2. Promoting liberalisation and fair competition in insurance and 
reinsurance market. 
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The reinsurance regulation in Taiwan was mainly designed to protect local insurance 
market and balance of payment. According to CRCA 1972, state owned reinsurance 
company-Central Reinsurance Corporation is required to assume a specified portion 
of business ceded by primary insurance companies in Taiwan 152 . In order to enhance 
underwriting capacity, promote risk retention of local insurance industry and protect 
national currency, Central Reinsurance Corporation also operates as a local pool 
organisation and conducts a certain amount of retrocession to local primary insurers. 
Due to the trend of liberalisation and globalisation, the barrier to trade in 
reinsurance will be dismantled gradually by the WTO in which the Taiwanese 
government has made its endeavour to participate. While some reinsurance 
regulations affected the free access to international reinsurance market will be 
avoided, however, the alternative regulatory system to safeguard the financial 
soundness of primary insurers and reinsurers should be established and implemented. 
In this connection, except the financial solidity of primary insurers mentioned above, 
government should enact and enforce laws that provide reasonable solvency standards 
for reinsurance companies. It means that government not only should liberalise local 
reinsurance market to foreign competitors but also establish prudential regulation 
relating to solvency standards. In addition, it is essential to establish specific 
regulations to deal with the issues relating to reinsurers. 
With respect to the trend of consolidation of international reinsurance market, 
it is reasonable to assume that more attention might be paid to the competition policy 
and anti -competitive behaviour relating to mergers and arrangements among 
reinsurers. Government should not only enact and enforce laws that provide an 
effective framework for competitive reinsurance market' 53 but also enhance 
international co-operations to prevent anti -competitive practices arising from 
international reinsurance groups. 
In the following section, the structure reform will be suggested along with the 
purpose of reinsurance regulation to ensure solvency of insurers and promote fair 
competitive market. 
C. The Structure Reform on Reinsurance Regulatory Regime 
152 Central Reinsurance Corporation Act (Taiwan ROC) 1972, art. 6 (1). 
153 See Harold D. Skipper, Jr., supra note 55, at 201. 
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To ensure a well-structured competitive and solvent insurance market, each 
government's intervention into its market should be reassessed to ensure that the 
154 
essential purposes are being accomplished with ryunimum market disruption 
Respecting the Taiwanese regulatory reform as to the reinsurance regulation, it 
remains difficult to define the priority of regulatory purposes. On the one hand, the 
increased regulation imposed on the foreign reinsurers may protect domestic 
reinsurers and may make it easier to settle legal disputes between reinsurers and 
insurers in the same jurisdiction. On the other hand, this may cause significant 
damage to diversification of insured risks. Consequently, "any restriction on this 
diversification as a result of over-regulation is of detriment to both the cedant and 
reinsurer. 1 55,, Additionally, unnecessary transaction costs may arise with the increased 
costs finally be passed on to the policyholders. To reconcile these conflicts, desirable 
regulations should ensure the security of foreign reinsurers, yet also should promote 
the diversification of insured risk. 
In order to achieve this particular purpose in Taiwan, the regulatory regime 
should be restructured on a comprehensive basis, which means that all the parties 
relating to reinsurance transactions should come within the scope of regulation. Such 
a comprehensive and viable regulatory regime should include reinsurers, insurers and 
reinsurance intermediaries. Furthermore, international supervisory standards should 
not be neglected while developing this new regulatory regime. Prudential regulations 
compatible with international standards should be introduced and implemented, in a 
realistic manner, to ensure the financial solvency of reinsurers and insurers. As a 
result, the Taiwanese regulators should endeavor to ensure their ability to assess the 
quality of reinsurance of insurers and to enhance international cooperation between 
the host regulators and home country supervisors. 
To ensure the solvency of insurers, the appropriateness of the reinsurance 
programme should be examined and assessed by the regulators. The host regulators 
should be able to obtain the accurate information relating to the financial condition of 
reinsurers and the quality of the home country regulation. In order to obtain such 
information, more attention should be paid to developing a working framework of 
international cooperation among domestic regulators and foreign regulators, and to 
154 See Harold D. Skipper, Jr., supra note 55, at 200. 
155 Michael Pickel, supra note 138, at 3. 
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intemationa accounting standards, that seeks to provide greater comprehensibility 
and reliability. 
In terms of specific structural reforms respecting the Taiwanese reinsurance 
regulation, the following are suggested: 
LRegulation of reinsurance arrangements of primary insurers 
With regard to primary insurers' reinsurance arrangements, three essential issues 
should be considered prudentially, namely risk retention of business written by 
primary insurers, security of placing reinsurance with reinsurers and accounting 
regulations. 
a. Risk retention of business written by primary insurers 
In order to improve primary insurers' capacity of obtaining business, to stabilize 
insurers' profits, and to strengthen their financial solvency, it is important for primary 
insurers to spread their risks more efficiently through reinsurance. To prevent 
primary insurers from exposing themselves to an ultimate loss arising from liability 
under insurance contracts, many countries prohibit them from accepting or retaining 
more than a certain specified amount of business. A similar regulatory mechanism has 
been adopted by Taiwanese regulatory regime. Primary insurers are required to obtain 
reinsurance to cede risks in excess of one-tenth of the amount of their surplus on any 
156 one property or liability risk 
On the contrary, the more dependent a primary insurer's capacity is upon its 
reinsurance arrangements, the more dependent is its solvency upon the 
security/creditworthiness of reinsurance. Furthermore, a primary insurer would 
operate as a broker and rely on reinsurance commission if it does not retain a 
57 
substantial proportion of its business' . Therefore, some countries may either restrict 
primary insurer's reinsurance premium to a certain amount of total gross premiums, 
or may impose a high solvency requirement on an insurer whose business is heavily 
reinsured through restricting the reinsurance fraction to a certain proportion of overall 
business (e. g., 50% restriction for a non-life insurer in the United Kingdom). Similar 
requirements have not been adopted by the Taiwanese regulatory regime. 
b. Security ofplacing reinsurance with reinsurers 
156 Insurance Law (amended) 2001 (Taiwan), art. 147. 
58 
Chapter One Purposes and Structures of Reinsurance Regulation 
According to the principles established by its IAIS, as mentioned above, regulators 
should ensure an ability to review reinsurance arrangements, to assess the degree of 
reliance placed on these arrangements and to determine the appropriateness of such 
reliance. In comparison with these standards, reinsurance regulations in Taiwan 
appear less developed than those standards suggested by the IAIS. Due to lack of 
substantial regulations, it is not clear that the Taiwanese regulators have any real 
specific control power or ability to intervene in issuing any order in the reinsurance 
context. In addition, the requirements, which should reflect an assessment of the 
ultimate collectability of the reinsurance recoverables, still have not been employed 
and established in the Taiwanese regulatory system. With regard to supervisory 
control over the reinsurers, except for reinsurance business accepted by the CRC and 
other domestic insurance companies, reinsurers who are incorporated in another 
jurisdiction can carry on reinsurance business without specific authorisation. 
Furthermore, due to the complexity of monitoring a reinsurer's financial 
creditworthiness, regulators in Taiwan should enhance their expertise in forming 
sound judgements about financial solvency of foreign reinsurers. 
Although the assessment of financial solvency of reinsurers relies heavily 
upon the insurance rating services (e. g., AM Best, Standard & Poor) in Taiwan as 
well as in other emerging markets, it has been suggested that a sound supervisory 
approach should be based more on "mutual recognition" of other countries' 
supervisory systems. In this case, foreign reinsurers could obtain authorisation to 
carry on their reinsurance business through demonstrating their financial solvency by 
being listed as part of a set of approved reinsurers' 58 . 
As alluded to above and as will 
be discussed in subsequent chapters, in addition to traditional reinsurance that 
transfers liability for potential future losses arising from actual insurance underwriting 
risks, alternative risk-financing mechanisms to transfer insurers' financial risk have 
been developed and can be categorised into four types of financial structures: finite 
risk reinsurance, securitisation of risk, insurance derivatives, and liquidity and 
59 contingent capital facilities' . 
157 See Peter Falush, supra note 6, at 266. 
158 See Peter Falush, supra note 6, at 266. 
159 See Michael P. Goldman, Michael J. Pinsel and Natalie Spadaccini Rosenberg, supra note 117, at 
80-82. 
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Finite risk reinsurance and securitisation of risk may be affected by the 
reinsurance regulatory regime. Finite risk reinsurance is often considered as financing 
arrangements under applicable accounting and reporting models, because there is an 
obligation to repay the funds provided and it can principally address "timing risk", 
with "Ies s-th an -complete transfer of subject underwriting risk" 160 . Apart from 
traditional risk-financing structure-reinsurance arrangements, securitisation of risk 
typically involves "the funding of traditional property and casualty risk through 
,, 161 capital market transactions not traditionally applied to property and casualty risk 
Although securisation of risks has not been used as an alternative risk 
financing technique in Taiwan, finite risk reinsurance is being used increasingly to 
fund time risk, investment risk and other financial risk. Due to lack of specified 
accounting regulations, however, the use of finite risk reinsurance has not been 
supervised under applicable domestic accounting and regulation. 
Legal and regulatory issues affecting finite risk reinsurance and securitisation 
of risk will be further discussed in Chapter Four. 
c. Accounting regulations 
The primary purpose of accounting regulation is full disclosure of the insurer's 
financial condition to regulators, policyholders, other interested parties and the 
general public. Following developing prudential solvency regulations, assessment of 
the financial impact of reinsurance arrangements will heavily rely upon the insurers' 
financial reports; these commonly include the annual report, the balance sheet and 
profit and loss accounts. In order to assess the degree of reliance placed on 
reinsurance arrangements and to determine the appropriateness of such reliance, it is 
important for primary insurers to provide comprehensive and detailed financial 
reports concerning reinsurers and its financial impact of reinsurance arrangements, 
including retention, technical reserves and reinsurance contracts. Consequently, some 
reliable method of evaluating the creditworthiness of reinsurers is needed. These 
methods should be based on the accounting standards which are acceptable and 
62 
recognised by most countries' '. With the trend toward internationalization of 
accounting standards in order to provide greater transparency and 
160 Id, at 80. 
161 Id, at 77. 
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comprehensibility 163 for regulators, insurers and the general public, Taiwan should 
consider facilitating the use of such international accounting standards. 
2. Regulations of accepted reinsurance activities 
Although the principles established by the IAIS and the OECD do not provide 
specified standards for supervising those who accept reinsurance business, it is well 
recognised that insurance undertakings which accept reinsurance business should 
maintain financial soundness and should be monitored by regulators. Regulators, in 
turn, should be able to supervise pure reinsurers and to monitor insurance companies 
which underwrite reinsurance business and direct insurance business. 
Due to particular market characteristic, specific regulations for pure reinsurers 
have not been established and implemented in Taiwan. Following the privatisation of 
CRC, it seems desirable now for Taiwan to develop and to enact specific regulations 
relating to entry requirements, financial solvency regulations and on-going 
supervision for those who intend to establish reinsurance companies in Taiwan. 
For insurance companies which accept direct insurance and reinsurance, the 
acceptance of reinsurance business, which can be a high risk business, may have a 
direct impact on the financial solvency of insurance companies and their 
policyholders. As such, many countries require direct insurance companies which 
wish to assume reinsurance to obtain specified authorisation to carry on their 
164 
reinsurance business . In addition, regulators need to pay more attention on the 
accepted reinsurance activities. This should include the financial solvency of the 
insurance companies, the type and sources of its business, its exposures to loss, its 
retrocession arrangements, its reinsurers, the competence of its management to 
manage relevant transactions, and its business control systems' 65 . 
3. Regulation of reinsurance intermediaries 
It is well accepted that reinsurance intermediaries play a vital role in many 
reinsurance transactions, including the placement of reinsurance, administration of the 
reinsurance contracts, and in some cases, the resolution of disputes between the 
162 See Tal P. Piccione, Panel on Reinsurance Regulation, in Seventh Annual Conference of the IAIS, 
at 6-7 (Cape Town, 10 October 2000). 
163 See JOSEPH J. NORTON, supra note 54, at 27. 
164 See Peter Falush, supra note 6, at 266-267. 
165 Id, at 267. 
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contracting parties' 66 . Consequently, reinsurance intermediaries should have a duty to 
ensure the quality of reinsurance transactions and the disclosure of material facts to 
prevent any legal dispute arising from the contractual reinsurance wording. Due to the 
broad spectrum of the reinsurance intermediaries' responsibilities and the potential for 
credit risk, error and fraud, the US and UK models have developed substantial 
regulations to regulate the activities of reinsurance intermediaries' 67 . However, 
reinsurance intermediaries can carry on activities without any authonsation in 
Taiwan. Therefore, the Taiwanese government should consider and enact appropriate 
regulations as to reinsurance intermediaries. 
166 See Debra J. Hall, supra note 116, at 859-860. 
167 See id. at 860-861. 
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Regulation of Reinsurers and the Reinsurance Arrangements of 
the Primary Insurers: Regulatory Reform in Emerging 
Economies 
As generally discussed in the Chapter One, various international trends can be 
discerned as significant impacting on current worldwide efforts, particularly in 
emerging market, to effect viable reinsurance regulatory reform. As the efforts have 
already been made to liberalise reinsurance business and to harmonise the insurance 
regulation by international organisations, e. g., WTO/GATS, OECD, and IAISI, the 
development of an appropriate reinsurance regulatory regime is becoming an 
increasingly essential issue for emerging market in order to enhance the stability of 
insurance market. In this context, this chapter will address the main issue of the 
regulation of reinsurers and the supervision of reinsurance arrangements of primary 
insurers, with a view to considering an appropriate model to maintain the solvency of 
primary insurers. In doing so, this chapter will attempt to lay out what appears to be 
the general issue relating to regulation of reinsurers and primary insurers' reinsurance 
arrangements. 
As a result of the indirect relationship between reinsurers and the insured 
party, it appears that the regulation of reinsurance varies in many aspects from the 
regulation of the primary insurers, particularly with regard to market conduct 
regulation including the tariff and reinsurance contracts. As stated in Chapter One, 
regulation of reinsurance has been reduced or even eliminated in most countries 2 
Since insurance regulation generally is based on the protection of policyholders 3 
emphasis has been given to the protection of the solvency of primary insurers in some 
1 See generally the discussion in Chapter One. 
2 See WERNER PFENNIGSTORF, PUBLIC LAW OF INSURANCE, INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW VOL. 6 COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS AND 
INSTITUTIONS CHAPTER 7,43 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1998). 
3 For example, in the reinsurance markets in the economies in transition, "reinsurance regulation has 
not received much attention partly because of the absent of significant domestic reinsurance activity 
and partly due to the absent of a reinsurance regulatory model in Europe, on which much of insurance 
regulation in economies in transition are based. " Peter Falush, The Development Of Reinsurance 
Markets In The Economies In Transition, in Insurance Regulation and Supervision in Economies in 
Transition: Second East-West Conference on Insurance Systems in Economies in Transition, OECD 
Proceedings 239 (Or, (),, anisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 1997). Cý 
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countries such as the United StateS4 . This emphasis is justified by the fact that several 
significant cases of insolvency relating to primary insurers result from unrecoverable 
5 
reinsurance . This might lead to the view that the main purpose of the regulation of 
reinsurers is to ensure the security of reinsurance arrangements and the recoverability 
of reinsurance. However, in the other countries 6, the reinsurers are treated similarly to 
the primary insurers and are subjected to relevant solvency regulation and investment 
regulation. Generally, the structure of the regulation of reinsurance will depend on the 
market characteristic and regulatory environments. 
In emerging markets, the main concern of primary insurers and regulators is to 
transfer risk and to extend domestic capacitY7 . As a result of a shortage of capital 
capacity to cover assumed risk, it is essential to avoid any unnecessary operational 
obstacles arising from relevant regulation that may impede the diversification of 
insurance risk. Liberalisation of reinsurance transactions will result in dramatic 
increase in cross-border transactions. Consequently, it may impede the capacity of 
regulators to supervise and regulate when reinsurers are licensed and regulated in 
another jurisdiction, in which financial information on reinsurers may be difficult to 
obtain. Regulators are likely to become unable to ensure the solvency of reinsurerS8. 
Under such a scenario, regulators in emerging markets might face the difficulty of 
reconciling between liberalisation of reinsurance transactions and guaranteeing 
financial solvency of primary insurers. Furthermore, it is unlikely to find many 
domestic reinsurers accepting risk from primary insurers that are licensed within the 
same jurisdiction. As a matter of fact, primary insurers in emerging markets rely on 
4 For instance, NAIC Model Law on Credit for Reinsurance in the US provides the condition which 
primary insurers should take credit from reinsurance for technical reserve. NATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS (N. A. 1. C. ), Reinsurance: Credit for 
Reinsurance Model Law, in NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES VOL. V, 
785(1999). 
5 See generally the discussion in Chapter One. 
6 Although the reinsurers in the United Kingdom are subject to the similar solvency regulation as the 
primary insurers, the reinsurers who only carry on the reinsurance business is relative less regulated. 
For detail, See chapter 1 the structure of reinsurance regulation, the UK model. 
7 It has been recognised that "the primary role of reinsurers is to provide adequate coverage of 
insurance risk. There should be no rules or limitations or international capital transfers for foreign and 
domestic reinsurers" during the Annual Conference of the IAIS, in Cancun, Mexico, in September 
1998. See IAIS Working Group on Reinsurance, Reinsurance and Reinsurers: Relevant Issues for 
Establishing General Supervisory Principles, Standards and Practices, at II (Feb. 2000), available at 
<www. laisweb. org> 
8 See Jonathan Spencer, Cross-border Services Regulation, in GLOBAL REINSURANCE, 
September/November 1995, at 76 (1995). However, this article points out that, while recognising the 
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either state-owned reinsurers or foreign reinsurers to assume their insured risk. Thus, 
more attention should be given to reinsurance arrangements of primary insurers 
instead of simply imposing stricter regulation on reinsurers. 
In terms of the regulation of reinsurers, reinsurers are subject to similar 
solvency requirements as those that are imposed on primary insurers although the 
standard of solvency requirement for reinsurers may be less stringent in some cases 9. 
Due to the dynamic character of reinsurance markets and the sophistication of 
contracting parties, regulation of reinsurers differs primary from the regulation of 
insurers with respect to market conduct regulation regarding contract terms and tariff. 
However, the regulators in emerging markets often encounter difficulties in obtaining 
information concerning foreign reinsurers who transact business with domestic 
insurers. In addition, it is unlikely that regulators would have the ability to ensure the 
financial solvency of foreign reinsurers by implementing relevant financial 
requirements. Therefore, it is essential to enhance cooperation amongst regulators in 
different jurisdictions in order to obtain the financial information and to introduce 
adequate regulatory methods to assess the security and the recoverability of 
reinsurance. 
With regard to regulation of primary insurers' reinsurance arrangements, 
issues often arise from the financial impact caused by reinsurance arrangements on 
primary insurers. The extent to which reinsurance affects the solvency of primary 
insurers depends upon the method of calculating the technical reserve (or loss reserve) 
designed to meet the liability arising from the claims from the policyholders. When 
countries adopt the "net reserving basis", which allow primary insurers to reduce 
technical reserve by the amount of reinsurance arrangements' 0, the recoverability of 
reinsurance might have a direct impact on the solvency of primary insurers. It should 
be noted that the amount of reduced technical reserve is not only determined by the 
amount of reinsurance, but also by the amount of paid reinsurance premium and the 
loss of investment on the reinsurance claims which should be received in a reasonable 
prudential concerns regarding the reliability of cross-border transactions, it is also important to 
consider the benefit these transactions can provide. 
9 For instance, in the United Kingdom, the deposit of requirement is not applicable in the case of an 
insurers for an authorisation restricted to reinsurance business in accordance with Insurance Company 
Act 1982. T. HENRY ELLIS & JAMES A. WILTSHIRE, REGULATION OF INSURANCE IN THE 
UNITED KINGDOM AND IRELAND B. 3.4-01 (Kluwer, Issue 63,02/2000). 
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time to meet the claims". As a result of the significant financial impact caused by the 
collection of reinsurance, some developed countries have developed relevant 
regulations to regulate the condition under which insurers may be able to reduce their 
2 loss reserve' . While it seems that these developed models have proved to be 
successful to ensure the stability of the insurance market, similar regulatory methods 
have not yet been implemented in emerging markets. In addition to the lack of 
prudential regulation, market characteristics and the particular legal environments has 
made it more difficult to design an appropriate regulatory model to maintain the 
stability of insurance market. 
The main objective of this chapter is to develop an appropriate regulatory 
model for emerging market. In order to achieve this objective, this chapter will be 
organised as follows. Section I and 2 will consider the general regulatory issues 
relating to the scope and the implementation of reinsurance regulation. In terms of the 
general regulatory issues relating to regulation of reinsurers and reinsurance 
arrangements of primary insurers, there are two that appear to be of most significance. 
First, regulators need to address the questions whether reinsurers who carry on 
reinsurance business should be subject to direct regulation and relevant solvency 
regulation. Second, given the trends of liberalisation of reinsurance trade, how should 
regulators supervise the reinsurance arrangements of primary insurers and maintain 
their financial solvency? After considering these issues, international supervisory 
principles will also be discussed in section 3. Drawing on these models and practical 
considerations, this chapter will then turn to propose a number of reforms for 
reinsurance regulatory structures in emerging market. 
1. Regulatory Issues relating to Reinsurers: Direct Supervision versus 
Indirect Supervision 
With respect to regulation of reinsurers, it is difficult to design an appropriate 
regulatory structure that enables domestic insurers to benefit from the liberalisation of 
10 In contrast, the gross reserving basis is that the amount of reinsurance transferred by the insurers can 
not be used to reduce their loss reserve. For detail, See generally discussion in Chapter 1. 
11 See Thomas Warnke, Reinsurance Collections: The Primary Companies' Challenge, in Law and 
Practice of International Reinsurance Collections and Insolvency, held by National Institute on 
International Reinsurance Collections and Insolvency, at 36, (New York, June 11-12,1988). 
12 In the United States, regulations regulate the conditions under which insurers may take credit for 
reinsurance in their reserves. NAIC, supra note 4, at 785-1. See also GRAYDON S. STARING, LAW 
OF REINSURANCE § 5: 5 (1993), West Group. 
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reinsurance without endangering the recoverability of reinsurance. In general, 
regulation of reinsurers can be categorised into two regulatory approaches: direct 
supervision of reinsures and indirect supervision of reinsurers by way of supervision 
of reinsurance policies of primary insurers. In terms of direct supervision of 
reinsurers, all the reinsurers who intend to carry on reinsurance business should obtain 
authorisation or license from the insurance regulators. According to this approach, the 
reinsurers should meet the regulatory requirements in relation to corporate structure, 
capital requirements, financial solvency requirements, and the relevant obligation to 
submit their financial statements. On the other hand, indirect supervision of 
reinsurance means that insurance regulators place emphasis on the reinsurance 
policies of primary insurers rather than the reinsures. In the case of the indirect 
regulatory approach, the insurance regulators monitor and supervise reinsurance 
arrangements of primary insurers. In other words, the insurance regulators lay down 
the requirements for the approval of reinsurance arrangements of primary insurers. In 
most cases, this approach often provides less strict regulations for reinsurers. 
In the following sub-section, these arguments will be identified and discussed. 
A. Arguments for Direct Supervision of Reinsurers 
13 In terms of arguing for direct supervision of reinsurers , several primary points can 
be made. 
First, regulators may face a dilemma between the liberalisation of reinsurance 
transactions and the financial security of reinsurance. While trade barriers as to 
reinsurance have been gradually dismantled in recent years, more attention should be 
paid to avoid any improper sequencing of financial reform, which has been a critical 
14 
factor in many financial crises . In other words, an alternative regulatory system 
should be introduced to maintain the financial stability of insurance market. 
Consequently, reinsurers should be subject to similar financial requirements as 
primary insurers and regulators should ensure their ability to supervise these 
reinsurance activities. In supervising reinsurers directly, insurance regulators can 
effectively monitor the financial solidity of reinsurers. Furthermore, regulators can 
13 It also can be catergorised as domiciled oriented regulation that means that all the reinsurers should 
be licensed or authorised in which they do reinsurance business. See Manuel Aguilera-Verduzco, 
Reinsurance Regulation and Supen, ision, OECD, at 2 (20 October 2001), at <www. oecd. orR>. 
14 JOSEPH J. NORTON, FINANCIAL SECTOR LAW REFORM IN EMERGING ECONOMIES 26 
(London, 2000). 
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obtain the essential information of reinsurers; e. g., investment, capital and 
management requirements, and reinsurance business' 5. 
Second, due to reinsurance market dynamics and intense competition, 
reinsurers frequently engage in innovative investment instruments to diversify 
assumed insurance risk. As a result, regulators may encounter problems in accurately 
assessing the financial security of reinsurers who are exempted from domestic 
regulation. In direct regulation of reinsurers, it can offer the advantage of supervising 
reinsurance solvency and investment management on national basis as the case is with 
respect to a primary insurer. 
Third, as a result of the necessity of fitness and propriety of management to 
keep pace with market dynamics and fierce competition, reinsurers should maintain 
their expertise, competence and suitability. In terms of governmental supervision 
concerning the competence and fitness of key personnel, a licensing or authorising 
procedure incorporated in the regulatory regime can ensure licensed or authorised 
reinsurers to carry on reinsurance business with integrity, prudence and the 
appropriate degree of professional competence. Therefore, it is essential to implement 
direct regulation of reinsurers to ensure the professionalism and appropriateness of the 
representatives of the reinsurance companies. 
B. Arguments against Direct Supervision of Reinsurers 
There are essentially three fundamental categories of arguments against direct 
supervision of reinsurers: (i) liberalisation of reinsurance business and diversification 
of insurance risk; (ii) systemic risk and reinsurance business; (iii) an alternative 
regulatory approach to maintain the stability of insurance market. 
1. Liberalisation of insurance business and diversification of insurance 
risk 
First, as the direct supervision of reinsurers could impose entry requirements on 
reinsurers who intend to carry on reinsurance business in the domestic market, it may 
impede the liberalisation of reinsurance transactions and increase transaction costs. In 
addition, it is likely that reinsurers who are licensed and supervised by the relevant 
solvency regulation should localise their capital and investment in the local market. 
Consequently, strict investment regulation may have adverse effect on the 
15 IAIS Working Group on Reinsurance, supra note 7, at 49. 
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diversification of insurance risk. Given that funds held relating to catastrophe risk 
(e. g., earthquake and hurricane) should not be affected by the occurrence of the 
event' 6, reinsurers may fail to diversify these risks by ways of investing funds abroad 
due to relevant restrictive regulations. Furthermore, it is argued that "high barrier to 
entry and restrictive practices in certain countries prevents free competition between 
,, 17 reinsurers and has the effect of keeping prices in those countries artificially high 
Such a domicile oriented regulatory approach tends to be used only in countries with 
high retention levels of premium' 8 or developed countries such as the United 
Kingdom. 
2. Systen-tic risk and reinsurance business 
Second, from the viewpoint of systemic risk and the stability of financial market, it 
has been observed that "it is unlikely that the reinsurance industry can be linked to 
systemic problems of financial instability. 19" The reasons for this conclusion are as 
follows. "(1) Relative magnitude of reinsurance; (2) Major reinsurers are neither 
subsidiaries of large bank holding companies nor owners of large banks; (3) Shift 
from proportional to non-proportional reinsurance programs; (4) Reduction in cession 
rates; (5) Industry stability; (6) Creditable rating system; (7) Limited importance of 
regulatory arbitrage; (8) Time lag between the occurrence of an event and the 
payment of claims; (9) Relative insignificance of alternative risk transfer products. 20ý9 
Given that systemic risk caused by the reinsurance industry seems low, it has been 
argued that "over-restrictive investment rules imposed to prevent insolvencies may 
not only be inefficient but also counterproductive. , 21 Therefore, strict direct 
16 John H. Fitzpatrick, Comments on Stephen Ross's Paper on Financial Regulation for the New 
Millennium: The Case for Liberal Reinsurance Regulation, THE GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND 
INSURANCE, Vol. 26 No. 1, at 26 (The International Association for the Study of Insurance 
Economics, January 2001). 
17 See Michael Pickel, Panel On Reinsurance Regulation: The Importance Of Global Regulation of 
Reinsurers Seen From The Point Of View Of A German Reinsurer, in Seventh Annual Conference of 
The IAIS, at 3 (Cape Town, 10 October 2000). In addition, as a result of characteristics of the 
insurance market, insurance companies are generally not subject to a run as the banking industry. See 
also John H. Fitzpatrick, supra note 16, at 24. 
18 See Manuel Aguilera-Verduzco, supra note 13, at 2. 
19 See Michael Hafeman, Work of the Financial Stability Forum-Working Group on Offshore Centres 
on Reinsurance, at the Seventh Annual Conference of the IAIS, at 8 (Cape Town, 10 October 2000). 20 Id. at 9- 10. 
21 John H. Fitzpatrick, supra note 16, at 24. 
69 
h CLapter Two Reinsurers and the Reinsurance Arrangements of Primary Insurers 
regulation imposed on reinsurers "would prevent reinsurers from performing many of 
their core functions and threaten the economic benefits associated with reinsurance. , 22 
3. An alternative regulatory approach to maintain the stability of 
insurance market 
The final argument is that the regulatory purpose of ensuring the stability of insurance 
market can still be achieved even without the prudential regulation to supervise 
reinsurers directly. This alternative regulatory approach is based on harmonisation of 
regulatory methods and mutual recognition among countries where reinsurers are 
already subject to prudential regulation and have sound financial condition. In 
essence, regulators place their emphasis on the reinsurance arrangements of primary 
insurers to control the quality of reinsurance with respect to financial solvency of 
reinsurers and the reinsurance contracts. To ensure the quality of reinsurance, 
regulators can authorise or accredit foreign reinsurers to carry on business if these 
reinsurers are licensed and regulated in the jurisdiction where there is a similar 
solvency regulation. As a result, harmonisation of relevant regulation is the first step 
to provide the level playing field for reinsurers and avoid regulatory arbitrage. 
Consequently, mutual recognition can be used as a tool to promote cooperation 
between countries and to reduce any unnecessary regulatory costs. In doing so, 
regulators not only can promote the diversification of domestic risks but also can 
prevent financial impact arising from insolvent reinsurers and irrecoverable 
reinsurance. Given the above assumption, it was suggested that "a harmonised single 
licensing system for reinsurance activities, that is similar to the current model of 
insurance supervision in the European Union, is the ideal to work towards. 23,, 
Therefore, such a regulatory approach can reduce the uncertainty of financial stability 
of reinsurance market in the absence of direct regulation of reinsurers. 
C. Summary Observation: Some Preliminary Requirements for a Viable 
Indirect Supervisory Approach 
Liberalisation and internationalization of reinsurance transactions provide emerging 
markets with the opportunity to extend capital capacity to underwrite risks; to enhance 
the expertise and competence of primary insurers; to diversify risks internationally; 
and generally, would contribute a stable growth of insurance market. As liberalization 
22 Id. at 25. 
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of reinsurance business may benefit emerging markets, the regulatory reform to 
develop an appropriate regulatory system is crucial to maintain the financial solvency 
of primary insurers. 
In essence, the financial condition of reinsurers is the main concern for 
regulators and primary insurers. However, regulators would face a dilemma between 
strict direct regulation of reinsurers and freedom of reinsurance transactions. In 
supervising reinsurers directly, regulators can efficiently monitor reinsurers and 
primary insurers can assess the quality of reinsurance accurately. By contrast, direct 
regulation of reinsurers may have adverse impact on the reinsurance business and 
may impede the diversification of insurance risks. As an alternative regulatory 
approach that can ensure the stability of insurance market, it appears that indirect 
regulation of reinsurers would be more appropriate for emerging markets to adopt. 
However, the indirect regulatory approach to regulating reinsurers may have 
some flaws if the following aspects have not been considered. 
First, as a fundamental and evident precondition, reinsurers should be licensed 
and subject to prudential regulation in the countries of domicile. This is due to the fact 
that indirect regulation as an alternative regulatory approach is based on the mutual 
recognition. In addition, regulators should promote cooperation among countries and 
gather sufficient information to assess reinsurers. 
Second, such a regulatory system should be harmonized and based on 
prudential regulatory standards. One of the arguments against direct supervision of 
reinsurers suggested that "there is no justification to increase reinsurance regulation 
for the purpose of securing the stability of the financial market. 24, ' This observation is 
generally based on the stability of the current reinsurance market and the low 
systemic risk (or liquidity crisis) caused by an insolvency of reinsurer 25 . Noted, 
however, that as a result of the trend towards concentration in reinsurance market26' 
the financial impact caused by these major reinsurers is becoming significant. 
Consequently, an appropriate governmental supervision of reinsurers is essential to 
review capital adequacy, solvency and professional competence of reinsurers. This 
23 See IAIS-Working Group on Reinsurance, supra note 7, at 6. 
24 See Michael Pickel, supra note 17, at 4. 
25 Id. at 3-4. 
26 See A. J. Vermaat, A Supervisor's View on Reinsurance, IAIS, at 4 (15 November 2001), at 
<www. iaisweb. o, rc, >- 
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will also benefit primary insurers in assessing the reinsurers accurately. An indirect 
regulation model will be successful only if it is properly structured and if it takes into 
account the supervision of foreign reinsurers who are already subject to similar 
regulatory requirements. 
Third, given that harmonization of reinsurance regulation would contribute to 
the stability of global insurance market and to the evaluation of the 
security/creditworthiness of reinsurers, the regulatory standards accepted by countries 
that intend to enhance international regulatory cooperation should not be set at the 
lowest common denominator. Although "harmonization" of regulatory approaches 
may reduce regulatory costs such as the single license concept in the European Union, 
a negative effect may occur in countries which already have more sophisticated 
systems of solvency regulation. It is inevitable that regulatory arbitrage would occur 
when the harmonization of regulatory standards is not based on the highest common 
denominator 27 . As a result, the acceptable regulatory standards for the global 
reinsurance market should not be established at the minimum regulatory requirements 
if they are to provide a level playing field for reinsurers. 
11. Selective Issues relating to Regulation of Reinsurance 
Arrangements of Primary Insurers 
In terms of solvency regulation for insurance enterprises, regulation generally 
concerns three aspects, namely technical reserve, solvency margin, and valuation of 
assetS28. The extent to which reinsurance may affect the solvency of primary insurers 
depends on the place of reinsurance in the method of accounting. In general, 
regulators may consider reinsurance either "in the framework of accounting (valuation 
of receivables, deposit of the reinsurer's part of liabilities), or in the framework of 
solvency requirements (taking into account only a limited part of ceded business to 
27 It has been observed that many in the U. S. fear that the mutual recognition approach "may result in 
regulation at the level of the lowest common denominator. " Debra J. Hall, Reinsurance Regulation in 
a Global Marketplace: A Viewfrom the United States, Reinsurance Association of America, at 11, (12 
Dec. 2001), at<http: //www. raanet. or2/poIicyupdate/MarketpIace. PDF. > 
28 Technical reserve is designed to ensure that an insurer has a sufficient fund to meet the liability 
arising from accepted insurance business. In addition to technical reserve requirements that ensure the 
ability of an insurer to cover the existing liability, the solvency margin is to ensure that an insurer has 
adequate funds to cover the future writings. When the funds can be invested and held by several 
different investment instruments (e. g. securities, bank deposit, and large property holdings), it is also 
essential to evaluate the actual value of assets held by an insurer. See generally ROBERT KILN & 
STEPHEN KILN, REINSURANCE IN PRACTICE 385-397 (4th ed. 2001). 
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reduce the required margin or required free capital in proportion of reinsurance 
receivables). 2999 In the European Union, some member states may allow reinsurance in 
reduction of required solvency margin, but the reduction must not exceed a specified 
percent of required solvency margin 30 . However, other member states adopt the gross 
technical reserving basis and only allow the reduction of required solvency margin "if 
a corresponding deposit of premium is made as security for future claims on the 
9,31 reinsurance. In the United States, the amount of technical provisions can be 
reduced by the amount of reinsurance that meets the relevant requirements such as 
evidence of risk transfer 32 , licensed and accredited reinsurers, or the certain amount of 
security held 33 . Although regulatory approaches vary in the methods to count 
reinsurance, to evaluate the creditworthiness of reinsurers is the most essential 
component in these regulatory approaches. 
In this section, emphasis will be placed on the assessment of the 
creditworthiness of reinsurers and the implementation of relevant solvency regulation. 
As reinsurance should be considered to secure primary insurer's financial stability, 
possible preventive measures which may be supported or even required by a 
regulatory framework will be examined. 
As the regulation concerning primary insurers' reinsurance arrangements 
generally gives emphasis to the security of reinsurance, the relevant issues relating to 
insolvency of insurers have drawn significant attention in some countries. In the event 
of insurer's insolvency, legal disputes often arose from the reinsurance payment of the 
reinsurer. As a result of possible effect on the interests of policyholders, this will also 
be discussed in the following sections. 
In addition to governmental supervision, corporate governance and internal 
controls can be used as a tool to ensure that the primary insurers would arrange 
29 See IAIS, On Solvency, Assessment and Actuarial Issues-An IAIS Issues Paper (Final Version), at 
15 (20 October 2001), at < ww w. i ai s web. org, /framesets/pub. html >. 
30 For example, the reduction must not exceed 50 per cent for non-life insurance and 15 per cent for life 
insurance. See id. at 26. 
31 In France, the ceding insurers cannot reduce their technical reserve only if the certain amount of 
reserve is made as a deposit for future reinsurance claims. See id at 26. 
32 NAIC, Chapter 22 of the Property/Casualty Accounting Practices and Procedures Manual for 
Statutory Accounting, in COOPERS & LYBRAND LLP., A SUPPLEMENT TO IMPLEMENTING 
FASB STATEMENT 113- A MANAGEMENT GUIDE 38 (London, January 1996). 
33 E. g., Del. Code Ann. Tit. 18, §910 (1989); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Tit. 24A, §731(1990); Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 375.246 (1968); N. Y. Ins. Law § 1308 (McKinney 1985). Cal. Ins. Code §§ 922.4,922.5 (West 
1993). Cited by GRAYDON S. STARING, supra note 12, §5: 5. 
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reinsurance prudentially. The relevant requirements for corporate governance and 
internal control will also be discussed in this section. 
A. Creditworthiness and Security of Reinsurance- the Implementation of 
Relevant Solvency Regulation 
In terms of creditworthiness and security of reinsurance, two fundamental regulatory 
issues emerge. First, it is difficult for supervisors to establish an appropriate 
assessment to evaluate the security of reinsurance. Second, it is also problematic to 
establish a regulatory framework concerning the evaluation of reinsurers. 
With respect to the assessment of security of reinsurance and creditworthiness 
of reinsurers, it can be analysed into the following aspects; (1) Fitness and Propriety 
of Management; (2) Legal Disputes and Payment Issues; (3) Financial Solvency and 
Capital Adequacy; (4) The Domiciled Regulatory System. 
As the creditworthiness of reinsurance can be evaluated and monitored, it is 
crucial to consider a viable solvency regulation concerning the reinsurance. In the 
following section, some developed models will be introduced and discussed. 
1. Assessment of security of reinsurance and creditworthiness of 
reinsurers 
Following on the discussion relating to the indirect regulatory model, indirect 
supervision of reinsurance considers possible regulatory approaches to control the 
creditworthiness of reinsurance and to monitor the financial condition of reinsurers. 
As such an indirect regulatory model not only can reduce the scope of regulation 34 but 
it can also ensure the security of reinsurance and maintain the stability of insurance 
market, it can offer an appropriate regulatory regime for emerging markets with their 
shortage of capital capacity and expertise. In the following section, several essential 
components will be identified to establish a viable assessment to evaluate the 
creditworthiness of reinsurance. 
a. Fitness and propriety of management and the performance of reinsurers 
The quality and integrity of management plays a crucial role in the evaluation of the 
security of reinsurance. From the viewpoint of ceding insurers, the competence, 
experience and integrity of key personnel (e. g., board management, legal 
34 Manuel Aguilera-Verduzco, supra note 13, at 3. 
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representatives 35 , and principal shareholders. ) in the reinsurance company might 
significantly affect the quality of reinsurance and provide relevant expertise to assist 
ceding insurers. For reinsurers, the competence and experience of key personnel are 
vital to manage underwriting risk 36 and operation risk. Furthermore, a sound risk 
management and prudent investment, which is essential to maintain financial 
solvency of a financial institution, is generally determined by the quality and 
propriety of management. In addition to competence and experience of key personnel, 
special attention should be paid to a person's past record relating to criminal or civil 
sentences or convictions 37 . Besides, the performance of a reinsurance company should 
be considered in the framework of the assessment. In terms of performance indicators, 
it has been suggested that the following aspects can be used as the performance 
indicators for the assessment of reinsurers: "(1) Gross and net premiums; (2) incurred 
losses (gross and net); (3) operation expenses; (4) investment income"38 . 
b. Legal disputes and payment issues 
While the issues concerning fitness and propriety of management and the key 
personnel in a reinsurance company has been addressed, the problems arising from 
legal disputes between reinsurers and ceding insurers needs to be discussed. Legal 
disputes "can arise from differences in interpretation of the contract, notice, 
performance and ultimately the amount recoverable. 399ý FEstorically, reinsurance 
practice regarding the partnership relation between reinsurers and primary insurers 
was based on utmost good faith. This approach was capable of resolving short-term 
legal disputes. It proved, however, insufficient when certain circumstances changed, 
such as unwillingness of one party to accommodate the other in long-term partnership 
" OECD, RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL OF ASSESSMENT OF REINSURANCE 
COMPANIES, adopted by the Council at its 921't Session on 25 March 1998 (CIM (98) 7/PROV), at 4 
(19 October 2001), at<www. oecd. orlz>. See also ROBERT KILN & STEPHEN KILN, supra note 28, 
at 396. 
36 It has been observed that "the best and safest reinsurer is one whose past record on underwriting is 
consistently profitable. " ROBERT KILN & STEPHEN KILN, supra note 28, at 396. 
37 OECD, RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL OF ASSESSMENT OF REINSURANCE 
COMPANIES, supra note 35, at 4. 
38 With regard to premiums and losses, it should obtain the information regarding "the main classes of 
covered risks; and at least for general liability, transport and catastrophic risks; and the main countries 
or regional group of countries, in which they operate. " Consequently, these data should enable "the 
calculation of combined ratio (losses plus expenses divided by premiums), loss ratio, expense ratio, 
operation ratio (losses plus expense minus investment income divided by premiums) and retention 
ratio. " It also should consider the security of retrocession. Id. at 4-5. 
39 Thomas Warnke, supra note II at 43. 
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or in cases of losses beyond the expectations 40 . 
Consequently, the reinsurers may 
delay or avoid payment and hence the financial impact on the primary insurers. With 
respect to general reinsurance claim disputes, it has been categorised as follows: (1) 
"Defenses against the existence of the reinsurance contract, including nondisclosure 
and misrepresentation issueS41; (2) Reporting and notice defenseS42; (3) Defenses 
arising from application of the reinsurance contract wording to the indemnity paid 43; 
(4) Cooperation and claim-handling defenses 44 ; (5) Public policy defenses 4591 . As a 
result of increasing legal disputes between reinsurers and primary insurers, the 
reinsurance contract should be carefully drafted. From the viewpoint of a ceding 
insurers, a reinsurer's past record and reputation on the reinsurance payment should 
also be considered. 
In addition to legal disputes, primary insurers should collect their reinsurance 
efficiently and avoid uncollectible reinsurance. Due to the financial impact ansing 
from delayed reinsurance recoverable, some developed models have certain statutory 
accounting treatments designed to reflect the recoverability of reinsurance claims. For 
instance, the NAIC created the 90-day rule to require primary insurers to collect their 
reinsurance recoveries in a timely mannet46 . The rules imposed the penalty on a 
primary insurer to "reduce surplus by an amount equal to 20 percent of all 
40 For instance, in the early 1980s, long-tail business in liability insurance. See id at 46. 
41 In the English courts, the following cases are related to misrepresentation and non-disclosure. Pan 
Atlantic v. Pine Top [1992] 1 Lloyd's Rep 101: "If the underwriter who actually wrote the risk was not 
influenced by the mispresentation or non-disclosure, he cannot avoid the contract. " For other cases 
concerning the mispresentation and non-disclosure, GMA v. Storebrand and Kansa [1995] LRLR 33; 
also See PCW Syndicates v. PCW Reinsurers [ 1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep 24 1. cited in lain Goldrein, Won't 
Pay-Reinsurers' Defences To Claims, in Reinsurance Recoveries, held by Hawksmere, at 6-14 (The 
Sheraton Park Tower, London, 1 October 1998). For the US cases, CAN Reinsurance of London v. 
Home Insurance Company No. 85 Civ. 5681 (JFK), WL 3231 (S. D. N. Y. Jan 10,1990) (relating to 
mispresentation); American Re-Insurance Company v. MGIC Investment Corporation No. 77 CH 1457 
(III. Cir. Ct. Cook City., Chanc. Div., Oct. 20,1987) (relating to innocent misrepresentation); American 
Home Assurance Company v. Fremont Indemnity Company 745 F. Supp. 974 (S. D. N. Y. 1990) (relating 
to materiality). See generally ROBERT W. HAMMESFAHR & SCOTT W. WRIGHT, THE LAW 
OF REINSURANCE CLAIMS 72-90 (Reactions Publishing Group, 1994). 
42 Unigrad Security Insurance Company, Inc. v. North River Insurance Company No. 91-7534 (2d Cir., 
Sept. 9,1993), 4 Mealey's Reins - Rep., No. 9, A- 1 (relating to the notice of loss). 43 For example, the legal disputes often arose from liability insurance and relevant pollution insurance. 
Insurance Company of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc. 633 F. 2d 121 (1980), reh'g 
granted, in part, clarified, 657 F. 2d 814 (6hCir. 1981) (relating to asbestos claims and exposure theory 
for trigger of coverage). cited by ROBERT W. HAMMESFAHR & SCOTT W. WRIGHT, supra note 
41, at 169. 
44 In the US court, Peerless Insurance Company v. Inland Mutual Insurance Company 251 F. 2d 696 
(4'h Cir. 1958) (cooperation relating to a claim). For the English court, Welch v. Royal Exchange 
Assurance [19391 1 KB 294. 
4' ROBERT W. HAMMESFAHR & SCOTT W. WRIGHT, supra note 4 1, at 4. 
46 Schedule F, Parts 1 to 8, the NAIC annual statement. See generally id. at 248-25 1. 
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recoverables due from the slow-paying reinsurer" if reinsurance recoverables are not 
received by year-end and are 90 days overdue 47 . To avoid such a penalty, the ceding 
insurer must draw down letters of credit or other collateral for amount owed by 
reinsurers even though collateral is required for ceding insurers in the event of ceding 
business to unauthorised and non-U. S. reinsurers 48 . However, as for disputed 
reinsurance claims, the 90-day rules pen-nit a primary insurer to avoid such a penalty 
if a reinsurer "issues a reservation of its rights, refuses to pay, or initates litigation or 
arbitration 949 . Although such a regulatory approach may provide an incentive to 
increase the claims efficiency, adverse effects may occur and legal uncertainty may 
increase in case of ambiguity of the relevant regulation (e. g, the definition of disputes 
and when the claims are considered due)50. 
c. Financial condition of reinsurers 
A sound financial condition of reinsurer plays an important role in the recoverability 
of reinsurance. In addition, reinsurers, like other financial intermediaries (e. g., Bank, 
and insurance companies), may cause systemic risks particularly following the trend 
of consolidation and convergence of financial markets. As a result, it is crucial to 
address the essential elements which may affect the financial solvency of reinsurers. 
In general, financial solvency of reinsurers who assume risk from insurance 
companies can be evaluated in similar manner as those applied to primary insurers. As 
for the solvency rules for insurers and reinsurers, a reinsurer's solvency relies on at 
least the following three aspects. 
" (1) a prudential evaluation of the technical provisions; 
(2) the investment of assets corresponding to these technical provisions in 
accordance with quantitative and qualitative rules; 
5191 (3) the existence of an adequacy solvency margin 
First, technical provisions are designed to ensure the financial ability of 
reinsurers or insurers to meet any possible liabilities arising from insurance or 
47 Id. at 248-249. 
48 This is because the ceding companies may not have drawn down collateral as contemplated. See id. 
at 250. 
49 Id. at 251 (1994). See also Property and Casualty Annual Statement Instructions, National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners 53-1 (revised P/C 1993). 
50 For instance, it has been criticised that such a rule cannot consider the difficulties arising from 
complex claims. ROBERT W. HAMMEESFAHR & SCOTT W. WRIGHT, supra note 4 1, at 249-25 1. 
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reinsurance contracts. Technical provisions generally comprise two main components; 
claims provisions and unearned premium provisionS52. With regard to claims 
provisions, it includes outstanding liability provisions, future loss expense, future 
claims handling expense, and incurred but not reported claims (also known as 
I. B. N. R. )53. It should be noted that reinsurers might encounter certain loss situation 
where there is little or no pattern of past settlements to calculate an appropriate 
amount of loss provisions (e. g., a major catastrophe, and legal liability relating to 
pollution and asbeStOS)54 . 
As a result of the significant impact caused by these risks, it 
has been suggested that provisions for special cases should be considered and should 
55 be maintained to meet the claims in the event of a catastrophe or long-tail business 
Second, the investment 56 of reinsurance companies' assets shall be prudential 
and the assets shall be valued properly. The primary insurers should gather accurate 
information relating to reinsurers' investment and evaluate the "security and 
profitability 57-)q of these investments. It has been recommended that primary insurers 
should take all appropriate steps to assess the soundness of the investments of 
58 reinsurance companies in the following respects .A primary insurer can evaluate the 
reinsurers' assets in several categories: real estate, mortgage loans, shares, bonds with 
fixed revenue, loan other than mortgage loans, other investments. As the use of 
financial derivatives as a management instrument may prove useful and effective if 
their use is consistent with appropriate and prudential management such as currency 
matching 59 , the assessment should take into account the relevant investment 
instruments. 
Third, solvency margins of reinsurers should be assessed accurately. In terms 
51 IAIS Sub-Committee, supra note 29, at 7. 
12 ROBERT KILN & STEPHEN KILN, supra note 28, at 397-401. 53 Id. at 398. 54 
Id. at 400-40 1. 
55 Id. at 401. As for long-tail business, it also has been considered in the EU solvency regulation. "The 
additional measures of long-tail risks have been on the agenda, as have the question of refined risk 
classification. " IAIS Sub-Committee, supra note 29, at 27. 
56 The source of investable fund comprises capital based fund and technical provisions based fund 
which is generated by the business written. 
57 OECD, Selected Principles for the Regulation of Investments by Insurance Companies and Pension 
Funds, in FINANCIAL MARKET TRENDS, no. 75, at 117 (March 2000), (9 Jan. 2002) at 
<http: //www. oecd. org/pdfiMOO00150OO/MO0015497. pdf>. 
58 OECD, RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL OF ASSESSMENT OF REINSURANCE 
COMPANIES, supra note 35, at 4. 
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of solvency margin, reinsurers should have sufficient funds (surplus) to support the 
future writings 60 and allow a margin for possible misrepresentation in the valuation of 
assets due to external factors (e. g., fluctuation in currency exchange 61 ). The solvency 
margin also can be described as a more technical definition as follows: 
"Solvency Margin (surplus capital) of an insurance company is the surplus of 
assets over liabilities, both evaluated in accordance with regulations of public 
accounting or special supervisory rules. 62ý, 
As a result of varying evaluation of solvency margin among countries, it 
should consider the domiciled solvency regulation to determine and analyse the 
financial solvency of a reinsurer. For instance, the solvency regime used in the 
European Economic Area (EEA)63 consists of two parts: (1) Required solvency 
margin and (2) Guarantee fund. Required solvency margin, called minimum solvency 
margin, uses fractions of some measure of risk exposure. For a non-life insurer, the 
required solvency margin is determined on the basis either of the annual amount of 
premium or of the average twelve-month claims during the past three financial 
64 years . For a life insurance, the required solvency margin is determined on the 
65 
mathematical provisions and sums at risk . 
In relation to guarantee fund, the main 
purpose is to reinforce the minimum solvency margin in the event of inadequacy. An 
insurer should maintain its guarantee fund at a level corresponding to the higher of 
either one-third of the figure arrived at for the required margin of solvency or at a 
fixed amount depending on the classes of business written (also called as minimum 
guarantee fund)66. 
59 As a result of internationalisation of reinsurance business, a reinsurer are not handled in one single 
currency. How to reduce risk in currency matching is one of main issues in reinsurers' investement 
policy. 
'0 ROBERT KILN & STEPHEN KILN, supra note 28, at 387. 
61 JOHN MCLEAN, CLIVE O'CONNELL, CHRISTOPHER PAINE, JOHN PAINE, & PERTER 
WEDGE, THE APPLICATION OF REINSURANCE, Study Course 825, at 1/4 (The Chartered 
Insurance Institute, 2000). 
62 IAIS Sub-Committee, supra note 29, at 7. 
63 The EEA consists of the 15 European Union (EU) member states, in addition to Iceland and 
Liechtenstein and Norway. 
64 See First Direct Non-Life Insurance Directive, 73/239/EEC, art. 16,1973 O. J. (L. 228/3). JOHN 
MCLEAN, CLIVE O'CONNELL, CHRISTOPHER PAINE, JOHN PAINE, & PERTER WEDGE,, 
supra note 6 1, at 7/14. ; See also JAIS Sub-Committee, supra note 29, at 25. 
65 See First Direct Life Insurance Directive, 79/267/EEC, art. 19,1979 O. J. (L. 63/1). See also IAIS 
Sub-Committee, supra note 29, at 25. 
66 See First Direct Non-life Insurance Directive, art. 17,1973 O. J. (L. 228/3); and First Direct Life 
Insurance Directive, art 20,1979 O. J. (L. 63/1). IAIS Sub-Committee, , supra note 
29, at 25. See aslo 
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d. The domiciled regulatory system 
To determine the creditworthiness of reinsurers particularly for a foreign reinsurer, a 
primary insurer and an insurance regulator generally rely on the essential information 
gathered from the domiciled or licensed countries (e. g., corporate structure, size and 
the performance). In the US regulatory regime, the Nonadmitted Insurers Information 
Office was created to compile information on insurers and reinsurers domiciled 
abroad and provided adequate information for state regulators to evaluate the financial 
condition of foreign reinsurers 67 . Note, however, that for emerging markets, it is 
unlikely that insurance regulators have adequate expertise to establish a similar 
institution to evaluate foreign reinsurers. Furthermore, it may increase extreme 
financial burden on the insurance regulatory system. As a result, the alternative 
approach would be to rely on private rating agencies and to enhance international 
supervisory cooperation. 
While private rating agencies have been frequently used to assess the secunty 
of reinsurers in many countries, international supervisory cooperation relating to 
reinsurance business has not been emphasised by international organisations until 
recent years (e. g, IAIS )68 . 
Although efforts have already been taken to facilitate 
international supervisory cooperation by some international orgainisations, it seems 
that the international supervisory cooperation in the insurance sector appears less 
developed than the bank's international supervisory cooperations (e. g., The Basel 
Committee 69). 
JOHN MCLEAN, CLIVE O'CONNELL, CHRISTOPHER PAINE, JOHN PAINE, & PERTER 
WEDGE, supra note 61, at 7/14. 
67 To facilitate the assessment and the comparison of foreign reinsurers, the financial results of the 
foreign reinsurers will be converted from its domestic currency to U. S. currency. See MICHAEL W. 
ELLIOTT, BERNARD L. WEBB, HOWARD N. ANDERSON & PETER R. KENSICKI, 
PRINCIPLES OF REINSURANCE VOL. 2, at 214-215 (Insurance Institute of America, Pennsylvania, 
2nd edition, 1995). 
68 With regard to reinsurance business and international supervisory cooperation, Insurance Code 
Principles established by international Association of Insurance Supervisors only stated that "The 
insurance supervisor should set requirements with respect to reinsurance contracts or reinsurance 
companies adressing- b. the amount of reliance placed on the insurance supervisor of the reinsurance 
business of a company which is incorporated in another jurisdiction. " See INTERNATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE SUPERVISORS, INSURANCE CORE PRINCIPLES. at 10 
(October 2000), (09 October 2001), at www. iaisweb. org. 
69 See COMMITTEE ON BANKING REGULATIONS AND SUPERVISORY PRACTICES, 
BASLE CONCORDAT ON PRINCIPLES FOR THE SUPERVISION OF BANK'S FOREIGN 
(1975); COMMITTEE ON BANKING REGULATIONS ON SUPERVISORY PRACTICES, 
REVISED BASLE CONCORDAT ON PRINCIPLES FOR THE SUPERVISION OF BANK'S 
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In addition, gathering information to evaluate the financial condition of 
reinsurers, political risk and domestic laws might cause collection problems and 
therefore should be taken into account. It has been observed that some insurers 
domiciled in countries that have gone through political and economic turmoil have 
been unable to meet the obligations under reinsurance contractS70. 
Possible regulatory approaches concerning creditworthiness of 
reinsurers 
71 In terms of solvency regulation, solvency margin , which is surplus of assets over 
liability, both evaluated in accordance with domestic solvency regulation, is the main 
component to assess the financial condition of an insurer. As the amount of 
reinsurance may be used to reduce the required technical provisions (or loss reserve) 
designed to meet the claims from the policyholders, the regulatory approaches 
concerning creditworthiness of reinsurers generally are considered into the framework 
of solvency regulation. 
Regulatory approaches concerning security of reinsurance can be divided into 
two categories. First, the amount of reinsurance may be allowed to reduce the 
required technical reserve and consequently increase the policyholder's surplus. On 
this basis, insurance supervisors could impose relevant requirements to secure 
credibility of financial statements of a primary insurer who transacts with an 
authorised or accredited reinsurer. Second, insurance supervisors may control the 
FOREIGN ESTABLISHMENT 2 (May 1983). BASLE COMMITTEE ON BANKING 
SUPERVISION, INFORMATION FLOWS BETWEEN BANKING SUPERVISORY 
AUTHORITIES 8 (April 1990); BASLE COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, 
MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR THE SUPERVISION OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING 
GROUPS AND THEIR CROSS-BORDER ESTABLISHMENTS (July 1992). BASLE 
COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION AND OFFSHORE GROUP OF BANKING 
SUPERVISORS, THE SUPERVISION OF CROSS-BORDER BANKING (Oct. 1996); BASLE 
COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CORE PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE BANKING 
SUPERVISION (Sept. 1997). 
70 In some countries, the governmental control on currency exchange may impose restriction on 
reinsurance payment. "In the main the reinsurers in question emanate from South America but to a 
lesser extent companies will be found in this situation in the Middle and Far East and even in Europe in 
countries such as, Greece and Spain. " Ivor Kiverstein, Techniques of Reinsurance Collection, in Law 
and Practice of International Reinsurance Collections and Insolvency, held by National Institute on 
International Reinsurance Collections and Insolvency, at 90-91 (June 11-12,1988, New York). 
71 As a result of varying forms of solvency regulation in different jurisdictions, required solvency 
margin also has been referred as "available solvency margin, actual solvency margin, statutory 
solvency margin, available surplus capital, eligible capital, regulatory capital, free capital, total 
adjusted capital, policyholder surplus, and statutory surplus". IAIS Sub-Committee, , supra note 29, at 
42. 
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amount of reinsurance by the required solvency margin. In other words, the amount of 
reinsurance could be taken into account only as a limited part of ceded business to 
reduce the required margin (or required free capital) in proportion of reinsurance 
receivables. 
a. Technical provisions and the credit of reinsurance 
The typical regulatory approach to regulate technical provisions and the credit of 
reinsurance is adopted by the United States. 
(1) U. S. NAIC Model Law 
Before describing the regulatory approach in the United States, it is essential to 
introduce the framework of solvency regulation as a background for further 
discussion. Although the insurance industry is regulated by the individual states, the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners formed by regulators in 55 
territorial jurisdictions has issued a series of model laws, regulations and guidelines 
concerning regulation of insurance. 
In terms of solvency requirements, the essential component of the solvency 
regulatory system is Risk-based Capital Approach specifying a minimum amount of 
capital based on the company's risk profile. As a result of drawbacks caused by the 
fixed-ration approach 72 , risk based capital models have been developed to assess risk 
elements that an insurer may encounter and to determine the solvency of an insurer. In 
general, risks are divided into the following categories: "a. Asset risk, b. Interest risk 
for life insurance and health credit risk for accident and health insurance, c. 
Underwriting risk, d. Credit risk (unrecoverable reinsurance of property and casualty 
insurance), d. Other business risk . 
73"' To ensure the financial solvency of an insurer, 
an insurer is required to prepare and submit to the commissioner an annual report of 
72 It has been summarised that the fixed-ratio basis may have the following shortcomings. 
(i) Inadequate respond to different risk profiles of individual insurers such as underwriting risk, and 
investment risk. 
(ii) "to the extent exposure is based on historical data, there is no explicit dynamic, forward looking 
basis for the approach. " 
(iii) "a general model may be vulnerable to the choice of exposure basis and respond illogically, e. g., 
by increasing requirements in respond to stronger premiums or safer technical provisions, and 
decreasing requirements with rebates on premiums or with weaker reserving". 
IAIS Sub-Committee, supra note 29, at 19.. 
73 IAIS Sub-Committee, , supra note 29, at 29. For details, NAIC, Risk-based Capital (RBC) for 
insurers Model Act, Model Laws, Regulations and Guidelines-Company Organization, Management, 
Securities Vol. 11, §2C, at 312-3-4. (July 2001). 
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its RBC Level S74. When the insurer's Total Adjusted Capita, 75 is below the level 
determined by this Model Law, it may trigger a governmental intervention 76 to control 
the operation of the insurer. 
As a result of the large increase in insurance insolvencies in the 1980s", a 
draft of the model addressing reinsurance regulation was published in 1983 78 . After 
efforts have been taken by many regulators to propose an appropriate model and 
resolve the relevant issues, the Credit for Reinsurance Model Law was adopted by 
NAIC in 1996. 
The amount of credit given to the reinsurance cover is regulated by various 
requirements. A primary insurer is not allowed to use the credit for reinsurance to 
reduce its technical provisions unless the reinsurer who transacts with this primary 
insurer meets relevant requirements provided by the insurance regulation. From the 
viewpoint of a primary insurer, the credit for reinsurance can reduce its required 
technical provisions and extend its capital capacity to underwrite business. If the 
technical provisions are not allowed to be reduced, a primary insurer's RBC level 
ratio may be below before the credit for reinsurance given to the insurer's financial 
statements. Consequently, it might trigger a governmental intervention or prevent the 
primary insurer from expanding business without adequacy of technical provisions. 
To meet the requirements provided by the NAIC Credit for Reinsurance 
Model Law, the regulation generally addresses the importance of the domiciled and 
licensed jurisdiction. The main purpose of this approach is to prevent domestic 
primary insurers from ceding business to a reinsurer who locates in another 
jurisdiction and beyond the state regulator's supervision 79 . In this regard, credit 
for 
74 RBC Levels are divided into four control levels. (i) Company Action Level RBC. (ii) Regulatory 
Action Level. (iii)Authorised Control Level RBC, (iv) Mandatory Control Level RBC. NAIC, Risk- 
based Capital (RBC) for Insurers Model Act, Model Laws, Regulations and Guidelines-Company 
Organization, Management, Securities Vol. II, §1J, at 312-2. 
75 Total adjusted capital means the sum of an insurer's statutory capital and surplus as determined in 
accordance with the statutory accounting principles. It may be adjusted by the RBC Instructions. Id. at 
§1L, 312-2. 
76 In the event of a regulatory action level event or lower action level (authorized control action and 
mandatory control), the commissioner shall take action as are necessary to cause the insurer to be 
placed under regulatory control e. g., a corrective order. Id. at § 4,5 and 6,312-6,312-9. 
77 Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 9: 5, at 1Q rd edition, 1995). 
78 NAIC, Reinsurance: Creditfor Reinsurance Model Law- Legislative History, in NAIC MODEL 
LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES VOL. V, 785-13 (1999). 
79 It has been observed, "a principal regulatory tool applicable to reinsurance, particularly reinsurance 
ceded to unauthorized insurers, is the recognition on a ceding company's financial statement of credit 
for unearned premium and loss reserves ceded to an assuming insurer. " Id. at 785-14. 
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reinsurance is allowed when the reinsurance is ceded to an assuming insurer that is 
licensed to transact insurance or reinsurance 80 . 
In addition, when the security of 
reinsurance is at the centre of the regulatory purposes, credit for reinsurance is 
allowed if a primary insurer transacts with "an accredited reinsurer 8191, who is already 
subject to 44 substantial equivalent" solvency regulation 82 . 
In order to eliminate the 
vague "standards of solvency" stated in the previous model law 83 , 
Credit for 
Reinsurance Model Law provided the precise requirements addressing the required 
84 amount of policyholder's surplus and accreditation procedure 
In addition to the reinsurer who is licensed or accredited in the same state, this 
Model Law provided the alternative requirements to allow the credit given to the 
ceding insurers. Due to lack of a single license regulatory system among the states, 
reinsurers licensed in one state should apply for authorisation to carry on reinsurance 
business in another state. To facilitate reinsurance transactions and avoid the multiple 
regulatory standards, Credit for Reinsurance Model Law allowed the credit for 
reinsurance when the reinsurers were licensed and supervised in the state employing 
standards "substantially similar 859, to those in the mode, 86. Second, credit is given to 
90 NAIC, Reinsurance: Creditfor Reinsurance Model Law, § 2A, supra note 4, at 785- 1. 
81 To qualify as an accredited reinsurer, the following requirements should be satisfied. 
"(a) Files with the commissioner evidences of its submission to this state's jurisdiction; 
(b) Submit to this state's authority to examine its books and records; 
(c) Is licensed to transact insurance or reinsurance in at least one state, or in the case of a U. S. branch 
of an alien assuming insurer, is entered through and licensed to transact insurance or reinsurance in at 
least one state; 
(d) Files annually with the commissioner a copy of its annual statement filed with the insurance 
department of its state of domicile and a copy of its most recent audited financial statement; 
(i) Maintain a surplus as regards policyholders in an amount not less than $ 20,000,000 and whose 
accreditation has not been denied by the commissioner within ninety days of its submission; or 
(ii)Maintain a surplus as regards policyholders in an amount less than $ 20,000,000 and whose 
accreditation has been approved by the commissioner. " NAIC, Reinsurance: Credit for Reinsurance 
Model Law, § 213, id, at 785-1,785-2. 
82 NAIC, supra note 78, at 785-14. 
83 Id. at 785-15. 
84 NAIC, Reinsurance: Creditfor Reinsurance Model Law, §2B (d)(i)(ii), supra note 4, at 785-2. 
85 To determine the substantial similar standards, the drafting note for this section stated that "the term 
substantial similar means standards that equal or exceed that the standards of the enacting state, as 
determined by the commissioner of the enacting state. It is expected that the NAIC will maintain a list 
of states whose laws establish standards that equal or exceed the standards of this model act. " It is 
suggested the NAIC accreditation approach to harmonise the supervisory standards among the states 
has been suggested to apply in the programme for reinsurance. It should be noted that the 
commissioner is responsible to determine the standards. In addition, it is argued that "tying the standard 
to the NAIC accredited status of the reinsurer's state of domicile could result in denial of credit even 
where the lack of NAIC accredited status was unrelated to that state's credit for reinsurance standards". 
As a result, such an accreditation procedure determined by the NAIC has not been drafted into this 
section. NAIC, supra note 78, at 785-15. 
86 NAIC, Reinsurance: Creditfor Reinsurance Model Law § 2C, supra note 4, at 785-2. 
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reduce technical provisions when a primary insurer can ensure the security of 
reinsurance by ways of trust fund established "in a qualified US financial institution 
for the payment of the valid claims of its US ceding insurers, their assigns and 
successors in interest 879, . This Model Law specified the relevant requirements relating 
to a recognised trust fund. The requirements consist of two main components 
concerning the commissioner's approval88 and qualified assuming insurers or 
groups 89 . Furthermore, credit permitted by this arrangement will not be allowed 
unless the reinsurer agrees certain arrangements concerning the role and power of the 
commissioner in the event of inadequacy of the trust fund9o. In addition to the 
respective requirements for the two kinds of reinsurers stated above, credit shall be 
allowed when the reinsurance is ceded to a reinsurer only "as to the insurance of risks 
located in jurisdictions where reinsurance is required by applicable law or regulation 
of that jurisdiction. 91" In the event of an unlicensed or unaccredited reinsurer, the 
credit for reinsurance permitted by the Section C and D will not be allowed unless the 
87 Id. Reinsurance: Credit for Reinsurance Model Law §2D, at 785-2,785-3. 
88 With respect to approval from the commissioner, the form of the trust and any amendments to the 
trust have approved by "(i) The commissioner of the state where the trust is domiciled" or "has been 
approved by the commissioner of another state who has accepted principal regulatory oversight of the 
trust. " In addition, the form of the trust and amendment should be filed with the commissioner of every 
state in which the ceding insurer beneficiaries of the trust are domiciled. The trust shall remain in effect 
for as long as the reinsurer's outstanding obligation due. Id. Reinsurance: Credit for Reinsurance 
Model Law §2D (2), at 785-3. 
89 In the NAIC Model Law, the requirements apply to the different categories of reinsurer. For the 
single reinsurer, a trusteed surplus of not less than $ 20,000,000 is required as well as the funds in trust 
in an amount not less than the reinsurer' liabilities attributable to reinsurance ceded by U. S. ceding 
insurers. For a group including incorporated and individual unincorporated underwriters, the group is 
required to establish a trust "in an amount not less than the group's several liabilities attributable to 
business ceded by U. S. domiciled ceding insurers to any member of the group" and to maintain the 
certain amount of surplus. In addition to the requirements relating to a trust fund and surplus, a group 
should be subject to a similar regulatory control and should submit its financial statements within 90 
days. See id. Reinsurance: Credit for Reinsurance Model Law §2D (3), at 785-3. 
90 In this section, this Model Law required the agreements addressing the supervision of the 
commissioner. In the event of inadequacy of the trust fund (e. g., the grantor of the trust has been 
declared insolvent), the trustee shall comply with an order of the commissioner. The assets should be 
distributed by and claims should be filed with and valued by the commissioner with regulatory 
oversight. If the commissioner determined that the assets of the trust fund are not necessary to satisfy 
the claims of the U. S. ceding insurers of the grantor of the trust, the assets should be returned to the 
trustee. "The grantor shall waive any rights otherwise available to it under US law that is inconsistent 
with this provision. " See id Reinsurance: Credit for Reinsurance Model Law §2G, at 785-5,785-6. 
91 The main purpose of this section is to allow the insurance risks located in the jurisdictions other than 
in the United States to be assumed by the state-owned reinsurers or reinsurers when the applicable 
insurance law and regulation in that jurisdiction required the compulsory cession. See id. Reinsurance: 
Credit for Reinsurance Model Law §2E, at 785-5. 
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reinsurer agrees certain conditions in the reinsurance agreements with respect to 
jurisdiction and arbitration 92 . 
In the case of ceding business to an unauthorised reinsurers not meeting the 
requirements of Section 2, the credit for reinsurance to reduce technical provisions 
can not be allowed unless certain amount of security has been held by or on behalf of 
the primary insurer 93 . 
(2) The Mexican regulatory approach 
As the regulators in the United States have developed a comprehensive regulatory 
regime concerning the creditworthiness of reinsurance, similar regulatory approaches 
have been also adopted or modified in some countries. Although the concept of 
regulatory approach addressing the control on technical provisions adopted by these 
countries is similar to that in the United States, the content of regulation might be 
different from that in the United States which gives emphasis to the domestic 
reinsurers and accredited reinsurers. For instance, the regulatory approach in Mexico 
seems more flexibly than that in the United States. Due to market characteristics and 
lack of domestic capital capacity, foreign reinsurance is crucial to promote domestic 
insurance market and to stabilise the growth of insurance business. As a result, the 
emphasis on the quality of reinsurance is given to the security of reinsurance rather 
than the domicile-oriented basis in United States. In the past, the regulation in Mexico 
was similar to other emerging markets where the reinsurance regulation generally 
focused on the risk retention and compulsory cessions to state-owned reinsurers. To 
correct the deficiency to supervise the quality of reinsurance, a new regulatory regime 
92 With respect to jurisdiction, a reinsurer shall agree in the agreements "to submit to the jurisdiction of 
any court of competent jurisdiction in any state of the United States, will comply with all requirements 
necessary to give the court jurisdiction in any state of the United States, will comply with all 
requirements necessary to give the court jurisdiction, and will abide by the final decision of the court or 
of any appellate court in the event of an appeal. " In addition, a reinsurer agrees to "designate the 
commissioner or a designated attorney may be served any lawful process in any action, suit or 
proceeding instituted by or on behalf of the ceding company". If this obligation is created in the 
agreement, the obligation of both parties to a reinsurance agreement to arbitrate their disputes will not 
be affected by the above section concerning the litigation. See id Reinsurance: Credit for Reinsurance 
Model Law §2F, at 785-5. 
93 The Model Law approved several forms of security. (i) Cash, (ii) Securities listed by the Securities 
Valuation Office of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners and qualifying as admitted 
assets; (iii) "Clean, irrevocable, unconditional letters of credit, issued or confirmed by a qualified U. S. 
financial institution" and such a letter of credit should, "notwithstanding the issuing (or confirming) 
institution's subsequent failure to meet applicable standards of issuer acceptability, continue to be 
acceptable as security until their expiration, extension, renewal, modification or amendment, whichever 
first occurs" Ov) "any other form of security acceptable to the commissioner. " id Reinsurance: Credit 
for Reinsurance Model Law § 3, at 785-6,785-7. 
86 
Chapter Two Reinsurers and the Reinsurance Arrangements of Primary Insurers 
concerning reinsurance was enacted by the National Insurance and Surety 
Commission (CNSF) in 1996 94 
. This new regulatory regime can be summarised in the 
following points: "(i) to establish a specialised reinsurance surveillance scheme within 
the CNSF, (ii) to support specialised inspection activities, (iii) to establish a legal 
framework to regulate the maximum retention limits, (iv) to establish a technical 
reserve for domestic companies considering the reinsurers' quality, and (v) to impact 
the solvency margin of ceding companies in the case of use of a low quality reinsurer, 
for foreign reinsurers, to modify the registration basis in order to have an updated 
situation of their claim pay ability (General Foreign Reinsurers Register); and for 
reinsurance brokers, (a) to implement the use of domiciled reinsurance brokers, and 
(b) to strengthen the legal sanctions regime for intermediaries' malpractice. 95,, As one 
of the main components of the regulation is to ensure the adequacy of technical 
reserve in relation to reinsurance, the quality of reinsurance should meet the 
requirements of insurance supervisors to reduce the technical provisions of a primary 
insurer. In terms of quality of reinsurance, a registration system with use of rating 
certificates is implemented for those foreign reinsurers who intend to carry on 
reinsurance business in Mexico. To obtain this register, reinsurers should have a 
satisfactory evaluation of an international specialised rating agency (e. g., Standard & 
Poor's, A. M. Best, Moody's, and Duff and PhelpS)96. In the event of non-registered 
reinsurers, a Special Reinsurers Quality Technical Reserve 97 is required to be created 
in order to reduce the credit risk arising from reinsurers. In addition to the required 
special reserves, such additional technical provisions may consequently affect the 
solvency margin of primary insurers and the required primary insurers to increase 
94 See Manuel Aguilera-Verduzco, supra note 13, at 3. 
95 See id at 3. 
96 To qualify to obtain the register, the minimum ratings are Standard & Poor's: BBB- or higher; A. M. 
Best: B+ or higher; Moody's: Baa3 or higher; Duff and Phelps: BBB-or higher. See id at 4. 
97 In this approach, this special technical reserve is considered as part of the technical reserve 
investment basis in a regulated investment regime. The calculation methods for this approach are 
described as follows. 
n 
Rtcr PC - Prrc) + Cnp 
Rtcr Special Reinsurance Quality Technical Reserve 
PC Premium Ceded to a Non-registered Reinsurer. 
Prrc =Retained Premium Ceded to a Non-registered Reinsurer. 
Cnp =Non-proportional Reinsurance Cost Paid to a Non-registered Reinsurer. 
11 =Total Number of Non-registered Reinsurers which the Insurance Company 
Worked With. 
See Manuel Aouilera-Verduzco, supra note 13, at 5. L_ 
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their required capital to protect their reinsurance programme in the short terM98. After 
the implementation of this new regulatory regime addressing the quality of 
reinsurance, it has been observed that "the quality of the foreign companies now 
registered offers a level of security in reinsurance operations that did not exist before, 
and this helps to reduce the solvency problems that domestic companies might face 
due to ceded risks"". 
b. Solvency margin approach 
In contrast to the regulatory approach on the technical provisions, ensuring the quality 
of reinsurance can be achieved by way of laying down the relevant requirements on 
the required solvency margin. In the European Union, the regulatory approach 
concerning the solvency of reinsurers is the minimum capital requirement, called 
required solvency margin'00. 
With regard to reinsurance and its effect on solvency requirements, the credit 
for reinsurance may be allowed to calculate the required solvency margin in some 
member states. In these member states, the reduction is restricted and should not 
exceed 50 percent for non-life insurance and 15 percent for life insurance'01. Note, 
however, that regulation of reinsurers may still vary in these countries that impose 
limitation on the calculation of required solvency margin. For instance, the UK model 
imposed limitation on the amount of cession in the calculation of required solvency 
margin. Reinsurers who intend to conduct business in UK are required to obtain 
authorisation from the Financial Services Authority' 02 . As a result, the quality of 
reinsurance has been considered by ways of the framework of direct regulation of 
reinsurers. In contrast to the direct regulatory approach in the UK model, the current 
German system of reinsurance regulation focuses on the ceding insurers rather than 
direct regulation of reinsurers. Foreign reinsurers are exempted from the direct 
supervision in Germany whereas German reinsurers are subject to strict accounting 
guidelines, submission of financial statements and regulation concerning adequacy of 
technical provisions, on the spot inspection and fines for non-compliance with 
98 See id. at 5. 
99 See id. at 4. 
100 IAIS Sub-Committee, , supra note 
29, at 25. 
1011t should be noted, however, that other member states do not give any credit for reinsurance and 
insisted on the gross reserving basis. Id. at 26. 
102 See T. HENRY ELLIS & JAMES A. WILTSHIRE, supra note 9, at B. 3.3-02 (Issue 63, Feb. /2000). 
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accounting and financial rules' 03. In addition, a direct insurer in Germany is required 
to assess the adequacy of reinsurance and the creditworthiness of reinsurers. In the 
event of inadequacy of reinsurance, it may trigger the governmental intervention of 
the insurance regulators (the Bundesaufsichtsamt fuer das Versicherungswesen) 104 . 
Besides the EU, a similar regulatory framework has been considered or 
modified in other countries, e. g., Australia. With regard to solvency requirements in 
Australia, the solvency margin is related to the level of premium income or the level 
05 of outstanding claims' . In relation to reinsurance and solvency requirements, the 
Australian solvency requirements are net reserve based, which means that the amount 
of reinsurance can be allowed to reduce the required solvency margin. In the absence 
of limitation on the amount of cession to reduce the required solvency margin, the 
credit for reinsurance is allowed only if the reinsurance policies of a primary insurer 
have been approved by the insurance regulators (the Australia Prudential Regulation 
Authority(APRA). With regard to foreign reinsurers, however, the Australian 
insurance regulators adopt a spread rule for foreign reinsurance to ensure the 
creditability of reinsurance by implementation of the guidelines issued by APRA' 06 .A 
spread rule for foreign reinsurance is that in the event of unauthorised reinsurers, the 
ceding insurance risk should not be more than 10 percent of the risk in the case of a 
lead reinsurer and 5 per cent of the risk in the case of other participants. By doing so, 
it may reduce the concentration of ceding risk to unauthorised reinsurers and the 
financial impact resulting from the credit risk of such reinsurers 107 . 
On the other hand, 
as the domestic reinsurers are subject to a similar solvency margin requirement and 
capital requirement applied to insurers 108 , the quality of reinsurance can 
be maintained 
and supervised by the APRA. 
B. Reinsurance Contracts and Solvency of Primary Insurers 
Although the main topic of this chapter is to discuss the security of reinsurance, a 
regulatory issue may arise concerning whether a reinsurer can pay an amount based 
103 §I Abs. 2 VAG: §§ 55-59 VAG. See Michael Pickel, supra note 17, at 5. 
104 §5 Abs. 5 Nr. 2 VAG: § 81 Abs. I VAG: BAV Rundschreiben R1/97. See id. at 5. 
105 20 per cent net premium income, or 15 per cent of the net outstanding claims provisions. See 
Richard Smith, Reinsurance Issues for Supervisors, OECD, at 3 (11 November 2001), 
at<www. oecd. oriz>. 
106 In addition to relevant insurance law, the regulatory approaches relating to the quality of reinsurance 
has been based on the guidelines developed in consultation with the industry. See id at 4. 
107 See id at 4. 
108 See id. at 3. 
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on the actual amount the insolvent insurer can pay in order to limit its liability in the 
event of insolvency of the primary insurer'09. The significant case addressing this 
issue in the US is Fidelity and Deposit Company v. Pink' 10. In that case, the reinsurer- 
Fidelity and Deposit Company argued that the reinsurance contract as an indemnity 
contract reimburses the liquidator-Pink (the Superintendent of Insurance for New 
York) only with respect to that proportion of losses the liquidator actually paid to 
claimants. On the other hand, Pink contended that the reinsurer should pay the amount 
based on the reinsurance contract regardless of the actual amount the insolvent 
company was able to pay the claimants. Based on the reinsurance agreement, "which 
the Court found made payment of a claim a condition precedent to reinsurance 
recovery, the United States Supreme Court found for the reinsurer" III . As a result of 
this case, some states in the US require that reinsurance contracts contain an 
Insolvency Clause, which obligates the reinsurers to pay the reinsurance proceeds to 
the domiciliary liquidator based on the liability of the primary insurer, regardless of 
the primary insurer's insolvency' 12 . 
In the event of insolvency of the primary insurer, the policyholders generally 
have no right to collect from the reinsurers and the reinsurance proceeds pay to the 
liquidator administrating the insolvent primary insurer's assets' 13 .A significant 
exception' 14 , however, would occur when the reinsurance contract contains a cut- 
through endorsement that allows the policyholder to sue the reinsurers directly in 
certain circumstances. As a result of the advantage of cut-throught clause that entitles 
'0' ROBERT W. HAMMESFAIFIR & SCOTT W. WRIGHT, supra note 41, at 251-252. 
110 302 U. S. 224 reh'g denied, 302 U. S. 780 (1937). 
... ROBERT W. HAMMESFAHR & SCOTT W. WRIGHT, supra note 41, at 252 (1994). 
112 For instance, in 1939, New York passed Section 77 of the New York Insurance Law. New York 
Insurance Law § 1308[a][2][A]. See R. MICHAEL CASS, PETER R. KENSICKI, GARY S. 
PATRICK, ROBERT C. REINARZ & DORIS HOOPES, REINSURANCE PRACTICES VOL. 1,25( 
Institute of America, 2 nd ed., 1997). See also T. Darrington Semple, Jr. & Robert M. Hall, The 
Reinsurer's Liability in the Event of Insolvency of Ceding Property and Casualty Insurer, 21 Tort & 
Ins. L. J. 407 (1980). (12 Dec. 2001), available at <http: //www. robertmhall.. com/articles/j. htm#N I >. 
113 For US cases, e. g., Avondale Mills, Inc. v. American Re-Ins. Co., 89-2514HA, 1991 U. S. Dist. 
LEXIS 20,632 (W. D. Tenn., Aug. 5,1991); Florida ex rel. O'Malley v. Department of Ins., 155 Ind. 
App. 168,291 N. E. 2d 907 (1973); People ex rel. Baylor v. Highway Ins. Co., 57 111.2d 590,316 N. E. 
2d 633 (1974). Cited by ROBERT W. HAMMESFAHR & SCOTT W. WRIGHT, supra note 41, at 
255. 
114 New York status allows some exceptions for insolvency clause when "(a) the reinsurance agreement 
specifies another payee of such reinsurance in the event of insolvency of the ceding insurer, and (b) the 
assuming insurer with the consent of the direct insureds, has assumed such policy obligation to the 
payees as a replacement for the obligations of the ceding insurer. " § 1308 (2) (B( 1) and (11)) of 
the New York Insurance Code. ,c it ed 
by T. Darrington Semple, Jr. & Robert M. Hall, supra 
note 112. 
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the policyholder to proceed directly against the reinsurer for the payment in the event 
of insolvency of the primary insurer, there have been regulatory and legislative debate 
concerning the enforcement of cut-through endorsement in the United States' 15. It 
should also be noted that insolvency laws and contract laws, which vary from country 
to country, might affect the validity of this endorsement. In the United States, Courts 
have upheld cut-through endorsements in certain circumstances' 16 . 
For instance, the 
cut-through endorsement must be clearly stated and must contain express language 
that the insured will be paid by the reinsurer directly or that the insured can sue the 
117 reinsurer directly in certain circumstances . By contrast, it has been criticised that 
the cut-through clause is contrary to public policy and effectively illegal under 
English Law" 8. There are few cases examining the cut-through clause in English 
Law. In 1975, House of Lords'19 held that the fundamental principle of pari passu 
distribution of the insolvent company's assets and states mandates that any 
preferences not expressly permitted by the insolvency legislation would be contrary to 
public policy. 
As a result of legal disputes arising from enforcement of cut-through clauses, 
the reinsurer should consider the potential risk for double exposure to the policyholder 
and liquidator. From the viewpoint of the policyholder, the cut-through clause, which 
is to entitle an insured to collect the payment directly from the reinsurer, provides 
additional protection for the insured in the event of insolvency of the primary insurer. 
Nevertheless, it is crucial to consider the interest of other claimants when the 
preferences have not been expressly permitted in the relevant insolvency legislation. 
C. Corporate Governance and Internal Controls 
It has been observed that "good corporate governance is critical in setting the 
incentives for a financial institution to act prudently and for control of the risks which 
115 See generally Reinsurance Association of America, Issues-Receivership: Cut-Through, (12 Dec. 
2001), at< http: //www. raanet. orWpolicyupdate/cut-throuizhs >. 
116 See Klockner Stadler Hurter, Ltd. v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania, 785 F. Supp. 1130 (S. D. N. Y. 
1990). 
117 See California Insurance Code Section 922.2. cited by Christopher Braithwaite, Cut-through 
Clauses, JTW, (12 Dec. 2001), at <http: //www. itw-re. com/rukleQýall. htm>. See also Chawki Kadoub v. 
Liberian American Insurance Corp No. 12405/91 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 16,1991), 2 Mealey's Reins. 
Rep. No. 14, at A-1., cited by ROBERT W. HAMMESFAHR & SCOTT W. WRIGHT, supra note 
41, at 257. 
118 Peter Sharp, Cut-through Clauses, London Engineering Group, (12 Dec. 2001), at<http: //www. le2- 
uk. ors4/cutthru. htm>- 
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a financial institution takes. 
120, ' Good corporate governance requires not only to 
strengthen shareholders' influence and control on corporate management but also to 
enhance internal control mechanisms and policies to ensure the key personnel act in 
121 the interest of the enterprise 
In terms of a primary insurer, good corporate governance is essential to limit 
or manage the amount of risk that they assumed or operated such as insurance risk 
and investment risk. From the viewpoint of insurance regulators, the establishment of 
relevant requirements for corporate governance can be used as a mechanism to require 
primary insurers committed to achieving regulatory objectives 122 and meeting the 
regulatory requirements. 
1. The importance of corporate governance and internal control to 
primary insurers' reinsurance arrangements 
In the area of insurance industry, governance problems can be categorised into the two 
different kinds of insurance business. In "non-life insurance", governance problems 
arise because "the poor management decision such as a rapid expansion in market 
share or a deliberate reduction in underwriting standards often can produce a dramatic 
decline in profits. 123,, By contrast, governance problems in "life insurance" focuse on 
"the continuity of operation and the ethicality of management" 124 . Given the function 
of reinsurance as a mechanism for extending the capital capacity of primary insurers 
to underwrite insurance business, the collection problems of reinsurance 
119 British Eagle International Airlines Limited v. Compagnie Nationale [1975] IWLR 758. cited by 
Christopher Braithwaite, supra note 117. See also Peter Sharp, id. 
120 JOSEPH J. NORTON, supra note 14, at 52. 
121 Norbert Seiler, Implementation of International Standards: The EBRD's Approach to Strengthening 
Good Corporate Governance, in THE REFORM OF THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 
ARCHITECTURE 327-328 (Rosa M. Lastra ed., Kluwer, 2001). 
122 It has been provided by IAIS that insurance regulators have responsibility to establish relevant 
requirements for corporate governance. "Insurance Core Principles 4: It is desirable that standards be 
established in the jurisdictions which deal with corporate governance. Where the insurance supervisor 
has responsibility for setting requirements for corporate governance, the insurance supervisor should 
set requirements with respect to: a. the roles and responsibilities of the board of directors; b. reliance on 
other supervisors for companies licensed in another jurisdiction; and c. the distinction between the 
standards to be met by companies incorporated in his jurisdiction and branch operations of companies 
incorporated in another jurisdiction. " See INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE 
SUPERVISORS, INSURANCE CORE PRINCIPLES, supra note 68, at 8. 
123 Stephen R. Diacon & Noel O'Sullivan, Does Corporate Governance Influence Performance? Some 
Evidence From UK Insurance Companies, 15 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS405,407 (Elsevier Science, December 1995). 
124 This is because life insurance operation "are long term and fiduciary in nature and attempt to build 
contractual relationship between the company and its customers that may last for several years". Id. at 
407. 
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arrangements, which include the credit risk of reinsurers, legal disputes arising from 
reinsurance contracts and inadequacy of reinsurance coverage, can be reduced by 
introducing proper corporate governance to promote risk management. 
In relation to reinsurance arrangements, an institutional framework for sound 
corporate governance should establish an evaluation procedure to assess 
creditworthiness of reinsurers and to develop effective means to measure and monitor 
the reinsurance contracts as well as the adequacy of reinsurance coverage. In addition, 
collection of reinsurance should be considered in the framework of internal control. 
Such a procedure should provide the process of reinsurance claim, identify the 
collection problems (e. g., legal disputes, financial condition of the reinsurers, 
jurisdiction), and the approaches to achieve collection (e. g., negotiation, collateral, 
125 
arbitration and litigation) 
To develop an evaluation procedure for reinsurance arrangements, the private 
rating agencies can be considered as an essential tool to assess the creditworthiness of 
reinsurers. Due to lack of inadequacy of information concerning reinsurers, a primary 
insurer may fail to assess the financial condition of reinsurers accurately and 
consequently credit risk of reinsurance may arise. As a result of the advantages of the 
assessment of reinsurers provided by these private rating agencies, a primary insurer 
should develop the relevant procedure to use these rating agencies. 
2. International supervisory standards and the IAIS Core Principles for 
corporate governance and internal control 
In order to ensure improved supervision of the insurance industry on the domestic as 
well as on an international level and maintain efficient, fair safe and stable insurance 
market, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors has issued the 
Insurance Code Principles which comprises essential principles and are intended to 
serve as a basic reference for insurance supervisors in all jurisdictions in October 
126 2000 
In relation to corporate governance, it addresses the responsibility of insurance 
supervisors to establish requirements for corporate governance concerning the 
125 For these elements of the reinsurance collection process See Thomas Warnke, supra note II at 37- 
56. 
126 INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE SUPERVISORS, INSURANCE CORE 
PRINCIPLES, supra note 68, at 4. 
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following matters: 
44a. The role and responsibilities of the boards of directors 
b. The reliance on other supervisors for companies licensed in another 
jurisdiction 
c. The distinction between the standards to be met by companies incorporated 
in his jurisdiction and branch operation of companies incorporated in another 
jurisdiction. 1271, 
To facilitate the assessment of the implementation of these piinciples, the 
Insurance Code Principles Methodology has been proposed to provide detailed criteria 
for insurance supervisors to carry on self-assessments or review 
128 
. The criteria 
relating to corporate governance addresses the insurance supervisor's responsibilities 
129 toward verifying and enforcing observance of those requirements 
With respect to reinsurance arrangements, the insurance supervisor should 
"have authority to require boards or directors to have in place and to monitor 
independent risk management functions related to the type of business undertaken' 30,, 
In other words, boards or directors are required to monitor the risk management 
functions including the risk transfer instruments such as reinsurance. 
With regard to internal control, the Insurance Code Principles recommended 
127 Principle 4: Corporate Governance of Insurance Code Principles, INTERNATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE SUPERVISORS, INSURANCE CORE PRINCIPLES, supra note 
68, at 8. 
128 INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE SUPERVISORS, CORE PRINCIPLES 
METHODOLOGY 4 (October 2000), (08 November 2001 visited), at<www. iaisweb. orR>. 
129 The elements of the criteria can be summarised in the following aspects: 
The responsibilities of boards of directors, their strategic objectives, the means for attaining those 
objectives and the procedure for evaluating their progress toward those objectives. 
The nomination and appointment procedures, structure, functions, re-elections and balance between 
executive and non-executive directors of the board in a transparent manner. 
Clarification of responsibilities which will ensure a balance of power and authority. 
Control on risk management functions. 
Protection of customers regarding customer complaints procedures, the enhancement of customer 
awareness and knowledge, and the assessment of business conduct at regular intervals. 
The policies regarding conflicts of interest, fair treatment of customers and information sharing with Z.. ) 21 
stakeholders. 
The policies regarding insider dealing. 
Proper and full disclosure concerning corporate governance principles and attainment of stated 
corporate objectives. 
A proper remuneration policy for directors and senior management, to review that policy and to 
disclose it to the insurance supervisors or to the general public. 
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE SUPERVISORS, id. at 18-20. 
130 Id. at 19. 
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that the insurance supervisors should be able to review the internal control and requIre 
the board of the directors to provide suitable prudential oversight 131 . In ten-ns of 
reinsurance arrangements of primary insurers, the insurance supervisor should require 
132 the boards of directors to provide suitable oversight of reinsurance arrangements In 
other words, the relevant assessment should be provided to enable the board of 
directors to monitor the efficiency of reinsurance arrangements and to identify the 
problems arising from reinsurance collection. 
D. Summary Observations 
An efficient reinsurance market provides the primary insurers with the capital 
capacity to underwrite and expand the business, the expertise to enhance the relevant 
experience, and the financial stability to smooth the fluctuations in underwriting 
results and to protect them against the potential large exposure from catastrophic 
events. However, the regulation concerning the security of reinsurance varies 
substantially in countries throughout the world. 
13 1 According to Principle 5 of IAIS Insurance Supervisory Core Principles, the insurance supervisor 
should be able to 
"review the internal controls that the board of directors and management approve and apply, and 
request strengthening of the controls where necessary; and 
require the board of directors to provide suitable prudential oversight, such as setting standards for 
underwriting risks and setting qualitative and quantitative standards for investment and liquidity 
management. " 
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE SUPERVISORS, INSURANCE CORE 
PRINCIPLES, supra note 68, at 8. 
132 The elements of essential and additional criteria provided by JAIS can be described as follows. 
The review of internal control that board of directors and management approve and apply; when 
necessary the supervisory requests a strengthening of the controls. 
Suitable prudential oversight, such as setting standards and monitoring controls for underwriting risks, 
valuation of technical provisions (policy liabilities), investment and liquidity management and 
reinsurance. 
Suitable oversight of market conduct activities e. g., setting standards and monitoring controls on fair 
treatment of customers; proper disclosure to customers of policy benefits, risk and responsibilities; 
conflicts of interest. 
Internal control to address issues of an organisational structure, accounting procedure, checks and 
balances. 
Control on safeguarding of assets and investments, including physical control. 
An ongoing audit function of a nature and scope appropriate to the nature and scale of the business. 
Formal procedures to recognise potential suspicious transactions. 
The establishment of lines of communication both to management, law enforcement authorities and/ or 
the insurance supervisor for the reporting of irregular and suspicious activities. 
In relation to additional criteria, the insurance supervisor encourages the company to appoint 
experienced non-executive directors to the board in case of a unicameral board structure and the 
establishment of an internal audit function that reports to an Audit Committee of the board. 
The insurance supervisors requires actuarial reporting where called for by applicable law or by the 
nature of the insurer's operations and where appropriate encourages the appointment of an actuary 
reporting directly to the board or directors. 
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To evaluate the security of reinsurance, a primary insurer should not only 
assess the financial solvency of the reinsurers but also draft the reinsurance contracts 
carefully. The quality and integrity of management is essential to ensure the quality of 
reinsurance and the good performance of business. As a result of financial impact 
from the legal disputes between reinsurers and the ceding insurers, the reinsurance 
wordings should be properly drafted. In addition to legal disputes, the ceding insurers 
should collect their reinsurance payment efficiently and any irrecoverable reinsurance 
should not be considered as assets in the solvency regulation accounting. With regard 
to financial solvency of the reinsurers, primary insurers and insurance regulators 
could evaluate reinsurers' adequacy of technical provisions, the investment of assets, 
and solvency margin. While the direct regulatory approach addressing the regulation 
of foreign reinsurers is not common in most countries, determining the security of 
reinsurance provided by reinsurers domiciled or licensed abroad should rely on the 
information gathered from other countries and the cooperation with foreign insurance 
regulators. 
Regulatory approaches concerning creditworthiness of reinsurance can be 
designed either in the statutory accounting or in the required solvency margin. In 
comparison with these two approaches, the differences generally depend on the 
frameworks of solvency regulation. Furthermore, it appears that the level of 
regulation concerning the security of reinsurance differs from country to country. 
However, the foreign reinsurers have been supervised either by direct licensing 
requirements or the indirect regulation concerning the financial condition of 
reinsurers. Due to problems caused by the unauthorised reinsurers, these regulatory 
approaches addressed the security of reinsurance provided by these reinsurers. 
In the United States, reinsurance can be used to reduce the ceding insurer's 
technical provisions if it meets the requirements, which are established by NAIC and 
then adopted by the states. In comparison with other regulatory approaches, it can be 
found that the approach in the United States emphasising the security of reinsurers 
licensed and domiciled abroad might lead to restricting the freedom of international 
reinsurance transactions although foreign reinsurers carrying on business are not 
subject to direct regulation and licensing requirements. In the event of ceding business 
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE SUPERVISORS, INSURANCE CORE 
PRINCIPLES, supra note 68, at 21-22. 
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to unauthorised reinsurers, reinsurers may either establish a multiple benficiary trust 
plus a required surplus amount or provide individual collateral to the ceding 
133 insurers . As a result, it may increase the transaction costs caused by the requried 
trusts or collateral arrangements. However, it has been argued that "eliminating 
regulation that presents obstacles to the marketplace while introducing and/or 
maintaining sufficient financial security of the industry is a critical balance that must 
be reached. 9,134 Due to the large number of U. S. insurers insolvencies in the 1980s, the 
collateralisation of unauthorised reinsurers is established to ensure the recoverability 
of reinsurance. From the viewpoint of insurance regulators, such a collateral 
arrangement eliminates the needs to evaluate financial solvency of unauthorised 
reinsurers 135 . On the other hand, in Mexico, the evaluation of the security of 
reinsurance depends on the financial assessments provided by specific rating 
agencies. Unlike the reinsurance market in the US, the shortage of reinsurance is the 
main concern in many emerging markets. It is more difficult for insurance regulators 
in emerging markets to reach a balance between the security of reinsurance and the 
availability of reinsurance. As a result, the regulatory emphasis has been given to the 
financial solvency of reinsurers rather than the location of reinsurers. In the event of 
non-registered reinsurers, the special technical reserve concerning the recoverability 
of reinsurance will be imposed on the ceding insurers. 
With regard to the regulatory approaches structured in the solvency margin of 
the ceding insurers, the approaches adopted by some EU countries restrict the 
reduction of required solvency margin. In doing so, it may reduce the ceding insurers' 
reliance on the reinsurance and limit the financial impact caused by irrecoverable 
reinsurance. The content of regulation varies among the EU member states. In the 
UK, reinsurers should be authorised to carry on reinsurance business even reinsurers 
domiciled in other member states are required to demonstrate their financial solvency. 
In this approach, the financial condition of reinsurers has been monitored and 
evaluated by the insurance supervisors and no reinsurer can be exempt from the scope 
of solvency regulation. By contrast, the regulatory regime in Germany imposed strict 
regulation on the ceding insurer's arrangements and the domestic reinsurers whereas 
foreign reinsurers are exempt from Germany's insurance regulation. Although it 
133 Debra J. Hall, supra note 27, at 7. 
134 Id. at 7. 
135 Id. at 6. 
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seems that the regulatory approach in Germany is less restrictive than other countries, 
it should be noted that the governmental intervention might be triggered in the event 
of inadequacy of reinsurance. In the Australian regulatory approach concerning the 
security of reinsurance, authorized reinsurers are subject to a similar solvency 
requirement as primary insurers whereas in the event of ceding business to an 
unauthorized reinsurer a spread rule will be imposed on the ceding insurers to prevent 
the concentration of credit risk of reinsurance. 
Designing an appropriate regulatory regime generally depends on market 
characteristics and relevant regulatory arrangements. Among these approaches stated 
above, the collateralisation of reinsurance and trust fund requirements in the United 
States may not be appropriate for emerging markets with the problem of shortage of 
reinsurance. From the viewpoint of the arguments for the U. S. approach, the trust 
fund and collateral arrangements eliminate the uncertainty of the financial solvency of 
unauthorized reinsurers. As a result of the varying accounting principles, it is also 
problematic to assess the financial condition of the foreign reinsurers and may cause 
enormous costs to establish general acceptable accounting standards' 36 . Furtheri-nore, 
in the event of insolvency of unauthorized reinsurers, legal disputes arising under 
insolvency law may increase the obstacles for the ceding insurers when the reinsurer 
in receivership is subject to foreign insolvency laws. Introducing the collateral 
requirement and trust fund will not only eliminate the difficulties arising from 
insolvent reinsurers but also ensure the reinsurance collection. From the viewpoint of 
competition between authorized reinsurers and unauthorized reinsurers, it may 
provide the competitive advantages for unauthorized reinsurers without collateral 
arrangements while the authorized reinsurers encounter the regulatory costs. 
It should be noted, however, that the significant costs associated with the 
collateral arrangements and trust funds may not be bearable for the ceding insurers in 
emerging markets with limited capital capacity. In addition, the main purpose of 
reinsurance, which is to absorb and diversify risk, should be addressed. It is not 
feasible to implement such a regulation while the shortage of reinsurance is the main 
concern in these markets. As a result, the regulation concerning the security of 
reinsurance should depend on the evaluation of foreign reinsurers rather than impose 
the restrictive regulation on the ceding insurers in the event of ceding business to a 
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foreign reinsurer. Although the Mexican regulatory approach, which highly depends 
on the analysis by rating agencies, seems less developed than the approach In the 
United States, it has improved the security of reinsurance without increasing the cost 
of reinsurance and impeding the diversification of reinsurance risk. 
In addition to governmental supervision, good corporate governance and 
sound internal control addressing the security of reinsurance should be incorporated 
into the framework of ensuring the solvency of primary insurers. Insurance 
undertakings should establish the criteria to review the reinsurance collection and the 
adequacy of reinsurance arrangements. 
111. International Supervisory Standards and Guidelines 
As a result of the trend towards harmonization of reinsurance regulation, the relevant 
supervisory guidelines and papers concerning the regulation of reinsurance issued and 
developed by the International Association for Insurance Supervisors JAIS) are worth 
introducing. 
A. IAIS-the Working Group's Issues Paper on Reinsurance. 
International Association for Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), which has published 
Insurance Principles, Standards and Guidance Papers to serve as a guideline for the 
regulation and supervision of insurance market' 37 , is in the process of developing 
guidelines or standards in the areas of licensing, use of derivatives, on-site 
inspections, solvency, reinsurance, market conduct, and investment policies. With 
respect to reinsurance and reinsurers, the Working Group on Reinsurance (now the 
Reinsurance Subcommittee) established by MIS issued a paper entitled: "Reinsurance 
and Reinsurers: Relevant Issues for Establishing General Supervisory Principles, 
Standards, and Practices" for developing guidelines in the area of reinsurance 
regulation and supervision in February 2000 138 . Although this paper 
does not reflect 
the view of the IAIS, this paper points out several essential issues and provides a good 
foundation for developing reinsurance regulations either in developed countries or in 
emerging markets' 39 . In the area of regulation of reinsurance and reinsurers, the 
136 Id. at 13. 
137 See IAIS-Working Group on Reinsurance, IAIS-Working Group on Reinsurance, supra note 7, at 9. 
138 This paper cohered with the existing IAIS principles, standards, and guidance papers. See generally 
id at 9. 
139 Id. at I 
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Working Group made the following recommendation to the Technical Committee, 
IAIS. First, a harmonized single licensing system should be established and be based 
on the mutual recognition of supervisory principles and practices among reinsurance 
supervisors 140 . Second, to facilitate mutual recognition among countries, the Working 
Group proposed that such a mutual recognition might be established on the regional 
basis 141 
. Third, in order to obtain accurate information to assess the financial 
condition and the corporate structure of reinsurers, a database of all reinsurance 
companies throughout the world should be created and made accessible. In addition, 
the rating agencies could be invited to provide the relevant credit rating and the MIS 
should be able to check the quality of the information they provided 142 . Fourth, a 
licensing or registration system for reinsurance companies should be implemented and 
such a system should be able to ensure the fit and proper quality of the key 
personnel 143 . As a result of increasing use of new risk transfer products (e. g., 
insurance-linked securities, and finite risk reinsurance) that may cause regulatory 
obstacles, the Working Group has placed their emphasis on the relevant issues and has 
recommended the improvement of regulators' expertise, accounting, and solvency 
144 requirements to keep pace with market dynamics . In addition to substantial 
recommendations on the aspects stated above, this paper identified three issues 145 
concerning the systemic risk 146 arising from current market consolidation, the 
industry's view on the database established by IAIS, and the requirements for 
licensing reinsurance companies. 
In terms of the regulation of reinsurance, this paper identified several essential 
issues and proposed several approaches to regulate and supervise reinsurance 
activities more effectively. These issues and recommendations can be divided into the 
140 Id. at 6. 
141 Regions could be the following groups. "A. North America, Australia and New Zealand gradually 
extended with the countries of Middle and South America; B. Japan and other Asian countries; C. the 
European Union, countries belonging to the European Economic Area and Switzerland, gradually 
extended to Middle and East European Countries; D. South Africa and other African countries. " In 
addition, it provided the alternative approaches such as a similar market condition to recognise each 
other's supervisory approach. Id. at 6. 
142 Id. at 7 
143 Id. at 7. 
144 IAIS-Working Group on Reinsurance, supra note 7, at 7. 
145 Id. at 7. 
146 In relation to system risk and reinsurance, it has been observed that "it is unlikely that the 
reinsurance industry can be linked to systemic problems of financial stability". See Michael Hafeman, 
supra note 19, at 9. However, this observation only reflects the current situation in the reinsurance 
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following categories: 
1. Sector Separation for Insurers and Reinsurers. While the separation of 
primary insurers between life insurance and non-life insurance is found in many 
jurisdictions, it is argued that a similar separation should also be applied to reinsurers. 
This paper categorised two kinds of reinsurers-primary insurers who also carry on 
reinsurance business and professional reinsurers who only conduct reinsurance 
business. For the primary insurers who also carry on reinsurance business, the sector 
separation should be applied because of the differences of risk characteristics and 
inadequacy of expertise 147 . 
However, the same separation regulations may not be 
148 appropriate to regulate professional reinsurers 
2. Supervision of reinsurance arrangements of a primary insurer 
This paper summarised the following essential aspects concerning supervision 
of reinsurance arrangements of a primary insurer. 
a. Information regarding reinsurers such as the country of registration, and 
financial condition. 
b. The type of reinsurance treaties and the relevant information (e. g., the terms 
of the treaties, the cost of reinsurance, the coverage. ) 
c. The amount of the risk retention. 
149 d. Plans for spreading risk to avoid the concentration of risk 
However, this paper only placed emphasis on the essential information 
regarding reinsurance arrangements of a primary insurer rather than providing a 
comprehensive approach to efficiently regulate a primary insurer to arrange their 
industry. As a result of the trends of consolidation of financial markets and increasing catastrophe risks, 
it is doubtful that reinsurance industry may not have significant impact on the global financial market. 
147 The main risks arising from life insurance business can be well identified and slow to change e. g. 
mortality risk. However, the risks of non-life insurance are not well predictable e. g. aviation and 
catastrophe. Therefore, the life insurers who also carry on non-life reinsurance may encounter 
difficulties from poor indemnity reinsurance result. See IAIS-Working Group on Reinsurance, supra 
note 7, at 42. 
148 This paper made the following observations to support that the absent of sector separation for 
professional reinsurers does not represent a significant impact on the insurance market. First, life 
reinsurance business, which is readily calculable risk and relative stable, may enhance the 
diversification of risks accepted by professional reinsurers. Second, the failure of reinsurers may not 
directly affect the policyholders. Third, the sector separation may impede the diversification of risk and 
restrict a sufficient volume of business from another sector. However, it should be noted that the failure 
of a reinsurers may consequently affect the financial stability of a primary insurers and hence the 
interests of the policyholders. See IAIS-Working Group on Reinsurance, supra note 7, at 42. 
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reinsurance arrangements. 
3. Supervision of Reinsurers 
In terms of supervision of reinsurers, the most controversial issue is to decide 
an appropriate regulatory model to regulate reinsurers. Should a reinsurer be 
supervised directly as a primary insurer who is subject to licensing requirements and 
solvency regulation? This paper analysed the advantages and disadvantages of 
supervising reinsurers directly and made the following observations. 
As a result of market dynamics and the innovations of investment instruments, 
it becomes increasingly difficult for a supervisor and a primary insurer to ensure the 
recoverability of reinsurance. In directly supervising reinsurers, the supervisors will 
be able to assess the reinsurer's financial condition and enhance the reinsurer's 
financial stability by the relevant investment regulations. Due to the importance of the 
reinsurer's activity in the comprehensive chain of risk spread, it is necessary to 
supervise reinsurers directly to ensure the fitness and competence of key personnel of 
a reinsurance company' 
50 
. 
Although both the objectives of the insurance regulation and reinsurance 
regulation are to ensure the financial security of insurers and reinsurers, the 
assessments may differ' 51 . As a result of lack of definite and uniform procedures 
for 
the analysis of the annual account or for further check, ceding insurers and insurance 
supervisors may arrive at different results regarding a reinsurer's security; e. g. capital 
adequacy requirement or investment regulation 152 . Consequently, it may cause the 
multiple financial assessments of the reinsurer. To avoid the multiple assessments of 
the same reinsurer's security, a system of home control, including an adequate system 
of information exchange has been proposed by this report 153 . Such a system should 
be 
uniform and provide a level playing field for reinsurers. Furthermore, this paper 
suggests that a system of single license and home region control could be a possible 
solution not only to reduce the operational obstacles but also to maintain the financial 
stability of reinsurers. In addition to governmental supervision, this paper recognises 
the essentiality of private rating agencies and encourages the supervisors and the 
149 See id at 48. 
150 See id at 49. 
151 See id at 50. 
15-1 See id at 50. 
153 See id. at 5 1. 
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ceding insurers to consider using these ratings in conjunction with other solvency 
regulation and the criteria to select the reinsurers. 154 
B. On Solvency, Solvency Assessments and Actuarial Issues-An JAIS 
Issues Paper (Final Version) 
In addition to the general issues relating to reinsurance provided by IAIS, the IAIS 
Technical Committee, the parent committee of Solvency Sub-Committee, focused on 
the specific supervisory standards on solvency of primary insurers and issued the 
paper to discuss the general principles on capital adequacy and solvency as laid down 
by insurance supervisory principles' 55 . 
Although this paper focused on the solvency requirements for primary 
insurers, it indeed raises several essential issues concerning reinsurance. First, it 
categorizes the financial impact arising from reinsurance arrangements, in terms of 
kinds of risk. One is that the reinsurance might prove insufficient to adequately cover 
the risk. The other is that a reinsurer might prove to be unable or unwilling to pay the 
claims. To prevent the risks stated above, it proposed that the directors of the insurers 
should assess properly the needs for reinsurance and the reinsurer's security or 
creditworthiness. Furthermore, it described some solvency practices in several 
countries. 
C. Summary Observations: Weaknesses in the Reinsurance 
Subcommittee's Issues Paper 
While the trends of liberalization of reinsurance and harmonization of insurance 
regulation have made a significant impact on emerging markets, the essential issues 
identified by the Reinsurance Subcommittee have provided a good foundation for 
further discussion and recommended a possible regulatory structure for those 
countries where the regulation of reinsurance needs to be enhanced. 
As the recommendation made by the Reinsurance Subcommittee establish a 
possible model for future reinsurance regulation, it is obviously important for 
countries to consider the potential difficulties when implementing a new regulatory 
154 The following commercial rating agencies provided in this paper have given their emphasis on 
reinsurers and insurers. A. M. Best Company; Standard & Poor's Corporation; and Duff & Phelps 
Credit Rating Corp. See id. at 51-52. 
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approach. 
First, while mutual recognition is recommended by the Insurance 
Subcommittee, the regulatory arbitrage should be considered. It has been stated that 
44 mutual recognition may result in the regulation at the level of the lowest 
1,156 denominator 
. For those countries with highly developed regulatory regime, a 
single license system may increase the competitive advantage for those reinsurers 
who are subject to less restrictive regulation. Second, the importance of reliable 
assessment standards is well recognized in mutual assessment. It has been argued that 
this paper failed to consider the obstacles of spelling out the standards 157 . To establish 
recognized and harmonized rules is difficult particularly in view of the varying 
solvency regulatory regimes in countries throughout the world. As a result, it has been 
suggested that "it is not until the International Accounting Standards Committee 
finalize its work for insurance and key financial centers have endorsed the standards 
and begun implementation of them that transparency in accounting and reporting 
standards can be achieved and discussions concerning mutual recognition made more 
meaningful. 158, ' Third, this paper placed emphasis on the assessment of the security of 
reinsurance rather than providing possible regulatory approaches to ensure the 
security of reinsurance. Based on the arguments discussed above' 59 ,a possible 
regulatory approach should take into account solvency regulation. The reduction of 
the amount of technical provisions or required solvency margin will not be allowed 
unless the creditworthiness of reinsurance has been ensured in reasonable costs. 
Fourth, while the needs of definite and uniform procedures have been addressed in 
this paper, the importance of an effective insolvency regime should be considered to 
reduce adverse effects in the event of the insolvency of a reinsurer. As a result of the 
increase in international reinsurance transactions, an effective insolvency regime' 60 
155 MIS Sub-Committee, , supra note 29, at 4. 156 Debra J. Hall, supra note 27, at 11. 
157 Id. at 13. 
158 Id. at 14. 
159 See Section 11, D Summary Observations of this chapter. 
160 With regard to international insolvency process, the following principles can provide the theoretical 
basis for discussion. Unity means that there are proceedings exclusively in the country of incorporation 
or at the place of business of the debtor. Plurality or multiplicity means that the possible exists to open 
more than one insolvency in order to liquidate or rescue a debtor's estate. Universality means that the 
proceedings relating to a company's insolvency will have worldwide extraterritorial effects. In contrast, 
territoriality means that the proceedings have a purely territorial, national scope. Nichi Kayser, A Study 
of the European Coni, ention on Insolvency Proceeds, 7 INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY REVIEW 
101 (1998). 
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may promote the ceding insurers' confidence to transact with foreign reinsurers and 
reduce unnecessary costs in collecting reinsurance proceeds. Last, while the 
Reinsurance Subcommittee recommended mutual recognition as basis for future 
harmonization of regulation, the cooperation between home country and host country 
is merely based on information exchange. It is suggested that mutual recognition 
should clarify the responsibility of the home country and the host country in a way 
that improves the access of home supervisors information and hence ensure that cross- 
161 border reinsurance operations are subject to effective supervision 
IV. Concluding Remarks: Implications for Reinsurance Regulation 
and Supervision in Emerging Markets 
A coherent and comprehensive system of regulation of reinsurance with proper 
implementation is essential to maintain the stability of insurance market when 
reinsurance provides external capacity for the ceding insurers to expand their 
business. As the insurance regulators and ceding insurers struggle to ensure the 
critical balance between efficiency of reinsurance and security of reinsurance, the 
framework of regulation of reinsurance should be properly structured and take into 
161 In comparison with other financial regulations concerning cross-border operations, the Basle 
Committee and the Offshore Group of Banking Supervision has issued twenty-nine recommendations, 
as a supplement to the Minimum Standards, under the title of "The Supervision of Cross-Border 
Banking". In relation to cross-border operations, it should ensure that "all cross-border banking 
operations are subject to effective home and host supervision. " For the host countries, it should 
"(1) Assist in providing the requisite information to home supervisors if this is not provided through 
other supervisory means; (2) Use its best endeavours to have its legislation, which prevents the access 
of home supervisors to depositor information, reviewed and, if necessary, amended; (3) Respond freely 
to any questions posed by a home supervisor on qualitative information and to inform the home 
supervisor if any area of concern comes to its notice; (4) Assist the home country to conduct on-site 
examination or undertake on-site examination on behalf of the home supervisor; (5) Ensure there is 
effective supervision of shell branches; (6) Ensure that operations of parallel-owned banks become 
subject to consolidated supervision; (7) Be extremely cautious about approving the establishment of 
cross-border operations by banks incorporated in under-regulated financial centers. " For the home 
country, it should "(1) Expect parent banks to pass quantitative and qualitative information on to it 
freely and verify accuracy of this information and reassure itself that there are no supervisory gaps; (2) 
Conduct on-site examination; (3) Pass the information on series criminal violation of home country law 
immediately to the appropriate law enforcement authorities in its home country and inform the host 
supervisor of the action it intends to take; (4) Inform the host supervisor immediately if it has reason to 
suspect the integrity of the local operation, the quality of its management or the quality of internal 
controls being exercised by the parent bank; (5) Have on its regular mailing list for relevant material all 
foreign supervisors which act as hosts to its banks; (6) Inform host supervisors of material adverse 
changes in the global condition of banking groups operating in their jurisdictions; (7) Ultimate 
responsibility to assure that any gaps in supervising shell branches are closed; (8) Ensure that 
operations of parallel-owed banks become subject to consolidated supervision; (9) Monitor operations 
of a banking entity on a worldwide basis and ensure that no entity should be allowed to use the word 
"bank" in its name if it is not conducting banking activities and being supervised by a bank". BASLE 
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account market characteristics and the legal system. While the shortage of reinsurance 
is the main issue in emerging markets, insurance regulators should consider an 
appropriate regulatory approach that ensure the security/creditworthiness of 
reinsurance and reduce any adverse effects caused by regulation. In this regard, this 
section addressed key aspects of the reinsurance regulation and supervision in 
emerging markets. 
First, all reinsurers should be subject to regulation as primary insurers. 
Although the direct regulation approach, which provides that all reinsurers should be 
authorized in order to carry on reinsurance, may not be appropriate for emerging 
market, foreign reinsurers should be regulated and supervised by the home country 
regulatory system. In other words, foreign reinsurers should be subject to the 
regulation of the country of domicile. Such a regulatory regime should be able to 
ensure the financial solvency of reinsurers and the fitness and propriety of 
management. 
Second, in relation to the regulation concerning the creditworthiness of 
reinsurance, relevant solvency regulation should be able to assess the security of 
reinsurance and to reflect the recoverability of reinsurance. While the collateralisation 
of reinsurance or trust fund requirements can eliminate the regulators' burden and 
ensure the reinsurance collection, the costs associated with collateral arrangements 
may impede the diversification of insurance risk particular in emerging market with 
the shortage of reinsurance. Alternatively, regulators in emerging markets may choose 
less restrictive regulatory approaches (e. g., the Mexican model relying on the rating 
agencies or the spread rules in Australia) to reduce the financial impact on solvency of 
primary insurers. It should be addressed that there is no feasible regulatory approach 
to ensure the security of reinsurance unless the market characteristics, the legal 
system and other social factors has been properly considered. 
Third, in addition to governmental supervision, good corporate governance 
and sound internal control should be introduced and implemented in the process of 
reinsurance arrangements for the primary insurers. Maintaining a stable financial 
market cannot merely rely on the regulators. As the failure of reinsurance may result 
from poor management, good corporate governance is essential to promote the risk 
COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION AND OFFSHORE GROUP OF BANKING 
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management of primary insurers to reduce financial risk. In relation to reinsurance 
arrangements of primary insurers, the relevant criteria concerning the adequacy of 
reinsurance and the recoverability of reinsurance should be structured into the 
framework of internal control. 
As the efforts have been made to reach the harmonization of regulation of 
reinsurance by IAIS, it appears that several obstacles are needed to address further 
issues, such as regulatory arbitrage, varying assessment and an effective insolvency 
regulation. While the mutual recognition approach proposed by IAIS may encounter 
the oppositions from countries where there are highly developed regulatory 
regimes 162 , the supervisory principles and relevant recommendations have contributed 
significant influence and an educational regulatory infrastructure for emerging 
markets in regulatory reform. 
SUPERVISORS, THE SUPERVISION OF CROSS-BORDER BANKING (Oct. 1996). 
162 Debra J. Hall, supra note 27, at 10- 13. 
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Reinsurance Intermediaries and Regulation of Reinsurance 
Reinsurance intermediaries, also known as reinsurance brokers', generally act as 
conduits in arranging reinsurance contracts, administration of these contract, and 
related claims negotiation and collection 2. These intermediaries do not merely engage 
in arranging reinsurance for the ceding insurers but also accept or underwrite 
3 reinsurance business on behalf of the reinsurers . The roles of reinsurance 
intermediaries vary considerably between countries throughout the world. For 
instance, German insurers tend to arrange reinsurance directly with reinsurers, 
whereas in Japan foreign intermediaries on the behalf of domestic insurers engage in 
placing reinsurance with reinsurers and also act as underwriting agents to acquire 
4 inward reinsurance . In the developing countries, the intermediaries may be expected 
to provide their expertise in helping to understand relevant insurance law and 
regulation, and to assist domestic insurers in identifying their exposure. Moreover, 
5 they may be involved in arranging reciprocal exchanges of reinsurance business . 
Although the reinsurance brokers are referred to as "intermediaries", it should be 
noted that the" reinsurance intermediaries has a larger function than merely affecting 
6 
a contract between a reinsured and reinsurer" 
In terms of the reinsurance brokers, the duties of the reinsurance brokers can 
1 It has been observed that "At the present time, particularly in reinsurance treaties, brokers are 
frequently referred to as intermediaries, a name perhaps slightly more elevated than broker. " P. T. 
O'NEILL, & J. W. WOLONEECKI THE LAW OF REINSURANCE IN ENGLAND AND 
BERMUDA 333 (1998). It also has been argued in England that "the term of intermediary, although it 
is commonly used in reinsurance, has no legal definition, and in law a broker is an agent. " BARLOW 
LYDE & GILBERT, REINSURANCE PRACTICE AND THE LAW 2-2 (LLP, Service Issue No. 15, 
1 October 2000). It should be noted, however, that the term of reinsurance intermediary does not 
merely include the reinsurance broker who generally is deemed as the agent of insurers, but also 
include the underwriting agent who acts as the agent of the reinsurers and are known as managing 
general agents (M[GAs) in the United States. As a result, this chapter will not only draw on the 
regulatory issues relating to reinsurance brokers but also will discuss issues relating to reinsurance 
underwriting agents. 
2 See John S. Diaconis, Introductory Comments and Basic Overview of Reinsurance Term, in 
REINSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE: NEW LEGAL AND BUSINESS DEVELOPMENTS IN A 
CHANGING GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 1998, at 25 (Practising Law Institute-Commercial Law and 
Practice Course Handbook Series, PLI Order No. A44548,778 PLI/COM[M[ 7, October 1998). 
3 R. L. CARTER, LEALIE LUCAS, & NIGEL RALPH, REINSURANCE 55 (5th ed., 2000). In some 
cases, the brokers hold binding authority to assess and to assume risk on the behalf of reinsurers. 
4 Id. at 57. 
5 Id. at 56-57. 
6 See P. T. O'NEELL, & J. W. WOLONIECKI, supra note 1, at 333. 
Chapter Three Reinsurance Intermediaries and Regulation of Reinsurance 
be divided into three main parts: the duties to the reinsurers, the duties to the 
reinsured, and the duties to the third party. The reinsurance broker's basic duty arises 
from the contractual relationship between the broker and his principal-reinsured, and 
is in general the same as that of other brokers subject to the general law of agency. 
Legal issues regarding the duty of reinsurance brokers often arises in the following 
contexts: 
(1) Issues regarding the authority of the reinsurance brokers such as sub- 
agent, dual agent, and ostensible authority; (2) Reasonable skill and care in the 
performance of placing reinsurance and selection of reinsurance security; (3) 
Collection of claims and preservation of documents; (4) the duties relating to 
defences -wavier, estoppel, ratification, contributory negligence and concur-rent 
liability in tort; (5) and the duty as an adviser 7. 
In addition to legal duties owed by the reinsurance broker to its principals, 
legal issues often arise from the bankrupcy of the parties involved in the reinsurance 
contracts and the complexity of the accounting custom 8. 
In terms of being an reinsurance intermediary, the reinsurance broker 
generally is an agent on behalf of reinsureds whereas underwriting agents who enter 
into some forms of written agreement addressing the scope of their authority are 
authorised by the reinsurers to evaluate risk and to provide reinsurance cover on the 
reinsurer's behalf9. In this connection, if the reinsurance underwriting agent, also 
known as a managing general agent (MGA), does not accept risk prudently and tries 
to maximise the premium flow in order to earn more commissions, it may endanger 
the financial stability of reinsurers and hence their other ceding insurers. 
In this Chapter, special emphasis will be given to the collection of the insurer's 
monies and reinsurance premiums, and to the selection of reinsurers. Several 
significant cases of insolvent insurers have involved extensive participation by 
"reinsurance intermediaries working on commissions, and they have been the chief 
' See generally P. T. ONEELL, &IW. WOLONEECKI, supra note 1, at 333-410. See also Stephen 
W. Schwab, Peter G. Gallanis, David E. Mendelsohn, Bradley V Ritter, Caught between Rocks and 
Hard Places: The Plight of Reinsurance Intermediaries Under U. S. and English Law, 16 MICHIGAN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 485 (Winter 1995); MICHAEL W. ELLIOTT, BERNARD 
L. WEBB, HOWARD N. ANDERSON, & PERTER R. KENSICKI, PRINCIPLES OF 
REINSURANCE Volume I (July 1995). 
8 The issues relating to accounting treatment of reinsurance mtermediary will be discussed below. 
9 See P. T. O'NEILL, & J. W. WOLONIECKI, supra note 1, at 333. Stephen W. Schwab, Peter G. 
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conduit for transferring policyholder funds to unsound and unscrupulous destinations 
9,10 around the globe . Furthermore, the use of MGAs by reinsurers to underwrite and to 
accept risk on their behalf has been proved to be exceedingly dangerous and result in 
11 a financial insolvency crisis of US insurers in the 1980s 
From the viewpoint of the regulation of reinsurance, it has been observed that 
"the regulation of reinsurance intermediaries, both in the United States and abroad, is 
regarded as essential to the preservation of insurance company solvency and the 
12ý9 
protection of a failed insurer's creditors . 
In the emerging markets, due to the lack 
of adequate knowledge and information, insurers rely on reinsurance intermediaries 
heavily to arrange reinsurance cover and retrocession. This increases the potential risk 
of financial failure of insurers in these emerging markets. However, a companion 
dilemma faced by regulators in these countries is that the overly regulation regarding 
reinsurance intermediaries may potentially impede the liberalisation of the domestic 
reinsurance business and the diversification of domestic risk. How to apply the 
developed regulatory models and to take into account particular legal and economic 
environment is one of the main issues to be addressed in this Chapter. 
In terms of reinsurance intermediary regulation, non-common law-based 
emerging markets may find it difficult to adopt basic common law concepts that 
underpin the legal aspects of such intermediaries into the existing civil law system, 
particularly in the field of general law of agency and the concept of self-regulatory 
Gallanis, David E. Mendelsohn, Bradley V Ritter, supra note 7. 
10 Staff of Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Common on Energy and Commerce, 
Cong., 2d Sess., Wishful Thinking: A World View of Insurance Solvency Regulation (Comm. Print 
1994), p. 14., cited by Id. at 490. 
11 The report submitted by a Committee of the United States House of Representatives states that 
"Mission had two subsidiaries... that acted as MGAs on behalf of Mission and its reinsurance pool 
members. Integrity and Transit used a nationwide system of independent MGAs to write direct 
business and arrange reinsurance on their behalf. Underpricing and minimal or poor underwriting by 
their MGAs were leading contributors to the failure of all three companies. Mission, Integrity and 
Transit were fronts used by their MGAs to write business that was intended to be passed almost 100 per 
cent to reinsurers... insurance policies can only be legally written in the name of licensed insurance 
companies,.. - At least one 
MGA even created his own private offshore reinsurance companies to 
capture the bulk of the premiums on the business he wrote for Transit, in addition to receiving 
commissions for originating and reinsuring the same business. Insurance companies that basically rent 
their name in a fronting agreement earn a fee, but they risk financial disaster if the reinsurers arranged 
by the MGAs refuse, or are unable, to pay their share of claims. In that situation, the fronting insurance 
company with its name on the policies is required to pay 100 per cent of the claims. That is exactly 
what happened to Mission, Integrity and Transit, and that was the immediate cause of their 
insolvencies. ", in Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Common on Energy and 
Commerce, 101 ST CONG., Failed Promises: Insurance Companies Insolvencies (Comm. Print 1990), 
at 11, cited by P. T. O'NEELL, & J. W. WOLONIECKI, supra note 1, at 412. 
12 Stephen W. Schwab, Peter G. Gallanis, David E. Mendelsohn, Bradley V Ritter, supra note 7, at 487. 
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organisations delegated by the government. 
This Chapter considers the theme of this volume concerning reinsurance 
intermediaries and their influence on financial solvency and stability of insurers from 
a comparative analysis of the leading regulation models, so as to establish the 
appropriate regulatory infrastructure that might best be applied in developing 
countries such as Taiwan. Section I and 2 discusses the general duties of reinsurance 
intermediaries and addresses the core of regulation of reinsurance intermediaries as 
well as the relevant regulatory issues. Section 3 then considers several experienced 
leading regulatory models that provide a more reliable regulatory infrastructure. In 
conclusion, the author will suggest a possible regulatory infrastructure necessary to 
maintain financial stability in the emerging insurance/reinsurance market. 
1. Reinsurance Intermediaries and Financial Stability of Insurers and 
Reinsurers 
With regard to business practices in the reinsurance market, it has been summarised 
that the reinsurance broker's functions are to 
64 advise the reinsured as to a suitable reinsurance programme and ways of 
improving its current programme, to obtain suitable reinsurers for a long term 
relationship on the best terms, to negotiate the terms of the reinsurance and to prepare 
the contract wording, or to ensure that any wording prepared by the reinsurers 
conforms to the agreed terms, to arrange the collection of claims and payment of 
premiums, to prepare any records or documentation for use by the reinsured for his 
accounting requirements or for renewal, and to assist the reinsured generally by using 
his relationship between the parties to fulfill their agreement to their mutual 
advantage. 1 391 In this section, the legal duties owed by the reinsurance intermediaries 
to their principals will be addressed. It is followed by the analysis and discussions of 
the reinsurance intermediary's activities affecting the financial condition of the 
primary insurers and reinsurers. 
The legal duties owed by the reinsurance intermediaries to their principals 
generally depend on applicable agency, tort, insurance, and insolvency law 14 and on 
13 See CHRISTOPHER HENLEY, THE LAW OF INSURANCE BROKING 245 (Longman, London, 
1990). 
14 The duty of reinsurance intermediary will also be affected by the equity law in the common law 
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the contracts between intermediaries and their principals. What follows is an attempt 
to analyze the general legal duties of reinsurance intermediaries as well as the 
customary practices in the international reinsurance markets. In addition to legal 
duties owed by the reinsurance intermediary to their principals, the legal disputes 
relating to reinsurance intermediaries will also be addressed. 
A. To Exercise A Reasonable Skill and Care in Transacting Reinsurance 
Business 
With respect to a reinsurance intermediary's contractual duty to its principals, it is 
generally agreed that the main contractual duty owed by a reinsurance intermediary is 
to exercise "reasonable skill and care" in transacting the reinsurance business. 
However, legal issues often arise from the difficulty in defining what constitutes 
64; reasonable skill and care" in transacting such business. 
The intermediaries should exercise "reasonable skill and care" on the 
placement of reinsurance covers for their principals and on the assessment of 
accepting risk. The brokers who act as agents of the ceding insurers usually are 
instructed to obtain available reinsurance coverage for the same risk as the original 
insurance. If the brokers fail to follow the reinsured's instruction to obtain suitable 
cover, the broker may be liable for any loss by reason of its failure to observe a degree 
of reasonable skill and diligence' 5. On the other hand, the underwriting agents should 
exercise reasonable skill and diligence in accepting insurance risk for the reinsurers. 
For determination of what constitutes "reasonable skill and diligence", market 
practices and particular circumstances in each case needs to be taken into account. 
In addition, the reinsurance intermediary is under a duty to select a financially 
solvent reinsurer and to assess the insurance risk that reinsurer intends to assume. In 
connection with a reinsurance broker, it should carry out a reasonable investigation 
and analysis into the financial creditworthiness of the reinsurers. Although the broker 
should not or be liable for every insolvent reinsurers, the broker is under a contractual 
duty to exercise reasonable skill and care in the selection of reinsurers (i. e., financial 
viability and the creditworthiness of reinsurers). What constitutes reasonable skill and 
system. P. T. O'NEILL, & J. W. WOLONIECKI, supra note 1, at 333. 
15 The issue of the contractual duties of a reinsurance broker to effect a valid reinsurance was discussed 
in National Insurance & Guarantee Corporation plc v. Imperio Reinsurance Co. (UK) Ltd. and Russell 
Tudor-Price & Co. Ltd. [ 1999] Lloyd's Rep IR 249 (QB Com Ct). 
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care in the selection of reinsurance was considered in the US case of Cherokee Ins. 
Co. v. E. W. Blanch Co. 16 . Here, the court held that the broker followed the customary 
practice in the industry and, accordingly carried out reasonable skill and care. With 
regard to the customary industry standard, the court found that the brokers should 
assess the following factors to meet the industry customary standards. (1) its rating by 
A. M. Best Company; (2) the size of the reinsurer, as measured by its policyholder 
surplus; (3) Insurance Regulatory Information System ratios tested by the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners; (4) the reinsurer's annual reports; and (5) 
the reinsurer's reputation in the industry 17 . In other words, what constitutes reasonable 
skill and care in the selection of reinsurers mainly depends on customary practice 
unless it has been regulated by specific regulations. 
In addition, the broker should exercise reasonable skill and care before the 
placement of reinsurance covers and remains under a continuing duty to monitor the 
18 
reinsurer's solvency if the broker has accepted such a responsibility 
On the other hand, the underwriting agent is to exercise reasonable skill and 
care in assessing the assumed risk and in analyzing the potential financial impact on 
the reinsurer's behalf. If the underwriting agent intends to extend its own profit 
without considering and assessing the insurance risk prudentially, it may be liable for 
any loss suffered by the reinsurers. A recent case19 in the US illustrates that the 
underwriting agent may be liable for the damages arising from its negligence in the 
acceptance of insurance risk. As a result of negligence in the acceptance of insurance 
risks without adequate investigation and assessment of the cedent's underwriting, 
reporting and claims practices, the court found that the management general agent and 
its chief executive was liable for the losses suffered by the reinsurers. 
16 It should be noted that conformity with customary practices is not necessarily conclusive evidence of 
reasonable care. If the precautions of the brokers are so imperative that customary practices might not 
be used as to excuse their omission. See Cherokee Ins. Co. v. EM Blanch Co., 66 F. 3d 117 (6 th Cir. 
1995), cert. Denied, 116 S. Ct- 1545 (1996). Cited by Joseph Schiavone, Recent Issues In US 
Reinsurance Law, Current Issues in Reinsurance Contracts, held by Hawksmere, at 15 (25 November 
1999, the Brewery, London). 
17 Cherokee Ins. Co. v. E. W Blanch Co., 66 F. 3d 117 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. Denied, 116 S. Ct. 1545 
(1996), p. 120. 
18 The broker may be liable to his principal for breach of contractual duty to monitor the solvency of 
the reinsurer if he has accepted such a responsibility. See Beck Helicopters Ltd., v. Edward Lumley & 
Sons [1964] A. C. 465. 
19 See Omaha Indem. Co. v Royal Am. Mgrs. (1991, WD Mo) Docket No. 86- 0422-CV-W-9,2 
Mealey's Reins Rep No. 11, B (re. ), cited by GRAYDON S. STARING, LAW OF REINSURANCE § 
7: 5 (1993). 
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B. Avoidance of Conflict of Interests and Dual Agent 
Due to the complexity of practices in the industry, reinsurance inten-nedianes may act 
simultaneously for a reinsured and reinsurer. For example, it was common at Lloyd's 
that the brokers act as the agents of the underwriter for the purpose of investigating 
claims while they have been instructed by a reinsured to collect claiMS20 . 
As a result, 
the reinsurance intermediaries might encounter difficulties arising from a conflict of 
21 interest between a reinsurer and a ceding insurer 
With regard to general principles of the law of agency, an agent should not act 
as both parties at the same time without the informed consent of both parties. Without 
giving full disclosure of the material facts, the brokers would be in breach of their 
duty to their principals and liable for damage or loss suffered as a consequence of his 
breach 22 
. Therefore, a reinsurance intermediary should make full disclosure of all 
material facts to both principals to avoid any potential conflict of interests. 
C. Retention of Documents by Reinsurance Intermediary and Collection 
of Claims 
In addition to a contractual duty to exercise reasonable skill and care in the placement 
of risk and selection of reinsurance security, the reinsurance intermediary is under a 
duty to retain adequate documents for the ceding insurers particularly in the case of 
collection of claims. For example, it was found essential to retain the relevant policies 
and details of the reinsurers when the reinsured wants to submit to their reinsurers 
asbestos -related claims covered by reinsurance policies 
23 
. Consequently, the question 
that arises in the relevant cases is whether the broker should be liable for the loss 
suffered by the ceding insurers as a result of its inability to collect any claims from its 
reinsurers 24 . It is well established that a 
broker is under a duty to exercise reasonable 
20 However, it should be noted that this practice has been disapproved. See Anglo-Aftican Merchants 
Ltd iý Baryley [ 1970] 1 Q. B. 311., cited by P. T. O'NEILL, & J. W. WOLONEECKI, supra note 1, at 
379. 
21 It has been observed that the dual agency may arise when a reinsurance intermediary arranges both a 
reinsurance and a retrocession placement for the same risk. MICHAEL W. ELLIOTT, BERNARD L. 
WEBB, HOWARD N. ANDERSON, & PERTER R. KENSICKI, supra note 7, at 74. It should be 
noted, however, that a broker merely acts as an agent of a reinsurer for a retrocession based on another 
contract. It is doubtful that there is conflict of interest under this circumstance. See P. T. O'NEILL, & 
J. W. WOLONIECKI, supra note 1, at 343. 
'2 BARLOW LYDE & GILBERT, supra note 1,2-4 (LLP, Service Issue No. 15-1 October 2000). See 
also North and South Trust Co. v Berkeley [1971] 1 W. L. R. 470. 
23 See Johnston v. Leslie & Godwin [1995] L. R. L. R. 472. 
2' BARLOW LYDE & GILBER, supra note 1, at 2-22 (LLP, Service Issue No. 4-1 May 1995). 
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skill and care to retain documents for a reasonable period of time 25 . Due to the lack of 
specific laws or regulatory controls in most countries, however, it is difficult precisely 
to define what constitutes "a reasonable period of time" and "reasonable skill and care 
to retain relevant documents 
The legal issue concerning retention of documents has been examined under 
the English case law. In Johnston v. Leslie & Godwin 26 , the plaintiffs (Lloyd's 
Syndicate 964) claimed damages because the defendants (the syndicate's reinsurance 
brokers) were unable to locate any documents listing the names of the 
retrocessionaries. Clarke J held that a broker's duty includes the duty "to exercise all 
reasonable care and skill in collecting claims when asked to do So,, 27. In order to 
collect claims from reinsurers, a broker has a duty to take care of relevant documents 
and to ascertain the names of restrocessionaires. Failing to retain sufficient records 
from which to identify the retrocessionaires, the broker was in breach of his 
contractual duty to the reinsureds and consequently may be liable for the loss arising 
from an inability to collect claims from reinsurers. Although this decision has stated 
the broker's duty to retain the relevant documents, it is ambiguous to state precisely 
what constitutes reasonable skill and care in the retention of documents. 
D. Transmission and Maintenance of Reinsurance Premium and Claims 
A reinsurance intermediary is under a general contractual duty to remit and to 
maintain the funds from reinsurance premiums and reinsurance payments on behalf of 
its principal. Due to the complexity of customary practices and the accounting tasks 
involved, many legal disputes consequently arise. Before defining this duty of a 
reinsurance intermediary, the question that should first be determined is whose agent 
is the intermediary when the intermediary holds monies (premiums or claiMS)28. If an 
intermediary holds monies and then becomes insolvent, the principal entitled to these 
payments will be liable for the credit risk of its intermediary. 
1. Reinsurance premium and the legal duty of reinsurance intermediary 
With regard to reinsurance premiums, the reinsurance intermediary is under a 
contractual duty to transmit these to the reinsurer or otherwise to maintain these 
25 Id. at 2-23. 
26 Johnston v. Leslie & Godwin [1995] L. R. L. R. 472 
27 Johnston v. Leslie & Godwin [1995] L. R. L. R. 472, p. 477. 
28 P. T. O'NEELL, & J. W. WOLONEECKI, supra note 1, at 462. 
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premiums for the benefit of the reinsurer. Under agency law principles 29 ,a 
reinsurance broker acting as the agent of a ceding insurer is under a duty to transmit 
the premiums on the ceding insurer's behalf. As a result, when a broker that have 
received premiums and then become insolvent before transmitting them, the payment 
made by the ceding insurer is not considered as having been paid to the reinsurer 
absent any other express or implied agreements or customary practices to the contrary. 
In other words, the ceding insurer assumes the credit risk of a failure of a reinsurance 
broker. 
It should be noted, however that the customary practice in certain markets is 
different from the general law of agency mentioned above. At Lloyd's in London, the 
broker is personally liable to pay premium to a Lloyd's underwriter: any premium 
paid to the broker is considered as pren-Lium paid to the underwriter 30 . In addition to 
the customary practice at Lloyd's, this same custom in the marine insurance market is 
codified in section 53(l) of the UK Marine Insurance Act 1906 (MIA 1906): 
" Unless otherwise agreed, where a marine policy is effected on behalf of the 
assured by a broker, the broker is directly responsible to the insurer for the premium, 
and the insurer is directly responsible to the assured for the amount which may be 
payable in respect of losses, or in respect of returnable premium. " 
Without an express or implied agreement stating the obligation of the broker, 
the section 53(l) of the MIA 1906 can be applied to the marine insurance and related 
reinsurance outside the Lloyd's syndicates. Although several attempts have been 
taken by litigants to extend this customary practice to non-marine reinsurance 
contracts outside the Lloyd's network 31 , it is still unclear whether this section can 
be 
applied to all reinsurance contract in the London market 32 . 
In relation to underwriting agents acting on a reinsurers behalf, an 
underwriting agent holds the reinsurance premium as a debtor of his principal rather 
than holding in the trust for the insured. The same agency law principles applies to the 
29 See In re Pritchard & Baird, Inc 8 B. R. 265 (D. N. J. 1980) aff'd, 673 E 2d 1301 (3d Cir. 1981. ) See 
also BARLOW LYDE & GILBER, supra note 1, at 2-20 (LLP, Service Issue No. 6,4 June 1996). 
30 See generally Edgar i,. Fowler (1803) 3 East. 222; Edgar v. Bumstead (1808) 1 Camp. 411; Power V. 
Butcher (1892) 10 B&C 329 at 347. Cited by P. T. UNEELL, & J. W. WOLONEECKI, supra note 1, 
at 462. 
31 Wilson v. Avec Audio-Visual Equip. Ltd, [1974] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 81. Cited by Stephen W. Schwab, 
Peter G. Gallanis, David E. Mendelsohn, Bradley V Ritter, supra note 7, at 498. 
32 It has been stated that the section 53 (1) of the MIA 1906 applies to facultative but not treaty marine 
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underwriting agents. As a result, an underwriting agent is personally liable to receive 
all premiums due to the principal in reinsurance business unless an express provision 
is contained in the agency agreements. 
2. Transmission and maintenance of reinsurance claims 
In terms of reinsurance claim monies, the broker, who generally acts as the agent of 
reinsured in this situation, is personally liable to transfer the claims to his principal. In 
other words, the payment of claims paid to the brokers is considered as having been 
paid to the reinsured. In this connection, the reinsured may assume the credit risk of 
the broker when the broker receives the claims from the reinsurers and then the 
reinsured fails to instruct the broker to collect the money and to hold these in a trust. 
With regard to the underwriting agent, the claim paid to the underwriting agent 
is not considered as having being paid to the reinsured. As a result, the reinsurers 
assume the credit risk of the agent. 
Where reinsurance intermediary holds large amounts of claims, the potential 
risk will arise if the intermediary does not exercise "reasonable care" to invest or to 
operate prudentially. This issue will be addressed in the following section. 
11. Regulatory Issues Arising From Reinsurance Intermediary and 
Financial Solvency of Primary Insurers and Reinsurers 
After looking at the general legal duties of reinsurance intermediaries and their impact 
on the financial solvency of the primary insurers, possible regulatory approaches and 
the relevant, related regulatory issues will be addressed in this section. 
As to general legal duties, the duty of care on the placement of reinsurance 
cover or on underwriting of risk owed by the reinsurance intermediaries to their 
principals, as well as the matter of market conduct control, will be discussed. Due to 
the complexity of reinsurance markets, the competence, integrity and experience of 
the reinsurance intermediary might be a contributing cause of an intermediary's 
failure. As a result, the licensing process should contain relevant criteria in 
considering application for registration or establishment of a reinsurance intermediary. 
Furthermore, as an intermediary might maintain the funds from the 
reinsurance premiums and claims, the solvency of the intermediary becomes a factor 
reinsurance. P. T. O'NEILL, & J. W. WOLONIIECKI, supra note 1, at 463. 
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when evaluating potential risks respecting the solvency of insurer and reinsurer. 
Therefore, the financial requirement relating to the accounting treatment of and the 
solvency of the reinsurance intermediary should be applied as a safeguard of solvency 
of a reinsurer and primary insurer who transact business with an intermediary. In 
addition to these financial requirements, possible role of compulsory liability 
insurance, which might be used to cover the intermediary's losses arising from the 
claims for the breach of duty in connection with the business by reason of any 
negligent act, error or omission, will be discussed. 
A. Duty of Care on the Placement of Reinsurance Cover or Acceptance of 
Risk for Their Principals 
It is generally agreed that reinsurance intermediaries should exercise "reasonable skill 
and care" in the performance of their function 33 on behalf of reinsurers or reinsured. 
In terms of reasonable skill and care, the general duty of a reinsurance broker is to 
obtain the available reinsurance coverage required by the reinsured within a 
64 reasonable time"'. 
However, legal disputes often arise in cases where a reinsurance broker fails to 
complete the coverage required by the reinsured. In addition to placing the cover to 
meet the coverage required by the reinsured, the reinsurance broker may have 
exposed himself to a claim for negligence for failing to select a solvent reinsurer. 
Although "it is a fundamental principle of the broking industry that brokers do not 
guarantee the performance of the reinsurers with which they place their client's 
business, 34,1 brokers should be careful to carry out reasonable investigation and 
analysis to satisfy the legal test of the "reasonably diligent broker". 
In the case of underwriting agents, they also should exercise "reasonable skill 
and care" in assessing and underwriting the insurance risk on the reinsurer's behalf. If 
an underwriting agent does not accept risk prudentially and tries to maximise its profit 
33 Eagle Star Insurance Company Ltd v. National Westminster Finance Australia Ltd. (1985) 58 A. L. 
R. p. 174. Challendar v. Oerlichs (1838) 5 Bing. N. C. 58., cited by P. T. O'NEELL, & J. W. 
WOLONIECKI, supra note 1, at 333. See also Commonwealth Insurance Company v. Thomas A. 
Greene & Co., 709 F. Supp. 86,87 (S. D. N. Y. ); Insurance Co. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Mead Reinsurance 
Corp., No. 88 CIV 8779 (PKL), 1994 WL 605987, at 9 (S. D. N. Y. Nov. 4,1994); Insurance Co. of 
th Ireland, 1994 WL 605987, at 10; Cherokee ins. Co. v. E. W. Blanch Co., 66 F. 3d 117 (6 Cir. 1995); 
Master Plumbers Ltd. Mutual Liab. Co. v. Cormany & Bird, Inc., 255 NW. 2d 533 (Wis. 1977)., cited 
by Paul M. Hummer, Reinsurance Intermeidaries: When are They Liable and to Whom, Mealey's 
Litigation Reports: Reinsurance 20,7 No. 10, (1996). 
34 BARLOW LYDE & GILBER, supra note 1, at 2-12 (LLP, Service Issue No. 15,1 October 2000). 
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earned from the commission, it might inevitably cause the insolvency of reinsurers or 
insurers in a case of a retrocession. It is evident that the financial solvency of 
reinsurers is endangered where the reinsurers were only dependent on an underwriting 
agent to determine the quality and amount of business accepted by the reinsurers, 
particularly in the case of a reinsurance P00135. 
Although the legal duties and the obligations of reinsurance intermediaries are 
determined by relevant law and decisions made by the courts, historical evident shows 
that the potential risk of the transactions handled by these intermediaries can not be 
36 
prevented unless appropriate regulatory control has been established and enacted . 
Therefore, it is important to develop a viable regulatory method to regulate the market 
conduct of reinsurance intermediaries. 
In the UK, it is unclear as to what constitutes "due diligence" in the selection 
of reinsurers although the broker is under a duty to exercise reasonable skill and care 
37 in assessing the creditworthiness of reinsurers . It has been suggested that 
"the 
38 
market practice will probably serve as a guide to a court called upon to decide" . 
With regard to regulatory control, the market conduct of a reinsurance intermediary in 
the UK are subject to principles and Code of Conduct provided by the self-regulation 
organisations such as Insurance Brokers Registration Council (IBRC) which has been 
replaced under the new UK Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 by the General 
Insurance Standards Council (GISQ. Although the Insurance Brokers (Registration) 
Act 1977 was repealed on 30th April 2001, the Code of Conduct provided by the 
IBRC is worth noting. 
In terms of the "reasonable skill and care" standard in the selection of insurers 
(reinsurer), the relevant Code of Conduct (which has been replaced by GISC Rules) 
provides: 
"If insurance brokers recommend to a client, or are requested by such a client, 
to place his insurance with an insurer who is not authorised or permitted to carry on or 
35 See generally Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Common on Energy and 
Commerce, 101 ST CONG., Failed Promises: Insurance Companies Insolvencies (Comm. Print 1990), 
at 10. 
36 See below section III A. United States and NAIC Regulation of Reinsurance Intermediary Model 
Act. 
37 See Hurrell v. Bullard (1863) 3 F-& F. 445. Cited by P. T. O'NEILL, & J. W. WOLONIECKI, 
supra note 1, at 391. 38 Id. at 391. 
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provide insurance of the relevant class in the UK, great care must be taken to ensure 
that at the time of recommendation or the request, the client appreciates the possible 
risks involved and such should be put in writing to the clients If the insurance broker 
reasonably believes it would be appropriate having regard to the client's experience of 
,, 39 insurance. 
However, this Code of Conduct only provides relevant principles regarding the 
selection of reinsurers when insurance brokers request their clients to place their 
reinsurance with an unauthorised reinsurer. In addition, it is still ambiguous as in 
defining what constitutes "reasonable skill and care" in the selection of reinsurers and 
insurers. 
B. Competence of Reinsurance Intermediary- Fit and Proper Principles 
In addition to the duty of care, a reinsurance intermediary must maintain a thorough 
knowledge of markets 40 when he places the reinsurance cover, negotiates the 
reinsurance agreement, transmits the funds and communicates between the parties. 
As a result of the necessity to ensure the fitness and propriety of management, 
the licensing or registration process should contain relevant criteria in considering 
application for registration or establishment of a reinsurance intermediary. These 
criteria should take into account the competence, practical experience and suitability 
of the applicant as the reinsurance intermediaries. For instance, the UK EBRC will 
consider the qualification 41 of the applicants. The IBRC also approved a list of 
educational institutions where the applicants can be educated and become as qualified 
brokerS42 . The appropriate character and the suitability quality of the 
key staffs also 
will be taken into account in the registration process 43 - In effect, there are one set 
criteria to be evaluated in a responsible discretionary setting. 
C. Transmission and Maintenance of Funds relating to Premium and 
Claims-Insurance Money Separation and Accounting 
Historical evidence shows that reinsurance intermediary could generate credit risk in 
39 Insurance Brokers Registration Council (Code of Conduct) Approval Order 1994 (SI 1994/2569), 
Regulation 2,1, (13). 
40 See CHRISTOPHER HENLEY, supra note 13, at 245. 
41 Section 3(l) of Insurance Brokers (Registration) Act 1977 (1977 c 46), INSURANCE LAW 
HANDBOOK 897 (Michael Browned., Butterworths, 2000). 
42 Section 6 (1) of Insurance Brokers (Registration) Act 1977 (1977 c 46). Id. at 897. 
43 Section 4 of Insurance Brokers (Registration) Act 1977 (1977 c 46). Id. at 898. z: 1 
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cases where the funds received from reinsurers and insurers are not prudentially 
managed 44 . In order to reduce adverse financial impact respecting the solvency of 
insurers and reinsurers, several regulatory approaches have been undertaken by 
developed countries. In general, the monies received from premiums and reinsurance 
claims are segregated from the general accounts of the reinsurance intermediary. In 
addition, the management of these accounts is limited to specific purposes in 
connection with the operation of the relevant insurance business. 
In the UK, the financial requirement issued by the GIS C45 provide that the 
reinsurance broker should open its insurance bank accounts (EBAs) for the specific 
purposes of payments to reinsureds and reinsurers and the operation of the broker's 
insurance business. The Lloyd's brokers are also subject to similar requirementS46 
relating to the IBAs. With regard to the IBAs, the operation of these accounts is 
limited to specified purposes stated in the EBRC rules. In the US, the NAIC 
Reinsurance Intermediary Model Act provides that all funds collected on behalf of the 
insurer must be held by the broker in a fiduciary capacity and must be deposited in a 
qualified US financial institutionS47. 
It should be noted, however, that the financial solvency of the reinsurance 
intermediary still might impose potential credit risk on its principal in cases where it 
holds the monies received from the reinsurers and insurers. Without express 
arrangements and customary practices to the contrary, the reinsurance intermediary 
does not hold the funds regarding premiums and claims as trustee for the ceding 
insurer or the primary insurer. Therefore, under the general law of agency, the ceding 
insurers may be liable for the credit risk of a failed reinsurance broker. By contrary, 
the reinsurers may bear the financial losses ansing from the credit risk of the failure 
of an underwriting agent where it acts as the agent of the reinsurer. 
A Professional Indemnity Insurance and Solvency of Reinsurance 
44 In re Pritchard & Baird, Inc. 8 B. R. 265 (D. N. J. 1980) aff 'd, 673 F. 2d 1301 (3d Cir. 198 1. ) In this 
case, the principal owner of the reinsurance intermediary-Pritchard & Baird withdrew large amounts of 
money estimated as high as $ 40 million from the firm as advances against future earnings As a result 
of inadequate capital, the intermediary was forced into bankruptcy. See MICHAEL W. ELLIOTT, 
BERNARD L. WEBB, HOWARD N. ANDERSON, & PERTER R. KENSICKI, supra note 7, at 78. 
45 Section G. 1, Financial Requirements of General Insurance Standards Council Rules. 
46 Lloyd's Brokers Byelaw No. 5 of 1988. Cited by P. T. O'NEILL, & J. W. WOLONIECKI, supra 
note 1, at 464. 
47 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS (N. A. I. C. ), Reinsurance: 
Reinsurance Intennediary Model Act §4 (C), in NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND 
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Intermediary 
Where the reinsurance intermediary holds the monies from premiums and claims and 
the relationship between the intermediary and the reinsurer or insurer is anything 
other than that of the debtor and creditor 48 , the solvency of the reinsurance 
intermediary is a vital factor that may affect the financial condition of the reinsurer 
and primary insurer. Furthermore, the intermediary may be liable for the losses of its 
principal arising from professional negligence in the placement of reinsurance cover 
or the acceptance of reinsurance risk. Under such a circumstance, the reinsurance 
intermediary should not only maintain its own financial solvency and capital 
adequacy but also hold a certain amount of professional indemnity insurance to meet 
possible losses from investments, operation of its insurance business, and legal 
disputes. 
In the UK, the new self-regulation orgainisation GISC, in June 2000, issued 
the financial requirements 49 to ensure the solvency of the intermediary. The GISC 
considers the possible losses arising from legal liability and requires each member to 
maintain adequacy professional indemnity cover. In addition to professional 
indemnity insurance, the GISC requires each member to maintain its financial 
solvency to meet any foreseeable liabilities. 
E. Fronting and Pool Members 
An underwriting agent acting as the agent of the reinsurer has the authority to assess 
and to accept reinsurance risk on behalf of the reinsurer by way of express agreement. 
In some cases, an underwriting agent who holds binding authority to underwrite 
reinsurance business may act as the agent of several reinsurers, particularly in a pool. 
It is common in the international reinsurance markets that several reinsurers act as a 
pool to accept insurance or reinsurance business. In a pool, the individual members 
are only liable for their respective proportions of the risk. In order to circumvent the 
regulator's authorisation and to facilitate transactions, one of the pool members who 
obtains the authorisation to carry on business can be nominated as the "fronting" 
company and can legally accept reinsurance risk. In this situation, the underwriting 
GUIDELINES VOLN, 790-4 (1999). 
48 See P. T. O'NEILL, & J. W. WOLONEECKI, supra note 1, at 464. 
49 GISC Rules, Section G: Membership Practice Requirements, Practice Requirement GI-Financial 
Requirements, supra note 47, at 1695-1697. 
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agent will be acting as the agent of the fronting companies to accept risk and then as 
the agent of the other members to accept the risk assumed by the fronting company 50 . 
Consequently, legal disputes often arise as to the scope of authority of the 
underwriting agent and as to the legal liability of pool members. 
With regard to legal disputes relating to the authority of the underwriting 
agent, the underwriting agent may nominate one of the pool members as a fronting 
company without the authority of all of the pool members. In an English case, 
Suncorp Insurance & Finance v. Milano Assicurazioni SpA 51 , the underwriting agent 
used Milano as a fronting company for the other pool members. Due to lack of 
express arrangement regarding the delegation of authority to nominate Milano as a 
fronting company, it was argued that the underwriting agent had inherent authority to 
use one or more members as the fronting company. However, Milano, having become 
aware of the fact that its agent had abused their authority, took no step within a 
reasonable time to notify the third parties. As a result, Waller J. concluded that: 
"Milano did adopt and intended to adopt the Suncorp contracts, at least to some 
extent. It thus seems to me on the basis that it is not possible to ratify in part, they 
152 have thus ratified the Suncorp contracts' . In other words, an underwriting agent who 
acts as the agent on behalf of a pool of the reinsurers has no actual authority to use or 
to nominate one or several pool members as the fronting companies without express 
provision in the underwriting agreement. 
As to legal liability of pool members, the pool members are only liable for 
their respective proportions of accepted risk. Furthermore, privity of contract only 
exists between the reinsured and the fronting reinsurer. As a result, it is obvious that 
the financial solvency of the fronting company will be vulnerable to the insolvency of 
pool members. Legal disputes may arise where the fronting company is exposed 
financially in the event of uncollectible claims from other pool members 53 . In some 
50 See P. T. O'NEILL, & J. W. WOLONIECKI, supra note 1, at 435. 
51 Suncorp Insurance & Finance v. Milano Assicurazioni SpA [199312 Lloyd's Rep 225. 
52 Suncorp Insurance & Finance v. Milano Assicurazioni SpA [ 199312 Lloyd's Rep 225, at 24 1. 
53 See Sedgwick Tomenson Inc. v. PT Reasuransi Unium Indonesia [199012 Lloyd's Rep. 334. In this 
case, Evans J. observed that "The usual form of remuneration for the fronting is an overriding 
commission, of , say 1 per cent. 
No one doubts that the name insurer is liable in full to the assured, in 
accordance with his contract and regardless of the reinsurance arrangements, though in the normal 
course he would recover an indemnity depending on the terms agreed with reinsurer. " In other words, 
in the event of insolvency of one of pool members, the fronting company who only earns overriding 
commission is vulnerable to the addition credit risk caused by the pool member. [1990] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 
334, p. 341. 
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cases, the pool members would arrange particular agreements, known as 44cross- 
liability clauses", to provide for the additional liability in the event of the default by 
some of memberS54. 
In terms of reinsurance regulation, a fronting arrangement raises considerable 
concerns from the regulators. Firstly, a fronting arrangement can be used to 
circumvent the insurance regulation to conduct reinsurance business in the case where 
some of the pool members do not obtain formal authorisation. Consequently, the 
primary insurers may have serious difficulty in the collection of reinsurance claims 
and as to the assessment of the appropriateness of the reinsurance. 
Secondly, the solvency of a fronting company may be endangered when the 
pool members are liable for their respective proportion of insurance risk. This has 
caused several insolvency cases where reinsurance pool members were dependent on 
an underwriting agent (managing agent) to determine the quality and the amount of 
55 risk assumed by the pool members . If the fronting company fails to exercise 
appropriate control in the placement of insurance risks and in the collection of claims, 
the financial difficulty of the fronting company consequently may affect the ceding 
insurer. 
In the US, attempts to regulate these controversial arrangements have been 
undertaken by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). In 
1993, the NAIC adopted a Model Law requiring the reporting and prior approval of 
these activities. Due to insurer's opposition and complexities in the reinsurance 
markets 56 , 
however, no state yet has adopted this model law. Alternatively, the NAIC 
adopted, in 1995, a revision to its Schedule F of the Annual Statement to require 
ceding insurers to disclose whether they have reinsurance contracts ceding 75 percent 
57 or more of direct written premiums 
54 See generally P. T. O'NEILL, & J. W. WOLONEECKI, supra note 1, at 437-440. 
55 See generally Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Common on Energy and 
Commerce, 101 ST CONG., Failed Promises: Insurance Companies Insolvencies (Comm. Print 1990), 
at 4-39. 
56 It is difficult to find a common approach to regulate such abuse without increasing considerable 
transaction costs and difficulties as to implement. For instance, one of the main purposes of this 
regulation is to restrict a licensed insurer from fronting for an unlicensed one. However, these measures 
may consequently prevent a licensed reinsurer from reinsuring business from a non-licensed insurer. 
Such a restriction may have a significant impact on the reinsurance market, particularly on the 
professional reinsurers who accept reinsurance risk internationally. See Reinsurance Association of 
America, Fronting, (17 August 2001), at <ht! p: //www. raanet. orWpolicyupdate/frontinlz. html>. 
57 id. 
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111. Leading Regulatory Models and Recent Developments 
In developing a viable regulatory approval for emerging markets, the leading 
regulatory models both in the United States and the United Kingdom are worth 
examining. In this connection, these developed models and the extent to which other 
historical precedents and specific legal issues may be of assistance in setting up a 
viable regulatory model will be noted. 
A. United States and NAIC Regulation of Reinsurance Intermediary 
Model Act 
Insurance companies in the United States had suffered a financial solvency crisis 
during the 1980s. In 1990, a report submitted by the Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Investigations of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, chaired by 
Congressman John D. Dingell, made the following observation on insurer 
insolvencies relating to reinsurance intermediaries: 
"I. The crucial process of selecting dependable reinsurers is left to the 
unfettered discretion of insurance company managers. 
2. No one seems to know where the reinsurance chain goes or whether its links 
are all around. 
3. Managing general agents are delegated many of the basic insurance 
functions including the placement of reinsurance. 
4. Reinsurance pool members are dependent on (a) managing agency to 
determine the quality and amounts of business accepted by (the) reinsurance 
pool. 
5. The slow payment of insurance and reinsurance proceeds threatens the 
fragile chain of financial stability in reinsurance relationships. 
6. A managing general agent's authority is difficult to terminate because the 
contracts typically provide for 90 to 180 days prior notice with the agent 
continuing to write more under-priced business until the end of this notice 
period. 
7. Agents frequently appoint subagent with little or no control by the company. 
8. Reinsurance intermediaries and underwriters often fail to inquire into the 
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combined ownership of the managing general agent (representing the 
primary insurer) and the reinsurer. 589, 
Four years later, the House Subcommittee issued a report entitled "Wishful 
Thinking: A World View of Insurance Solvency Regulation"59 which concluded that 
federal intervention and the implementation of appropriate regulatory systems to 
prevent insolvency is needed. With regard to reinsurance intermediaries, the 
Subcommittee recommended that the regulators should "closely inspect the 
qualifications and activities of independent brokers and agents, especially those 
60 handling reinsurance and surplus line coverage" 
Following the publication of this report, a number of steps were taken by 
several states regulators and the NAIC, with a view to improving the regulatory 
system for preventing another insolvency crisis. Furthermore, the failure of a 
reinsurance intermediary, Pritchard and Baird (P&B) had the effect of requiring the 
regulators to regulate reinsurance intermediaries' activities. 
1. Pritchard & Baird decision and the Intermediary Clause 
The case of In re Pritchard & Baird, Inc., 61 involved a dispute over whether a 
reinsurance intermediary acting as the agent of insurer or reinsurer and the ceding 
companies have claims against assets of the intermediary's estate for the transmitted 
premiums. In this case, the reinsured Hartford Fire Insurance Company and Hartford 
Accident and Casualty Company remitted reinsurance premiums to the Intermediary, 
P&B, for transmittal to the reinsurer. However, the intermediary went bankrupt and 
the premiums were never been transmitted to the reinsurers. On the one hand, if P&B 
were the agent of the reinsurers, the premiums paid by the Hartford would constitute 
payment to the reinsurer. On the other hand, the reinsurer would have a claim against 
the assets of the bankrupt estate for the premiums transmitted to P&B if P&B was the 
agent of the insurer, Hartford. As a result, both sides argued over the scope of 
58 See Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Common on Energy and Commerce, 101 
ST CONG., Failed Promises: Insurance Companies Insolvencies (Comm. Print 1990), at 4-39, cited by 
Debra J. Hall, The Emerging Regulation of Reinsurance Intermediaries, 42 DRAKE LAW REVIEW 
859,861(1993). 
59 Staff of Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Common on Energy and Commerce, 
103d Cong., 2d Sess., Wishful Thinking: A World View of Insurance Solvency Regulation (Comm. 
Print 1994), cited by Stephen W. Schwab, Peter G. Gallanis, David E. Mendelsohn, Bradley V Ritter, 
supra note 7, at 490. 60 Id. at 490. 
618B. R. 265 (D. N. J. 1980) aff 'd, 673 F. 2d 1301 (3d Cir. 198 1. ) 
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authority of P&B for determining which party should bear the ultimate loss of failure 
of P&B. 
Based on P& B's operating practice that the ceding insurer has the ultimate 
authority to accept or to reject reinsurance contracts, the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey held that the cedent de facto controlled the intermediary 
and that an agency relationship existed between ceding companies and intermediary 
62 rather than between intermediary and reinsurers . As a result, the premium paid by 
the ceding insurer to the intermediary did not constitute payment to the reinsurer. 
Accordingly, the reinsurance payments paid by reinsurers should be deemed as 
payment to the ceding insurer if the reinsurance intermediary is the agent of the 
ceding insurer. In other words, the ceding insurer assumed the credit risk of the 
intermediary relating to payments to the intermediary. 
In order to reduce legal disputes arising as to the authority of the reinsurance 
intermediary and to ensure the financial stability of the ceding insurer, the NAIC 
enacted a model regulation to clarify the liability of the intermediaries to the ceding 
insurers and reinsurers relating to these payments. This has been amended in the 
63 NAIC Examiner's Handbook , with this "intermediary clause" placing the credit risk 
on the reinsurer in a reinsurance transaction. Otherwise, the insurer cannot take 
statutory reinsurance credit to reduce its loss reserves. A typical "intermediary clause" 
relating to payments reads as follows: ........ Payments by the Company to the 
Intermediary shall be deemed to constitute payment to the reinsurer. Payments by the 
reinsurer to the Intermediary shall be deemed to constitute payment to the Company 
only to the extent that such payments are actually received by the CompanY64" 
Although this clause requires the reinsurer to assume all the credit risk 
regarding the payment paid by the reinsurer and insurer, the intermediary is deemed 
the agent of the reinsurer only for the purposes of receiving and transmitting monies. 
62 The court considered the following factors: 
(1) the term and conditions of the reinsurance treaty were set by the reinsured; (2) the reinsured made 
the premium check payable to the reinsurance intermediary; (3) the intermediary then distributed the 
premiums to the reinsurers, less its commissions; (4) the reinsurer wrote less checks payable to the 
reinsured directly, instead of the intermediary; and (5) the reinsured did not delegate any authority to 
the reinsured. " 8 Bankr. 265 (D. N. J. 1980), p-270., cited by ROBERT W. FLAMMESFAHR & SCOTT 
W. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF REINSURANCE CLAIMS 262 (Reactions Publishing Group, 1994). 
63 NAIC, National Association of Insurance Commissioners Examiners Handbook 5-9 (1994). 
64 See Marilyn J. Laughlin, General Clauses for All Treaties, REINSURANCE CONTRACT 
WORDING, at 102 (Robert W Strain ed., 1996). 
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Therefore, it should be noted that the question of whose agent the reinsurance 
65 intennediary is should be decided by the basic legal principles of agenc y. 
2. National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
In 1976, New York was the first state to require the licensing of reinsurance 
intermediaries, enacting Section 122-a of the New York Insurance Code 66. This was 
followed by Regulation 98, which mandated several significant changes as to 
intermediary conduct. Regulation 98 generally requires as to reinsurance 
intermediaries: 
(1) a written authorisation from a ceding insurers; (2) notification regarding a 
reinsurance agreement for the cedents; (3) to provide information relating to financial 
condition for their principals; (4) avoidance of the conflict of interest between the 
reinsurers and insurers; (5) obligation to maintain books and records of reinsurance 
transactions, (6) to create separate accounts for their principals monies 67 . 
In 1993, the NAIC Reinsurance Intermediary Model Act was adopted by the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners to govern reinsurance 
intermediaries, including reinsurance brokers and agents of reinsurers, known as 
Managing General Agents (MGAs). This Model Act, addressing the earlier report, 
"Failed Promises: Insurance Companies Insolvencies", mainly focused on the 
reinsurance brokers (RBs) and reinsurance managers (RMs) respectively. The Model 
Act contains specific provisions including licensure of reinsurance intermediaries, 
required contract provisions between the intermediaries and their principals, 
prohibited acts of the reinsurance managers, and duties of insurers or reinsurers 
utilising the services of a reinsurance intermediary including brokers and managers. 
Till now, statutes based on this Model Act have been adopted in whole or a modified 
form by nearly all states in the US68. 
a. The scope of Reinsurance Intermediary Model Act 
The NAIC Reinsurance Intermediary Model Act categorises reinsurance 
65 See generally Paul M. Hummer, supra note 33. 
66 New York Insurance Law section 122-a (McKinney Supp. 1984-85), as amended by New York Law 
section 2106 (McKinney 1984)., cited by Stephen W. Schwab, Peter G. Gallan's, David E. 
Mendelsohn, Bradley V Ritter, supra note 7, at 514. 
67 N. Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs., tit. 11, s32 (1983)., cited by Id. at 514. 
68 See Mason & Pfeifer, A Closer Look at Facultative Reinsurance, 31 Tort & Insurance Law Journal 
641,650 n. 56 (1996), collecting state statues, cited by GRAYDON S. STARING, supra note 19, § 5: 5 
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intermediaries into "reinsurance brokers" and "reinsurance managers". It defines a 
reinsurance broker as "any persons, other than an officer or employee of the ceding 
insurer, firm, association or corporation who solicits, negotiates or places reinsurance 
cessions or retrocessions on behalf of a ceding insurer without the authority or power 
to bind reinsurance on behalf of such insurer 69 .,, The definition of a reinsurance 
manager is any person, firm, association or corporation who has authority to bind or 
to manage all or part of the assumed reinsurance business (including the management 
of a separate division, department or underwriting office) and act as an agent on 
behalf of a reinsurance 70 . 
The following persons, however, are excluded from the 
definition of "reinsurance manager": "(1) An employee of the reinsurer. (2) A U. S. 
Manager of the United States branch of an alien reinsurer. (3) An underwriting agent 
which managers all or part of the reinsurance operations of the reinsurers, is under 
common control with the reinsurance, subject to the Holding Company Act, and 
whose compensation is not based on the volume of premium written. (4) The manager 
of a group, association, pool or organisation of insurers which engage in joint 
underwriting or joint reinsurance and who are subject to examination by the 
(Insurance Commission) of the state in which the manager's principal business office 
71ýq is located . 
b. Licensure of reinsurance intennediary 
In a state following the Model Act, a reinsurance broker or reinsurance manager who 
wishes to carry on business should be a "licensed producer" in the state. If a broker or 
reinsurance manager wishes to carry on business in another state, it should obtain 
license in that state or another state, which has a law substantial similar to this law or 
such a broker or manager should be licensed in this state as a "nonresident reinsurance 
intermediary"72 . 
With respect to the protection of the reinsurer, the reinsurance 
manager may be required by the state Insurance Commissioner to file a bond for the 
protection of the reinsurance and to maintain an "errors and omissions" policy in a set 
73 amount 
(1993). 
69 Reinsurance: Reinsurance Intermediary Model Act § 2. F., supra note 47, at 790- 1. 
70 Reinsurance: Reinsurance Intermediary Model Act § 2. G., id. at 790-2. 
71 Reinsurance Intermediary Model Act § 2. G. Id. 
72 Reinsurance: Reinsurance Intermediary Model Act §§3. A. (1) and (2) B. (1), (2) and (3), id. at 790- 
2,790-3, 
73 Reinsurance: Reinsurance Intermediary Model Act § 3. C. (1) and (2), id. at 790-3. 
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The Reinsurance Intermediary Model Act, however, does not provide the 
detailed requirements relating to licensing procedure and professional standards for 
the reinsurance intermediaries. These standards mainly depend on the Commission's 
discretionary judgement. 
c. Required contract provision and transactions between reinsurance 
intermediary and its principal 
Under the Model Act, transactions between a reinsurance intermediary and the insurer 
it represents are to be based on a written authorisation addressing the responsibility of 
each party. 
In respect of reinsurance brokers, authorisation is required to contain a 
provision on the insurer's right to terminate the RB's authority, the RB's duty to 
maintain a complete record of related documents, the security of payment from 
74 
reinsurers and retrocession . In order to ensure accountability and the right of the 
recourse, the provision should provide that the insurer has a right to terminate the 
RB's authority at any time 75 . With regard to accounting and other related documents, 
the provision of the contract is to provide that the RB shall give the reinsurers access 
to all relevant accounts and books, including information necessary to support all 
commission, charges and other fees received by, or owing, to the RB, and shall remit 
all funds due to the insurer within 30 days of receipt. Additionally, the RB is to keep a 
complete record for each transaction for at least 10 years after expiration of each 
contract76. In order to ensure the security of payment from reinsurer, the RB is to hold 
all funds collected for the insurer's account in a fiduciary capacity in a qualified US 
financial institution. In relation to retrocession, the RB is to comply with the written 
standards established by the insurer for the cession or retrocession of all risk and will 
74 Reinsurance: Reinsurance Intermediary Model Act § 4., id. at 790-4. 
75 Debra J. Hall, supra note 58, at 869. 
76 The record for each transaction includes: "(1) the type of contract, limits, underwriting restrictions, 
classes, or risks and territory, (2) period of coverage, including effective and expiration dates, 
cancellation, provisions and notice required of cancellation; (3) Reporting and settlement requirements 
of balances; (4) Rate used to compute the reinsurance premium; (5) Names and address of assuming 
reinsurers; (6) Rates of all reinsurance commissions, including the commissions on any retrocessions 
handled by the RB; (7) Related correspondence and memoranda; (8) Proof of placement; (9) Details 
regarding retrocessions handled by the RB including the identity of retrocessionaires and percentage of 
each contract assumed or ceded; (10) Financial records, including but not limited to, premium and loss 
accounts; and 0 1) When the RB procures a reinsurance contract on behalf of a license ceding insurer: 
(a) Directly from any assuming reinsurer, written evidence that the assuming reinsurer has agreed to 
assume the risk; or (b) If placed through a representative of the assuming reinsurer, other than an 
employee, written evidence that such reinsurer has delegated binding authority to the representative. " 
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disclose to the insurer any relationship with any reinsurer to which business will be 
ceded or retroceded. " 
With regard to RMs, a transaction between a RM and a reinsurer also is 
required to be entered into pursuant to a written contract that specifies the 
responsibilities of each party and that is approved by the reinsurer's Board of 
Directors. The contract, at least, needs to contain provisions respecting the reinsurer's 
right to terminate the authority of the RM, RM's duty regarding related to accounts 
and documents, and the security of the funds for the reinsurer's account 77 
d. Prohibited acts of reinsurance managers 
As mentioned above, the activities of the reinsurance managers (also known as 
MGAs) can also affect the financial stability of reinsurers. It has been identified that 
the cause of three significant insolvencies in the 1980s was related to the delegation of 
underwriting authority to the RM. The NAIC Model Act addressed these issues 
relating to the RM containing the provisions that prohibit reinsurance managers from, 
engaging in specified acts that may be beyond the reinsurer's control. With regard to 
retrocessions, the RMs are prohibited from ceding retrocession on behalf of the 
reinsurer unless this is in pursuant to obligatory facultative agreements containing 
specified guidelineS78. Furthermore, the RM is also prohibited from collecting any 
payment from a retrocessionaire or committing the reinsurer to any claim settlements 
with a retrocession aire without prior approval of the reinsurerS79. In order to ensure 
the reinsurer's control on the RM and to prevent legal dispute arising as to the 
authority of the RM to act on the behalf of the reinsurer, the RM is not to pay or to 
commit the reinsurer to pay any claim, net of retrocessions, without approval of the 
Reinsurance: Reinsurance Intermediary Model Act § 5. Id. at 790-4,790-5. 
77 "A. The reinsurance may terminate the contract for cause upon written notice to the RM. The 
reinsurance may immediately suspend the authority of the RM to assume or cede business during the 
pendency of any dispute regarding the cause for termination. 
B. The RM will render accounts to the reinsurer accurately detailing all material transactions, including 
information necessary to support all commissions, charges and other fees received by, or owing to the 
RM, and remit all funds due under the contract to the reinsurer or not less than a monthly basis. 
C. All funds collected for the reinsurer's account will be held by the RM in a fiduciary capacity in a 
qualified US financial institutions. The RM may retain no more than three months estimated claims 
payments and allocated loss adjustment expenses. The RM shall maintain a separate bank account for 
each reinsurer that it represents. " Reinsurance: Reinsurance Intermediary Model Act § 7., id at 790-6, 
790-7. 
78 t6--- . Such guidelines shall 
include a list of reinsurers with which such automatic agreements are in 
effect, and for each such reinsurer, the coverages and amounts or percentages that may be reinsured, 
and commission schedules. " Reinsurance: Reinsurance Intermediary Model Act §8A., id at 790-8. 
79 Reinsurance: Reinsurance Intermediary Model Act §8E., id at 790-8. 
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reinsurer 80 . In addition, the RM is prohibited from committing the reinsurer to 
participate in reinsurance syndicate and appointing a sub-RM81. 
e. Duties of insurers and reinsurers utilizing the services oa reinsurance 
intermediary 
While the reinsurance intermediary is subject to the provisions required by the Model 
Act, the regulatory objectives can not be achieved unless the principal of the 
reinsurance intermediary exercises "reasonable care" to delegate its authority. As a 
result, the Model Act contains a provision requiring that an insurer or reinsurer 
engage the services of person who is licensed in accordance with this Model Act 82 and 
obtain a copy of the reinsurance brokers' or managers' financial statement 83 . 
In 
addition to RM's financial statement, the reinsurer annually needs to obtain the 
opinion of an actuary attesting to the adequacy of the loss reserves established by a 
84 RM 
. 
In order to ensure the independence of the RB, an insurer may not employ an 
individual who is employed by a broker associated with the transaction unless such a 
broker is under common control with the insurer 85 . 
With regard to a RM, a reinsurer is 
required to vest binding authority for all retrocessional contracts or participations in a 
reinsurance syndicate with an officer of the reinsurer who is not affiliated with the 
RM86 
. 
Additionally, reinsurers are prohibited from appointing to its board of directors, 
any officer, director, employee, controlling shareholder or subproducer of its RM 
unless their relationships is governed by the federal Holding Company Act or the 
Broker Controlled Insurer Act87 . 
The reinsurer is also required to provide written 
notification to the state Insurance Commissioner if a contract with a reinsurance 
manager is to be terminated 88 . 
B. European Union Directives 
In 1976, the EC Insurance Intermediaries Directive of 13 th December 1976 was 
80 44 **''** that exceeds the 
lesser of an amount specified by the reinsurer or one percent of the reinsurer's 
policyholder's surplus as of December 31 of the last complete calendar year. " Reinsurance: 
Reinsurance Intermediary Model Act §8D., id. at 790-8. 
81 Reinsurance: Reinsurance Intermediary Model Act §8B&G. Id. at 790-8. 
82 Reinsurance: Reinsurance Intermediary Model Act §§6 (A) &9 (A). Id. at 790-5,790-9. 
83 Reinsurance: Reinsurance Intermediary Model Act §6 (C) & 9(B). Id. at 790-5. 
84 Reinsurance: Reinsurance Intermediary Model Act §9 (C). Id. at 790-9. 
85 Reinsurance: Reinsurance Intermediary Model Act §6 (B). Id. at 790-5. 
86 Reinsurance: Reinsurance Intermediary Model Act §9 (D). Id. at 790-9. 
87 Reinsurance: Reinsurance Intermediary Model Act §9 (F). Id. at 790-9. 
88 According to this Model Act § 7, the transaction between a RM and the reinsurer shall be filed with 
the Commissioner for approval. As a result, the termination of such a contract is required to notify the 
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adopted to facilitate the freedom of services for insurance intermediaries, including 
reinsurance intermediaries. Because the creation of a single internal market and the 
freedom of services within the EC/EU should result in an extensive range of insurance 
products, "the policyholders will be even more dependent on the professional 
competence of the insurance intermediaries 899 '. As a result, it is essential to 
promulgate a comprehensive statutory framework to ensure the professional 
competence and financial solvency of insurance intermediaries. In 1991, the EC 
Commission issued Commission Recommendation (92/48/EEC) 90 to "ensure that all 
member states establish the exact level of general, commercial and professional 
knowledge considered appropriate to guarantee that the policyholders and persons 
seeking insurance will be adequately informed and assisted, taking into account the 
type of intermediary involved. 91" 
Article 3 of this Recommendation contains the following levels of disclosure 
regarding the independence of insurance intermediaries: "to person seeking insurance 
or reinsurance of risks, any direct legal or economic ties to an insurance undertaking 
or any shareholdings in or by such undertakings which could affect the complete 
freedom of choice of insurance undertaking, and to a compete body, as determined by 
the member state, the spread of business with different insurance undertakings over 
the previous year', 92 . 
In order to ensure that intermediaries will be subject to certain professional 
standards and registration requirements, the Commission recommended that member 
states establish an appropriate regulatory regime including the requirements of 
professional competence of knowledge and ability for the different categories of 
intermediary, 93 the possession of professional indemnity insurance or other 
comparable guarantees against liability arouse from professional negligence 94, "fit and 
Commissioners. Reinsurance: Reinsurance Intermediary Model Act §9 (E). Id. at 790-9. 
89 See T. HENRY ELLIS & JAMES A. WILTSHIRE, REGULATION OF INSURANCE IN THE 
UNITED KINGDOM AND IRELAND A. 5.2-01 (Issue 33). 
90 Commission Recommendation on Insurance Intermediaries, 92/48/EEC, 1992 O. J. (L. 19). 
91 See T. HENRY ELLIS & JAMES A. WILTSHIRE, supra note 89, at A. 5.2-01. (Issue 33). 
92 See id at A. 5.2-02. 
93 The level of such knowledge and ability is to be determined by the member states. Furthermore, such 
levels and their practical application may be determined and administrated by professional 
organisations recognised by a member state or by an insurance undertaking assuming responsibility and 
liability for the activities exercised by the category of intermediary. See generally Professional 
Requirements and Registration of Insurance Intermediaries, Commission Recommendation on 
Insurance Intermediaries, art. 4(2), 92/48/EEC, 1992 O. J. (L. 19), Annex. 
94 In order to protect the interests of policyholders and ceding companies, an insurance intermediary 
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proper" persons, 95 and the maintenance of financial solvency96. In addition to these 
professional standards, the Commission recommended that member states should be 
compulsory registration of insurance intermediaries in each member state (in the 
Article 5). Insurance intermediaries are also required to inform the public of the fact 
that they have been registered. Once a central registration exists, this should be able to 
distinguish between independent and dependent insurance intermediaries. Co- 
operation between member states in obtaining access to national insurance 
intermediaries should be enhanced. In member states, adequate sanctions and 
measures should be established and applied to any unregistered person conducting the 
business of an insurance intermediary and to those who violate any of the professional 
competence standards. 
Following Commission Recommendation 1991, the Commission in 2000 has 
published the proposal for the directive addressing insurance mediation including 
97 
reinsurance mediation and reinsurance intermediaries 
This proposal extends the scope of the regulatory regime relating to insurance 
98 intermediary and insurance mediation . With regard to reinsurance mediation, it 
provides that 64 reinsurance mediation" means the activities "of introducing, giving 
information, proposing or carrying out work preparatory to the conclusion of contracts 
of insurance, or in assisting in the administration and performance of such contracts, 
should possess professional indemnity insurance or any other comparable guarantee against liability 
arising from professional negligence, unless such insurance is already provided for by an insurance 
undertaking or other undertaking by which he is employed or for which he is empowered to act. See 
generally Professional Requirements and Registration of Insurance Intermediaries, Commission 
Recommendation on Insurance Intermediaries, art. 4 (3), id.. 
95 The member state should impose requirements evidencing good reputation of insurance intermediary. 
See generally Professional Requirements and Registration of Insurance Intermediaries, Commission 
Recommendation on Insurance Intermediaries, art. 4 (4). Id. 
96 Intermediaries may be required to demonstrate financial capacity. The level and form of capital 
required to do this by the member states is also provided. See generally Professional Requirements and 
Registration of Insurance Intermediaries, Commission Recommendation on Insurance Intermediaries, 
art. 4 (5). Id. 
97 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Insurance Mediation 
(COM (2000) 5 11 final) (200/213/FC), OJ 200 1, C 29E/245. 
98 The provision of this Directive should be applied to the persons carrying on insurance mediation 
unless the following conditions are met: (a) the contracts do not require general or specific knowledge 
of insurance; (b) the contracts are not life insurance contracts; (c) the insurance does not cover any 
liability risk; (d) the principal professional activity of the person is other than insurance mediation; (e) 
the insurance is ancillary to the good or service supplied, in particular where such insurance covers 
either the risk of breakdown, loss of or damage to goods supplied by that person or an indemnification 
of goods linked to the travel booked with that person; (f) the amount of the premium does not exceed 
EUR 1000 and the duration of the insurance contract is less than a year. " See Proposal for a Directive 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on Insurance Mediation, art. 1(2). 
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particularly in the event of a claim"99 
In comparison with the Commission Recommendation 1991, the 2000 
proposal provides and detailes the requirements that relate to professional indemnity 
insurance with certain limitation and financial solvency of intermediaries. The amount 
of professional indemnity insurance with a limit of indemnity should be at least EUR 
I million per claim "unless such insurance or comparable guarantee is already 
provided by an insurance undertaking, reinsurance undertaking or other undertaking 
on whose behalf the insurance or reinsurance intermediary is acting or for which the 
insurance or reinsurance intermediary is empowered to act"100. 
Furthermore, member states are required to take "necessary action to protect 
customers against the inability of the insurance or reinsurance intermediary to transfer 
the premium to the insurance or reinsurance undertaking or to transfer the amount of 
claim to the insured"101. The required amount of capital should be 8% of the premium 
income, with a minimum of EUR 15 '000102 unless one of the following requirements 
have been established: " 
(1) provisions laid down by law whereby monies paid by the customer to 
intermediary are treated as having been paid to the undertaking, whereas monies paid 
by the undertaking to the intermediary are not treated as having been paid to the 
customer until the customer actually receives them; 
(2) customer's monies shall be transferred via strictly segregated client 
accounts and that these accounts shall not be used to reimburse other creditors in the 
event of bankruptcy; 
(3) a guarantee fund has been set up on behalf of the customer" 103 . 
To maintain the independence of insurance intermediary, it also sets out 
several information requirements 104 which should be provided by the insurance 
99 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Insurance Mediation, art. 
2(4). 
100 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Insurance Mediation, art. 
4(3). 
101 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Insurance Mediation, art. 
4(4). 
102 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Insurance Mediation, art. 
4(4)b. 
103 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Insurance Mediation, art. 
4 (4) (a), (c) and (d). 
104 c, an insurance intermediary shall provide the customer with at least the following information: 
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intermediary. It is likely that the Commission will adopt this 2000 proposal and issue 
another Insurance Mediation Directive, which also would cover reinsurance 
intermediaries' 05 
. 
C. Regulatory Regime in the United Kingdom 
The first step in the UK toward regulating insurance intermediary was taken by the 
National Consumer Council in 1970s. That was followed by the enactment of the 
Insurance Broker (Registration) Act 1977 and the Insurance Company Act 1982. The 
Insurance Broker (Registration) Act 1977 established the Insurance Brokers 
Registration Council (113RC), which was responsible for registering all those 
conducting the business of insurance brokers and their professional competence 
standards. The regulatory system was accomplished through the adoption and 
implementation of various statutory instruments issued by the IBRC 106 including 
(a) his identity and address; 
(b) whether he advises the customer on insurance cover from a broad range of insurance undertakings 
or not. In the latter case, the insurance intermediary shall also inform the customer of the number and 
identity of the insurance undertakings with which he may and does conduct business for each class of 
risk; 
(c) any holding, direct or indirect, by the insurance intermediary representing more than 10% of the 
voting rights and of the capital in an insurance or reinsurance undertaking and of any holding, direct or 
indirect, by an insurance undertaking, reinsurance undertaking or parent undertaking of an insurance or 
reinsurance undertaking representing more than 10% of the voting rights and of the capital in the 
insurance intermediary; 
(d) any contractual obligation to conduct the respective business with one or more insurance 
undertakings as well as the names of those undertakings; 
(e) the party to be held liable for any negligence, misconduct or inappropriate advice by the 
intermediary in relation to the insurance mediation; 
(f) the facility referred to in Article 8 allowing customers and other interested parties to register 
complaints about insurance and reinsurance intermediaries and, if appropriate, about the out-of-court 
complaint and redress procedures referred to in Article 9; 
(g) the register in which they have been included and the means for verifying that they have been 
registered". Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Insurance 
Mediation, art. 10. 
105 See Europa Internal Market, "Insurance Commission Welcomes Council Common Position on 
Proposed Insurance Mediation Directive", <europa. eu. int/comm/internal-market/en/finances/ins/02- 
432. htm> (last visited 15 May 2002). 
106 The IBRC established the requirements for registration of individual insurance brokers and 
reinsurance brokers carrying on their own business in the United Kingdom. The statutory instruments 
governing reinsurance intermediaries in the United Kingdom can be summarised as follows: 
1) Registration and Enrolment-the Insurance Brokers Registration Council (Registration and 
Enrolment) Rules Approval Order 1978, Sl 1978/1395. 
2) The Investigating Committee and the Disciplinary Committee- the Insurance Brokers Registration 
Council (Constitution of the Investigating Committee) Rules Approval 1978, SI 1978/1456, the 
Insurance Brokers Registration Council (Constitution of the Disciplinary Committee) Rules Approval 
1978, SI 1978/1457, the the Insurance Brokers Registration Council (Procedure of the Disciplinary 
Committee) Rules Approval 1978, SI 1978/1458, the Insurance Brokers Registration Council 
(Disciplinary Committee) Rules Approval 1978, SI 1978/1503. 
3) Professional indemnity insurance and compensation- the Insurance Brokers Registration Council 
(Indemnity Insurance and Grants Scheme) Rules Approval Order 1987 SI 1987/1496 and the Insurance 
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registration and training of insurance brokers, regulation of conducts, disciplinary 
proceedings, the structure of Committees of the Council, and the restriction on the use 
of titles and descriptions. Although the IBRA have been repealed by the Financial 
Services And Markets Act 2000 after the establishment of the Financial Services 
Authority, the statutory instruments issued by the IBRC are still worth noting for 
facilitating a comparative analysis on the regulation of reinsurance intermediaries. 
1. Registration of reinsurance brokers 
The original Insurance Brokers Registration Council was to establish and to maintain 
a register of insurance brokers carrying on the business in the title of the insurance 
"Brokers" 107 
. 
To qualify as an insurance broker, the broker had to hold a qualification 
approved or recognised by the Council, or meet the requirements set our in the EC 
08 Council Directive 77/92/EEC in the specific period' . In addition to the registration 
of brokers, the IBRC was to be responsible for the supervision of educational 
institutions and qualifying examinations' 09. With regard to the refusal to register as a 
broker, the IBRC are required to give the applicants an opportunity of appealing 
before and being heard by a committee of the Council. If the Council refuses such 
applications, the applicants can appeal against the refusal of the Council to the Court 
Brokers Registration Council (Indemnity Insurance and Grants Scheme) (Amendment) Rules Approval 
Order 1990, modifying earlier rules made in 1979. 
4) Accounting and business requirements -the Insurance Brokers Registration Council (Accounts and 
Business Requirements) Rules Approval Orderl. 979, SI 1979/489. 
5) Use of the title "insurance broker"-the Insurance Brokers (Registration) Act 1977 (Commencement 
No. 3) Order 1980. 
6) Authorisation to carry on investment business-the Insurance Brokers Registration Council (Conduct 
of Investment Business) Rules Approval Order 1996, Council (Conduct of Investment Business) Rules 
Approval Order 1996, S11996/1151. 
It should be noted that the Insurance Brokers Registration Council (Conduct of Investment Business) 
Rules Approval Order 1988 is "the means by which insurance brokers carrying on some life assurance 
or unit trust business can secure authorisation under the Financial Services Act 1986". See T. HENRY 
ELLIS & JAMES A. W]ILTSHIRE, supra note 89, at Al. 1-02 (Issue 65 August 2000). With regard to 
the FSA, the UK government announced that the FSA would extend its powers to include the sale of 
general insurance/reinsurance product. In addition, from around mid-2004, all those who sell general 
insurance/reinsurance will be required to obtain the authorisation from the FSA and will be required to 
comply with relevant business standards provided by the FSA Handbook. Financial Services Authority, 
Mortgage and General Insurance Regulation: A Guide for Firms, (March 2002)(last visited 15 May 
2002) <www. fsa-gov. uk/mort-gen-ins/ins-reg. pdf>. 
107 "The Council shall establish and maintain a register of insurance brokers containing the names, 
addresses and qualifications, and such other particulars as may be prescribed, of all persons who are 
entitled under the provisions of this Act to be registered therein and apply in the prescribed manner to 
be so registered. " Section 2 of Insurance Brokers (Registration) Act 1977 (1977 c 46), supra note 47, at 
897. 
108 Section 3(l) of Insurance Brokers (Registration) Act 1977 (1977 c 46), id. at 897. 
109 Section 7 of insurance Brokers (Registration) Act 1977 (1977 c 46), id. at 900. 
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who may make order and its order shall be the final one 110 
2. The Code of Conduct and conduct of intermediaries 
In relation to the conduct of business of reinsurance intermediaries, the EBRC issued 
the Code of Conduct' 11 establishing several fundamental principles addressing the 
market conduct of brokers now reissued by the GISC Rules. These principles regard 
the relationship between consumers and brokers as follows: "a) A Insurance brokers 
shall at all time conduct business with utmost good faith and integrity. b) Insurance 
brokers shall do everything possible to satisfy the requirements of clients and shall, 
subject to principle C, place the interests of clients before all other considerations. 
Subject to these requirements and interests, insurance brokers shall have proper regard 
for others. c) Insurance brokers shall not directly or indirectly do anything in the 
course of practising as insurance brokers who comprise or impair, or are likely to 
compromise or impair, the good repute of insurance brokers or the insurance broking 
profession. d) Statements made by or on behalf of insurance brokers when advertising 
shall not be misleading or extravagant. f) Insurance brokers shall organise and control 
the internal affairs of their insurance broking business in a responsible manner, and 
where staff are employed ensure that they are compete, suitable, and under adequate 
day to day supervision by a registered insurance broker' 12, ý . The Code of 
Conduct also 
sets out the principles respecting the conduct of brokers with regard to their 
relationship with its self-regulatory body" 3, and their compliance with any statements 
110 Section 5 of Insurance Brokers (Registration) Act 1977 (1977 c 46), id. at 899. With respect to the 
new regulatory regime, GISC in June 2000 issued the Commercial Code regarding the reinsurance 
intermediaries. According to the Section D-the Commercial Code of the GISC Rules, a Member of 
GISC should: "Ll act with due skill, care and diligence; 1.2 observe high standards of integrity and 
deal openly and fairly with their commercial customers; 1.3 seek from Commercial Customers such 
information about their circumstances and objectives as might reasonably be expected to be relevant in 
enabling the Member to fulfill their responsibilities to them; 1.4 take reasonable steps to give 
Commercial Customers sufficient information in a comprehensible and timely way to enable them to 
make balanced and informed decisions about their insurance; 1.5 take appropriate steps to safeguard 
information, money and property held or handled on behalf of Commercial Customers; 1.6 conduct 
their business and organise their affairs in a prudent manner; 1.7 seek to avoid conflicts of interest, but 
where a conflict is unavoidable or does arise, manage it in such a way as to avoid prejudice to any 
party. Members will not unfairly put their own interests above their duty to any Commercial Customer 
for whom they act; and 1.8 handle complaints fairly and promptly. " General Insurance Standard 
Council, General Insurance Standards Council Rules, <www. gisc. co. uk> (last visited: 05/06/2002). 
111 Insurance Brokers Registration Council (Code of Conduct) Approval Order 1994, SI 1994/2569, in 
JOHN LOWRY & PHILP RAWLINGS, INSURANCE LAW: DOCTRINES AND PRINCIPLES 338 
(HART, 1999). 
112 Regulation 2 (2) A-H, in Insurance Brokers Registration Council (Code of Conduct) Approval 
Order 1994, SI 1994/2569, supra note 47, at 1512-1513. 
See also id at 338-339. 
113 It states that "E. Insurance brokers shall conduct their relationship with the Council, their 
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of principle issued under Section 47 A of the Financial Services Act 19861 14 . 
3. Requirements for carrying on business and professional indemnity 
cover 
In addition to the Code of Conduct governing the activities of insurance brokers, 
brokers in the UK are required to ensure their solvency margin. The brokers are 
required to maintain a certain amount of working capital and the amount at which the 
value of assets of their businesses exceed the amount of the liabilities of their 
5 businesses" 
. The specified amount was prescribed in the Insurance Brokers 
Registration Council (Accounts and Business Requirements) Rules, Approval Order 
16 1979(SI 1979/489)1 
. 
Furthermore, the broker may be liable for a breach of duty or incur legal 
liability arising otherwise from the broking business. As a result, the Council requires 
that practising insurance brokers and enrolled corporate bodies carry on and maintain 
the professional indemnity insurance against losses arising from claims stated in the 
Insurance Broker Registration Council (Indemnity Insurance and Grant Scheme) 
17 Rules Approval Order (SI 1987/1596)1 . 
4. Regulatory reform in the United Kingdom 
After the establishment of Financial Services Authority in 1997 and the enactment of 
the Financial Services and Markets Act in 2000, the Brokers (Registration) Act 1977, 
the Insurance Companies Act 1982 and the Financial Services Act 1986 were 
repealed. 
In relation to the regulatory development in the United Kingdom, it is 
noteworthy that a proposal for the formation of a self-regulatory body-General 
Insurance Standards Council (GISC), sponsored by several professional 
professional body, with propriety; G. Insurance brokers should be familiar with, and in carrying on 
business should be mindful of guidance as to proper professional conduct contained in any Practice 
Notes issued or endorsed by the Council. " Regulation 2 (2) E and G, Insurance Brokers Registration 
Council (Code of Conduct) Approval Order 1994, (SI 1994/2569), supra note 47, at 1511-1512. 
114 Regulation 2 (2) H, Insurance Brokers Registration Council (Code of Conduct) Approval Order 
1994, (SI 1994/2569), id, at 1512. 
115 Section II of Insurance Brokers (Registration) Act 1977 (1977 c 46), id. at 902-903. 
116 See Insurance Brokers Registration Council (Accounts and Business Requirements) Rules, Approval 
Order 1979(SI 1979/489) Part 11,3., id. at 1483. 
117 See The Insurance Broker Registration Council (Indemnity Insurance and Grant Scheme) Rules 
Approval Order (SI 1987/1596), part 11,3., id. at 1501-1502. 
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8 
organisations" , was launched in 1998. The objective of this organisation is to build 
up an effective self-regulatory body to establish professional standards and 
competence" 9 for those it regulates and the customers are protected 120 . 
In order to maintain the independence of the GISC, it will not "discriminate 
against or favour insurers as distinct from intermediaries, and is determined that the 
momentum in establishing the GISC as a creditable organisation must be 
maintained 121 ". Additionally, the regulations or other codes of conduct issued by 
GISC will base on a consultation process' 22 and will be a reflection of good business 
123 practice 
The Code of Practice, which was developed by the working groups in the 
Board of the GISC, is a combination of the existing ABI and IBRC codes. To ensure 
the financial solvency of intermediaries, the Code of Practice developed the following 
requirements: a) to keep insurance monies separate from other assets of the business; 
b) to maintain professional indemnity insurance; and c) to maintain a minimum 
124 solvency margin 
It was followed by that the establishment of the GISC and the General 
Insurance Standards Council Rules in June 2000 125 . Pursuit to 
GISC Rules, the 
regulatory subject-matter of the GISC is member's general insurance activities, which 
118 These organisations are Association of British Insurers, the Association of Insurance Intermediaries 
and Brokers, the British Insurance and Investment Brokers Association, the International Underwriters 
Association/London Insurance and Reinsurance Market Association, Lloyd's and the Lloyd's Insurance 
Brokers Committee. See T. HENRY ELLIS & JAMES A. W]ILTSHERE, supra note 89, at DLIA-01 
(Issue 65, August 2000). The GISC was officially launched on 3 July 2000. "In an announcement by 
the Treasury on 12 December 2001, Ruth Kelly MEP(Economic Secretary to the Treasury) 
acknowledged GISC's hard work in raising industry standards and called for GISC to work closely 
with the Financial Services Authority (FSA) to ensure seamless transition from voluntary regulation by 
GISC to statutory regulation under the FSA, likely to be during 2004. " General Insurance Standard 
Council, New Watchdog for General Insurance Industry, available at <http: //www. gisc. co. uk/Home/> 
(last visited 20 April 2002). 
119 64 to establish, promote, monitor, and enforce high standards of integrity, financial soundness, fair 
dealing and competence for those it regulates. " See id. at DLIA-01. 
120 With respect to the protection of customers, the purpose of this proposal is "to ensure that as far as 
possible policies that are proposed are suitable to the needs and resources of customers and that 
customers are informed about the products they are buying and their place; and to ensure that adequate 
systems are in place for dealing with customer complaints and ensuring that redress is available. " See 
id. 
121 See id. at D 1.1 A-06. 
122 In order to ensure the independence of this self-regulator body, the consultation process will not 
only comprise members of the GISC, but also trade associations and consumer groups. See id. at 
D 1.1 A- 17. 
123 See id at D 1.1 A-06. 
124 See id at D 1.1 A- 17. 
125 General insurance Standard Council, General Insurance Standards Council Rules, June 2000, supra 
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also includes relevant reinsurance and retrocession 126 . The GISC set out several 
financial requirements to apply to all intermediaries in Section GI- Financial 
Requirements. 
These financial requirements are divided into three main subsections: 
Insurance Money Segregation, Professional Indemnity Insurance and Solvency 
127 Requirement 
a. Insurance money segregation 
In order to keep all monies, including premiums and claims, from other assets of 
business, the intermediaries shall "maintain one or more separate Insurance Bank 
Accounts with an Approved Bank and containing in its title the name of the Member, 
128 
together with the designation Insurance Bank Account (or IBA)" . Insurance 
Intermediaries only use an IBA for specified purposes provided in these rules 129 . In 
addition, intermediaries can obtain a loan or overdraft for any purpose related to an 
IBA only if 
a) the loan or overdraft is "used for the payment to Customers or Insurers of 
Monies due under General Insurance Activity 130 transactions; 
note 47, at 1661-1720. 
126 Section A-General, Scope and Objective I., General Insurance Standard Council, General Insurance 
Standards Council Rules, June 2000, id. at 1661-1720. 
127 Section GI-Financial Requirements -Practical Requirement 1-32, General Insurance Standard 
Council, General Insurance Standards Council Rules, June 2000, id at 1692-1697. 
128 Section GI-Financial Requirements-Practical Requirement 1.2, General Insurance Standard 
Council, General Insurance Standards Council Rules, June 2000, id at 1692-1697. 
129 Insurance Intermediaries can "only use an Insurance Bank Account for the following purposes: 
"1.5.1 the receipt of Insurance Monies; 1.5.2 the receipt of such monies as may be required to be paid 
into the Insurance Bank Account to ensure compliance by the Member with any conditions or 
requirements prescribed by GISC; 1.5.3 the payment to Customers or to Insurers of monies due under 
General Insurance Activity transactions; 1.5.4 the payment of all monies payable by the Member in 
respect of the acquisition of or otherwise in connection with Approved Assets; 1.5.5 the withdrawal of 
brokerage and other general insurance activity-related income either in cash or by way of transfer to an 
account in the name of the Intermediary which is not an Insurance Bank Account (but so that no 
amount received by an Intermediary by way of Net Retained Brokerage and other General Insurance 
Activity-related income may be withdraw from the Insurance Bank Account before the time at which, 
in accordance with the accounting the accounting policies adopted by the Intermediary, that amount 
may be brought into account as income of the Intermediary); 1.5.6 the withdraw of monies paid into the 
Insurance Bank Account in error; and 1.5.7 the withdraw of any monies credited to the Insurance Bank 
Account in excess of those required by any conditions and requirements prescribed by GISC. " Section 
Gl-Financial Requirements-Practical Requirement 1.5, General Insurance Standard Council, General 
Insurance Standards Council Rules, June 2000, id. at 1692. 
130 "General Insurance Activities means Regulated Activities carried on from a permanent place of 
business within the United Kingdom in connection with one or more General Insurance Products 
(unless GISC agrees to restrict the application of the Rules to a specified category to a Member's 
General Insurance Activities)". See Section B-Definition, General Insurance Standard Council, General 
Insurance Standards Council Rules, June 2000, id. at 1665. 
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b) does not give rise to a breach of the requirements of that any amount held in 
the IBA or other Approved Assets, together with any amount due and recoverable 
from insurance debtors, is equal to or greater than the amount due to insurance 
creditors' 31 ; or 
132,, c) is of a temporary nature and is repaid as soon as reasonable practicable 
In relation to holding insurance monies, intermediaries are to hold their 
"Insurance Monies" in an "Insurance Bank Account" with one or more "Approved 
Banks", or in "Approved Assets" and shall follow the requirements specified in the 
section G1,3-8. Furthermore, the GISC require that the intermediaries to make 
appropriate investment arrangements and maintain a suitable level of liquidity to 
ensure their financial soundness 133 . The requirement to segregate insurance monies 
does not apply if the following conditions are met: 
"the intermediary is regulated by a recognised regulatory or professional body 
approved by GISC; the intermediary has sought and obtained confirmation from 
131 Section GI-Financial Requirements -Practical Requirement 1.6, General Insurance Standard 
Council, General Insurance Standards Council Rules, June 2000, id. at 1692. 
132 Section GI-Financial Requirements-Practical Requirement 2.1-2.3, General Insurance Standard 
Council, General Insurance Standards Council Rules, June 2000, id. at 1693. 
133 As to the definition of Insurance Monies, it has been provided in the GISC Rules that "Insurance 
Monies means the following individual items or balances representing the same arising from General 
Insurance Activities: 1. premiums, additional premiums and return premiums of all kinds; 2. claims and 
other monies due under the contracts of insurance; 3. Refunds and salvages; 4. fees, charges, taxes and 
similar fiscal levies relating to contracts of insurance; 5. all form of reserves under contracts of 
insurance and any adjustment to them; and 6. discounts, commissions and brokerage. " In addition, the 
Insurance Bank Account means "a bank account designated as an Insurance Bank Account for holding 
Insurance Monies in accordance with the Financial Requirements. This must be an account offered by 
an Approval Banks and may be an ordinary, current, savings, investment, call, notice, treasury, money 
market, or deposit account. " See General Insurance Standard Council, General Insurance Standards 
Council Rules, <www. gisc. co. uk> (last visited: 05/06/2002). In relation to the investment requirements, 
the Membership Practice Requirement of GISC Rules provides that: "10. Intermediaries' investment 
arrangements shall include: 10.1. a suitable diversification policy and strategy; 10.2. a suitable liquidity 
strategy to ensure the timely meeting of financial obligation relating to Insurance Monies; 10.3 a 
suitable credit risk policy and strategy; 1.4 an overall investment policy and strategy which has been 
approved by the Intermediary's board of directors or equivalent body; 10.5 appropriate and prudent 
custody arrangements; 10.6 the prudent management of foreign exchange risks; 10.7 the proper 
recording, monitoring and control of investments; 10.8 the proper supervision of internal and external 
investment managers, if any; and 10.9 a review of investment performance at least every 6 months by 
the Intermediary's board of directors or equivalent body. 
11. Where Insurance Monies are held in Approval Assets whose rating drops below the minimum 
stipulated within the definitions, that investment or asset will cease to be an Approved Assets and the 
Intermediary must dispose of the investment or asset as soon as possible and no later than within 20 
business day of the rating change. 
12. Where any Approved Bank, Approved Asset or Approved Bank, Approved Asset or Approved 
Investment has more than one rating, the lowest of the ratings will apply. 
13. The use of derivatives is not permitted except for the prudent management of currency exchange 
risk. " Section GI-Financial Requirements -Practical Requirement 9-13, General Insurance Standard 
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GISC that their General Insurance Activities are secondary to the main business 
activity of the intermediary; the Intermediary is a Single-Tied Agent or a Multi-Tied 
Agent; their General Insurance Activities are covered by agency agreements which 
ensure the maintenance of reinsurance cover; the intermediary's annual Net Retained 
Brokerage is less than F-5,000 and premiums handled are less than f 50,000 per 
annum 134 . 
11 
b. Professional indemnity insurance 
The GISC established several requirements respecting intermediaries taking out and 
maintaining professional indemnity cover. The professional indemnity insurance 
should indemnify losses arising in the course of its "General Insurance Activities" and 
those of its "Appointed Agents" and "Appointed Sub-Agents" 135 . 
The professional 
indemnity insurance should not contain any term to the effect that payment of claims 
136 indemnifies the insured first . The amount of indemnity is to be at least f-Imillion or 
3 times the annual "Net Retained Brokerage" 
137 
and the minimum level of indemnity 
138 
must apply to any one claim and in the aggregate 
c. Solvency margin 
The scope to solvency requirement applies to those who are "required to segregate 
insurance monies and may apply where the uninsured excess under a professional 
indemnity insurance exceeds the permitted limit" 139 . Intermediaries whose practice is 
to withdraw revenue on a "received basis" must have sufficient assets to meet their 
liabilities 140 whereas those whose practice is based on a "earned basis" must maintain 
Council, General Insurance Standards Council Rules, June 2000, id at 1693. 
134 Section GI-Financial Requirements -Practical Requirement 18.1-18.5, General Insurance Standard 
Council, General Insurance Standards Council Rules, June 2000, id. at 1694-1695. 
135 Section GI-Financial Requirements-Practical Requirement 19.1.1-19.1.6, General Insurance 
Standard Council, General Insurance Standards Council Rules, June 2000, id at 1695. 
136 Section GI-Financial Requirements-Practical Requirement 19.2, General Insurance Standard 
Council, General Insurance Standards Council Rules, June 2000, id. at 1695. 
137 Section GI-Financial Req uirements-Prac tic al Requirement 19.5, General Insurance Standard 
Council, General Insurance Standards Council Rules, June 2000, id. at 1695. 
138 Section GI-Financial Requirements-Practical Requirement 19.6, General Insurance Standard 
Council, General Insurance Standards Council Rules, June 2000, id. at 1695. 
139 Section GI-Financial Requirements -Prac tic al Requirement 23, General Insurance Standard Council, 
General Insurance Standards Council Rules, June 2000, id. at 1696. 
140 "Received basis" is "the practice of withdrawing Revenue due in respect of a particular sum only 
after the payment has been received into the Insurance Bank Account or is due under a formal credit 
arrangement (that includes payments due from agents within a formally agreed period not exceeding 30 
days). Section GI-Financial Requirements -Practical Requirement 24, General Insurance Standard 
Council, General Insurance Standards Council Rules, <www. gisc-co. uk> (last visited: 05/06/2002). 
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141 net assets, as determined by Generally Accepted Accountancy Principles (GAAP) 
D. Summary Observations: a Comparative Analysis on the Leading 
Regulatory Models 
As discussed above, regulation of reinsurance intermediaries is concerned with, and 
should take into account, the complexities of market practices and the general law of 
agency. Also, as discussed above, while the conduct of reinsurance intermediary may 
endanger the solvency of the reinsurers and the primary insurers, it is essential to 
develop a viable regulation not only to maintain the stability of insurance market but 
also to promote fair competition. 
In looking to the developed models (discussed above) governing reinsurance 
intermediaries, several significant features are worth noting in considering an 
appropriate regulatory model approach for the emerging markets. 
1. The scope of regulation and fitness and propriety of management 
With regard to entry requirement, these leading regulatory models adopt a licensing or 
registration procedure with intermediaries being required to obtain authorisation to 
carry on their insurance business. However, differences exist in the scope of their 
intermediary regulation. In the United States, reinsurance intermediaries are 
catergorised into reinsurance brokers and reinsurance managers. In the UK, the self- 
regulatory body-IBRC is only responsible for registering all those conducting the 
business of insurance brokers. In other words, the statutory instruments issued by the 
IBRC can only be applied to those who carry on broking business and use the 
description of the insurance brokers ("reinsurance brokers"). As a result of the limited 
scope of this regulation, it had been criticised that some people who may carry on 
142 
broking business used alternative names such as "consultants" or "intermediaries" 
Due to the lack of statutory definition of broking provided in the Insurance Brokers 
(Registration) Act 1977, this act "does not prevent unregistered persons carrying on 
the activity of broking" 143 . It should 
be noted, however, that this Act restricts the use 
of the titles and descriptions. After the enactment of the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 which still encourages the introduction of a self-regulatory scheme 
14 1 Earned Basis means that intermediary withdraws "revenue from an IBA other than deducting 
revenue on a Received Basis. " Id. 
142 See P. T. O'NEILL, & J. W. WOLONIECKI, supra note 1, at 333. 
143 See id at 404. 
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for the general insurance intermediaries, the General Insurance Standards Council 
(GISC) are established. The GISC rules not only now govem the reinsurance brokers 
but also extend to regulate other reinsurance intermediaries. 
As mentioned above, the European Union steps forward to extend the scope of 
regulation and has published a proposal for the directive addressing insurance 
mediation that would include the reinsurance mediation and reinsurance 
intermediaries. This proposal provided that reinsurance mediation means the activities 
"of introducing, giving information, proposing or carrying out work preparatory to the 
conclusion of contracts of insurance, or in assisting in the administration and 
performance of such contracts, particularly in the event of a claim" 144 . However, it 
has 
not proposed the specific requirements for different intermediary whereas the GISC 
has issued two codes of conduct, one for dealing with private consumers and the other 
covering commercial customers. 
In general, the regulatory development on these developed countries intends to 
extend the scope of regulation of intermediary. While the reinsurance intermediary 
generally deals with professional enterprises, it is suggested that differences between 
the reinsurance intermediary and insurance intermediary should be drawn and the 
flexibility of the regulation should be enhanced to prevent the distortion of 
reinsurance business. 
As a result of the importance of fitness and propriety of management, the 
licensing or registration process should contain relevant discretionary criteria in 
considering application for registration or establishment of a reinsurance intermediary. 
The discretionary criteria should take into account the competence, practical 
experience and suitability of the applicant as a reinsurance intermediary. 
Leaming from these models, the licensing or registration authority should be 
able to assess the fitness and propriety of management. The relevant discretionary 
generally relates to the competence of the key personnel. However, in the case of 
Pritchard, the principal owner of the reinsurance intermediary-Pritchard & Baird 
withdrew large amounts of money estimated to be as high as $ 40 million from the 
firm and this consequently resulted in the firm's bankruptcy. With this in mind, it is 
suggested that the scope of the qualification check should be extended to major 
144 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Insurance Mediation 
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shareholders. Further, special emphasis should be given to the key personnel, and 
major shareholders' past record, in particular with regard to any illegal, fraudulent or 
dishonest activities they were involved in. 
2. Market conduct control 
In terms of market conduct control regarding reinsurance intermediary, the NAIC and 
the UK adopted different approaches. Under the UK regulatory regime, the regulation 
relating to the market conduct was provided in a IBRC "Code of Conduct" that sets 
out several fundamental principles to regulate the intermediary directly. In other 
words, the regulation adopted by the UK required the intermediary to exercise 
"reasonable skill and care" in the placement of the reinsurance cover or the 
assessment of risk. However, this Code of Conduct does not intend to deal with the 
legal duties and contractual relationship between intermediary and his principal. 
Instead, the law of agency, customary practices and the decision of courts govern 
relevant legal duties and arrangements in this regard. 
In contrast, the approach adopted by the NAIC model is to require the contract 
between reinsurance intermediary and his principal to contain specific provisions 
addressing legal duties and relevant rights. This model extends the protection of the 
ceding insurers and reinsurers by the means of compulsory provisions in the relevant 
arrangements. Furthermore, it not only regulate the conduct of reinsurance 
intermediary but also require the principals of reinsurance intermediaries to exercise 
64 reasonable care" in delegating their authority. 
It seems that the approach adopted by the NAIC provides a comprehensive 
regulatory control on the conduct of intermediary and his principal. It should be 
noted, however, that such an approach might result in a legal challenge that this 
regulation interferes in the private contractual relationship between the reinsurance 
intermediaries and their principals. Consequently, this may impede the flexibility of 
reinsurance transactions and increase the transaction costs. Whether it is appropriate 
to adopt such an approach should depend on the specific legal environments and 
market practices in a particular country. 
In addition to the implementation of market conduct control as to the 
reinsurance intermediaries, several important aspects regarding the conduct of 
(COM (2000) 5 11 final) (200/213/EC), art. 2 (4), OJ C29E/245. 
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reinsurance intermediaries are considered in these models, and, differences exist 
between these developed approaches. In the NAIC model 145 , the intermediary 
arrangement regarding the scope of authority is required to contain provisions 
concerning the insurer's right to terminate, the intermediary's duty to maintain a 
complete record of related documents, and the security of insurance monies arising 
from premiums and claims. However, the reinsurance intermediary's conduct relating 
to exercising "reasonable care and skill" has not been considered in these provisions. 
In contrast, the IBRC Code of Conduct 146 (as amended under the GISC Rules) 
describes the conduct of the brokers more specifically and sets out eight fundamental 
principles. In addition to these fundamental principles, the Code of Conduct further 
provides specific examples of the application of these principles. In relation to the 
relationship between brokers and consumers, the Code of Conduct requires insurance 
brokers to exercise all the reasonable care and skill when they conduct their broking 
business. 
In the field of reinsurance intermediary, the main concern for regulators and 
insurers is whether reinsurance intermediaries will exercise "reasonable care" in the 
placement of reinsurance cover or assessment of insurance risks. However, these 
developed models do not provide specific provisions concerning what constitutes 
"reasonable care and skill". As mentioned above 147 , whether a reinsurance 
intermediary meets a reasonable intermediary's test generally depends on the 
customary industry standard. Due to the lack of relevant guidelines or a code of 
conduct, this issue may lead to the legal disputes. In the case of selection of 
reinsurers, it has been observed that a reasonable broker should assess a reinsurer's 
financial rating, corporate structure, Insurance Regulatory Information System ratio, 
annual report, and reputation 148 . 
As a result of legal disputes arising from a 
reinsurance intermediary's duty of care, it is suggested that the relevant regulation or a 
code of conduct issued by a self-regulatory body should provide specific guidelines 
and possible non-exhaustive examples for the reinsurance intermediaries. Such 
guidelines may not only be used to reduce legal uncertainty but also may be used as a 
145 See generally Reinsurance: Reinsurance Intermediary Model Act, supra note 47. 
146 See generally Code of Conduct, Insurance Brokers Registration Council (Code of Conduct) 
Approval Order 1994, (SI 1994/2569). 
147 See Chapter 31A. 
148 See Cherokee Ins. Co. v. E. W. Blanch Co., 66 F. 3d 117 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. Denied, 116 S. Ct. 1545 
(1996). 
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reflection of customary practices for the courts in deciding relevant disputes. 
3. Financial requirement: segregation of insurance monies, solvency and 
professional indemnity insurance 
One of the main regulatory issues regarding reinsurance intermediary is whether the 
intermediary will maintain its financial solvency and will exercise reasonable care in 
the maintenance of insurance monies. In addition to solvency margin and accounting 
requirements, professional indemnity insurance generally is required to cover legal 
liabilities arising from the relevant transactions. 
The developed models, discussed above, generally require the reinsurers to 
separate the insurance monies from the general account of the reinsurers. In the GISC 
model, an Insurance Business Account is formed to hold the monies receiving from 
the premiums and claims 149 . The use of an IBA has been restricted in that it can be 
used only in connection with general insurance business activities. In the NAIC 
Model Act, all funds collected for the (re)insurer's account should be held by the 
reinsurance intermediary in a fiduciary capacity in a qualified financial institutions. 
Although these two models require the insurance monies from premiums and claims 
should be held in a segregated account, it does not mean that such an account is 
deemed as a trust on the behalf of the reinsurers or insurers, particularly under the UK 
approach. In order to enhance the protection of customers, the proposal made by the 
EU Commission in 2000 150 suggested that "the customer's monies shall be transferred 
via strictly segregated client accounts and that these accounts shall not be used to 
reimburse other creditors in the event of the bankruptcy. ' 5 "' Furthermore, this 
proposal adopted the similar approach as under the Intermediary Clause approach in 
the US. This proposal stated that 
(. 4 -member state may lay down the provisions by law "whereby monies paid by 
the customer to the intermediary are treated as having been paid to the undertaking, 
whereas monies paid by the undertaking to the intermediary are not treated as having 
52-)1 
been paid to the customer' 
149 See GISC Rules, Section G: Membership Practice Requirements, Practice Requirement Gl- 
Financial Requirements, supra note 47, at 1692. 
150 See generally Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on Insurance 
Mediation, (Com (2000) 511 final), (2000/213/EEC). 
151 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on Insurance Mediation, art. 4 
(4) (C)(Com (2000) 5 11 final), (2000/213/EEC). 
152 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on Insurance Mediation, art. 4 
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In the case of reinsurance brokers, the reinsurance premiums paid by the 
ceding insurers is treated as having been paid to the reinsurers, whereas claims paid 
by the reinsurers to the intermediary are not treated as having been paid to the ceding 
insurers. In other words, the reinsurers will bear the ultimate loss from the credit risk 
of the reinsurance brokers. 
In comparison, these developed models tend to protect the ceding insurers and 
consequently result in increased burdens on the reinsurers. From the viewpoint of 
protection of ceding insurers, it seems that a legal provision requirement that the 
reinsurers to bear the ultimate loss from credit risk of the reinsurance intermediaries is 
the most efficient approach in promoting the security of insurance monies and for 
protecting the interests of the ceding insurers. It should be noted, however, that the 
insolvency of reinsurance intermediary may affect the solvency of reinsurers and 
hence the financial condition of the primary insurers. In addition, the ceding insurers 
may act as a reinsurer to accept reinsurance business. Unlike other insurance 
customers, the financial burdens imposed on these insurers and reinsurers may have 
an adverse effect on the solvency of insurers. As a result, it is suggp'sted that the 
monies received from the premiums and claims should be regulated prudentially. 
Therefore, the regulation should not only segregate the insurance monies from the 
general account of the reinsurance intermediaries but also should lay down provisions 
regarding limitations on the holding and investing of these insurance monies. 
As a result of the importance of the financial solvency of the reinsurance 
intermediaries, the GISC rules specify solvency requirements. These requirements do 
not, however, specify the method to calculate the solvency margin. Alternatively, the 
intermediary can choose a practical basis either on an "earned basis" or "received 
basis". In addition to the solvency requirement, the GISC Rules require intermediaries 
to make appropriate investment arrangements and to maintain a suitable level of 
liquidity to ensure their financial obligations relating to these insurance funds. 
However, these developed models do not provide particular investment regulation for 
the general account of the reinsurance intermediaries. Although the GISC rules 
regulate the investment of "approved assets" in connection with the insurance 
business account, potential investment risk still exists if the appropriate investment 
regulation is not applied to the general assets and investments of intermediaries. 
(4) (a) (Com (2000) 511 final), (2000/213/EEC). 
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In the event of legal liability arising from professional negligence, the 
proposal issued by the EU Commission and the UK GISC rules require reinsurance 
intermediary to hold professional indemnity insurance or some other comparable 
guarantee 153 . In order to prevent the insolvency of the intermediaries, the professional 
indemnity insurance is essential to safeguard the financial stability of reinsurance 
intermediary and their principals, including the insurers and the reinsurers. No matter 
what other different types of "guarantee" the reinsurance intermediary may provide, it 
is appropriate to require a certain minimum amount of the guarantee or professional 
indemnity insurance against the legal liabilities arising from professional negligence. 
VI. Concluding Observation: Implication of Appropriate 
Reinsurance Intermediary Regulation in Emerging Markets 
In emerging markets, the insurers often rely on reinsurance intermediaries to cede 
insurance risk or to accept reinsurance business. Furthermore, the transactions 
between the insurers and reinsurance intermediaries are generally cross-border. Under 
these circumstances, the regulation of the reinsurance intermediaries becomes 
complicated when it comes to the implementation stage. In addition to this difficulty, 
it should be noted that the enactment of the overly strict regulation might impede the 
freedom of reinsurance transactions and the diversification of insurance risks. 
Learning from the developed regulatory models in the US, EU and the UK, 
several fundamental aspects should be considered when an emerging country seeks 
regulatory reform in this area. To prevent inappropriate transactions costs and to 
develop a viable and comprehensive regulatory regime relating to reinsurance 
intermediary, the development of these regulations should take into account the 
particular market characteristics and existing legal system. 
First of all, a suitable entry requirement should be developed to regulate the 
reinsurance intermediaries who conduct business with domestic insurers. With regard 
to this entry requirement, a registration or licensure approval should be implemented. 
It is suggested that the entry requirements should include the following aspects: 
153 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Insurance Mediation, art. 
4 (3) (COM (2000) 511 final) (200/213/EC), supra note 47, at 2412. Section GI-Financial 
Req u irements -Practical Requirement 19-1.1-19.1.6, General Insurance Standard Council, General 
Insurance Standards Council Rules, June 2000, supra note 47, at 1695. 
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"fitness and propriety" of management (consisting of the competence, practical 
experience and suitability of key staff including the major shareholders); the adequacy 
of capital and liquidity of assets to meet any liability from operation of insurance 
business; and the holding of a certain amount of professional indemnity insurance or 
other comparable guarantee against any legal liability arising from professional 
negligence in connection with the insurance business activities. While some emerging 
markets may already have a regulatory regime relating to insurance intermediary, it is 
appropriate to amend any existing regulations if needed so that they can be applied to 
the reinsurance intermediaries. Notwithstanding the need for a comprehensive 
regulatory framework and set regulatory control, it is suggested that the "flexibility" 
of regulation should be maintained to prevent any distortion of freedom to conduct 
reinsurance business. 
Secondly, the market conduct of reinsurance intermediary should be 
considered as the essential part of a viable regulatory regime. This regulation should 
ensure the reinsurance intermediaries to exercise "reasonable care and skill" in 
carrying on their insurance business. As mentioned above, the approach adopted by 
the NAIC might interfere unduly with the customary agency of law and thus may 
impede the freedom of private contracts. The UK approach, which lays down 
fundamental principles and states numerous illustrative examples, seems a more 
appropriate for emerging market countries. In any event, the reinsurance 
intermediaries should be subject to criteria to ensure that they meet high standards of 
competence and integrity. These criteria would ensure that the reinsurance 
intermediaries exercise "reasonable care and skill" in carrying on their insurance 
business activities and the monies received from premiums and claims would be held 
prudentially. In addition, these criteria should address issues such as the avoidance of 
conflict of interests arising from intermediaries being "dual agents", the avoidance of 
legal disputes among the scope of authority relating to sub-agency, "timely and best 
execution" of transactions, the right of the (re)insurers to terminate the arrangements, 
and the duty of reinsurance intermediary to maintain the relevant documentation. 
Thirdly, the insurance monies held by the reinsurance intermediary should be 
maintained in a segregated account, which should be separated from the general assets 
of the reinsurance intermediaries. The reinsurance intermediaries should be subject to 
minimum standards to ensure that the insurance monies will be held and invested in 
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the relevant insurance business. It is crucial to ensure that in the event of bankruptcy 
of an intermediary these accounts shall not be used to reimburse other creditors. 
Fourthly, it is a common practice that insurers in emerging markets accept or 
assume reinsurance business by means of pool and fronting arrangements. On the 
other hand, the insurers might transfer their insurance risk to other unauthorised 
reinsurers through these fronting arrangements. As a result of legal disputes that may 
endanger the solvency of the insurers and the fronting insurers, the regulation should 
be able to provide a mechanism to monitor these arrangements. Yet, it needs to be 
kept in mind that undue restrictions on these arrangements increase transaction costs, 
and may have a significant adverse impact on the ability of the reinsurers to accept 
insurance risk internationally. It, therefore, would be appropriate to require insurance 
undertakings to disclose the relevant information regarding their risk retention and 
fronting arrangements. 
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Alternative Risk b-ansfer and Reinsurance Regulation: 
Regulatory Issues arising from Financial Reinsurance and 
Securitisation of Insurance Risk 
In addition to the traditional reinsurance vehicle, there are several alternative methods 
to transfer insurers' risk arising from operating and underwriting with respect to the 
insurance business and investments. Such alternative risk-financing techniques' 
typically involve the funding of underwriting risk from life insurance or non-life 
insurance through the capital market and investors 2. Although the underlying risks 
(underwriting risk or other financial risk) are not extraordinary, nor are the subject 
financial structures and instruments necessarily unique (securitisation structures and 
derivative mechanism have existed for the past several decades. ), the application of 
such structures and instruments to existing insurance risks are truly extraordinary and 
unique 3. 
While the development of these risk transfer instruments has increased 
significantly in recent years, this also has raised considerable concerns to regulators, 
accountants, investors and insurers. In general, alternative risk transfer structures for 
insurers can be divided into four categories as folloWS4: 
A. Reinsurance 
As mentioned in the previous chapters, the main function of reinsurance is to transfer 
the insurer's risk to the reinsurers. Traditional reinsurance can transfer all the 
components of an insurer's underlying risk including underwriting risk and timing 
risk. Since the 1960s, financial reinsurance for transferring the "timing risk" and other 
"financial risks" arising from investment, currency exchange and interest rate 
fluctuations, has been developed for developing obtain greater capacity, and smoother 
management of insurer's risk in the Lloyd's market 
5. Regulators have struggled to 
1 See generally Society of Chartered Property and Casualty Underwriters, THE ALTERNATIVE 
MARKET (International Risk Management Institute, 1994). 
2 See Michael P. Goldman, Michael J. Pinsel and Natalie Spadaccini Rosenberg, Legal and Regulatory 
Issues Affecting Insurance Derivatives and Securitization, in SECURITIZED INSURANCE RISK 
STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITIES FOR INSURERS AND INVESTORS 77,77 (Michael Himick ed., 
Glenlake, Chicago 1998). 
3 See id. at 77. 
4 Id. at 80. 
5 See R. L. CARTER, LEALIE LUCAS, & NIGEL RALPH, REINSURANCE 730 (4th ed., 2000). 
Chapter Four Alternative Risk Transfer and Reinsurance Regulation 
develop a suitable regulatory regime and as a result after have ended up considering 
transactions on an individual basis, ad hoc, by looking either at the "economic 
substance" of the product, or at its form 6. 
B. Securitisation of Insurance Risk 
Securitisation of insurance risks provides additional capacity for the insurance and 
reinsurance markets by tapping into capital markets through insurance-linked 
securities. From the viewpoint of investors, insurance- linked securities also offer the 
17 advantage of diversifying their portfolios without bearing "interest rate risk' . 
In 
general, a "special purpose vehicle" (SPV) is created to provide reinsurance coverage 
for the ceding insurers and to issue the insurance- linked securities to investors. A trust 
is also created for collecting funds from investors while ceding insurers pay premiums 
to the SPV in exchange for reinsurance coverage. The ultimate return can be based on 
the actual loss of the ceding insurer, the performance of the related index, the 
occurrence or nonoccurrence of a specific event, or the physical parameters of a 
natural hazard 8. Insurance-I inked securities can be designed both on a "principal-at- 
risk" or on a "principal -protected basis", with variable coupons/or extension of 
9 maturity providing the underlying risk fundings . 
C. Insurance Derivatives 
Insurance derivatives involve the transfer of non-life insurance risk through the 
issuance of one or more derivative instruments, such as an option through the Chicago 
Board of Trade (CBOT) and Bermuda Commodities Exchange (BOCE) and swap 
activity at Catastrophe Risk Exchange (CATEX)10. Under such a transaction, an 
insurer or reinsurer can invest its underwriting risk in the future depending upon the 
performance of that risk as a hedge instrument. In December 1992, CBOT opened the 
See also REINSURANCE PRACTICE AND THE LAW, LLP, at 14-5 (Colin Croly & Michael 
Mendelowitz eds., Service Issue No. 14- 1, March 2000). 
6 See Omar Hameed, Alternative Risk Transfer-Legal and Regulatory Issues, 39 BLG INSURANCE 
LAW QUARTERLY 8,8 (Barlow Lyde & Gilbert, London, Autumn 1999). 
7 Bertil Lundqvist, Catastrophe Bonds as a Method of Securitizing Insurance Risk, in New 
Developments in Securitization 1999, at 801 (Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook Series 
PLI Order No. AO-0033, Practising Law Institute, December 1999). 
8 See Eduardo Canabarro, Markus Finkemeier, Richard R. Anderson & Fouad Bendimerad, Analyzing 
Insurance-linked Securities, FINANCING RISK & REINSURANCE September 1999,3, at 5 
(International Risk Management Institute, 1999). 
9 See Eduardo Canabarro, Markus Finkemeier, Richard R. Anderson & Fouad Bendimerad, id. at 5. See 
also Michael P. Goldman, Michael J. Pinsel and Natalie Spadaccini Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 8 1. 
" See generally SECURITIZED INSURANCE RISK STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITIES FOR 
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first-ever exchange-traded insurance derivatives market to "build a new bridge 
between the insurance and capital markets upon which insurers and reinsurers could 
transfer catastrophe property risk to a large pool of private investor capital" II- 
D. Liquidity and Contingent Capital Facilities 
Unlike other risk transfer mechanisms, liquidity and contingent capital facilities 
typically involve a predetermined obligation to provide financial support to the 
enterprises, the ceding insurer and the reinsurers upon either the occurrence of a 
11 12 specific "trigger , or at the election of the covered party . 
The main function of 
liquidity facilities is to provide funds or capital for the payment of loss during the 
initial periods following a specific event such as a catastrophe. Contingent capital 
facilities "provide the subject entity with the right to put its equity to the contingent 
13 investors" 
Most of the financing risk instruments mentioned above are designed to 
transfer insurance risk from one party to another. Finite risk reinsurance (financial 
reinsurance) and insurance securitisation are based on the reinsurance contract. As 
the main purpose of this volume is to discuss the regulation of reinsurance, this 
chapter will focus on those transactions, formed as reinsurance contracts, including 
financial reinsurance and the securitisation of risk. 
With regard to finite risk reinsurance, the types of instruments will be 
introduced and described, along with their characteristics. This is followed by a 
discussion of relevant regulatory issues arising from such reinsurance contracts. 
Several leading regulatory models, including the United States and the United 
Kingdom, will then be analyzed. Drawing on these developed country regulatory 
models, suggestions based on this comparative analysis will be provided as to 
possible emerging market approaches. 
The second part of this chapter will discuss regulatory issues relating to 
securitisation of insurance risk. First, the general structure of securitisation of risk will 
be identified. Subsections 11 and III follow with an explanation of the motivations for 
INSURERS AND INVESTORS (Michael Himick ed., Glenlake, Chicago 1998). 
11 See Sylvie Bouriaux, Michael Himick, Exchange-Traded Insurance Derivatives: Catastrophe 
Options and Swap, SECURITIZED INSURANCE RISK STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITIES FOR 
INSURERS AND INVESTORS 23, at 24 (Michael Himick ed., Glenlake, Chicago 1998). 
12 Michael P. Goldman, Michael J. Pinsel and Natalie Spadaccihi Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 81-82. 
13 Id. at 82. 
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in surance- I inked securities as taken into account by policyholders, investors and 
insurers, focusing on characteristics that facilitate and hinder transactions. 
Furthermore, the regulatory issues relating to securitisation of risk will be discussed. 
These relevant issues are then categorised into three parts including the issuance of 
insurance-linked securities, the corporate structure of special purpose reinsurers and 
reinsurance regulation relating to these transactions. This will be followed by an 
analysis of certain developed regulatory models and by selective conclusions. 
1. Finite Risk Reinsurance and Reinsurance Regulation 
From the viewpoint of risk management, the principal risk for an insurer is the 
underwriting risk that the losses actually paid differ from the expected losses due to 
"changes in the underlying condition (risk of change), to random events (risk of 
14 
random fluctuations) or erroneous calculations (risk of error)" . In other words, 
underwriting risk arises from a mismatch between the expected losses and economic 
damage from a defined peril, which may range from smoke damage to hurricane 
wind, from slander to malpractice. Apart from underwriting risk, all insurers are 
15 16 17 
exposed to the adverse effects of timing risk , investment risk and credit risk . 
Insurance and reinsurance can either transfer all components of an underlying risk 
(underwriting risk and timing risk), or they often can address timing risk or other 
financial risk including investment risk and credit risk, with a less -than -complete 
transfer of subject underwriting risk. The latter form of reinsurance arrangement was 
traditionally known as "Financial Reinsurance" during the 1980s, whereas it is now 
commonly known as "Finite Risk Reinsurance 
1891 
. 
Since the 1960s, a variety of innovative reinsurance products have been 
14 See Swiss Re, Alternative Risk Transfer via Finite Risk Reinsurance: an Effective Contribution to the 
Stability of the Insurance Industry, 5 SIGMA 1, at 11(1997). 
15 "Timing risks" result from erroneous expectations relating to the rapidity of "settlement risk". If the 
actual time of claim settlement is earlier than the planned one, it will reduce the investment earnings 
because interest-bearing capital in the form of technical provision is lost earlier than expected. See 
Swiss Re, id at 11. See also R. L. CARTER, LEALIIE LUCAS, & NIGEL RALPH, supra note 5, at 
735. 
16 Investment and currency exchange risk mainly are divided into three part: investment risk, interests 
risk and currency exchange risk. The investment risk tends to be affected by the length of the delay 
between the receipt of premium and the payment of liability. See R. L. CARTER, LEALIE LUCAS, & 
NIGEL RALPH, id at 735. 
17 For the ceding insurer, credit risk is the risk that the reinsurer will be unable to pay the amount due 
the ceding insurer because of financial insolvency or other difficulties. See DIANE WALLACE, RISK C) 
TRANSFER IN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY REINSURANCE TRANSACTIONS 6 
(Reinsurance Section of the Society of Actuaries, Schaumburg, August 1995). 
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developed to "enable individual's organisations and insurance companies to better 
99, 
manage financial risks' . As the use of these arrangements could especially optimize 
the balance sheet as well as contradict the "true and fair view" principle in some 
cases, these arrangements are gaining increasing the attention of supervisors and tax 
authorities. The initial function of reinsurance is to transfer the liability for potential 
future losses arising from actual insurance underwriting risks 20 along with the 
premium corresponding to such risks. Finite risk reinsurance, however, mainly 
transfers finite risk 21 that could affect the reality of future profits (e. g., investment and 
interest profit) of insurance companies from future loss payments through a 
deterioration of an insurer's loss reserves. This controversial reinsurance contract 
plays an important focus in the issue of reinsurance and solvency regulations 22 . 
A. Types of Finite Risk Reinsurance and their Characteristics 
Due to the complexity and diversity of finite risk reinsurance, it is difficult to 
surnmarise adequately their different types. Nevertheless, it has been observed that 
finite risk contracts can be divided into two main categories; namely retrospective loss 
reinsurance, which reinsures existing business, and prospective loss reinsurance, 
23 which reinsures future business 
1. Retrospective loss contracts 
A retrospective loss reinsurance is a contract where under a reinsurer provides a 
ceding insurer with the coverage for liabilities incurred as a result of past events 
18 See Michael P. Goldman, Michael J. Pinsel and Natalie Spadaccini Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 80. 
19 See R. L. CARTER, LEALEE LUCAS, & NIGEL RALPH, supra note 5, at 730. See also 
REINSURANCE PRACTICE AND THE LAW, supra note 5, at 14-5 (Service Issue No. 14-1, March 
2000). 
20 64 Underwriting risk is against the resulting economic damage from a defined peril, which may range 
from smoke damage to hurricane wind, from slander to malpractice. " ROSE PHIFER, 
REINSURANCE FUNDAMENTALS-TREATY AND FACULTATIVE 99 (1996). 
21 There are several types of finite risk. For example, investment return risk is the uncertainty as to the 
ultimate investment return that a reinsurer will earn, other than by reason of the timing risk, on net 
moneys accruing under a reinsurance contract. See The Institute of Chartered Accountants in English 
and Wales, Accounting for Non-Life Financial Reinsurance: A Discussion Paper, at 6(1992). 
22 For example, The Insurance Committee in OECD discusses major recent policy issues in solvency 
regulations which include financial reinsurance. See OECD, INSURANCE IN FINANCIAL, 
INVESTMENT, TAXATION AND COMPETITION, at 3, (12 April 1998) available at 
. zi>. <http: //www. oecd. oria/search97c, ai/s97 ci 23 See R. L. CARTER, LEALEE LUCAS, & NIGEL RALPH, supra note 5, at 740-750. See also 
Daniel S. Jones & Richard N. Glaser, Finite Risk Reinsurance-A Year 2000 Solution, FINANCING 
RISKS & REINSURANCE December 1998,3, at 9-10(1998). P. T. O'NEILL, & J. W. 
WOLONIECKI, THE LAW OF REINSURANCE IN ENGLAND AND BERMUDA 313(1998). 
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covered under contractS24. In general, retrospective loss contracts are used for "long- 
tail" business (i. e., liabilities insurance in which the reinsured may obtain the effective 
benefit of discounting reserves to allow for the time value of money)25. 
a. Funded cover contract 
At the end of the 1960s, many Lloyd's syndicates developed the initial form of 
financial reinsurance that was commonly called "rollovers". Under this arrangement, 
these Lloyd's syndicates received from the reinsurer the entire premium paid, together 
with interest at an agreed rate or that was earned through the investment of the 
reinsurer. When the syndicates produced an underwriting profit in good years, part of 
the profit would be paid as a reinsurance premium to the reinsurer. The premiums 
were "rolled over" from year-to-year together with interest or investment profit and 
then were put into a fund available for return to the syndicates whenever they 
wished 26 . It has 
been argued that such an arrangement can be deemed a genuine 
reinsurance contract, because there is no transfer of insurance risk to the reinsurer. As 
a result, the UK Inland Revenue investigated rollovers in the 1980s and Lloyd's 
reached an overall settlement with the Inland Revenue for a figure of around E40 
million in 1985 27 . 
"Funded cover" contracts mainly provide reinsurance recoveries in the future 
for ceding insurance enterprises. The premium paid by the ceding enterprises was 
based simply on the present value of the agreed series of payments. The payment 
from the reinsurer is structured on a financial basis rather than on an indemnity basis. 
As a result, there is no transfer of underwriting risk between the reinsured and the 
reinsurer. Under these contracts, the reinsurers guaranteed a schedule of future 
settlements on a particular block of business written by the ceding insurer. The ceding 
insurer can obtain the benefit of discounting reserves arising from the difference 
28 between the premium paid and the reserve initially established 
b. Loss portfolio transfer agreements 
24 See Daniel S. Jones & Richard N. Glaser, id at 9. 
25 See REINSURANCE PRACTICE A-ND THE LAW, supra note 5, at 14-6 (Issue No. 14-1 March 
2000). 
26 See id at 14-5. 
27 See P. T. O'NEELL, & J. W. WOLONIECKI, supra note 23, at 312. See also REINSURANCE 
PRACTICE AND THE LAW, id. at 14-5 (Service Issue No. 14- 1, March 2000). 
28 See R. L. CARTER, LEALIE LUCAS, & NIGEL RALPH, supra note 5, at 74 1. 
158 
Chapter Four Alternative Risk Transfer and Reinsurance Regulation 
The early forms of loss portfolio transfers were commonly called "time and distance 
29 
contracts" among the Lloyd's syndicates . The payment of reinsurance recoveries 
was structured on a financial basis relating to interest and investment of premiums 
rather than on an indemnity basis corresponding to the actual loss arising from 
liability to the policyholders. Furthermore, the payment made by the assuming 
reinsurer was paid in accordance with specified schedules, regardless of the ceding 
insurer's underlying loss development. As a result, there was no transfer of 
underwriting risk to the reinsurer. 
Following "time and distance contracts, " "loss portfolio transfer" (LPT) 
agreements have been developed to transfer liability arising from a particular book of 
discontinued or expired insurance policies, along with sufficient cash to cover loss 
and loss adjustment expense to a reinsurer. The premium paid by the ceding insurer is 
approximately equivalent to the net present value of the loss reserve of the ceding 
insurer 30 . The reinsurer "assumes not only liability for payment of outstanding losses 
but also responsibility for handling their ultimate settlement". Therefore, such an 
agreement can be a "viable and cost-effective alternative to a potentially costly, long 
term run-off of outstanding claims"31 . On the other hand, the assuming reinsurer can 
also obtain the profit of future cash flow arising from investment income on the loss 
reserve relating to discontinued or expired insurance policies transferred from the 
ceding insurer. In practice, LPTs allowed the ceding insurer to transfer certain lines of 
insurance immediately. Additionally, LPTs were often used for the ceding insurer to 
arrange mergers and acquisitions 32 , as well as to expand other 
lines of business. 
c. Retrospective aggregate loss agreements 
These contracts which are similar to LPT contracts allow the ceding insurer to transfer 
both outstanding losses as well as incurred but not reported losses on a block of 
existing business. Unlike other LPTs, a retrospective aggregate loss agreements 
(RAL) contract provides the ceding insurer with the coverage on a specified portfolio 
business with an aggregate limit of an agreed amount, usually without any annual 
limit. The premium is based on the discounted value of an estimated schedule of loss 
29 See Andrew Barile, Finite Risk Reinsurance, in Reinsurance's Technical Report, Vol. 25 No. 10, at 7 
(Timothy Benn, January 1995). 
30 See Swiss Re, supra note 14, at 13. 
31 See Andrew Barile, supra note 29, at 9. 
32 Swiss Re, supra note 14, at 15. 
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payments. Under this contract, 44a timing risk is introduced If a contract provides for 
the payment of ultimate net losses over an agreed amount (or in excess of a specified 
loss ratio) at the time when they are actually incurred" by the ceding insurers 33 . 
d. Retrospective excess of loss agreements 
"Retrospective excess of loss agreements" (RYCL), which are also called adverse 
development covers (ADCS)34, provide the ceding insurer with the coverage for the 
ultimate cost of outstanding and incurred but not reported losses that exceed a 
specified amount. In addition, RXLs may extend their cover against losses, which 
have been incurred but for which inadequate reserves have been made, or cover the 
35 credit risk arising from insolvent reinsurers 
2. Prospective loss contracts 
A "prospective reinsurance contract" is one where the reinsurer provides a reinsured 
with protection in relation to future losses on existing and future business. Prospective 
contracts can be used to provide protection against catastrophe losses such as 
windstorms or hurricanes and to smooth fluctuations in a reinsured's business 36 . The 
premiums paid by the ceding insurer are based on the scope of the underwriting risk 
and take into account the net present value of loss payments expected during the term 
of the contract37. 
a. Prospective aggregate excess of loss covers 
"Prospective aggregate excess of loss contracts", or "spread loss" contracts 38 , are 
designed to spread losses in annual net loss experience over time. Under this cover, 
the ceding insurer pays a predetermined annual premium into an "experience 
account", which is used to pay for loss payments arising from liabilities of the ceding 
insurer and should earn investment income that is to be credited to the fund balance. 
However, if the account can not meet the loss payment, the ceding insurer is to pay 
higher premiums to compensate part of this account 39 . On the other 
hand, "such 
33 See R. L. CARTER, LEALIE LUCAS, & NIGEL RALPH, supra note 5, at 743. 
34 Swiss Re, supra note 14, at 23. See also R. L. CARTER, LEALIE LUCAS, & NIGEL RALPH, id. 
at 745. 
35 See Swiss Re, id at 17. 
MR. L. CARTER, LEALIE LUCAS, & NIGEL RALPH, supra note 5, at 741. 
37 See Swiss Re, supra note 14, at 16. 
38 See Andrew Barile, supra note 29, at 11. See also P. T. O'NEILL, & J. W. WOLONIECKI, supra 
note 23, at 315. 
39 See Swiss Re, supra note 14, at 21. 
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agreement can use profit commissions in which a portion of premium is returned to 
the ceding insurer in the event the reinsurer suffers no IOSS, 940. The main function of 
this cover for a ceding insurer is that it protects both its income and balance sheet 
against adverse loss experience up to the reinsurance limit, while a ceding insurer is 
seeking to either expand new lines of business or to engage in a merger or 
acquisition 41 . 
b. Financial quota share reinsurance 
Under such an agreement, the ceding insurer transfers a portion of its unearned 
premiums to the assuming reinsurer and then receives a ceding commission, which is 
treated as current income and which is intended to increase the ceding insurer's 
statutory SUrPIUS42. Unlike quota share reinsurance, the payment does not correspond 
to the equivalent percentage of claims, although the reinsurer under the financial 
quota share reinsurance receives a predetermined percentage of the net premi UMS43. In 
addition, the reinsurer typically limits its liability expressed as an absolute sum or a 
44 "loss ratio" or a percentage of reinsurance premiums 
B. Regulatory Issues arising from Financial Reinsurance and Finite Risk 
Reinsurance 
While financial reinsurance and finite risk reinsurance may offer several benefits to 
the ceding insurers, they also raise potential risks, particularly as to the financial 
solvency of the ceding insurers. Through financial reinsurance that helps smooth the 
ceding insurer's fluctuations on investment risks rather than on substantial insurance 
risks, the balance sheet of the ceding insurer and the reinsurer may give a misleading 
view of its financial positions. Consequently, loss reserves may be inappropriately 
reduced by the amount of finite risk reinsurance and may be inadequate to meet the 
payments for liabilities to policyholders. As a result of misleading financial reporting, 
"the truth and fairness, comparability, and consistency of the published financial 
statements of insurers and reinsurers may be impaired . 
451 'Additionally, in some finite 
risk reinsurance, such as time and distance policy, it can amount to no more than a 
40 Andrew B arile, supra note 29, at 11. 
4'R. L. CARTER, LEALIE LUCAS, & NIGEL RALPH, supra note 5, at 746. 
42 See Andrew Barile, supra note 29, at 8. 
43 P. T. O'NEILL, & J. W. WOLONIECKI, supra note 23, at 315. 
44 See R. L. CARTER, LEALEE LUCAS. & NIGEL RALPH, supra note 5, at 748. 
45 See The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, supra note 21, at 3. 
161 
h Chapter Four Alternative Risk Transfer and Reinsurance Regulation 
loan facility, in the form of an insurance contract, to postpone the financial impact of 
claims on the ceding insurerS46. 
In some jurisdictions, insurance regulations may prohibit insurers from 
carrying on any transactions that are not true reinsurance. For instance, in the United 
Kingdom Section 16 (1) of the Insurance Companies Act 1982 requires that an insurer 
"shall not carry on any activities, in the United Kingdom or elsewhere, otherwise than 
in connection with or for the purpose of its insurance contracts. " If the reinsurers are 
conducting transactions that are not reinsurance, then they may "lose their licenses, be 
subject to penalties or other disciplinary measures, find the contracts unenforceable, 
and be the subject of actions by shareholderS47,. In addition, the insurer who engages 
in such a transaction also is subject to relevant investment requirements and solvency 
regulation. 
C. Recent Regulatory Developments and Finite Risk Reinsurance 
The dynamic character and complexity of financial reinsurance and late finite risk 
reinsurance, which could optimize the balance sheet and could contradict the "true 
and fair view" principle in some cases, has raised accounting, insurance regulation 
and taxation issues. Consequently, the structure of contract has been affected by the 
responses of accounting bodies, tax and regulatory authorities 48 . Several attempts 
relating to the accounting treatment of financial reinsurance and finite risk reinsurance 
have been made to define what constitutes a reinsurance contract and to analyze the 
essential characteristics of reinsurance. 
1. United States 
The rules in 1992 adopted by the US Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
were set out in Statement No. 113 (FAS 113). The risk transfer requirement in FAS 
113 is that there must be "a reasonable possibility that there is a significant loss to the 
reinsurer" under a reinsurance contract. Any contract that fails to meet this 
requirement must be accounted for as a financing transaction. The risk transfer 
requirements in FAS 113 are referred to as the "9a test" and the "9b test". The former 
requires that "the reinsurer must assume significant insurance risk (timing and 
46 See Jonathan Miles & Diana Owen, Accounting For Non-life Financial Reinsurance, 104 JOURNAL 
BRITISH INSURANCE LAW ASSOCIATION 16,17(September 2000). 
47 P. T. O'NEILL, & J. W. WOLONIECKI, supra note 23, at 315. 
48 See R. L. CARTER, LEALEE LUCAS, & NIGEL RALPH, supra note 5, at 736. 
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underwriting risk) under the reinsured portions of the underlying insurance contracts". 
Additionally, "it must be possible that the reinsurer may realize a significant loss from 
the transaction . 
49, ' Although the definition of a significant loss has not been provided 
the FAS 113, the informal guidelines used to define this criterion is that "a 10%-15% 
loss (calculated by dividing the present value of all cash flows between the ceding and 
assuming enterprises with the present value of amounts paid to the reinsurer before 
50 commissions) could be considered to be significant" . FAS 113 applies primarily to 
retroactive reinsurance contracts or loss portfolio transfer contracts under which" an 
assuming enterprise agrees to reimburse a ceding enterprise for liabilities incurred as a 
result of past insurable events. 511, 
This was followed by the FASB's Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF Issue 93- 
6), which further addresses multiple-year retrospectively rated contracts or spread loss 
treaties. In addition to the risk transfer test of FAS 113, it requires that the contract 
must be of a short duration and that the premiums expected to be paid or received 
under the contract must be reasonably estimable and allocable in proportion to the 
reinsurance protection provided 52 . 
The main purpose of the EITF Issue is to 
"effectively eliminate the income statement smoothing benefits previously recorded 
53 by certain companies under these types of contracts" . This guideline mainly applies 
to "spread loss treaties" that make use of experience accounts in order to distribute 
54 loss payments over time 
In order to adopt the concept similar to FAS Statement 113, the National 
Association of Insurance Conunissioners (NAIC) revised Chapter 22 of the 
"Property/Casualty Accounting Practices and Procedures Manual" for statutory 
accounting (Chapter 22 NAIC) in 1994. However, it should be noted that the revised 
49 See COOPERS & LYBRAND, REINSURANCE ACCOUNTING UPDATE 1995: A 
MANAGEMENT GUIDE: A SUPPLEMENT TO IMPLEMENTING FASB STATEMENT 113-A 
MANAGEMENT GUIDE 2(January 1996). In practice, a rule of thumb has been developed to define 
whether a contract will qualify for treatment as a reinsurance contract. To meet this rule, there must be 
at least a 10% chance of a 10% underwriting loss by the reinsurer. See Jonathan Miles & Diana Owen, 
supra note 46, at 20. 50 See id. at 7. 
51 See Swiss Re, supra note 14, at 23. Also See COOPERS & LYBRAND, id. at 2. 
52 See COOPERS & LYBRAND, supra note 49, at 16. 
53 Id. at 16. 
54 Spread loss treaties are often used by the ceding insurers to pay reinsurers for catastrophe risks. The 
contracts provide for an initial deposit premium and retrospective rating based on contract experience 
which is generally tracked through an off-bal ance- sheet account (a fund balance or experience 
account). See Swiss Re, supra note 14, at 23. See also COOPERS & LYBRAND, id at 15. 
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Chapter 22 differs in many ways from FAS 113 and EIFT Issue 93-6, particularly as 
to retrospective contractS55. With regard to the risk transfer criteria, Chapter 22 adopts 
the same test established in FAS 113. If a contract does not meet the risk transfer risk, 
the net consideration paid to the reinsurers should be accounted for as a deposit by the 
ceding insurers. Consequently, such a deposit should meet the requirements of 
relevant insurance regulations in order to be admitted as an asset in the ceding 
company's Annual Statement56. 
2. United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom, recent legal development regarding finite risk insurance have 
taken place as to its accounting, tax and regulatory implications. In this section, three 
main issues relating to finite risk insurance will be discussed. 
a. Accounting treatment forfin ite risk insurance in the United Kingdom 
The first step to develop an appropriate accounting treatment was taken in December 
1991 by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICA). 
"Accounting for Non-life Financial Reinsurance: A Discussion Paper" was prepared 
by the Working Party on Financial Reinsurance set up by the Insurance Sub- 
Committee of the ICA. This discussion paper addresses several main issues, including 
the need for guidance, transfer of risk, recognition tests for reflecting the substance of 
transactions, contract categories, and guidance on the identification of contracts. This 
paper develops guidance on (a) the transfer of risk and its identification; (b) what 
should be and should not be accounted for as reinsurance; and (c) the disclosure that 
57 should be made in various circumstances 
With regard to the need for guidance, it has been observed that "if financial 
reinsurance is accounted for as conventional reinsurance, the balance sheet of both the 
ceding company (or reinsured) and the assuming company (or reinsurer) may give a 
misleading view of their financial positions; published underwriting and operating 
55 For instance, for retrospective reinsurance contracts, Chapter 22 requires that surplus resulting from 
any such contract should be restricted as a special surplus fund until such time as the liabilities 
transferred have been recovered or terminated. However, under GAAP, gains on such transactions 
should be deferred and presented as liabilities and amortized over the estimated settlement period of the 
underlying insurance contract using either the recovery or interest method. COOPERS & LYBRAND, 
id at 38. See also Daniel S. Jones & Richard N. Glaser, supra note 23, at 7-8. 
56 The assuming reinsurers should be appropriately licensed, accredited or otherwise qualified in the 
ceding insurer's state of domicile. Alternatively, the fund should be established and maintained on the Z71 
ceding insurer's behalf. See COOPERS & LYBRAND, id at 16. 
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results may also be distorted .5 8" Due to the lack of generally accepted accounting and 
reporting practices, "the truth and fairness, comparability, and consistency of the 
59 published financial statements of insurers and reinsurers may be impaired 
The types of risk described in this discussion paper are divided into (a) 
underwriting risk, (b) timing risk, (c) investment return risk, (d) credit risk and (e) 
expense risk 60 .A distinction is drawn between timing risk and investment risk. "The 
timing risk has a bearing on the level of funds available for investment, where 
investment income on technical provisions is an integral part of the commercial 
underwriting result (although generally not part of the published underwriting result). 
,, 61 The investment risk relates to the risks associated with the investment function .A 
contract in the absence of any transfer of underwriting risk and/or timing risk is not 
sufficient to categorize the contract as one of reinsurance for accounting purposes. 
However, a contract that transfers no underwriting risk but transfers timing risk is 
sufficient for the transfer of risk and can be deemed a reinsurance contract62. 
Additionally, this discussion paper provides guidance as to the identification 
of contracts. A contract should be accounted for as reinsurance if the ceding insurer's 
insurance risk, including underwriting risk and/or timing risk, has been transferred to 
the reinsurer. The underwriting risk is transferred to the reinsurers if the reinsurer 
assumes a specified proportion or percentage of the ceding insurer's incurred claims 
or exposure to future losses. Furthermore, the terms of the contract, including any 
adjustable features, should not result in the underwriting margin or deficit being fixed 
in advances as a specified single amount. There should remain a reasonable degree of 
57 See The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, supra note 2 1, at 4. 
58 Id. at 3. 
59 Id. at 3. 
60 Underwriting risk is that "Uncertainty as to the occurrence of the loss event and/or the ultimate 
amount of any claim payments". Timing risk arises from "uncertainty as to when gross claims are paid 
and consequently when reinsurance recoveries will become due to the cedant from the reinsurer. " As 
for investment risk, this paper provides that "the investment return risk is the uncertainty as to the 
ultimate investment return which a reinsurer will earn, other than by reason of the timing risk, on net 
moneys accruing under a reinsurance contract". Credit risk is the risk borne by the cedant that the 
reinsurer, by reason of insolvency or otherwise, does not meet its obligation to pay losses, return 
premiums or profit commissions under the reinsurance contract. " Also the investment risk is borne by 
the reinsurer on investing premiums received from the reinsured. Expense risk is the risk relating to 
"uncertainty as to whether expense loadings in the premiums ceded to the reinsurer will be sufficient to 
meet the operating costs of the reinsurer. " Id. at 6-7. 
61 See id. at 7. 
62 "Because the date of the event triggering the claim and the related reinsurance recovery is not 
certain. " As a result, a contract that only transfers timing risk can be deemed a reinsurance contract. Id. 
at 7. 
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potential variability in the ultimate underwriting results in relation to the total 
premiums paid to the reinsurer. On the other hand, if the contract provides for the 
prompt reimbursement of the claim reinsured by the reinsurer, the contract can be 
accounted for a reinsurance contract because the timing risk has been transferred to 
the reinsurer 63 . 
If the contract does not provide for the transfer of insurance risk, the 
transaction should not be accounted for as reinsurance. Consequently, the premium 
paid by the ceding insurer should be accounted for as a cash deposit and not as an 
64 
underwriting transaction . 
The reinsurer should account for the amount repayable to 
the ceding insurer as a liability. As a result, "the difference between the consideration 
paid by the ceding insurer and the recoveries expected to be received from the 
reinsurer should be amortized over the period of the contract by each party as 
965 investment income or interest expense, as appropriate' 
Following this ICA discussion paper, the ICA issued its Financial Reporting 
Exposure Draft, "Reporting the Substance of Transactions" (FRS5), in order to 
require the clear disclosure in accounts of the substance of transactions. In 1994, a 
Technical Release on the "Application of FRSS5 to General Insurance Transactions" 
(FRAG 35/94) was then provided by the Institute. This indicates that "an element of 
either underwriting risk or timing risk would be sufficient for a contract to qualify as a 
reinsurance and to be accounted for as such"66 . 
In relation to accounting standards, the "Statement of Recommended Practice 
for Accounting for Insurance Business" (SORP) that places the emphasis on the 
economic substance of a contract rather than its form was proposed by the 
Association of British Insurers (ABI) in December 1998 67 . 
This states that "the 
economic substance of a general insurance transaction should be reflected in the result 
for the year and the balance sheet68,,. With regard to the determination of the 
economic substance of an insurance transaction, it has been observed that: 
"In considering whether or not a significant transfer of insurance risk has 
63 Id. at 16. 
64 Id. at 17. 
65 Id. at 18. 
66 See R. L. CARTER, LEALIE LUCAS, & NIGEL RALPH, supra note 5, at 737. 
67 Id. at 738. 
68 Id. at 738. 
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taken place under a contract of insurance, the entity should consider first whether it is 
reasonably possible that the insurer may realise a significant loss from the contract, 
and secondly, whether there is a reasonable possibility of a significant range of 
outcomes under the contract. If there is a significant degree of uncertainty in respect 
of the timing of claim payments then, depending on the effect of the contract as a 
69,, whole, timing risk alone may be sufficient to constitute a transfer of insurance risk . 
b. Tax and regulatory implication in the United Kingdom 
The FSA IPRU (INS) Chapter 5, Rule 5.2 (1) provides that "the amount of liabilities 
of an insurance company is respect of long term and general business shall be 
determined in accordance with generally accepted accounting concepts, bases and 
policies or other generally accepted methods appropriate for insurance companies". 
With regard to generally accepted accounting concepts, bases and policies or other 
generally accepted methods, FRS 5 taken with FRAG 35/94 and the SORP 
recommended by the ABI may be regarded as "generally accepted accounting 
methods" in defining what constitutes a reinsurance contract and insurance risk 70 . 
Furthermore, the FSA EPRU (INS) Appendix 9.2, paragraph 26, which provides the 
form of insurance companies' annual returns to the FSA, requires that amounts in 
respect to inwards and outwards contracts of insurance must be classified for 
inclusion in the relevant forms "according to their economic substance in accordance 
with generally accepted accounting practice. 71ý, 
In relation to the positions of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), 
HM TreasurY72 , and the Financial Services Authority, these bodies have emphasised 
the need for full disclosure and for adequate accounting treatment of financial 
reinsurance and finite risk reinsurance. The DTI wrote several letters to authorised 
insurance companies to clarify some regulatory requirements relating to financial 
reinsurance and provided specific guidance. 
69 See Omar Hameed, supra note 6, at 8. 
70 See Ian Mathers, Financial Reinsurance: United Kingdom Regulatory Implication, 
INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 6 Issue 8,247,248(1998). 
71 FSA, Interim Prudential Sourcebook: Insurers Vol. 2, Appendix 9.2, paragraph 26. 
72 Although there is no provision in the Insurance Company Act for the Treasury to give an 
authoritative ruling on the scope of the authoristalon requirement or the prohibition in section 16 of 
non-insurance activities, the regulation of insurance and reinsurance companies by the Treasury is 
accomplished through the annual return. See Ian Mathers, id. at 248. See also P. T. O'NEELL, & J. W. 
WOLONIECKI, supra note 23, at 323. 
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In its Letter dated 22 June 1992 73 
, the 
DTI provides with specific guidance on 
prospective aggregate excess of loss contracts (spread loss contracts). In relation to 
the recognition of liabilities under a spread loss contract, the effect upon the technical 
account balance must be considered. A contingent or prospective liability should be 
taken into account in accordance with Regulation 52(2) of the Insurance Companies 
Regulations 1981 if the statement of balance shows an adverse balance. The 
Director's letter dated 26 May 1995 refers to FRAG 35/94 and states that the regulator 
"expects the guidance in FRAG 94 to be followed..... assets and liabilities should be 
-)ý74 adequately disclosed... 
Although the Financial Services Authority, the Treasury and the DTI have 
shown considerable concern regarding the disclosure and reporting of finite risk 
reinsurance and financial reinsurance, relevant precise guidance, in defining when a 
contract should be deemed a reinsurance contract have not been developed yet by the 
UK regulators 75. 
D. Implication of Reinsurance Regulation and Finite Risk Reinsurance: A 
Comparative Analysis 
From the viewpoint of regulators, the main concern is whether finite risk reinsurance 
will result in misleading statutory reporting through the deterioration of an insurer's 
loss reserves. In general, developed regulation and accounting standards focus on the 
"economic substance" of the transactions, although a definition of "economic 
substance" and the treatment of specified transactions may differ. 
In comparing the two leading developed country models, the main difference 
that exists is in the determination of what constitutes insurance risk. Under the US 
model, the essential components of insurance risk include underwriting risk and 
timing risk according to FAS 113. In contrast, in the UK, insurance risk may comprise 
either underwriting risk or timing risk in accordance with the FRAG 35/94. As a 
result of a timing risk that can constitute insurance risk alone, spread loss transactions 
focusing on timing risk can be deemed a reinsurance contract in the UK, whereas the 
same transaction would be deemed as a "deposit arrangement" rather than a 
73 See REINSURANCE PRACTICE AND THE LAW, supra note 5, at 14-14 (Issue No. 12-1 March 
1999). 
74 Id. at 14-15. 
75 See P. T. O'NEELL, & J. W. WOLONIECKI, supra note 23, at 324. 
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reinsurance contract in the US. 
Furthermore, another difference arises from the regulatory structure of 
financial reporting obligations and results in different treatment for the specified 
transactions. In the United States, FAS 113 is applied to enterprises, whereas the 
model statutory accounting Chapter 22 issued by NAIC is applied to insurance 
enterprises for the purpose of solvency regulation. Statutory accounting principles and 
4ý general accepted accounting principles" (GAAP) in general differ significantly on 
the treatment for the realisation of expenses, but are similar with regard to the 
realisation of revenues 76 . As a result, treatment for the same finite risk reinsurance 
may differ. For instance, any gain arising from retrospective covers is deferred and 
recognized on either the interest method or recovery method. As a result of Chapter 
22 based on the purpose of the solvency regulation, the treatment for retrospective 
loss contracts focuses on adequacy of capital. Therefore, any gain from retrospective 
loss contracts is shown as other income and separated as special surplus until 
77 
recoverables are realised in accordance with Chapter 22 . It should 
be noted, 
however, that this different reporting treatment would impose a burden on insurance 
enterprises to submit two sets of financial reports. Under the UK model, the definition 
of "economic substance" of an insurance transaction is determined by the generally 
acceptable accounting concepts that can be taken into account with FRS 5, FRAG 
35/94 and SORP in accordance with the FSA EPRU (INS). With regard to the 
treatment for these transactions, the UK regulators have a tendency to narrow the gap 
between the statutory accounting and UK "generally accepted accounting principles" 
by moving such transactions from the revenue account into the balance sheet78 . As a 
result, in 1995, the DTI proposed to make explicit provision that "inwards and 
outwards financial reinsurance will be treated in the DTI in according to the same 
principles as apply in the shareholder accounts". 
79 It is likely that the Financial 
Services Authority will provide further specified statutory accounting treatment for 
these transactions based on the UK trend of coordination of accounting methods 
among relevant governmental authorities. 
76 See generally MICHAEL W. ELLIOTT, BERNARD L. WEBB, HOWARD N. ANDERSON & 
PETER R. KENSICKI, PRINCIPLES OF REINSURANCE VOL. 2, at 169-170 (Insurance Institute of 
America, Pennsylvania, 2nd edition, 1995). 
77 See Daniel S. Jones & Richard N. Glaser, supra note 23, at 6-7. 
78 See REINSURANCE PRACTICE AND THE LAW, supra note 5, at 14-11. 
79 See id. at 14-15. 
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In addition to accounting structural difference between the UK and the US, 
FAS 113, EITF Issue 93-6 and Chapter 22 issued by NAIC prescribed more specified 
treatments for finite risk reinsurance than the accounting standards and statutory 
requirements provided in the United Kingdom. First, FAS 113 prescribes different 
accounting treatments for prospective and retrospective loss contracts. For prospective 
loss contracts, reinsurance premiums are required to be treated as prepaid premiums 
and are to be amortised over the remaining contract period. On the other hand, the 
premium paid for retrospective loss contracts are required to be reported as 
reinsurance receivables to the extent that they do not exceed recorded liabilities 
relating to the reinsurance insured. Under UK GAAP, prospective and retrospective 
reinsurance contracts are treated in a similar manner to the treatment of prospective 
reinsurance under US GAAp80. Moreover, there is no specified accounting guidance 
for multiple year, retrospectively rated contracts in the UK, whereas US EITF 93-6 
prescribes specific accounting treatment for these agreements. In the absence of 
specified accounting guidance in the UK, the DTI wrote its letter dated 22 June 1992 
that contains specific guidance regarding spread loss contracts and technical 
accounting balances. 
Although accounting principles have been developed to deal with finite risk 
reinsurance and financial reinsurance, weakness still exists in these developed models. 
There may be conflict arising from the definition of reinsurance. The approach 
developed by accounting bodies and relying on the "economic substance" of 
transactions may be different from the decision made by a court, that may be asked to 
define reinsurance based on the legal concept such as subject matter or insurance 
interest. In addition, the issues relating to finite risk reinsurance and technical 
provisions should be considered prudentially. For the purpose of solvency regulation, 
the requirement of technical provisions is designed to ensure that insurers can meet 
the liabilities arising from the insurance policies and relevant losses. With respect to 
certain finite risk reinsurance transactions, which assume limited underwriting risk, 
the reliability of such transactions and the adequacy of loss reserves should be 
appropriately considered even though these transactions formally meet the criteria for 
a reinsurance contract. For instance, under a spread loss contract, if actual loss 
payment exceeds the estimated payment based on the reinsurance premiums, the 
80 See Jonathan Miles & Diana Owen, supra note 46, at 21. 
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insurer is obligated to pay a further reinsurance premium to compensate the additional 
loss payment. As a result of the possibility of a further premium for loss payment, it 
has been suggested that a reserve should be held for the amount of this contingent 
liability8l. Therefore, it is important to develop methods to estimate the extra reserve, 
taking into account reinsurance contracts regarding the terms, commission provision 
and other relevant provisions that can substantially affect the loss payment and any 
further reinsurance premium. 
To develop appropriate regulation governing the finite risk reinsurance, the 
following aspects should be considered: 
First, basic criteria relating to risk transfer should be developed to enhance the 
transparency of the relative regulation as to the insurers and reinsurers. This criteria 
could be based on the "economic substance" of the transactions or so called "a 
significant risk transfer" and "a possible loss" provided by FSA 113. With regard to 
risk transfer criteria, it would be appropriate that timing risk alone is sufficient to 
constitute a reinsurance because the timing risk arising from the uncertainty of 
liability payment for policyholders will significantly affect the capacity of the ceding 
insurers. This will provide more flexible and less stringent regulatory requirements for 
insurers who suffer the timing risk arising from the assumed insurance risk. In 
addition to development of risk transfer criteria, it should be noted that the criteria 
based on the accounting principles should not be inferred as to what constitute the 
reinsurance contract in law and should only be used to decide the appropriate 
accounting and regulatory treatments. 
Secondly, the issue relating to the econon-Lic substance of transactions should 
take into account the relevant contractual terms that may affect the loss payment from 
the reinsurers and further reinsurance premiums to be paid by ceding insurers, (e. g., 
experience account, the premium payable estimated by reference to a stated or 
implied interest rate, a return of profit commission, cancellation or commutation 
provisions that would result in a loss to the ceding insurers). This should take into 
account the terms of reinsurance contracts as a whole and the analysis of the financial 
outcome relating to the transaction, although this may increase the regulatory costs 
81 See R. C. WILKINSON, D. H. CRAIGHEAD, J. W. DEAN, A. H. S]ILVERMAN, P. K. CLARK 
& M. G. WHITE, FINANCIAL REINSURANCE OF GENERAL INSURANCE, at 17 (Institute of 
Actuaries, UK, 1993) (unpublished a discussion paper presented to the Institute of Actuaries on 27 
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and may place undue burdens on the regulators in monitoring and analysing these 
transactions. Accordingly, the cooperation between auditors, tax authority and 
insurance regulators should be enhanced. 
Thirdly, while one of the characteristics of finite risk reinsurance is being 
multi-year, the security/creditworthiness of reinsurance transactions (i. e., financial 
viability of reinsurers) is the main issue relating to reinsurance regulation. These 
transactions often involve huge amounts of reinsurance premiums, with payments 
being distributed over several years. For example, under loss portfolio transfer 
agreements, the payment of reinsurance recoveries is structured on a financial loss 
event and is distributed along with the investment income during the covered period. 
The financial condition of the reinsurer will have a significant impact on reinsurance 
recoveries. Furthermore, reinsurers who specialise in the area of finite nsk 
reinsurance are often located and registered in less stringent regulated jurisdiction 
such as Bermuda and the Cayman Island. This situation increases the concerns for the 
creditworthiness of reinsurers. Therefore, the regulators should be able to assess the 
reliability of such a transaction and the financial solvency of the reinsurers. 
Fourthly, the adequacy of loss reserves should be considered even though the 
reinsurance transaction meets the risk transfer criteria. The main advantage of finite 
risk reinsurance is the reduction of loss reserves after finite risk reinsurance cover was 
provided. While finite risk reinsurance may lead to an inadequacy of loss reserves, it 
is essential to develop methods to estimate the extra reserves and to analyse the 
possible effect of the contractual terms on the insurer's financial solvency. 
11. Securitisation of Insurance Risk and Relevant Regulatory Issues 
The first step towards the securitisation of insurance risk began following the shortage 
of reinsurance capacity caused by a series of severe catastrophes in the early 1990s 82. 
Feb. 1993),. 
82 With regard to catastrophes in the 1990s and their impact on insurance industry, it has been observed 
by US Insurance Service Office that: 
"In 1992, when Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki struck, a record sixty-three property/casualty insurers 
became insolvent. Fifteen of those insolvencies were directly attributable to the losses those storms 
caused in Florida, Louisiana and Hawaii. In the nine years and ten months from January 1989 to 
October 1998, the US property/casualty industry suffered an inflation-adjusted $98.0 billion in 
catastrophe losses-101.2% more than the inflation-adjusted $48.7 billion in catastrophe losses during" 
the 39 years from January 1950 to December 1988. " In addition, "the population in parts of the United 
States exposed to hurricanes and earthquake rose 24.5% from 1970 to 1990, as the population other 
areas of the country rose 20.7%. And, based on demographic projections provided by NPA Data 
Services, Inc., the population of areas exposed to catastrophe will rise another 36.6. % from 1990 to 
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Consequently, the hardening of the reinsurance market for catastrophe loss coverage 
compelled insurers to look for an alternative source of capacity and caused reinsurers 
to look for alternative means of risk financing capitaI83 . To deal with this situation, 
insurers and financial institutions began to develop ways of securitising catastrophe 
84 risk to attract additional capital from investors and the capital market . After learning 
from the successful "mortgage backed securities" transactions in the early 1980's 85 , 
the major landmark in surance- I inked securities to carry a rating on the underlying 
catastrophe risk-USAA (United Services Automobile Associations, USAA) 
/Residential Reinsurance transaction, was launched in June 1997 86 , providing USAA 
with the coverage of a single hurricane. Subsequent insurance-linked securities and 
similar insurance securitisation structures were developed as an alternative risk 
transfer mechanism to conventional reinsurance and provided insurers with the 
coverage of earthquake, hurricane, windstorm, credit insurance, bankrupcy, 
temperature risk 87 and life insurance risk arising from mortality, expense fees and 
acquisition CoStS88. 
2025. " That means that "exposure growth in those areas increase potential catastrophe losses". See 
Insurance Services Office, Financing Catastrophe Risk: Capital Market Solutions, (January 1999), 
available at<www. iso. com/docs/stud013. htm>(18 August 2000 visited). See also Garry Booth, 
Catastrophe Bonds, in INSURANCE RISK SECURITIES- A GUIDE FOR ISSUERS AND 
INVESTORS 47, at 48 (Garry Booth & Charles J. Allard Jr., ed., 1999). 
83 See INSURANCE RISK SECURITIES- A GUIDE FOR ISSUERS AND INVESTORS, at 16 
(Garry Booth & Charles J. Allard Jr., ed., 1999). 
84 It has been estimated that fifteen property and casualty insurers became insolvent and were directly 
affected by the catastrophes in Florida, Louisiana, and Hawaii. See Insurance Services Office, supra 
note 82. 
85 In order to meet the need to finance collections of mortgages, as early as 1938, The Federal National 
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) started to issue debt guaranteed by the Federal Government of the 
United States. As a forerunner to mortgage securitisation, many companies gathered government 
guaranteed mortgages, packaged them "whole" and sold them to private investor as a new hedge tool. 
See Charles J Allard Jr., The Development of Risk Securitisation, in INSURANCE RISK 
SECURITIES- A GUIDE FOR ISSUERS AND INVESTORS 33, at 21-22 (Garry Booth & Charles J. 
Allard Jr., ed., 1999). 
86 By gaining double B ratings from the main rating agencies, this transaction successfully represented 
that insurance-linked securities had become the significant part of investment grade securities and had 
opened up the market to diversify the investors' portfolio. See INSURANCE RISK SECURITIES- A 
GUIDE FOR ISSUERS AND INVESTORS, supra note 83, at 17. See also Michael S. Canter, Joseph 
B. Cole and Richard L. Sandor, Insurance Derivatives: A New Asset Class for the Capital Markets and 
a New Hedging Tool for the Insurance Industry, Hedge Financial Products Inc. (10 March, 2002) 
available at <http: //www. cnare. com/rescenter/s2k-reports/s2k-insderivatives. htm>. 
87 See Bertil Lundqvist, supra note 7, at 801. 
88 With regard to acquisition costs, for instance, the UK mutual life insurer National Provident 
Institution (NPI) in 1998 securitised the future profits of a block of its life insurance policies through 
Mutual Securitisation Pic which provided cash flow for NPI and improved its financial flexibility to 
expand its business. See Richard H. Bernero, Second Generation OTC Derivatives and Structured 
Products: Catastrophe Bonds, Catastrophe Swaps, and Life Insurance Securiti--ations, in 
SECURITIZED INSURANCE RISK STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITIES FOR INSURERS AND 
173 
Chapter Four Alternative Risk Transfer and Reinsurance Regulation 
A. General Structure of Securitisation of Risk 
The majority of insurance securitisation involves the transfer of catastrophe risk from 
the ceding insurer which has underwritten and transferred catastrophe risk to investors 
who in turn purchase the insurance-linked securities to fund the ceding insurer's risk 
exposure. Additionally, insurance-linked securities have been developed to provide 
coverage of life insurance risk relating to mortality, expense fees and acquisition 
costs. 
In a typical insurance securitisation, a special purpose reinsurers (SPR) will be 
structured and formed as the issuer of insurance-linked securities and the insurer or 
the reinsurer who underwrites an insurance or reinsurance contract for the insured, 
insurer, or reinsurers. Although it might be more effective to transfer insurance risks 
to the capital market directly by means of issuing in surance-I inked securities to the 
investors, the SPR is often necessary because of legal circumstances (e. g., concern for 
"bankruptcy" and relevant regulations) and taxation concerns. SPRs, in practice, have 
often been established in Bermuda or the Cayman Islands, which subject them to 
lower minimum required levels of surplus and capital and a generally reduced level of 
regulatory scrutiny, auditing and financial reporting requirements 89 . The typical 
structural model regarding cash flow and contractual relationships for those insurance 
securitisation transactions are illustrated as follows: 
INVESTORS 39, at 64-73(Michael Hin-&k ed., Glenlake, Chicago 1998). 
89 See Bertil Lundqvist, supra note 7, at 810. See also Michael P. Goldman, Michael J. Pinsel and 
Natalie Spadaccini Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 96-99. 
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General Structure of Insurance Securitisation 
Premium 
Cedant Special Purpose 
Reinsurer 
Proceeds 
Investors 
Reinsurance 
Principal 
Interest 
Principal and 
Investment Income 
Trust 
Proceeds + Premium 
The SPR assumes the risk from the business underwritten by insurers through 
insurance or reinsurance contracts and is formed as an issuer for the insurance-linked 
securities in order to fund its risk exposure under such insurance or reinsurance 
contracts. The ceding insurers pay the premiums of the reinsurance contracts to SPR, 
and these premiums combined with the payment from investors generally will be held 
90 in the trust. Thus, effectively, this trust holds substantially all of the SPR's assets . 
The investment earnings on the invested assets in the trust then will be used to pay the 
SPR's expense, reinsurance claims from the ceding insurers and the return on the 
securities (i. e., include the full principal plus interest payments). 
In relation to the investing bondholders, the return on the securities may be 
structured on the basis of "(1) the occurrence or nonoccurrence of one or more 
referenced event, (11) the performance of a referenced industry index, or (iii) the 
experience of an actual or hypothetical portfolio of insurance business. "91 In addition, 
"the securities can either be subject to principal invasion or be principal protected 
with variable coupon and/or extension of maturity providing the underlying risk 
funding"92 . For 
instance, if a catastrophe occurs or the performance index goes 
beyond the limit, investors may lose all or a portion of their principal. 
90 See Bertil Lundqvist, supra note 7, at 805. 
91 See Michael P. Goldman, Michael J. Pinsel and Natalie Spadaccini Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 8 1. 
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B. Advantage of Securisation of Risk 
From the viewpoint of investors, "in suranc e- linked securities can offer investors 
attractive returns while providing a way of reducing the overall risk of their 
93 
portofolio" . In comparison with other rated fixed income securities, catastrophe 
bonds in their early stages of development have yielded a "spread" over the London 
Inter-Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR). Even after the market has matured and the 
advantages of lower premiums would disappear or at least shrink, profitable 
opportunities may arise again when the capacity of the reinsurance market dries up 
and pricing tightens 94 . 
Catastrophe bonds and other types of insurance securities can provide an 
effective way to diversify their traditional investment portfolios, (e. g, stocks, 
corporate bonds, property, commodities and cash). The return on catastrophe-linked 
securities, which are generally uncorrelated to economy or to other existing 
95 investments, may be considered as "Zero-beta" assets . Noncorrelation indicates that 
the circumstances that cause fluctuations in the performance of some investments will 
not have an adverse impact on those that do not correlate. Thus, catastrophe-linked 
securities, which would not be affected by the overall fluctuations of the stock market 
and other factors such as interest rate and foreign exchange rates, can be treated as 
risk hedges and investment instruments that offer diversification potential to 
6 investors9 
. 
In addition, "the randomness of natural catastrophes is actually less 
susceptible to insider information, moral hazard and potential pricing difficulties than 
other high-yield corporate bonds .,. )97 In order to reduce c ompan y- specific loss 
experience and to improve the analysis of loss probabilities, some catastrophe bonds 
are even designed to link industry losses or other parametric factors (i. e. the Richter 
92 See id. at 8 1. 
93 SWISS RE (New Market), INSURANCE-LINKED SECURITIES 19 (1999). 
94 Id. at 19. 
95 As a matter of fact, the correlation of annual percentage changes of the S&P 500 equity index and 
catastrophe losses was close to zero (r=-0.05, t=-0.33) between 1949 and 1996. Joseph Cole, Insurance 
Risk-Securitisation- The Best of Both Worlds, Risk Publication, (1999)(10 October 2000), available 
at<www. financewise. com/public/edit/riskm/insure/ins-securit. htm>. 
96 See Bertil Lundqvist, supra note 7, at 804. 
97 Joseph Cole, supra note 95. See also R. L. CARTER, LEALIE LUCAS, & NIGEL RALPH, supra 
note 5, at 757. 
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scale levels of earthquakes or the Saffir Simpson scale levels of hurricanes)98 . This 
innovation in programme structuring by developing a parametric trigger mechanism 
delivers several advantages for investors. Firstly, the parametric trigger, which can be 
determined within days, offers investors greater certainty and objectivity". Secondly, 
the transparency of pricing these insurance-linked securities can be enhanced because 
the trigger mainly depends on the physical probability of the occurrence of the 
catastrophic event. As a result, investors do not need to have an intimate knowledge 
00 of the composition of issuers and details of issuers' portfolio of business' . Thirdly, it 
may reduce the scope of "moral hazard". In practice, insurers may tend to exert some 
degree of control over their losses (i. e. mitigation measurers, loss cost). The greater 
the moral hazard arising from insurer's control of the loss trigger the greater the 
payment will be. Therefore, the parametric trigger mechanism, which is often beyond 
the insurer's controllol, can help reduce the moral hazard of insurers. 
From the insurers' perspective, insurance securitisation provides the advantage 
of moderating the price volatility of reinsurance and bringing stability to the insurance 
industry after a major disaster which often causes a shortage of insurance industry 
02 
capacity' . 
In addition to the advantages providing greater capacity to underwrite 
more risk with a given level of capital, insurance-linked bonds can offer special 
features, such as multi-year reinsurance programmes. For instance, it is unlikely that a 
large exposure to a California hurricane risk or a Tokyo earthquake risk could be 
transferred to reinsurers through conventional reinsurance programmes, but these can 
03 be covered with insurance-linked securities' . Furthermore, the credit quality 
is a key 
98 With regarding to deals in the recent years, the trigger of the USAA/Residential Re transition in 1997 
was structured to link the Saffir Simpson scale. In the same year, a SPV named SR Earthquake Fund 
simultaneously issued $ 137 million notes and entered into a $112.2 million contract with Swiss Re 
based on an industry loss index of California earthquake losses determined by P. C. S. (Property Claim 
Services). In 1999, the Oriental Land/ Concentric Re transaction which cover the earthquake losses 
around the Disney theme park near Tokyo also was designed to link the parameters (location and 
severity) of the triggering earthquake. See Joseph Cole, id. See also Alan Punter, Innovations in 
Insurance Linked Securitisation, RISK FINANCIER V61.4 no. 6,8, at 9-11 (June 2000); SWISS RE 
(New Market), supra note 93, at 7-18. 
99 See id at 10. 
100 See Alan Punter, supra note 98, at 11. 
101 When a trigger of insurance-linked bond are determined by industry loss index such as PCS index, 
moral hazard remains a concern. Because PCS index is based on surveys, it is possible to manipulate 
reports and information relating to actual losses by insurers. As a result, moral hazard still exists. See 
Kenneth Froot, Key Ingredients for a Successful Cat Bond Issue, in INSURANCE RISK 
SECURITIES- A GUIDE FOR ISSUERS AND INVESTORS, at 67-68 (Garry Booth & Charles J. 
Allard Jr., ed., 1999). 
102 Bertil Lundqvist, supra note 7, at 803. 
103 Id. at 804. 
177 
Chapter Four Alternative Risk Transfer and Reinsurance Regulation 
advantage that insurance-linked securities can provide while insurers seriously 
consider credit risk with respect to traditional reinsurance programmes. Insurance- 
linked securities can be structured to minimize credit risk. For example, insurers can 
specify that the bond proceeds are invested in highly rated investment grade securities 
to be held as collateral in a SpVI04. 
C. Limitation and Disadvantage of Insurance Securitisation 
An insurer or insured can use a customised approach to securitising catastrophe or 
other risk to strengthen their financial structure and to expand their business. High 
transaction costs, however, is the main obstacle for an insurer or insured in 
securitising their risks. Unlike other standardised, exchange-trade catastrophe 
options' 05 that may offer lower transaction costs, the insurers or insured who 
securitise their risks may encounter considerable administrative expense. In practice, 
these expenses generally include "the definition of the full condition of the insurance- 
linked securities, the drafting, finalisation and distribution of the issue prospectus, and 
finally the placing of the bonds" 106 Legal, accounting and investment expenses may 
be especially high. 
Due to insurance securitisation transaction based on the multiple-year contract, it is 
difficult for the insurer to alter the transaction and to amend the conditions of the 
underlying contract to adopt to nsk developments in its insurance business before the 
maturity of the insurance-linked securities. In addition, the parametric trigger 
mechanism that is often used on a risk securitisation transaction can significantly 
reduce moral hazard from the ceding insurer, but may result in "basis risk" 107 arising 
104 See SWISS RE (New Market), supra note 93, at 17. See also Stephen Walker, The Fusion Of 
Insurance And Capital Markets, RISK FINANCIER V61.4 no. 6,5,5 (June 2000). Bertil Lundqvist, id 
at 804. 
105 Typically, exchange-traded catastrophe options are standardised contracts that provide "the 
purchaser the right to a cash payment if a specified index of catastrophe losses for a specific period 
reaches a specified level -the strike price. " Though purchasing these options, an insurer can use this 
type of securitisation to hedge catastrophe risk or other relevant risk. In practice, these options can be 
traded on the Chicago Board of Trade which use PCS industry loss estimates and the Bermuda 
Commodities Exchange which are based on a family indexes created by Guy Carpenter & Company 
(G-CCI). See Insurance Services Office, supra note 82. See also Sylvie Bouriaux & Michael Himick, 
supra note 11, at 23-37. 
106 See Fred Wagner, Risk Securitzation-An Alternative of Risk Transfer of Insurance Companies, in 
THE GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND INSURANCE Vol. 23 no. 89,574,595(October 1998). 
107 "The term-"basis risk" is used to define the difference that exits between a hedger's (the purchaser 
of the option) loss experience and the loss experience used by the index that underlies the contract. 
Since contract settlement values are predicated on the index value at settlement time, the hedger's 
actual loss experience may differ significantly from the index; the greater the difference, the less 
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from a mismatch between the insurer's actual experience and the cover provided by 
the insurance-linked securities. 
D. Regulatory Issues relating to Securitisation of Risk 
In a typical insurance securitisation transaction, the SPR which is an special legal 
structural vehicle, will be a party to detailed and complex agreements that focuses on 
two primary contractual relationships: first, the SPR's relationship with the insurers 
based on reinsurance contracts and second, the SPR's relationship with bondholders 
based on issuing of insurance-linked bonds. 
In relation to the ceding insurer who transfers its risk to a SPR, the main 
contractual relationship is based on the reinsurance contract. In practice, other 
ancillary agreements would include (1) a collateral security agreements to provide 
security of claims by the ceding insurers, (2) a claims review agreements to review 
the claims made by the ceding insurers, (3)an administrative services agreements 
relating to the SPR, and (4)an investment administrative agreements to control the 
investment of the collateral for claims' 08 . Furthermore, another concern of the ceding 
insurers is that the ceding insurers will be able to reduce their technical reserves by 
the amount of reinsurance provided by the SPR. Therefore, the reinsurance contracts 
between the SPR and the ceding insurers should be drafted as a typical reinsurance 
arrangement governed by applicable insurance laws. 
With regard to the bondholders, they are generally concerned with the terms of 
the bonds themselves, the relevant trust deed that is entered into between the issuer 
and a trustee on behalf of the bondholders, the security documents and the contractual 
arrangements. From a securities law regulatory perspective, the SPR will be required 
to make the "appropriate information and disclosures regarding the SPR itself and the 
nature and risk of the bond on offer" 109 . 
1. Issuance of insurance-linked securities 
The issuance of insurance-linked bonds by an authorised insurer may give rise to 
regulatory concerns and arguably may be deemed a reinsurance contract business in 
effective the hedge. " See DONALD J. RIGGIN, RISK FINANCING IN THE 21st CENTURY: 
SECURITIZATION AND FINANCIAL REINSURANCE 5 (International Risk Management Institute, 
Dallas, 1998). 
108 See Michael Graham, Legal Issues, in INSURANCE RISK SECURITIES- A GUIDE FOR 
ISSUERS AND INVESTORS 89, at 89 (Garry Booth & Charles J. Allard Jr., ed., 1999). 
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most jurisdictions. With respect to the liabilities of the issuers, it will be necessary to 
describe and disclose the risks of loss on the insurance-linked securities in most 
jurisdictions. Due to the lack of insurable interest in these securities, these 
arrangements could arguably be construed to be "wagering contracts" under common 
0 law principles" , which might cause them void and/or illegal. Three main issues 
relating to issuance of insurance-linked securities will be discussed further as follows. 
a. Insurance contract and insurance -Linked securities 
As a result of the similarity of a insurance-linked securities' function to other 
reinsurance contracts that assume an insurer's risks, it is conceivable that investors in 
insurance-linked securities could be deemed to be conducting an insurance business 
and consequently could be subject to insurance regulations. If the investors were 
deemed as to be carrying on an insurance business, they could be found to be 
operating without appropriate authorisation or licenses' 11 . 
Consequently, in such a 
situation, insurance-linked securities would not be enforceable against the issuing- 
12 SPR and the investors may be subject to civil law or criminal statute 1. 
There is limited regulatory and judicial guidance relating to the definition of 
the "business insurance" and the definitions contained in most jurisdictions are too 
13 broad to be drafted with the concept of capital market securities in mind' . 
Nevertheless, it is still arguable to say that an investor would not be deemed to be 
conducting an insurance business by investing insurance-linked securities. In 
comparison with the definition of insurance business, it has been observed that 
46 securities should not be deemed to be conducting insurance business because they 
involve a one-time investment prior to and irrespective of loss occurrence, and as a 
109 See Michael Graham, id at 98. 
110 The common law definition of a "wagering contract" is "two persons, professing to hold opposite 
views touching the issue of a future uncertain event, mutually agree that, upon the determination of that 
event, one shall win from the other, and the other shall pay over or hand to him, a sum of money or 
other stake... ", Carcill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., 2 QB 484,490-491 (1892), cited with approval in 
City Index Ltd v. Lesile, BCLC 643 (1991). Derived from E. Massock, C. Scales, J. Abramson, J. 
Irving, M. C. Veed, G. Leal, R. J. Cata, A. Borrell, 1. Kawaley, and L. Savitt, Recent Developments in 
International Tort and Insurance Law and Practice, 34 TORT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL 519, 
538 (ABA, Winter 1999). 
111 See Michael P. Goldman, Michael J. Pinsel and Natalie Spadaccini Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 108. 
112 See Michael Graham, supra note 108, at 97. 
"' See generally Andrew S. Rowen & William D. Torchiana, Outline of Legal Issues for Insurers and 
Reinsurers Considering Securitization of Insurance Risk, in Nuts & Bolts of Financial Products 2000, 
269,279 (Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series PLI Order No. BO-OOFG, 
1164PLI/Corp269, Practising Insurance Institute, February 2000). See also Michael P. Goldman, 
Michael J. Pinsel and Natalie Spadaccini Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 8 1. 
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result the investor can not be liable for additional payment thereafter"' 14 - 
Furthermore, in relation to insurance interests, if insurance-linked securities are 
designed to be based on an industry-wide losses or an index rather than actual losses 
of the ceding insurers, then this will distance the link between the payment of 
investors and the underlying loss suffered by the SPR under the reinsurance contracts. 
Thus, all these factors should substantially reduce legal uncertainty and legal risk of 
the securitisation transactions being constituted as an insurance contract" 5. 
This issue will be determined by reference to the laws of the jurisdiction in 
which the issuer of insurance-linked securities (SPR) is located and the securities are 
distributed. 
b. Securities laws relating to liabilities of the issuers 
In some jurisdictions, the persons participating in a "distribution of securities" are 
usually liable for inadequate disclosure and the terms of issue of the bond will be 
required to contain sufficient protection for investors. In this context, the jurisdiction 
in which the SPR is located is important. 
"The prospectus or other offering material in relation to the bonds will need to 
contain full and fair disclosure of the terms of the bonds, the underlying reinsurance 
business to which they relate and the risks to investors of investing in these securities, 
particularly where their principal is at risk. 
1 161g In addition, the subordination of claims 
that the bondholders may have against the SPR issuer to the claims of the ceding 
insurers should be disclosed, particularly in jurisdictions where policyholders have 
prionty over other investors' 17 . 
c. Wagering and gambling issues 
Many countries have civil laws rendering gambling and wagering contracts 
unenforceable and have criminal statutes subjecting the violating parties to 
114 See Andrew S. Rowen & William D. Torchiana, id at 28 1. 
115 See Katherine Coates, Hilary Evenett & Cheryl Ronaldson, Securitising Insurance Risk: Legal 
Implication, PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF FINANCIAL MARKET TOOLS TO CORPORATE 
RISK MANAGEMENT 35 (Emap Finance, 1997). See also Omar Hameed, supra note 6, at 9. It 
should be noted that it would increase the basis risk arising from mismatch 
between actual loss of the 
ceding insurers and the payment of reinsurance from SPR. 
116 Katherine Coates, Hilary Evenett & Cheryl Ronaldson, id at 36. See also Omar Hameed, id at 9. 
117 See Michael Graham, supra note 108, at 90. See also Katherine Coates, Hilary Evenett & Cheryl 
Ronaldson, id at 36. 
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prosecution" 8. These laws generally prohibit contracts or arrangements that provide 
for the making of payments based on a fortuitous event beyond the control of the 
parties. With regard to insurance-linked securities based on the occurrence of an 
external event such as a catastrophe or other indices beyond the control of the parties, 
these transactions would be construed as wagering contracts under these 
circumstances. As such, it is arguable that the concept of gambling and wagering 
contracts might be implicated to a broad range of financial investment tools such as 
interest swap, future and options 119 . It generally is believed, however, that the statutes 
relating to gambling or wagering do not apply to financial investment instruments as 
well as insurance- linked securities because they are deemed "commercial contracts" 
exempt from laws or regulations relating to wagering, gaming and gambling 120 . 
2. The structure of special purposes reinsurers (SPR) 
In most jurisdictions, a SPR is required to obtain authorisation or licenses to carry on 
insurance or reinsurance business. Furthermore, in most countries, a SPR is prohibited 
from carrying on non-insurance business that may include any activities relating to 
issue insurance-linked securities' 21 . That explains why 
SPRs historically have been 
licensed as restricted insurers in the Cayman Island, or Guernsey, where statutes have 
adopted the concept of the segregated portfolio or "cell company", or in Bermuda, 
which permits a similar concept of designated investment contracts 122 . Following a 
growing recognition of the advantages of insurance securisation from insurers, 
investors and regulators, attempts are been made to facilitate securisation transactions 
operated domestically by introducing a similar concept to the "protected cell" 
"8See generally Andrew S. Rowen & William D. Torchiana, supra note 113, at 284. 
119See id. at 285. 
120 See Bertil Lundqvist, supra note 7, at 810-811. 
12 1 For instance, in the United Kingdom Section 16 of Insurance Companies Act 1982 provides that: 
"An insurance company .... shall not carry on any activities, 
in the United Kingdom or elsewhere, 
otherwise than in connection with or for the purposes of its insurance business. " See Michael Graham, 
supra note 108, at 93. 
122 For instance, The Cayman Islands ( The Companies (Amendment) (Segregated Portfolio 
Companies) Law, 1998) and Guernsey (The Protected Cell Companies Ordinance 1997). A protected 
cell company, which is a modern derivative of the capital company, is a single legal entity comprising a 
number of separate cells. "The assets and liabilities of one portfolio or cell generally are insulted from 
the generally business and liabilities of the company and those relating to another portfolio or cell, and 
any assets not allocated to a specific portfolio or cell are considered to be general assets of the 
company". See Michael P. Goldman, Michael J. Pinsel and Natalie Spadaccini Rosenberg, supra note 
2, 
at 97. See also REINSURANCE 
PRACTICE AND THE LAW, supra note 5, at 14-4 (Issue No. 14- 1, 
March 2000). 
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legislation in the United States 123 . 
Apart from regulatory issues relating to carrying on insurance business, the 
corporate structure of the SPR tends to be driven by the relevant regulatory system 
and tax regime because the SPR generally does not "involve any material financial 
124 
opportunity to residual equity holders" . 
Under this circumstance, the SPR should 
avoid being treated as "engaged in a trade or business" in some highly regulated 
jurisdictions. Therefore, substantive negotiations over reinsurance contracts and other 
agreements relating to the formation of the SPR, the invested proceeds of the 
insurance-linked securities, and operating activities should be held outside these 
125 jurisdictions 
In addition to tax and regulatory reasons, the SPR should be operated 
independently from the ceding insurers in order to reduce actual or potential conflict 
of interests between the ceding insurers and the investors. Nevertheless, the structure 
of the SPR generally should be approved by the ceding insurers such as to the location 
of the SPR, the arrangements concerning the security of over fund raised by the 
reinsurance premium and the nature and structure of the insurance-linked securities 126 . 
In relation to investors' interest, arrangements, generally to be provided in a trust deed 
for investors, would include the following: 
(1) Controls on creating security over the SPR's assets or SPR incurring debt 
or giving credit by the SPR; 
(2) Restrictions on the acceptance of risks and the manner of settlement of 
claims; 
(3) Provision of appropriate information to the investors by the SPR; 
(4) Regarding the reinsurance contracts with the ceding insurers, ensured by 
the SPR that the reinsurance arrangements will not be replaced or amended and the 
123 In the United States, Illinois and Rhode Island have already introduced their own protected cell 
legislation. See Garry Booth, Convergence and the Future, in INSURANCE RISK SECURITIES- A 
GUIDE FOR ISSUERS AND INVESTORS 99, at 104 (Garry Booth & Charles J. Allard Jr., ed., 
1999). 
124 See Michael P. Goldman, Michael J. Pinsel and Natalie Spadaccini Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 98. 
125 See generally Bertil Lundqvist, supra note 7, at 811. See also 
Andrew S. Rowen & William D. 
Torchiana, id at 296-299. 
126 See Michael Graham, supra note 108, at 91-92. 
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corporate structure of the SPR will not be merged, consolidated or changed 127 . 
Furthermore, the applicable tax regime will substantially affect the structure of 
the SPR. Tax liability for the SPR mainly exists in relation to any profit it makes. For 
instance, in the United States, the SPR would be subject to a relative high income tax, 
which would substantially reduce the return to investors and would increase the 
transaction costs on the insurance securitisation if they were found to be engaged in a 
128 "trade or business" within the United States . Alternatively, an SPR often intends to 
treat itself as a "passive foreign investment company" (PFICs) because the insurance- 
linked securities may be treated as "equity interest" for U. S. federal income tax 
purposes. In relation to this election, "investors in the bonds agree to the treatment of 
29 
the SPRs as PFICs and covenant to take no action inconsistent with that treatment"' . 
3. Reinsurance contract and SPR 
As mentioned above, the main contractual relationship between SPR and the ceding 
insurer is based on the reinsurance contract transferring the ceding insurer's risk to 
SPR. The main motive of the ceding insurers in insurance securitisation transactions 
is to reduce its technical reserves by the amount of reinsurance contracts offered by 
the SPR. As a result, in some jurisdictions, an SPR is required to demonstrate its 
financial solvency or to provide appropriate collateral arrangements in order to meet 
the requirements of domestic insurance regulation relating to reinsurance 
arrangements 1 30 . 
With respect to the financial solvency of an SPR, it would affect the solvency 
credit that an insurer could take for a reinsurance contract in some jurisdictions where 
131 
the regulators prudentially monitor the financial condition of the SPR . In this 
regard, it should be noted that the SPR often has no significant assets other than the 
proceeds of the issue of the insurance-linked securities. Thus, counter-party risk still 
127 See generally id at 90-98. 
128 In this case, "the SPR would be subject to US income tax at a rate up to 35 %, and 30% branch 
profit tax, on their income computed without any reduction for interest on securities they issue, 
resulting in an effective U. S. federal income tax rate up to 54.5%". See Bertil Lundqvist, supra note 7, 
at 811. 129 See id at 81 L 
130 In the United States, if an SPR is established in offshore and is not licensed or accredited as an 
insurance company or reinsurer, "a reinsurance trust usually is required to enable the ceding insurer to 
take "credit" for the reinsurance provided by the SPR. " In other words, a reinsurance trust is to enable 
the ceding insurer to reduce its technical reserve for the reinsurance provided by the SPR. See Michael 
P. Goldman, Michael J. Pinsel and Natalie Spadaccini Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 98-99. See also 
NAIC, Section 2D of the NAIC Creditfor Reinsurance Model Law. 
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remains in the reinsurance contract and may arise from the SPR being unable to meet 
its obligation, particularly when the arrangements cover a relatively long period of 
time. As a result of this risk, the ceding insurers, investors and regulators should pay 
careful attention to ensure that the proceeds of the issue and the premiums paid will 
be sufficient to meet the SPR's obligation arising not only under the reinsurance 
contracts but also under the issue of insurance-linked securities. In practice, the 
ceding insurers may require the SPR to invest conservatively and to provide collateral 
arrangements such as the deposit of collateral, a letter of credit' 32 . 
In relation to 
collateral arrangements such as through a "reinsurance trust" in the United States, 
these arrangements usually are required to help provide financial security to the 
ceding insurer and should invest and be operated for the benefit of the ceding 
133 insurers 
E. Recent Regulatory Development relating to Insurance Securitisation 
Transactions 
The need to create some forms of effective regulatory mechanism has been confirmed 
by the continued growth in the use and increased complexity of insurance 
securitisation transactions in international insurance markets. While the development 
of insurance transactions raises a large number of regulatory and legal issues, the most 
important challenge is the facilitation of such an arrangement which ensuring that all 
of the securitisation transactions are subject to prudential supervision and regulation. 
Several attempts by regulatory authorities have been made to meet this challenge. 
1. Illinois Insurance Exchange and NAIC Protected Cell Company Model 
Act 
It has been estimated that from 1997 to 1998, approximately $2 billion in international 
insurance reinsurance capacity has been created through insurance securitisation 
transactions' 34 . While most of these transactions took place 
in jurisdictions such as 
Barbados, Bermuda and the Cayman Islands 135 , the National 
Association of Insurance 
Commissioners and insurance regulators in several states of the U. S. have launched 
131 See Katherine Coates, Hilary Evenett & Cheryl Ronaldson, supra note 115, at 36. 
132 See id. at 35. 
133 See Michael P. Goldman, Michael J. Pinsel and Natalie Spadaccini Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 99. 
134 SWISS RE (New Market), supra note 93, at 3. 
135 See David Alberts, Bringing Insurance Securitisation Onshore in the US, REACTIONS, May 1999, 
at 46. 
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initiatives to create a regulatory framework to allow insurance transactions operated 
on-shore by adopting the "Protected Cell Company Model Act' 
Before the creation of a similar regulatory framework in several states, the 
Illinois Department of Insurance had adopted its Regulation 27, filed by the Illinois 
Insurance Exchange (known as "Inex"), which allows property and casualty insurers 
to fund insurance liability through insurance securitisation. Consequently, the first 
state-regulated securitisation transaction, Kemper Insurance Companies/Inex, was 
completed in April 1999. In this securitisation transaction, Kemper Insurance 
Companies issued insurance-linked securities through an "Index syndicate" and 
obtained the coverage for Midwest earthquake catastrophes by funding a fully 
collateralised reinsurance arrangement. 136 
In general, a "protected cell" would be a custodial account established to hold 
and to invest protected cell assets from the protected cell company's general account. 
A protected cell account is segregated and insulated from the protected cell 
company's general assets and liabilities. 
a. Illinois Protected Cell Legislation 
The basic regulatory framework regarding protected cell legislation introduced by 
Illinois, namely Regulation 27, sub section C: limited syndicates, is as follows: 
(1). Authorisation of insurance securitisation: A limited syndicate may 
participate in the securitisation of insurance and reinsurance risk ("insurance 
securitisation") as reinsurer, co-participant, investors or otherwise; provided, however, 
such limited syndicate shall engage in no other business during the period of time in 
which it participates in insurance transaction. A special purpose limited Syndicate that 
intends to participate in insurance transaction must receive the prior approval of the 
Board for each proposed transaction 137 . 
In determining whether to grant such 
approval, the Board shall consider the business plan describing the proposed 
insurance securitisation, the parties involved in this transaction and the impact on 
Exchange (Illinois Insurance Exchange) 138 . 
(2). Operation and investment: A limited syndicate may conduct or engage in 
136 See id. 
137 See Garry Booth, supra note 82, at 104. 
138 See id. at 105. 
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any activities and enter into any agreements and transactions, as may be necessary or 
139 appropriate to effect insurance securitisation 
(3). The trust established to secure the financial condition of the SPLS: The 
Special Purpose Limited Syndicate shall establish a trust to secure the Special Purpose 
Limited Syndicate's maximum aggregate potential reinsurance or participation 
obligation to the syndicate or limited syndicate 140 . With respect to the trust, the trustee 
shall be a financial institution with one or more offices located in the State of Illinois. 
The assets deposited in the trust account shall consist of cash; or commercial paper 
with a certain rating (Al or better) from specified rating agents such as Standard & 
Poor's Rating Services; or other assets to ensure the financial solvency of the Special 
Purpose Limited Syndicate 141 . The assets 
held in trust shall be for the benefit of the 
syndicate or limited syndicate and a secondary beneficiary of the trust may be the 
insured or ceding company. The trust agreement shall have those standard provision 
for such agreements as contemplated by Section 173.1 of the Illinois Insurance Code 
(215 ILCS 5/173.1) and Illinois Insurance Regulation 1104.70(50111. Adm. Code 
§ 1104.70 ). In addition, "such trust agreement shall provide for the return of assets by 
the trustee to the Special Purpose Limited Syndicate upon the receipt by the trustee of 
a certification' 42 . 
In order to "satisfying the risk limitation, risk ratio and reserve 
provisions of these Regulations, the Act and applicable provisions of the Illinois 
Insurance Code, and in calculating risk-based capital and reserve, the retained risk of 
a Special Purpose Limited Syndicate shall be that amount of risk that is in excess of 
the assets held in the trust established to secure the Special Purpose Limited 
143 Syndicate's obligations to the syndicate or limited syndicate" 
(4). Reporting requirement: In order to assess the financial security of such a 
transaction, this legislation prescribed specified provisions addressing the reporting 
requirements. It should be noted that the financial statement can be simplified to an 
annual statement if the statement is certified by the Manager of the Special Purpose 
Limited Syndicate. This will significantly reduce the transaction costs. 
It has been stated that "The periodic reporting requirements of Section 17 may 
139 Id. at 105. 
140 Id. at 105. 
141 Id. at 105-106. 
142 Id. at 106. 
143 Id. at 107. 
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be modified for a Special Purpose Limited Syndicate to permit substituting for an 
annual statement a simplified annual financial statement that is certified by the 
Manager of the Special Purpose Limited Syndicate, and to waive the requirements or 
quarterly statements, actuarial reports and certifications, and annual business plan"144. 
(5). Corporate Issue relating to acquisition of control or change in control: The 
acquisition by a person of voting securities shall not constitute an "acquisition of 
control" or "change in control" of the Special Purpose Limited Syndicate unless 
otherwise specified in the Director's approval of a proposed insurance transaction. 
This approval shall be deemed to be a determination by the Director that such control 
transaction will not result in an acquisition of control of the Special Purpose Limited 
Syndicate for purposes of Section 131.4 of the Illinois Insurance Code (215 ILCS 
145 5/131.4) 
(6). Insurance contract issue: It is arguable that the investor of insurance- 
linked securities could be construed as carrying on insurance business in most 
jurisdictions. This legislation has been established to clarify the uncertainty that the 
purchaser of securities might be found as conducting insurance business, and to 
provide that the purchase of securities issued by a Special Purpose Limited Syndicate 
or any person controlling or holding a debt or equity interest in, dose not constitute 
the transaction of an insurance business. In this regard, the underwriters or selling 
agents involved in an insurance transaction would not be deemed to be conducting an 
insurance or reinsurance agency, brokerage, intermediary, advisory or consulting 
146 business, either 
b. NAIC Protected Cell Company Model Act 
On September 21 1999, the NAIC Financial Condition Subcommittee adopted the 
Protected Cell Company Model Act. This act is designed to allow the insurers in the 
United States to create protected cells to issue insurance-linked securities and to fund 
insurance liability through insurance securitisation' 47 . The main purpose of this 
Act is 
to bring insurance securitisation transactions back to the United States because the 
144 Id. at 107. 
145 Id. at. 108. 
146 Id. at 108. 
147 "Our goal in developing this model was to create a regulatory framework to allow property and 
casualty insurers to create protected cells to fund insurance liability through insurance securitization. " 
NAIC President and Connecticut Insurance Commissioner Reider said, from Mealey's Litigation 
Reports: Insurance Insolvency, II No. 9 Mealey's Litig. Rep.: Insolvency 23,6 October 1999. 
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securitisation business is often placed through offshore transactions. Protected cell 
means an identified pool of assets and liabilities of a protected cell company 
segregated and insulated from the protected cell company's general assets and 
48 liabilities' 
. In addition, the protected cell account is established to segregate the 
protected cell assets of one protected cell from the protected cell assets of other 
protected cells and from the assets of the protected cell company's general account. 149 
The Model Act provides as follows: 
(1). Establishment of Protected Cells: A protected cell company, which intends 
to establish one or more protected cells, must obtain the prior approval of the 
commissioner' 50 . All attributions of assets and liabilities between a protected cell and 
the general account are to be in accordance with the plan of operation approved by the 
Insurance Commissioner' 51. "The creation of a protected cell does not create, in 
respect of that protected cell, a legal person separate from the protected cell company. 
Amounts attributed to a protected cell under this Act, including assets transferred to a 
protected cell account, are owned by the protected cell company and the protected cell 
company may not be, nor hold itself out to be, a trustee with respect to those protected 
cell assets of that protected cell account". 152 
(2). Use and Operation of Protected Cells: With respect to the liabilities of the 
protected cell, the assets of a protected cell may not be charged with liabilities anising 
from any other business the protected cell company may conduct 153 . 
In relation to the 
liabilities of the issuance of insurance-linked securities, the contracts or other 
documentation effecting the transaction shall contain provisions identifying the 
protected cell to which the transaction will be attributed 154 . 
As a result of separation 
from the protected cell company's general account, the protected cell shall not 4 'be 
assessed by or otherwise be required to contribute to any guaranty fund or guaranty 
55 association"' . 
(3). Reach of Creditors and Other Claimants: Protected cell assets shall only 
148 See N. A. I. C., Protected Cell Company Model Act, §3G, in NAIC MODEL LAWS, 
REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES VOL. 111,290-2 (2000). 
149 See id. Protected Cell Company Model Act §3. H, at 290-2. 
150 Protected Cell Company Model Act §4. A, id. at 290-3. 
151 Protected Cell Company Model Act §4. B, id. at 290-3. 
152 Protected Cell Company Model Act §4. C, id. at 290-3. 
153 Protected Cell Compan 'v 
Model Act §5. A, id. at 290-4. 
154 Protected Cell Company Model Act §5. E, id. at 290-5. 
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be available to the creditors of the protected cell company that are creditors who are 
entitled, in conformity with the provisions of this Act, to have recourse to the 
protected cell assets attributable to that protected cell. It will be absolutely protected 
and separated from the creditors of the protected company that are not creditors of 
that protected cell. The creditors of that protected cell are not to be entitled to have 
recourse against the protected cell assets of other protected cells or the assets of the 
protected cell company's general account 156 . 
(4). Conservation, Rehabilitation or Liquidation of Protected Cell Companies: 
The receiver is bound to deal with the protected cell company's assets and liabilities, 
including protected cell assets and protected cell liabilities, notwithstanding any 
contrary provision in the insurance code or relevant regulations of this state upon any 
order of conservation, rehabilitation or liquidation of a protected cell company. The 
amount recoverable by the receiver is not reduced or diminished as a result of the 
entry of an order of conservation, rehabilitation or liquidation with respect to the 
protected cell company' 57 . 
(5). Insurance Contract Issue: A protected cell company insurance 
securitisation is not to be deemed to be an insurance or reinsurance contract. An 
investor in a protected cell company insurance securitisation shall not be deemed to 
be carrying on insurance or reinsurance business. Consequently, the underwriters or 
agents involved in this transaction are not to be deemed to be conducting an insurance 
or reinsurance agency, brokerage, intermediary, advisory or consulting business' 58 . 
The Protected Cell Company Model Act has been adopted in whole or 
amended form by several states including Illinois' 
59 
, Iowa' 
60 
, Rhode Island 
161 
, South 
62 63 Carolina' and Vermont' . 
2. Bermuda's Insurance Amendment Act 1998 
As mentioned above, in order to take advantage of the reduced level of regulatory 
155 Protected Cell Company Model Act §6. D., id. at 290-6. 
156 Protected Cell Company Model Act §6. A., id. at 290-5,290-6. 
157 Protected Cell Company Model Act §7. A., id. at 290-6. 
158 Protected Cell Company Model Act §8., id. at 290-7. 
159 215 ILL. Comp. Stat. §§ 5/179A-1 to 5/179A-40 (1999). 
160 IOWA Code §§ 521 G. I to 521G. 10 (2000). 
161 R. 1. GEN. LAWS §§ 27-64-1 to 27-64-12 (1999). 
162 S. C. Code ANN. §§ 38-10-10 to 38-10-80 (2000). 
163 V. T. STAT. ANN. tit. 8§ 6021 (1999) (captives only). 
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scrutiny and to relieve the tax burden, SPRs historically have been established in 
Bermuda or the Cayman Islands, which subject them to minimum net worth, auditing 
reporting requirements and to a favourable tax regime 164 . Bermuda, in which many 
popular investment vehicles are established in place of traditional reinsurance, has 
enacted section 57 A of the Bermuda Insurance Act 1978, as amended by the 
Insurance Amendment 1998 (Act No. 8 of 1998). This amendment has been described 
as providing a mechani SM165 to clarify that certain popular investment vehicles 
established in Bermuda in place of traditional reinsurance are exempt from "both the 
regulatory constraints on conducting insurance business and common law and 
statutory prohibitions on wagering contracts 166,, . These insurance-linked bonds or 
securitisation arrangements may now be obtained through an application under 
section 57A of the Insurance Act 1978 for prospective or retrospective approval 167 of 
a contract as a designated investment contract. This amendment (section 57 A(1)(a) of 
the Insurance Act 1978) provides the definition of the designated investment contract 
as follows: 
"The designated investment contract" means- 
(a) any contract (including, but not limited to, any option contract, futures 
contract, swap contract, derivative contract, contract for differences or 
security) the purpose of which is to secure a profit or avoid a loss- 
(i) by reference to fluctuations in the value or price of property of any 
description, or in an index, or other factor, specified for that purpose in the 
contract, or 
(ii) in relation to which the Minister has given a direction under section 
168 
164 See Bertil Lundqvist, supra note 7, at 810. 
165 "Uncertainty as to the legal standing of certain contracts under Bermuda law can adversely affect 
the ability of companies to raise capital for securitization deals. For example, linking an investment 
contract such as a bond to insurance results raises questions about its legal classification. This is 
important where capital is coming from institutional investors who want to know whether they will be 
deemed to be conducting business as insurers under Bermuda law". See Kymn Astwood, Minister of 
Finance, Press Release, (February 5,1998). 
166 E. Massock, C. Scales, J. Abramson, J. Irving, M. C. Veed, G. Leal, R. J. Cata, A. Borrell, 1. 
Kawaley, and L. Savitt, supra note 110, at 536-537. 
167 See section 78A(3)(a) of the Bermuda Insurance Act 1978. 
168 57 A of the Bermuda Insurance Act 1978, as amended by the Insurance Amendment Act 
1998(operative date 23 March 1998) provides that 
" (1) For the purposes of this section- 
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If an insurance securitisation has been approved as a designated "investment 
contract", the contract will not be treated as an "insurance contract". "No party to the 
instrument can seek to argue that the transaction is contrary to public policy and void 
as a wagering contract of official sanction for it has been received, albeit in an 
169 insurance contract" 
F. Summary Observation: Implication of Reinsurance Regulation on the 
Securitisation of Insurance 
While the appropriate regulatory regimes relating to the securitisation of insurance 
risks are being developed to facilitate such transactions, the reinsurance regulatory 
issues arising from these developed models are worth analysing for leaming lessons 
that might be used in emerging economies. In this section, suggestions relating to 
reinsurance regulation concerning insurance securitisation will be provided which are 
based on the comparative study of these developed models. In addition, potential 
problems will be identified. 
"Contract" includes investment or security, and any reference to "parties" in relation to an investment 
or security shall be taken to be a reference to its issuers and investors; and "designated investment 
contract" means- 
(a) any contract (including, but not limited to, any option contract, futures contract, swap contract, 
derivative contract, contract for differences or security) the purpose of which is to secure a profit or 
avoid a loss- 
(i) by reference to fluctuations in the value or price of property of any description, or in an 
index, or other factor, specified for that purpose in the contract, or 
(ii) in relation to which the Minister has given a direction under section (2). 
(2)The Minister may direct in writing that a contract falling within paragraph (a) of the definition of 
designated investment contract in subsection (1), which was submitted to him in draft together with- 
(a) the fee of $ 1000, or such other fee as may be prescribed under the Government Fees Act 1965, and 
(b) such other documents as the Minister may require, is a designated investment contract for the 
purposes of this section. 
(3) A direction under this section- 
(a) may be made with retroactive effect; 
(b) may be subject to conditions which may be varied at any time, provided- 
(1) that the variation has been applied for, or is consented to by the parties to the contract in 
question; and 
(ii) that those parties undertake to notify such other persons as the Minister considers may be 
affected by the variation; 
(c) is not a statutory instrument having legislative effect. 
(4) Being a party to a designated investment contract shall not constitute carrying on insurance 
business, and a designated investment contract shall not constitute a contract of insurance, for any 
purposes. 
(5) For the avoidance of doubt, a designated investment contract shall not constitute a bet for the 
purposes of the Betting Act 1975. 
(6) The Minister may by order amend the definition of designated investment contract in subsection 
(1), if, after consulting the Insurance Advisory Committee, he considers it necessary to do so; and any 
such order shall be subject to the negative resolution procedure. " 
169 E. Massock, C. Scales, J. Abramson, J. Irving, M. C. Veed, G. Leal, R. J. Cata, A. Borrell, I. 
Kawaley, and L. Savitt, supra note I 10, at 53 8. 
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1. Insurance contract issue and parametric trigger mechanism 
As mentioned above, it is still arguable whether an investor for insurance-linked 
securities would or would not be deemed to be conducting insurance business that 
would be subject to relevant insurance regulation. To facilitate such a transaction, it 
has been suggested that insurance-linked securities based on industry-losses, on index 
or on a parametric trigger would distance the link between the payment to investors 
and the underlying loss suffered by the insurers. Such a distance, most likely, will 
reduce the legal uncertainty of the transaction because the payments to investors do 
not indemnify the ceding insurer's actual loss. From the viewpoint of efficiency, the 
parametric trigger mechanism not only improves the speed of settlement but also 
simplifies the modelling analysis for investors. 
It should be noted, however, that the parametric trigger may increase the 
"basis risk" suffered by the ceding insurers and may raise other regulatory issues. 
First, would the basis risk suffered by the ceding have a significant impact on the 
financial solvency of the ceding insurers? While a main advantage of insurance 
securitisation is to reduce the credit risk caused by the financial insolvency of 
reinsurers through funding a trust, the basis risk arising from the mismatch between 
the ceding insurer's actual loss and payment of the investors should be prudentially 
reconsidered by the ceding insurers. Secondly, the issue relating to the adequacy of 
technical provisions would arise as the part of the technical reserve will have been 
reduced by the amount of the reinsurance transactions. For example, assume the 
parametric trigger is based on a "Richter earthquake magnitude" over 6. The 
earthquake occurs at a magnitude 5.5 and results in catastrophe loss to the ceding 
insurers. This basis risk will then cause a significant impact on the financial solvency 
of insurers because of inadequacy of loss reserves. Thirdly, if the reinsurance 
contracts are designed to be based on a relevant parametric trigger or other industry 
loss index, rather than on the ceding insurer's actual loss, it also increases the legal 
uncertainty to qualify as a "reinsurance contract". This will increase legal uncertainty 
and may give rise to the disputes relating to insurance interest and subject matter. In 
contrast, if the reinsurance contracts are based on the ceding insurer's actual loss 
rather than the parametric trigger or industry loss index, the basis risk will be suffered 
by the SPR. As the SPR does not involve any substantial financial operation, the basis 
risk will significantly weaken its financial condition and hence the trust funded by the 
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ceding insurers and investors. This potential problem should be considered along with 
the possible impact on the ceding insurers. Therefore, the regulators and the ceding 
insurers should pay more attention to the adequacy of loss reserves and the 
creditworthiness of the SPR. Such circumstances take into account the possibility and 
severity of basis risk. 
2. A Designated Investment Contract versus A Protected Cell Company 
The main motive of developed models is to clarify that the insurance securitisation 
transaction is exempt from the regulatory constraints on conducting insurance 
business. However, the approaches to facilitate such a transaction and effectively to 
monitor relevant activities are significantly different. 
With regard to Bermuda's Insurance Amendment Act 1988, this provision 
only prescribes the elements of certain transactions and the approval requirements. 
The specified provisions relating to insurance-linked securities still rely on the 
regulation or requirements set by the insurance regulatory authority. Due to the 
approval that can be obtained prospectively or retrospectively, potential problems can 
occur and legal uncertainty still can exists. Under section 57A of the Insurance Act 
1978, approval for designated investment contracts can be obtained prospectively or 
retrospectively. This will lead to some insurance securitisation transactions, which 
have been effected but which have not obtained approval, failing to meet the 
requirement of the Minister. Therefore, approval with retrospective effect should be 
reconsidered due to this legal uncertainty. Furthermore, another issue is whether the 
payment of insurance securitisation transactions based on the ceding insurer's actual 
loss can constitute a designated investment contract rather than a reinsurance contract. 
The Bermuda Insurance Act provides that the purpose of contracts that are to 
secure a profit or to avoid a loss "by reference to other factors specified for that 
purpose in the contracts" can be deemed a "designated investment contract". It is 
ambiguous to define that "other factor", might include the ceding insurer's loss. It 
should be noted that if the insurance-linked securities are based on the ceding 
insurer's actual loss, it will facilitate those who are not subject to relevant reinsurance 
regulation to carry on reinsurance activities by means of reinsurance securitisation 
transactions. The Minister should promulgate the relevant criteria to clarify this 
ambiguity. 
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In comparison with Bermuda's Insurance Amendment Act 1998, the Protected 
Cell Company Model Act approved by the NAIC is more prescriptive and provides 
specified guidance for securitisation transactions. Under the Protected Cell Company 
Model Act, a protected cell is created to be a custodial account established to hold and 
to invest assets from the proceeds of securities and reinsurance premium. The 
essential element of a protected cell is that the protected cell assets and liabilities is 
segregated and insulated from the protected cell company general assets and 
liabilities. Following such a basic structure, this Model Act also provides several 
specified provisions to supervise effectively these transactions. These includes 
establishment, use and operation of the protected cell, the segregated protected cell 
accounts, provisions to clarify the legal uncertainty relating to the insurance contract 
issue. The Illinois Protected Cell Legislation further prescribes the corporate issue 
relating to the acquisition of control or a change in control. The main purpose of this 
provision is to protect the investors' interest from being endangered by a change in 
control or other acquisition of control. 
Unlike the Bermuda Insurance Amendment Act 1998, the approach developed 
by the US requires these securitisation transacions to obtain a prior approval from the 
Insurance Commissioners. This should enhance the legal certainty for those who 
intend to engage in these transactions. In order to support the financial condition of 
the SPRs, the Model Act provides provisions relating to the investment of protected 
cell assets. 
While the possible methods to support the financial solvency of an SPR have 
been applied by limitations on the investment of protected cell assets, counter-party 
risk still may exists. In addition, the creditors of the SPR are not entitled to have 
recourse against the protected cell assets of a protected cell company's general 
account. Further, the protected cell account itself does not involve in any other 
substantial commercial operations. This would affect the recoverability of reinsurance 
payment and the acceptability of the insurance-linked securities. To deal with this 
shortcoming, an approach used is that credit support, similar to that applied in other 
securitisation transactions 
170 can be proposed for enhancing the acceptability of 
insurance-linked securities and for reducing counter-party risk. In general, credit 
170 See JOSEPH J. NORTON, FINANCIAL SECTOR LAW REFORM IN EMERGING 
ECONOMIES 246-248 (2000). 
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support can be structured as either internal support or external support. External 
support is supported by the credit of other parties, such as financial institutions (e. g, a 
letter of credit), whereas internal support is dependent on the value of protected cell 
assets. However, due to the protected cell's limited assets, this will significantly 
increase the transaction costs by forming the internal support. As a result, the author 
suggested that it would be better to obtain credit support from external financial 
institutions. 
Another issue that needs to be addressed the potential disputes relating to the 
conflicts of interests between the ceding insurers and the investors. This issue has not 
been addressed in the NAIC Protected Cell Company Model Act, whereas the Illinois 
Protected Cell Legislation prescribes specified provision relating to the approval 
regarding a change in control or acquisition. 
In the insurance securitisation transaction, the ceding insurers may intend to 
exert some degree of control over their losses. On the other hand, the investors might 
be vulnerable to a change of control on the SPR as to loss settlement. While the 
insurance securitisation transactions are mainly influenced by the ceding insurers and 
the reinsurers, the investors would tend to protect their interest by arrangements 
including controls over the SPR as to creation of security, restrictions on the 
acceptance of risks, the settlement of risk, appropriate disclosure, and a change in 
control or acquisition. With regard to the settlement of loss, the degree of moral 
hazard of the ceding insurers might be reduced by applying a parametric trigger 
mechanism. This might offer investors greater certainty and objectivity. In addition, it 
is suggested that appropriate information regarding the risk of securities should be 
disclosed to the investors. This should provide greater transparency and certainty for 
the investors who intend to engage in and to assess these transactions. Therefore, 
appropriate regulation should provide requirements to ensure full material disclosure 
as the underlying transactions. 
3. Developing a Regulatory Infrastructure for Insurance Securitisation 
While the insurance securitisation transactions have created worldwide insurance and 
reinsurance capacity through the issuance of in surance-I inked securities, the 
regulatory infrastructure to facilitate and effectively to supervise these transactions 
has only developed in some countries. This subsection will discuss a few of the more 
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essential components of an appropriate regulatory infrastructure. 
Countries wishing to facilitate securitisation of insurance risks should amend 
or abolish certain existing statutes or other laws that may prohibit any corporations or 
insurers from engaging in securitisation transactions. Alternatively, these countries 
may choose to pass specified legislation to allow these transactions such as has been 
done in Bermuda, Cayman Island, and several states in the US. As a result of legal 
ambiguity that the investors engaging in insurance securitisation transactions would 
be deemed as carrying on unauthorised insurance business, these countries should 
provide specified laws/regulations to define that the purchase of insurance-linked 
securities does not constitute the transaction of insurance business. 
Leaming from these developed models, the main element of the legal 
infrastructure for insurance securitisation is to develop suitable legislation to allow the 
creation of an SPR that can assume the insurance risks and that can issue insurance- 
linked securities. To reduce the transaction costs, some countries have developed the 
concept of the "protected cell" to allow these entities to engage in several transactions 
at the same time. Unlike other securitisation transactions where a SPV can be formed 
as a corporation, a trust, or as a limited partnership, the SPR usually is formed as a 
reinsurance company that is authorised to assume insurance risks and to issue 
insurance-linked securities. The collateral arrangements to ensure the financial 
solvency of the SPR should be established. In general, a trust is established along with 
certain restrictions on its investment activities. For example, the NAIC Protected Cell 
Company Model Act contains the provisions regarding the investment of the 
protected cell assets. In relation to the solvency and establishment of the SPR, basis 
risk should be considered, particularly in the case of the payment upon a parametric 
trigger, because this may endanger the financial solvency of the ceding insurer. 
The relevant bankruptcy system should be amended to accommodate the 
concept of a "protected cell". The main feature of a protected cell is to shield a 
protected cell account's assets and liabilities from the credit risk of the reinsurers in 
the case of insolvency. By introducing this concept, the relevant bankruptcy system 
should ensure that the protected cell should not be affected by any order of 
conservation, rehabilitation or liquidation of a protected cell company. It should be 
noted, however, that the segregation of a protected cell, as a practical matter, would 
need external credit support to enhance the acceptability of the in surance-I inked 
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securities and to ensure the financial solvency of a protected cell. 
In contrast to onshore securitisation transactions, the insurance supervisors 
should be aware of offshore insurance securitisation transactions. The insurance 
supervisors should be in a position to assess the appropriateness of reinsurance and 
related securitisation transaction. It is suggested that the assessment of these 
transactions should take into account the operation and the corporate structure of the 
SPR, along with the collateral arrangements relating to securitisation transactions and 
reinsurance contracts. 
111. Concluding Remarks 
At the expense of repetition but for the benefit of performing key observations, the 
author summarized his concluding observations below 
1. Traditional reinsurance deals with the consequences of insurance risks transferred 
from ceding insurers to reduce their loss reserves and to provide greater capacity to 
expand their business. Finite risk reinsurance, known as financial reinsurance, 
principally addresses the "timing risk" and other financial risks for providing more 
capital and more flexibility to finance the ceding insurers. As a result of the 
questionable reporting of these transactions as to financial condition of the ceding 
insurersl finite risk reinsurance poses potential difficulties for regulators and 
accountants throughout the world. Specific guidance regarding the accounting 
treatment for finite risk reinsurance has been mainly developed in the US and the UK. 
However, due to the complexity and diversify of finite risk reinsurance, an acceptable 
definition of finite risk reinsurance has not been developed under the relevant 
solvency regulations, and regulators often rely on the accounting principles to define 
the differences between conventional reinsurance and finite risk reinsurance. At the 
international level, the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) was set 
up in the early 1970s to formulate and to publish, in the public interest, accounting 
standards to be observed in the presentation of financial statements and to promote 
their world-wide acceptance and observation. The IASC has set up a Steering 
Committee that has issued a discussion paper on insurance accounting. Although the 
steering committee has not yet developed guidance on the level or type of risk transfer 
to be used as a core element of reinsurance, it is likely that global accounting 
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171 standards for the treatment of finite risk reinsurance will be developed in the future 
2. With regard to appropriate regulation governing finite risk reinsurance, it is 
suggested that basic criteria relating to risk transfer should be developed to enhance 
transparency under the relative regulation for insurers and reinsurers. With regard to 
risk transfer criteria, it would be appropriate that timing risk alone is sufficient to 
constitute a reinsurance because the timing risk arising from the uncertainty of 
liability payment for policyholders will significantly affect the capacity of the ceding 
insurers. This should provide more flexible and less stringent regulatory requirements 
for insurers who suffer the timing risk arising from the assumed insurance risks. 
Additionally, the issue relating to the "economic substance" of transactions should 
take into account the terms of contracts that may affect the loss payment from the 
reinsurers and the reinsurance premiums paid by ceding insurers. In addition to risk 
transfer criteria, regulators should be able to assess the creditworthiness and the 
financial solvency of reinsurers. Furthermore, the adequacy of loss reserves should be 
considered even though reinsurance transaction meets the risk transfer criteria. As the 
finite risk reinsurance may lead to inadequacy of loss reserves, it is important to 
develop methods to estimate the extra reserves and to analyse the possible effect of 
terms of contracts on the insurer's financial solvency. 
3. Insurance securitisation transactions provide insurers with an alternative 
risk transfer mechanism. Although recent low reinsurance pricing have been the main 
obstacle for the growth of insurance securitisation, the potential scale of insurance 
securisation market remains substantial. Insurance securitisation grew out of a period 
of limited reinsurance capacity arising from several catastrophes, so it is likely that 
the same structure of risk transfer transactions is developed quickly into areas other 
than catastrophe risk, such as credit risk, general liability, political risk 
172 and life 
insurance. As the regulators and credit rating agencies have become more involved in 
these transactions and have begun evaluating and monitoring these insurance-linked 
securities, the focus on the credibility of the securities has been increased. As a result 
of adequate disclosure and prudent supervision of these transactions, more investors 
should feel more comfortable in accepting these securities as investment instruments. 
4. While the insurance securitisation transactions have created worldwide 
171 See Jonathan Miles & Diana Owen, supra note 46, at 23. 
172 See Bertil Lundqvist, supra note 7, at 813. 
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greater insurance/reinsurance capacity through the issuance of insurance-linked 
securities, the regulatory infrastructure to facilitate and effectively to supervise these 
transactions have only been developed in some countries. To facilitate such 
transactions, countries should amend or abolish certain existing statutes or other laws 
that may prohibit any corporations or insurers from engaging in securitisation 
transactions. As a result of legal ambiguity that the investors engaging in insurance 
securitisation transactions might be deemed as carrying on insurance business, these 
countries should provide specific laws to define that the purchase of insuranc e- linked 
securities does not constitute the transaction of an insurance business. 
5. Learning from these developed models, the main element of the legal 
infrastructure for insurance securitisation is to develop suitable legislation to allow the 
SPR that can assume the insurance risk and issue insurance-linked securities. To 
reduce transaction costs, some countries have developed the concept of the "protected 
cell" to allow these entities to engage in several transactions at the same time. In 
addition to creating protected cells, "basis risk" should be considered, particularly in 
the case where parametric trigger is used because it may endanger the financial 
solvency of the ceding insurer. 
6. The relevant bankruptcy system should be amended to accommodate the 
concept of a protected cell. The main feature of a protected cell is to shield a protected 
cell account's assets and liabilities from the credit risk of the reinsurers in the case of 
insolvency. By introducing this concept, the relevant bankruptcy system should ensure 
that the protected cell is not affected by any order of conservation, rehabilitation or 
liquidation of a protected cell company. To ensure the financial solvency of protected 
cell accounts, it is suggested that the segregation of a protected cell would need 
external credit support. 
7. Last but not least, insurance supervisors should be aware of offshore 
insurance securitisation transactions. In this connection, insurance supervisors should 
be able to assess the appropriateness of reinsurance and the relevant securitisation 
transaction. It is suggested that the assessment of these transactions should take into 
account the operation of and the corporate structure of SPR, and the collateral 
arrangements relating to the securitisation transactions and reinsurance contracts. 
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Reinsurance Regulation Reform in Emerging Markets: 
Suggestions for Taiwanese Reinsurance Regulation Reform and 
the Broader Relevance 
As set out in Chapter One, over the past two decades, the international insurance 
markets have experienced liberalization of reinsurance trade. However, emerging 
markets may encounter difficulties in reaching a critical balance between the 
creditworthiness/security (i. e., the creditworthiness and financial viability) of 
reinsurers and the availability of reinsurance. In searching for an appropriate 
regulatory approach to ensure financial stability with facilitating the diversification of 
insurance risks, developing countries might tend wholesale and uncritically to 
transplant aspects of the leading regulatory models of developed countries into their 
domestic regulatory reform or to adopt the supervisory principles established by 
international organizations such as International Association of Insurance Supervisors 
(IAIS). Although the supervisory principles developed by international institutions 
and sophisticated regulatory models adopted by some developed countries can be 
used as "guidelines" for the development of reinsurance regulation in emerging 
markets, the "en masse" application of these principles does not necessarily achieve an 
optimal outcome for these countries, if it does not take into account the pre-existing 
regulatory and legal environment and market characteristics. 
In this Chapter, the Taiwanese insurance market will be used as a "case study" 
for identifying the potential problems in and providing suggestions for developing an 
appropriate regulatory system relating to reinsurance in emerging market. As set out 
in Chapter One, the Taiwanese insurance market relies on the international 
reinsurance market to extend its limited capital capacity to underwrite insurance risks 
and to stabilize the development of its domestic economy. Due to lack of reinsurers in 
Taiwan, the main issue relating to reinsurance regulation is to establish an appropriate 
regulatory regime to maintain the financial solvency of primary insurers. It should be 
noted, however, that some developed regulatory models implemented in the 
developed countries might not be appropriate for the emerging markets with a 
shortage of reinsurance. Based on a careful, analytical and practical scrutiny and 
taking into account the particular regulatory environment and market characteristics, 
suggestions will be provided as to potential solutions for the regulatory reform in the 
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Taiwanese reinsurance sector. This will be followed by recommendations concerning 
the fundamentals of reinsurance regulation reform in emerging markets more 
generally, through a comparative study on the Taiwanese reinsurance regulation 
reform. 
1. Financial Regulation Reform and Reinsurance 
Following the recent global trends of liberalization of financial services, the 
Taiwanese government began in the early 1990s to revise its laws and regulations to 
facilitate financial market access for greater international competition. As a result of 
the governmental policies to open up the financial markets, financial institutions in 
Taiwan increase dramatically' and these markets became "overcrowded', 2 . 
Due to the 
lack of innovative financial products, the financial institutions in Taiwan tended to 
engage in a fierce price war in the traditional markets 3. In addition to fierce 
competition, the Asia Financial Crisis began to influence the stability of financial 
4 markets in Taiwan . 
In order to cope with the dramatically changes in the global financial market 
and to follow the international trends of harmonization or convergence of financial 
market supervision, the Taiwanese government has been updating the legal and 
regulatory frameworks to facilitate financial restructuring 5. In terms of recent 
regulatory reforms in Taiwan, there are several aspects of significance for present 
1 With regard to bank sector in Taiwan, the number of the banks increases rapidly from 24 banks with 
953 branches to 53 banks with 2690 branches. As for the securities market, the number of securities 
firms rose from 28 firms in 1988 to 196 in 1999. In the insurance market, the number of insurance 
companies has expanded from 45 insurance companies before 1992 to 62 insurance companies in 2000. 
See In-jaw Lai, Challenges of Financial Reforms, the speech delivered at the 2001 Economic and 
Financial Summit, 18 January, 2001, Taipei International Convention Center, Taipei, Taiwan, Republic 
of China, http: //www. icbc. com. tw/chinese/news/news06/news32001/news32001. htm., visiting time: 
06/01/2002. 
2 There are 53 commercial banks and 362 primary financial institutions with a population of 23 million. 
3 See In-jaw Lai, Challenges of Financial Reforms, the speech delivered at the 2001 Economic and 
Financial Summit, 18 January, 2001, Taipei International Convention Center, Taipei, Taiwan, Republic 
of China, http: //www. icbc. com. tw/chinese/news/news06/news32001/news32001. htm., visiting time: 
06/01/2002. 
4 Prior to the 1997 Asia Financial Crisis, the average Non-performing Loan ratio was only 4.18%. 
However, the NPL ratio rose up to 6.2 % at the end of December 1999. See Ching-Chang Yen, Recent 
Financial and Fiscal Developments in the Republic of China, the speech delivered at the US-ROC 
Business Council Board Meeting in Washington, D. C., United States on May 14,2001. 
http: //www. icbc. com. tw/chinese/news/news06/news323/news32301. htm, visiting time: 06/01/2002. 
5 Prior to the 1997 Asia Financial Crisis, the average Non-performing Loan ratio was only 4.18%. 
However, the NPL ratio rose up to 6.2 % at the end of December 1999. See Ching-Chang Yen, Recent 
Financial and Fiscal Developments in the Republic of China, the speech delivered at the US-ROC 
Business Council Board Meeting in Washington, D. C., United States on May 14,2001. 
http: '/www. icbc. com-tw/chinese/news/news06/news323/news32301. htm, visiting time: 06/01/2002. 
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purposes: (1) liberalization of investment of banks in securities, insurance and other 
financial services 6; (2) implementation of a Financial Holding Company Act to 
facilitate the cross-sector financial services and control the relevant risks 7; (3) 
establishment of financial assets management companies to reduce non-performing 
loans in the banking sector; (4) the enactment of the Merger Law of Financial 
Institutions to allow the restructuring the financial market8; (5) establishment of the 
Financial Supervision and Management Committee as an financial supervisory 
agency to supervise and monitor the financial institutions efficiently9; and (6) 
6 The Amended Banking Law was enacted in November 2000. With regard to liberalisation of 
investment by banks, it has dismantled the investment restriction imposed on the deposit banks. 
< http: //www. boma. pov. tw/law/banklaw. htm>, visiting time: 02/01/2002. 7 In order to facilitate the cross-sector financial services, the enactment of the Financial Holding 
Company Law 2001 (hereinafter FHCL) allow the financial holding companies to be established and 
own the other financial institutions as subsidiaries. After the implementation of FHCL on 9 July 2001, 
there are several successful applications for establishment of financial holding companies such as 
Taiwan's First Commercial Bank acquiring Taisec Securities Inc., and Mingtai Fire & Marine Inc. Co., 
as well as five farmers' and fishermen's credit cooperatives. The law encourages the integration of 
financial services, the diversification of operational risks, and to enlarge the economic scale to 
encounter the fierce competition following with Taiwan's accession into WTO. See Chiu Yueh-wen, 
New Financial Holding Company Law, in Taipei Journal November 2001, 
http: //publish. j4io. Rov. tw/FCJ/past/01110232. html, visiting time: 09/01/2002. However, it is 
questionable whether such a new legal infrastructure would benefit the Taiwanese economy. Although 
it provides an opportunity to allow the financial institutions to merger the other sector financial 
institutions, the transaction costs associated with the establishment of a holding company may deter the 
advantages from the cross-sector operations. For discussions about financial holding companies and 
universal banks, see generally Jennifer Manvel Jeannot, "An International Perspective on Domestic 
Banking Reform: Could the European Union's Second Banking Directive Revolutionize the Way in the 
United States Regulations its Own Financial Services Industry? ", in American University International 
Law Review Fall 1999. Also see Mitchell S. Eitel, William D. Torchiana & Donald J. Tourney, 
"Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Provisions of Particular Interest to Insurers and Banks", in After the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act-A Road Map for Banks, Securities Firms and Investment Managers, 
Practising Law Institute- Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series PLI Order No. BO- 
OOQT, March 2000. George S. Zavvos, "Banking Integration and 1992: Legal Issues and Policy 
Implications", Harvard International Law Journal, Spring, 1990. 
8 It has been estimated that NPLs in Taiwanese banks reached their highest level in recent years- 
officially 5.49 %. In addition to the ratio in Taiwanese banks, NPLs of the most trouble financial 
institutions 350 fishermen's and farmer's credit unions may reach as high as 50%. As a result, the 
government enacts the Merger Law of Financial Institutions to create asset management companies that 
could purchase NPLs and liquidate collateralized assets. As a result of over-crowd financial institutions 
in Taiwan, the competition among institutions might bail out the low performance of institutions. To 
reduce the systemic risk and its impact on the public, the government encourages the merger of 
financial institutions to restructure the financial market and maintain the stability by passing the Merger 
Law of Financial Institutions. See "Financial Reform in Taiwan Gets a Boost", in Asia Pacific Bulletin- 
A Weekly Analysis of Breaking Issues in Asia Pacific, May 24,2001, Asia Pacific Bulletin 8, 
www. asiapacific. ca, visiting time: 08/01/2002. 
9 Learning from the Financial Services Authority in UK, the Draft Financial Supervision and 
Management Committee Organization Law has been submitted by the Executive Yuan to the 
Legislative Yuan in March 2001. While the enactment of the Financial Holding Company Law allows 
the cross-sector financial services, the functional regulation system is in need to supervise the financial 
holding companies more efficiently. However, unlike the Financial Services Authority, the fund of 
FSMC is monitored by the Legislative Yuan. In this regard, the independence of such an institution 
might be impeded. 
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development of the Trust Enterprises Law and Securitization of Financial Assets Act 10 
to liquidate collateralized assets, to provide the investors with innovative investment 
instruments and to minimize the risks arising from non-performance loans. 
In the area of the insurance sector, the recent regulatory reform generally has 
focused on the liberalization of the investment, of insurance undertakings, risk-based 
capital requirements, corporate governance, internal control, financial reporting 
requirements relating to actuaries and external auditors, restructure of the "guarantee 
fund" to enhance of the protection of the policyholders in the event of insolvent 
insurers, revision of the current "technical provision" requirements, provisions of 
earthquake insurance for home owners, and investment-linked insurance". In relation 
to reinsurance, the most important components of the recent Taiwanese regulatory 
reform are the new Rules of Capital Adequacy for Insurance Enterprises published on 
20 December 2001 and to be implemented in September 2003 12 . Learning from the 
U. S. NAIC Risk-based Capital for Insurers Model Law, these Rules address the risk- 
based approach for evaluating the financial solvency of insurers. As the insurance 
business risks an insurance undertaking assumes will increase with the growth of 
business, the traditional fixed-sum capital requirements can not adequately respond to 
the various risks inherent in the business. In order to maintain an insurer's capital 
adequacy to encounter the internal and external risks (e. g., business risk and market 
risks), risk-based capital (hereinafter as RBQ requirement has been enacted to correct 
the drawbacks of fix sum capital requirement. 
Risk-based capital computations specify a minimum amount of capital based 
on the company's risks. In accordance with the new rules, the risks of life insurers are 
divided into (1) asset risk, (2) insurance risk; (3) interest risk; and (4) other risk 13 . For 
property insurers, the risks are categorized into the following risks (1) asset risk; (2) 
10 The Trust Law and Trust Enterprises Law have been implemented in 1996 and 2000. As NPI-s 
endangered the stability of Taiwanese financial market, the Executive Yuan proposed the draft 
Securitization of Financial Asset Act to facilitate the asset securitisation providing a means to assess 
the capital market and improve the liquidity. After the implementation of the Securitization of Financial 
Asset Act, the main stream of products will include house mortgage loans, automobile loans and credit 
card loans. 
11 These have been published in the official website of the Department of Insurance, Ministry of 
Finance, Taiwan, ROC. Prospectus, Department of Insurance, Ministry of Finance, in 
http: //www. i isurance. pov. tw/watch/watch4. aýp, visiting time: 02/01/2002. 
12 In accordance with the section 143-4 of the Insurance Law amended in June 2001, the Rules of 
Capital Adequacy for Insurance Enterprises (20/Dec. /2001) was published. The Rules of Capital 
Adequacy for Insurance Enterprises, Tai-Tsai-Bao, No. 0900751413. (20/Dec. /2001) 
13 Section 3 (1) of the Rules of Capital Adequacy for Insurance Enterprises, Tai-Tsai-Bao, No. 
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credit risk; (3) underwriting risk; (4) asset-liability matching risk; and (5) other 
ri sks 14 . These risks are combined in accordance with a formula to determine the total 
RBC amount. Consequently, the total RBC amount is adjusted for a correlation 
between risks and additional risks in certain types of risk categories such as 
"investments". The resulting adjusted total RBC amount is compared with the 
"Surplus Capital" (known as Total Adjusted Capital in the U. S. ), which consists of 
company capital, surplus and special reserve determined by the relevant statutory 
accounting principles' 5. If the value of its ratio between the two components falls 
below the required level, this may trigger governmental intervention in accordance 
with Section 149 (1), (2) and (3) of Insurance Law amended in 2000. For instance, the 
Department of Insurance required the insurance undertaking to submit a 
comprehensive financial plan to correct the financial problems or control on the 
operation of the insurance undertaking 16 . 
Under this new Taiwanese regulatory system, the adequacy and the security of 
reinsurance arrangements of a primary insurer can be ensured if the relevant 
regulatory approach has been considered. As a result, a possible regulatory approach 
concerning the creditworthiness/security of reinsurance will be suggested so as to take 
into account the related solvency regulation system. 
11. Issues of Reinsurance Arrangements of Primary Insurers in 
Taiwan 
Under the new Taiwanese solvency regulatory regime based on risk-based capital, 
insurance undertakings should increase their paid-in capital commensurate with the 
growth in their insurance business to respond to the risks associated with the 
operation of their insurance business. Under such a dynamic capital mechanism, the 
regulation concerning the "security" (i. e., creditworthiness and financial viability) of 
reinsurance will be suggested as follows. 
0900751413, (20/Dec. /2001), Taiwan, ROC. 
14 Section 3 (2) of the Rules of Capital Adequacy for Insurance Enterprises, Tai-Tsai-Bao, No. 
0900751413, (20/Dec. /2001), Taiwan, ROC. 
15 Section 143-4, Insurance Law and Section 2,3 of the Rules of Capital Adequacy for Insurance 
Enterprises, Tai-Tsai-Bao, No. 0900751413, (20/Dec. /2001), Taiwan, ROC. The relevant accounting 
principles are generally contained in the Principles for the Annual Business Examination Report of Life 
Insurance Undertakings and the Principles for the Annual Business Examination Report of Property 
Insurance Undertakings, Tai-Tsai-Bao, No. 0900751404. 
16 Section 143-4 (3), Insurance Law (amended in June 2001) Taiwan, ROC 
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A. The Security of Reinsurance Should Be Considered In the Framework 
of the Risk-Based Capital Solvency Regulation 
In terms of risk-based capital approach, the security of reinsurance can be structured 
into the calculation of technical "provisions" affecting the "Surplus Capital" account. 
The credit given to reduce the required technical provisions and increase in admissible 
assets should only be allowed if the reinsurance arrangements of insurance 
undertakings meet the criteria regarding the recoverability and 
creditworthiness/security of reinsurance. If the reinsurance arrangement fails to meet 
the criteria, the technical provisions cannot be reduced and their liabilities remain the 
same as before the purchase of reinsurance. As a result, it may affect the amount of 
the "Surplus Capital", representing the excess of admissible assets over liabilities, and 
then may reduce the value of the ratio between the Risk-based Capital and the 
"Surplus Capital". Consequently, this may trigger governmental intervention to revise 
the relevant reinsurance arrangements or increase their paid-in capital to maintain the 
required capital adequacy level, if the resulting value of the ratio falls below the 
required level. 
B. The Establishment of the Criteria Regarding the Security of 
Reinsurance 
The search for an appropriate regulatory approach concerning the 
creditworthiness/security of reinsurance should take into account the particular market 
characteristics and pre-existing legal environments. In comparing the possible 
regulatory approaches among the developed countries and as to emerging markets, the 
collateralisation of reinsurance ceding to unauthorized reinsurers in the U. S. can not 
only significantly reduce the possibility of credit risk arising from insolvency of 
reinsurers but also can maintain the competitive advantages of domestic reinsurers 
17 
. 
It should be noted, however, that the transaction costs associated with the 
requirements relating to the collateral and the related trust fund may impede the 
diversification of insurance risks particular in countries with a shortage of capital 
capacity to assume the insured risk. As a result, the regulation of insurers' reinsurance 
arrangements should emphasis on the accurate evaluation of reinsurers' financial 
condition rather than merely the domicile of reinsurers (e. g., the US model). For 
17 For details, see Chapter 2. 
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example, it seems that the Mexican approach utilising the analysis made by the rating 
agencies may be an appropriate model for emerging markets with limited expertise. 
But, even with that approach, there may be some flaws if other external and internal 
factors have not been considered, such as political risk in the location of the 
reinsurers, the fitness and propriety of management, and the foreign jurisdictions 
relating to the relevant regulations and the accounting principles. Therefore, the 
44rating results" should not be used as the sole "yardstick" to evaluate the 
creditworthiness/security of reinsurers. 
C. Requirements Regarding Good Corporate Governance and Internal 
Control Should Include the Reinsurance Arrangements 
As the failure of reinsurance may result from poor management, good corporate 
governance is essential to promote sound risk management of primary insurers. In 
relation to reinsurance arrangements of primary insurers, the relevant criteria 
concerning the adequacy of reinsurance and the recoverability of reinsurance should 
be structured into an appropriate framework of internal controls. Although the 
importance of corporate governance and internal controls has been addressed in the 
recent Taiwanese regulatory reform' 8, the details regarding reinsurance arrangements 
have not been provided. As a result, it is suggested that the requirements relating to 
internal control should establish an evaluation procedure to assess 
creditworthiness/security of reinsurers and to develop effective means to measure and 
to monitor the reinsurance contracts as well as the adequacy of reinsurance coverage. 
In addition, the collection of reinsurance should be considered in the framework of 
internal control. Such a procedure should provide for the actual process of reinsurance 
claims, should identify the collection problems (e. g., legal disputes, financial 
condition of the reinsurers, jurisdiction), and should establish the approaches to 
achieve collection. In sum, the private rating agencies can be considered as an 
important component of the overall evaluation procedure for assessing the 
creditworthiness/security of reinsurers in order to reduce the credit risk of reinsurance. 
111. Issues relating to Reinsurance Intermediaries 
18 Section 148-3 of the Insurance Law (amended in 2001). The insurance supervisors in accordance 
with this new section shall issue the relevant requirements regarding internal control. On 20 December 
2001, the Insurance Department of Ministry of Finance issued its Rules for the Implementation of 
Internal Control and Audit of Insurance Undertakings, Tai-Tsai-Bao, no. 0900751422. 
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In Taiwan, insurers often rely on a reinsurance intermediary to cede insurance risks or 
to accept reinsurance business. Furthermore, transactions between insurers and the 
reinsurance intermediary are generally on a cross-border basis. Under these 
circumstances, the implementation of regulation of reinsurance intermediaries is 
complicated. In addition to the difficulty of implementation of intermediary 
regulation, it should be noted that the enactment of strict regulation might impede the 
freedom of reinsurance transactions and the diversification of insurance risks. 
Learning from those developed regulatory models in the US, European Union and the 
UK, several fundamental aspects should be considered when Taiwan intends to adopt 
these models. 
With regard to the insurance regulation regime in Taiwan, the main component 
of the current regulatory regime is the Regulation Governing the Administration of 
9 Insurance Agencies, Brokers and Surveyors' . According to Section 163 of the 
Insurance Law, insurance intermediaries are required to obtain the license approved 
by the Ministry of Finance. The requirements relating to the criteria and capital 
adequacy are described in the aforesaid Regulation. 
Similar to the system of the UK, the Taiwanese system perceives that the 
fitness and the propriety of management have been considered in the licensing 
procedure including the matter of required professional qualifications 20. However, 
there are no differences between the insurance intermediary who deals with private 
consumers and the reinsurance intermediary who transacts with the commercial 
consumers. In other words, regardless of their natures of business, the insurance and 
reinsurance intermediary should be subject to the same criteria. In this regard, it is 
21 argued , however, that the same criteria might not be sufficient to ensure the 
expertise of an reinsurance intermediary to carry on the reinsurance business 
especially ceding business to foreign reinsurers. 
In relation to capital adequacy, the minimum statutory paid-in capital for 
establishment of an insurance intermediary in NT$ 2 million (around UK f 40,000 at 
2001 exchange rate) is required. In addition to the minimum statutory paid-in capital, 
19 Regulation Governing the Administration of Insurance Agents, Brokers and Surveyors (Sep. 1997). 
20 See Section 6 and 7 of Regulation Governing the Administration of Insurance Agents, Brokers and 
Surveyors (Sep. 1997). 
21 Chia-Yi Young, Research on Regulation of Reinsurance, Dissertation for Mater Degree in National 
Chengchi University, Taiwan, (June 1998), p. 135. 
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an insurance intermediary is required to hold professional indemnity insurance or 
some other comparable guarantee 22 . However, there is no investment regulation 
governing the financial solvency of insurance intermediary. Due to lack of limitation 
on the investment of insurance premiums and claims, it is argued that the insurance 
intermediary might not be able to make appropriate investment arrangements and to 
maintain a suitable level of liquidity to ensure their financial obligations relating to 
insurance monies. 
With respect to market conduct regulation concerning the insurance 
intermediary, the Taiwanese regulation generally focuses on the market conduct of the 
insurance intermediary rather than that of the reinsurance intermediary 23 . Due to the 
difference in the nature of their respective business, insurance inten-nediary and 
reinsurance intermediary will have significant differences in their market conduct for 
exercising "reasonable care and skill" in the business. However, there is no such 
distinction made between an insurance and reinsurance intermediary in the current 
regulatory regime. It is argued that the same principles applying to their different 
intermediaries might lead to the distortion of reinsurance business. 
Learning from the UK and US model, but taking into the market 
characteristics and legal environments in Taiwan, the following possible suggestions 
are submitted: 
A. A Distinction between Insurance and Reinsurance Intermediary 
Should Be Considered 
Due to the differences of the business nature between an insurance intermediary and 
reinsurance intermediary, it is argued that the requirements based on the insurance 
intermediary who deals with the private consumers may not be appropriate to apply in 
the reinsurance intermediary who transacts with the commercial consumers-insurance 
undertakings. As a result, it is suggested that a distinction should be considered in the 
regulatory framework. For instance, the relevant criteria concerning the fitness and 
propriety of management should contain the specific requirements of the expertise of 
a reinsurance intermediary and should take account of any special professional 
qualification. In addition, the principles concerning the market conduct of reinsurance 
22 Section 17 (1) of Regulation Governing the Administration of Insurance Agents, Brokers and 
Surveyors (Sep. 1997). 
23 Section 36 of Regulation Governing the Administration of Insurance Agents, Brokers and Surveyors 
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intermediary should be amended to apply to the reinsurance intermediary context. 
B. Market Conduct of Reinsurance Intermediary Should Be Considered 
As An Essential Part of Regulatory Regime 
The market conduct of the reinsurance inten-nediary should be considered as the 
essential part of a viable regulatory regime. The overall regulation should ensure that 
the reinsurance intermediary exercises a "reasonable care and skill" in carrying on its 
business. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the approach adopted by the NAIC might 
interfere with the law of agency and thus impede the freedom of private contracting. 
The UK approach, which lays down fundamental principles and states several 
examples, seems more appropriate for other emerging markets to develop an 
appropriate regulatory regime. The reinsurance intermediary should be subject to 
minimum standards to ensure that it meets high standards of competence and 
integrity. These principles could ensure that the reinsurance intermediary exercises a 
reasonable care and skill in carrying on its business and that the monies received from 
premium and claims are held prudentially. In addition, these standards should address 
issues such as the avoidance of conflict of interests arising from dual agents, the 
avoidance of legal disputes of authority relating to sub-agency, timely and "best 
execution" of transactions, the right of the (re)insurers to terminate the arrangements, 
and the duty of the reinsurance intermediary to maintain all relevant documents. 
C. Insurance Monies from Premium and Claims should be Maintain in a 
Separated Account 
In order to maintain a suitable level of liquidity to meet the financial obligation of the 
reinsurance intermediary, the insurance monies held by the reinsurance intermediary 
should be maintained in a specific account that should be segregated from the general 
assets of the reinsurance intermediary. Further, the reinsurance intermediary should be 
subject to minimum standards to ensure that these insurance funds will be held and 
invested in connection with specified purposes stated in the relevant regulations (such 
as UK GISC Rules in the Chapter Three). In addition, it is important to assure that in 
the event of bankruptcy of intermediary these accounts are not be used to reimburse 
other creditors. 
(Sep. 1997). 
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D. Disclosure Requirements relating to Fronting Arrangement 
It is a common practice that insurers in emerging markets accept or assume 
reinsurance business by means of "pool" and "fronting" arrangements. On the other 
hand, the insurers might transfer their insurance risk to other unauthorised reinsurers 
through these fronting arrangements. As a result of legal disputes that may arise and 
that may endanger the solvency of insurers and fronting insurers, the appropriate 
regulation should be able to provide for monitoring these arrangements. It has been 
noted that the restriction on these arrangements might increase unnecessarily 
transaction costs and might have a significant impact on the reinsurers to accept 
insurance risk internationally. As a result, it is appropriate to require insurance 
undertakings to disclose all material and relevant information regarding any risk 
retention and the fronting arrangements. 
IV. Issues of Finite Risk Reinsurance and Securitisation of Insurance 
Risk 
In addition to traditional reinsurance, there are several alternative methods to transfer 
insurers' risk arising from operating and underwriting. Such alternative risk-financing 
techniques typically involve the funding of underwriting risk from life insurance or 
non-life insurance through capital market and investors. While the development of 
these risk transfer instruments has increased dramatically in recent years, this raises 
considerable concern for regulators, accountants, investors and insurers. As a result of 
lack of any relevant regulation and accounting principles to supervise these 
transactions in Taiwan, further suggestions are provided below in this section. 
A. Finite Risk Reinsurance 
In Taiwan, the definition of reinsurance is provided in Section 39 of the Insurance 
Law. According to this Section, reinsurance is an insurance contract, which assumes 
the "insured risk" of an insurer. Due to lack of any decisions made by the courts and 
of relevant regulations in Taiwan, it is problematic to define the meaning of "insured 
risk". From the viewpoint of insurance regulation, the main purpose is to ensure the 
adequacy of technical "provisions" and to prevent a misleading view of the financial 
condition of insurers if such a reinsurance contract does not transfer the underwriting 
risk significantly. As a result, it is suggested that the relevant regulations as to 
reinsurance should provide the following aspects. 
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1. The basic criteria relating to risk transfer should be developed and 
structured in the framework of solvency regulation 
The basic criteria relating to risk transfer should be developed to enhance the 
transparency of the respective regulation for the insurers and reinsurers. The criteria 
should be based on the economic substance of transactions (such as US FASB 113). 
With regard to risk transfer criteria, it would be appropriate that timing risk alone is 
sufficient to constitute a reinsurance contract because the timing risk arising from the 
uncertainty of liability payment for policyholders will significantly affect the capacity 
of the ceding insurers. This will provide more flexible and less stringent regulatory 
requirements for insurers who suffer the timing risk arising from the assumed 
insurance risk. In addition to development of risk transfer criteria, it should be noted 
that the criteria based on the accounting principles should not be inferred as to what 
constitutes the reinsurance contract in law and only should be used to decide the 
relevant accounting and regulatory treatments. 
2. The criteria should take into account the terms of the reinsurance 
contract as a whole 
The issue relating to the economic substance of transactions should take into account 
the terms of contracts that may affect the loss payment from the reinsurers and further 
reinsurance premium to be paid by ceding insurers, e. g. experience account, the 
premium payable estimated by reference to a stated or implied interest rate, a return of 
profit commission, and cancellation or commutation provisions that would result in a 
loss to the ceding insurers. This should also take into account the terms of reinsurance 
contracts as a whole and the analysis of the financial outcome relating to this 
transaction, although this may increase the regulatory costs and may place an 
excessive burden on the regulators in monitoring and analyzing these transactions. As 
a result, the cooperation between auditors, tax authority and insurance regulators 
should be enhanced. 
3. The security and the reliance of reinsurance should be ensured 
While one of the characteristics of finite risk reinsurance is multi-year, the security of 
reinsurance transactions is the main issue relating to reinsurance regulation. These 
transactions often involve huge amount of reinsurance premiums and the payments 
will be distributed over several years. For example, under loss portfolio transfer 
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agreements, the payment of reinsurance recoveries are structured on a financial loss 
and distributed along with the investment income during the covered period. So such, 
the financial condition of the reinsurer will have a significant impact on the 
reinsurance recoveries. Furthermore, the reinsurers who specialise in the area of finite 
risk reinsurance are often located and registered in less stringent regulated 
jurisdictions such as Bermuda and the Cayman Islands. All this has increased 
concerns for the security of reinsurance transactions. Therefore, the regulators should 
be placed in a position to assess the reliability of such a transaction and the financial 
solvency of the reinsurer. 
4. The loss provisions should be sufficient to meet the liabilities from the 
policyholders 
The adequacy of loss reserves should be considered even though the reinsurance 
transaction meets the risk transfer criteria. For instance, the main advantage of finite 
risk reinsurance is the reduction of loss reserves after finite risk reinsurance cover is 
provided. While the finite risk reinsurance may lead to inadequacy of loss reserves, it 
is essential to develop the methods to estimate the extra reserves and to analysis the 
possible effect of the specific terms of contract on an insurer's financial solvency. 
B. Securitisation of Insurance Risk 
While insurance securitisation transactions have created a worldwide insurance and 
reinsurance capacity through the issuance of insurance-linked securities, the 
regulatory infrastructure to facilitate and effectively to supervise these transactions 
still only has been developed in few countries. As the implementation of the new 
Taiwanese Securitisation of Financial Asset Act may facilitate the securitisation of 
assets and mortgages, it also offers the legal infrastructure for insurance securitisation 
transactions. From the viewpoint of insurance regulation, the following aspects should 
be considered if these on-shore transactions are penrnitted. 
Securitisation transactions should be allowed under the relevant laws 
and regulations 
First, the Taiwanese Insurance Law should be amended to allow the insurance 
company to engage in securitisation transactions. As a result of an ambiguity that 
investors engaging insurance securitisation transactions might be deemed as carrying 
on insurance business, the country could provide a specific statutory provision to 
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define that the purchase of in surance- linked securities does not constitute the 
transaction of insurance business in order to clarify this legal uncertainty. 
2. Special purpose reinsurers should be allowed to operate in Taiwan 
Learning from the developed models of developed countries, the main focus of any 
regulatory infrastructure for insurance securitisation should be to develop the 
legislation to allow Special Purpose Reinsurers (SPRs) that can assume the insurance 
risk and can issue insurance-linked securities. To reduce transaction costs, it is 
suggested that the concept of the "protected cell" in the SPR can be adopted to allow 
these entities engage several transactions at the same time. Unlike other securitisation 
transactions where a SPV can be formed as a business corporation, a trust, or as a 
limited partnership, the SPR usually is formed as a corporate reinsurer that is 
authorised to assume insurance risk and to issue insurance-linked securities. 
3. Requirements relating to collateral arrangements should be established 
In general, a trust is established to hold the related collateral with certain restrictions 
on the investment activities of the trust. For example, the NAIC Protected Cell 
Company Model Act contains the provisions regarding the investment of the 
"protected cell" assets of SPRs. In relation to the security of the SPR, the basic risk 
should be considered particularly in the case of a "parametric trigger", because it may 
endanger the financial solvency of the ceding insurer as mentioned in Chapter Four. In 
addition to collateral requirements, the segregation of a "protected cell" would need 
external credit support to enhance the market acceptability of the insurance-linked 
securities and to ensure the financial solvency of a protected cell company. 
4. The bankruptcy law relating to SPR should be amended 
The bankruptcy system should be amended to accommodate the concept of a 
protected cell is introduced. The main feature of a protected cell in a SPR is to shield 
a protected cell account's assets and liabilities from the credit risk of the reinsurers in 
the case of insolvency (i. e., bankruptcy, remoteness). By introducing this concept, the 
relevant bankruptcy system should ensure that the protected cell of the SPR should 
not be affected by any order of conservation, rehabilitation or liquidation of a SPR. 
5. Insurance supervisors should ensure their ability to supervise the 
offshore securitisation transactions 
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In addition to on-shore securitisation transactions, the insurance supervisors should be 
aware of offshore insurance securitisation transactions. The insurance supervisors 
should be able to assess the appropriateness of reinsurance and the securitisation 
transaction whether on-shore or off-shore. It is suggested that the assessment of these 
transactions should take into account with the operation and the corporate structure of 
the SPR, and the collateral arrangements relating to the securitisation transactions and 
reinsurance contracts. 
V. Recommendations for Reinsurance Regulation Reforms in 
Emerging Market 
As the regulators in emerging economies often face the dilemma between the 
diversification of risk and the security of the reinsurance, the development of indirect 
regulation as an appropriate approach to ensure the solvency of primary insurers is 
24 
vital to promote the domestic insurance market . Based on the study of reinsurance 
regulation reform in the Taiwanese insurance market, the author's modest 
recommendation for an appropriate reinsurance regulatory infrastructure more 
generally in emerging economies, would entail the following: 
First, insurance regulations should provide a viable and comprehensive 
solvency regulatory regime to supervise and monitor the financial solvency of the 
insurers. Under such a framework, solvency regulation should further address the 
security of reinsurance and the creditworthiness/security of the reinsurers either in 
terms of statutory accounting requirements or in the required solvency margin. As a 
result, the evaluation of foreign reinsurers plays a vital role in this reinsurance 
regulation. It seems that the Mexican regulatory approach, which did improve the 
quality of reinsurance arrangements of primary insurers in Mexico, depend largely on 
the analysis by rating agencies without proper concerns the domiciled regulatory 
regime. Therefore, it is suggested that the cross-border cooperation between 
regulators should also be enhanced. In doing so, the accuracy of the evaluation can be 
improved, as well as, can be the solvency of primary insurers. In addition to the 
evaluation of reinsurers, all the reinsurers should be subject to appropriate regulation 
in the domiciled country, where the regulatory regime is able to ensure the financial 
solvency of reinsurers and the fitness and propriety of management. Furthermore, 
24 See generally Chapter 2. 
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good corporate governance and sound internal controls should be introduced and 
implemented in the process of the reinsurance arrangements for the primary insurers. 
Second, with regard to the regulation of reinsurance intermediaries, three 
fundamental issues, which include the licensure requirements, market conduct of 
intermediaries and the separation of insurance monies from the general account of 
intermediaries, should be carefully considered. The licensure requirements should 
include the criteria concerning the fitness and propriety of management, adequacy of 
capital and professional indemnity insurance to meet the liabilities arising from the 
operation of relevant business and the specified requirements for the reinsurers. In 
addition to the licensure requirements, the regulation should provide principles to 
ensure the reinsurance intermediaries exercise "reasonable care and skill" in carrying 
on its business. In order to protect the interests of the principals (e. g., reinsurers or 
primary insurers), an approach regarding the establishment of a specific, segregated 
account can be adopted to ensure that in the event of bankruptcy of intermediary these 
accounts will not be used to reimburse other creditors. 
While the increasing use of financial reinsurance in emerging markets raises 
considerable concerns, it would be difficult to establish an appropriate criteria 
concerning the relevant regulation without comprehensive statutory accounting 
principles. It is suggested that the statutory accounting principles should be able to 
reflect the accurate evaluation of the financial condition of the primary insurers. 
Consequently, the criteria concerning the risk transfer should be set out as well as the 
sufficiency of loss provisions. 
As the securitisation of insurance risk has significantly provided alternative 
capital derived from the capital market, it is likely that emerging economies should 
follow this path to look for additional risk transfer means, particularly in these 
emerging markets with a basic securitisation regulatory infrastructure (e. g., Chile 25 ). 
To create the appropriate legal infrastructure, the law should allow the Special 
Purpose Reinsurer to assume insurance risk and to issue insurance-linked securities. 
In addition, it is essential that the collateral arrangements and the restriction on 
investment activities should be established to bloster the financial solvency of the 
25 See generally JOSEPH J. NORTON, FINANCIAL SECTOR LAW REFORM IN EMEERGING 
ECONOMIES 252 (2000). 
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SPR. In the case of off-shore securitisation transactions between the primary insurer 
and the SPR, the regulators should ensure the ability to assess these transactions and 
to take into account the corporate structure and financial condition of the SPR and the 
relevant collateral arrangements. 
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